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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of the nation in the British Empire in the process of thinking about 
empire, economy and biology during the late-Enlightenment and the nineteenth century. A key aspect 
of this, Knapman argues, was concern over the dialectic of civilization and order as it related to the 
barbarian and the savage. The notion of the barbarian grounded the European nations in time and 
therefore constructing a sense of origin and particularism. Equally the savage and the barbarian placed 
non-European cultures in time.  The thesis draws on a range of writers from eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries such as Adam Smith, Edward Gibbon, David Hume, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, 
Charles Darwin, James Cowles Prichard, Robert Knox and many other lesser-known figures. This is 
related to an examination of the nation in British representations of Southeast Asia, including colonial 
officials such as Stamford Raffles, John Crawfurd, and James Brooke who produced encyclopaedic 
accounts of their experiences in Asia.  The thesis argues that while the complex grammar of the British 
Empire divided the world into spheres of civilisation and barbarism, it retained a special place for 
barbarians within the core and thus allowed for the naturalisation of nations within the context of an 
empire of civilizing others.  
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Part One: 
Dominant 
Discourse in 
Britain 

Chapter 1 - The Nation as Natural: 
Naturalising the Nation in a World 
of Empires 
 
The origin of nations is an ongoing debate in nationalism studies. Modernists point to 
the fact that the nation emerges in the context of the modern world (Anderson [1983] 
1991, Gellner 1964, Hobsbawm and Ranger [1983] 2000). By comparison the 
primordialists point to clearly evident cultural origins that descend back into the mists 
of the ancient world (Hutchinson 1996, Smith 1986). One underlining point that these 
perspectives assume but do not directly analyse, is the question as to why the 
contemporary world assumes the nation to be natural? Primordialists tend to assume 
that naturalness evolved as a process of cultured evolution; whilst modernists tend to 
bypass this issue, assuming the necessity of nations and nationalism within the structure 
of modernism. 
 
It was not always the case that the nation was assumed to be the rightful dominant 
association of peoples. At the end of the eighteenth century, and even the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, the nation was not assumed to be a natural form of identity. In 
the early modern world, empires and kingdoms were the dominant expressions of 
polity. Although these empires and kingdoms had names, this did not make them 
nations. Tom Nairn (1977), Linda Colley (1992), Krishan Kumar (2003), and others 
have focused on how these empires were transformed into nations. They argue that the 
pursuit of empire contributed to creating nationalism. Empires were the setting in which 
cultural groupings were transformed into nations. However, how did the nation become 
assumed as natural in this transition?  
 
From the late-eighteenth century to the late-nineteenth century, the process of 
naturalising the nation occurred across the breadth of the British Empire, and this is the 
subject of this thesis. The thesis argues that the process of naturalising the nation 
occurred both in the centre or metropole and at the farthest reaches of the British 
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Empire. The nation came to be seen as a natural structure. Its naturalising was expressed 
within the dominant ideologies of the time. The nation became the dominant expression 
of cultural and social identity within British thought. The nation became intertwined 
with ideologies of liberalism, materialism, race, state-building, and social evolution. 
This constituted a prism of comparison through which British politicians, intellectuals, 
travellers and colonists began to interpret the world around them. In doing so, the 
British began to actively imagine colonial spaces of occupation as nations.  
 
The fact that the nation emerged within the context of empire is on the face of it 
surprising. Nations and empires are very different expressions of identity. Chapter Two 
examines how this naturalization occurred within political thought on Empire. Empires 
divide identity into order (civilization) and chaos (barbarism). In pre-modern thought, 
nations were tribes and located within the sphere of barbarism. This continued within 
Edward Gibbon’s ([1788] 1997) theory of empire. For Gibbon, empire ended the nation. 
Nations were a symptom of primitivism whilst empires were a symptom of civilization. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century this changed. Writers on empire increasingly 
projected empire as an expression of nationhood, whilst also seeing the divisions within 
empire as nations. Although the nineteenth century was characterized by empires, the 
argument of this thesis is that the idea of the nation came to colonize the idea of empire.  
 
The nineteenth century saw the deliberate introduction of the nation into cultural-
political thinking (Berlin 1991, Kedourie 1960). This was particularly the case in 
German romanticism (Berlin 2000). Yet it would be simplistic to assume that the nation 
was a manufactured creation of romantic intellectuals (Gellner 1964). By the mid-
nineteenth century the nation was already a naturalized part of British political rhetoric. 
This was not the result of a deliberate introduction. Some argue that the nation became a 
natural part of British political discourse by the end of the seventeenth century. Liah 
Greenfeld (1993, 2003), for example, makes the claim that the nation was born in 
Britain, and that Britain introduced the world to nationalism. Chapter Three focuses on 
this sense of nationhood, examining how the nation was intertwined with the emergence 
of liberalism. The importance of the nation prior to the nineteenth century can easily be 
overstated, yet there is a connection between the rise of liberalism in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries and the naturalization of the nation. Liberalism developed a 
sense of society as separate and distinct from the state. This separate sphere was 
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conceptualized as ‘civil society’, and in the eighteenth century this was entwined with 
ideas about the nation. In this sense, liberalism unintentionally opened an early means 
of conceiving that a nation exists.  
 
The scientific revolutions of the nineteenth century transformed these early liberal ideas 
on the nation. The progress in understanding biology and race occurred in the context of 
deliberations on slavery (Carroll 2003, Desmond 1989, Moore and Desmond 2004). 
These deliberations resulted in the biological interpretation of race. Chapter Four 
examines how race became incorporated into the idea of the nation. The effect of this 
was to overwhelmingly naturalize the nation into peoples’ biology. Emerging in the 
mid-nineteenth century, racial writers such as Robert Knox ([1850] 1862) and Arthur 
Gobineau ([1856] 1984) argued that nations were biologically determined (Hawkins 
1997: 184-215). Even internationalists such as John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx 
grounded the nation in biology. This acceptance of the racial nation saw the embedded 
naturalization of the nation, and in the nineteenth century this became increasingly 
overt. 
 
The three chapters of Part One portray how the nation emerged within three dominant 
ideological discourses of empire, political economy and biology. In each of these, I 
argue that the nation was naturalized as a vision of cultural and political identity. The 
impact was that the nation became a universal expression of identity and difference. 
Traders, adventurers and colonists going to the far-flung ends of the empire used the 
concept of ‘nation’ to describe the peoples they encountered. As an expression of 
difference, the nation emerges only in the context of a society that was globally aware.  
 
From India to Papua, local and indigenous societies were described as national groups. 
However, this discourse was a loaded discourse. Civil society had a powerful impact on 
the sense of national being. ‘The nation’ was not a mere descriptive term, but a 
powerful concept of social and political obligation. For many writers, the national 
society was attributed as having primordial origins that descended from the material 
relationship with the landscape. Each nation (sometimes translated as each ‘civil 
society’) had a duty to engage in technological and commercial progress and join other 
nations in commercial exchange. The second half of this thesis charts how the nation 
was used to imagine colonial Southeast Asia. 
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Colonial travel narratives outlined the romantic primordial conditions of the colonial 
peoples. They also outlined the natives’ role in the modern global system of exchange 
and contextualized this within an ethical framework of obligation. By comparison, the 
colonial administrations legitimized their own existence though the ethnofication of 
colonial spaces. They claimed that good British governance was needed to maintain 
peace. Empire was legitimized through the prevention of native barbarism and in the 
creation of a commercial environment in which nations could flourish. The native 
barbarian stood in contrast to the barbarian in European culture. Far from distancing 
themselves from barbarism, Europeans internalized barbarian narratives and legitimized 
their actions through narratives of the barbarian. Barbarianism became, for some 
writers, a basic characteristic: the core being of the nation for European nations and the 
rest of the world. The particular character of this barbarian determined the destiny of the 
nation. The British Empire became the protector of nations rather than the suppressor of 
the uncivilized nations. This broke with the tradition of empire, which linked nations 
with tribes and barbarians. 
 
Through this legitimization, the colonial administrations introduced two conceptions of 
the liberal nation: firstly, the direct concept of ‘primordial race-nations’ and secondly, 
the implied concept of the ‘multicultural nation-state’. Part Two of this thesis, Chapters 
Five, Six and Seven, examine three ways in which Southeast Asia was imagined 
through the nation. Chapter Five focuses on the nation as an expression of colonial 
governance, whilst Chapter Six focuses on the nation within popular travel writing. In 
both of these cases the nation was an expression that emerged from within the empire. 
The nation was used to describe the limits of inclusiveness. I have chosen to focus on 
Southeast Asia because it represents one of the far reaches of empire, a region less 
prominent in the British imagination than that of India or Africa. If we find that the 
nation is naturalized at the furthest reaches of empire, then my argument is more 
substantially demonstrated than through examining naturalization in a region more 
prominent in the British imagination. The British Empire in Asia increasingly justified 
itself in the name of liberal inclusiveness, producing a rhetorical cosmopolitanism. In 
doing so, liberalism was confronted with difference. National difference became a 
means of explaining the limits of liberal inclusiveness, and legitimising authoritarian 
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policies in the name of liberalism. The separateness of nations became a structural 
component that legitimized and maintained practices within the empire.  
 
An empire of divisions and repressive practices was itself illiberal. It was on this basis 
that critics from within the metropole developed an anti-imperial critique. Chapter 
Seven, focuses on how the nation turned full circle. What had developed in the empire 
to describe the limits of liberalism became a source describing the natural rights of the 
colonized. Liberal critics of empire such as Richard Cobden and Joseph Hume made 
national rights a core part of their liberalism.  
 
The nation thus became a means of imagining an empire and deconstructing it. The 
British Empire, like all modern European empires, emerged simultaneously with the 
consolidation of the nation-state.1 As the following chapter outlines, nations have an 
uneasy relationship with empires, with nations providing an easy source of resistance to 
empires. This is not a retrospective analysis. Authors that were contemporary to the rise 
of the British Empire saw modern empires as a threat to the national community. In his 
essay Politics as Science, David Hume ([1742] 1998) cautioned against free states 
pursuing empire, arguing that it creates division not unity. Similarly an early critic of 
the British Empire, James Callender (1794) believed that “Britain” was a repressive 
                                                          
1 This point can not be understated, but it can lead to confusion between the ideas of empire, imperialism, 
the nation and nation-state.  In most instances this is not a problem, with authors discussing how empire 
fed into nationalism in the late-nineteenth century.  As well as empires feeding into nationalism, the idea 
of nation emerged from a world of empires. This theme will be explored in Chapter Two. The central 
problem is the transition from pre-modern conceptions of empire to modern conceptions of empire. The 
word ‘imperialism’ is indicative of this tension and can be seen in Bruce McLeod (1999: 1) introduction 
to his book the Geography of Empire: 
This book is about the production of space. More particularly, it explores the production of an 
empire, the creation of ‘Englands out of England’. The expansive multiplication of certain 
(extremely unstable) spatial and ideological formations was as much a question of imagination 
and myth as hard-nosed calculation and economic realities … In this project I hope to reinforce 
Edward Said’s contention that the ‘major … determining, political horizon of modern Western 
culture [is] imperialism’. I have, perhaps, taken the risky step of applying Said’s thesis to the 
very beginning of what became, though not inevitable, the British Empire. The 1580s is a time 
when imperialism clearly had more to do with far-fetched dreams than with far-flung territories. 
In light of this, I will follow the useful distinction … between “Imperial Britain” and the “British 
Empire”. The former “indicates the informing spirit” or “consciousness” that aids and abets 
sometimes precedes and often falsifies the territorial materiality of the latter. 
McLeod’s argument is very similar to Linda Colley’s (1992) and Krishan Kumar’s (2003) arguments that 
Britain had a national identity which was imperialist. Framing imperialism in this way emphasizes the 
expansionist character of the nation and the nation’s fulfilment through empire. The problem is that 
imperialism is not quite the same as empire. McLeod acknowledges this and uses John Cramb’s 
distinction between ‘informing sprit’ and the structure of empire, but avoids addressing how the nation 
emerged out of pre-modern conceptions of empire. We need to examine how empires transform from the 
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political force that would break down under the pressure of nations wanting their 
liberty. Another liberal critic John Wade (1831: 335) asked the rhetorical question:  
 
A Great nation, possessing within herself the resources of wealth and civilization, what 
advantage can she derive from exhausting her energies in rearing to maturity and fostering 
ingratitude in the unfledged offspring of future empires? 
 
It was not only critics of the empire that observed this tension. W.B. Cooke (1835: 26) 
was an advocate of imperial expansion, maintaining that it was a “glorious and 
philanthropic undertaking” and “that the conquest that is … open to us, over the desert 
wilds, by means of emigration” would produce “beneficial results to mankind”. At the 
same time, he openly recognized that “the mother country … ought to bear in mind that 
she is laying the foundation of future empires”, which need to be granted independence 
eventually (Coke 1835: 48). Likewise, John Stuart Mill saw that empire was ultimately 
inconsistent with the principle of nation (examined in Chapter Two). In short, the 
empire bore the critical brunt of an approach which increasingly accepted the nation as a 
natural entity in social political thought.  
 
Theorising the Naturalized Nation 
The naturalness of the nation presents a dilemma for nationalism theory. A key problem 
is that much of the theoretical work focuses on nationalism, with the nation being 
tagged-on as an also-ran. Volumes are churned out every year on the construction of 
nationalism, but little of this deliberation is on the construction of the nation. The 
theoretical writing that does so, is often trapped within the primordialist versus 
modernist argument. Theoretical approaches based around primordialism or modernism 
essentially frame the nation within the questions: ‘when did nations come into being?’ 
and ‘what is the nation’s relationship to the state and to modernity?’ (Hutchinson 1994: 
2) There are a series of assumptions within these questions. The prime assumption is 
that, at a certain point in time, the nation became a reality. By this I mean there is an 
acceptance that the nation is a natural structure in society. The next assumption is that 
the nation is intrinsically bound to the state and to modernity. These assumptions frame 
the nation as a natural reality and mean that arguments focus on when the nation was 
                                                                                                                                                                          
expansionary absolutist states into nations and reinterprets expansion as imperialism in the formation of 
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formed socially, or whether or not the nation is reliant on invented tradition (Hobsbawm 
and Ranger [1983] 2000), but the overall assumption is that the nation is a natural 
reality.  
 
One of the few theorists to move outside this framework is Paul James (1996), who 
argues that the nation is both primordial and modern at the same time. It is reborn every 
day in a series of integrated practices, in which the natural reality of the nation is 
reaffirmed. Modern theory, although separated from the nation, is still inherently bound 
up in the reproduction of the nation. This thesis follows in James’ wake, examining how 
an earlier generation of theorists naturalized nation whilst also observing its creation. As 
James (2006) observes, this process is ongoing. It is established in our daily practices. 
In accounting for the rise of nationalism, there is a theoretical space in which we need to 
address how people assumed the nation to be a natural reality.  
 
Through the endeavours of Ernest Gellner, Tom Nairn and Benedict Anderson, the 
theoretical dissection of the nation was revolutionized in the second part of the 
twentieth century. Each of these writers carefully mapped the interrelationships between 
nation (as a cultural entity) and the material transformations occurring during the 
formation of national communities. The common argument inherent in these theoretical 
discussions is that collective identity underwent a radical transformation which 
coincided with modernization. In making this general claim, Gellner, Nairn and 
Anderson each addressed the role of empire in creating the structural preconditions for 
the emerging imagined nation.  
 
The word ‘imagined’ is important to this theoretical approach. It is commonly linked to 
Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991), but more broadly it is also indicative of Gellner’s 
and Nairn’s work. The notion of ‘imagined community’ needs to be placed in context. 
Many people over-interpret Anderson’s normative argument, focusing on his overall 
statement that nations are ‘imagined communities’ without giving due attention to his 
materialist arguments that establish why and how nations were imagined (James 1996: 
6-7). Anderson’s use of ‘imagined communities’ is based in the belief that material 
relations create consciousness. Each of these writers outlines an argument for the nation 
                                                                                                                                                                          
modern empires.   
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as an imagined community that was framed by material and structural relationships. In 
doing so each of these writers maintains a double argument: wherein material relations 
creates the environment for nationalist ideologies; in turn nationalist ideologies then 
framed the structures of the new material order. This role for the imagined nation 
acknowledges a process in which the nation became natural. The next few pages 
examine how naturalization fits within Gellner’s, Nairn’s and Anderson’s arguments on 
the nation.  
  
Gellner: Culture and Industrialization 
Ernest Gellner is the doyen of nationalism theorists. From his pen flowed the basic 
themes of most subsequent nationalist theory. His basic argument was that nationalism 
was not the mere ideological product of nations, but rather the creator of nations. He 
argued that nationalism created nations where they did not exist. Gellner developed this 
point within a framework of epochal transformation, wherein he argued nations were a 
product of modernization (he called it industrialization). Gellner’s interpretation 
maintains that industrialization is a painful transition, and acts as the catalyst which 
created nationalism. With ironical shades of Marx, his argument maintains that history 
can be divided into three epochs: foraging (or pre-agrarian), agrarian, and the 
scientific/industrial society (Gellner 1983: 5).  
 
Pre-agrarian society provided the first epoch; however, the hunter-gatherer society was 
too small to require political institutions — nationalism was not an issue for them 
(Gellner 1983). Developments in agricultural technology created a population boom and 
forged the second epoch: the agrarian age. Forms of organization in this period revolved 
around a stratified division of labour, linking control of food storage to status and rank 
(Gellner 1997: 18). In all agrarian societies, social organization fixed an individual’s 
occupation to their family’s historic occupation (Gellner 1964: 154-157). Society was 
hierarchical; and, as such, cultural differences were not important. People were more 
concerned with maintaining rank in society rather than culture (Gellner 1983: 12-13). 
With both the aristocratic and clerical classes adopting common cultural traits, that 
transcended political boundaries, culture came to symbolize rank not ethnicity (Gellner 
1983: 11). 
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The Enlightenment, and the subsequent industrial revolution, changed the world — 
creating the modern epoch. This transition, from agrarian society to modernity was 
central to Gellner’s view of history. He perceived that this process transformed the way 
people related to each other (Gellner 1964: 154-155). 
 
In an industrial society every profession requires a high level of standardized education 
to accommodate social mobility; or, in Gellner’s words (1964: 160), the modern epoch 
created “every man a clerk”. With the destruction of the agrarian system, Gellner 
maintains that people could no longer relate to each other through a structured system of 
rank. The industrial modern age became egalitarian, with people relating to each other 
directly (Gellner 1997: 28). Gellner’s concept that industrial society is more egalitarian 
requires clarification. Gellner was making a distinction between social divisions and 
class divisions. He argued that class divisions in the modern epoch were not enshrined 
in the manner that social divisions were in the agrarian period. Access to capital and/or 
education, facilitated a reasonable amount of social and class fluidity.  
 
 Gellner saw empire as a mode of government suited to agrarian society. The 
hierarchical structure of agrarian society supported empire better than the mobility of 
industrial society. The agrarian empires and states that existed at the end of the agrarian 
age became the starting point for nationalism. These political formations attempted to 
adjust to the new industrial wave sweeping the socio-political landscape. Gellner’s 
(1964: 166) theory holds that transition to nationalism occurs because of the uneven 
progress of industrialization. Industrialization is subject to the availability of suitable 
natural resources and human expertise. The economic prowess of the first regions to 
industrialize enabled these regions to become major centres of modernity. The culture 
within these centres came to symbolize modernity, effectively making them the high 
cultures of their time. The people from these regions came to dominate, and their culture 
became dominant over other regions in the former agrarian empire or state.  
 
The dominated areas also gained from pre-existing political connections. Traditional 
empires all had a political centre. Although empires downplay ethnicity, many have 
dominant ethnic groups that were geographically located around the political centre. In 
the agrarian epoch, dominant ethnic groups, became the symbol of cosmopolitanism. 
For example, in Ancient Rome, the Romans were originally an ethnic group. This 
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ethnicity was transformed into a cosmopolitan entity that anybody could become part of 
once they were named as a citizen. A more recent example was the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, in which the Germans were the dominant ethnic group. German was the 
language of state, yet German-ness was presented as a cosmopolitan entity. The 
Germans could not emphasize their identity as ethnically narrow without destroying the 
empire.2 Being a Jewish-German from the Sudetenland, in the former Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, probably meant that Gellner saw this empire as an example of what he had in 
mind.  
 
In this model, the first region affected by modernization would probably be approaching 
a period of affluence whilst regions affected by modernization at a later date would be 
going through the growing pains and misery of early industrialization. Gellner 
maintained that ethnic and cultural differences became cultural chasms when the 
minority gravitated to regions of affluent modernity. Through lack of industrial skills, 
the minority would become a disadvantaged group; this caused economic and political 
inequality and emphasized cultural differences (Gellner 1964: 168). This economic and 
political inequality would give rise to the majority perceiving the minority as backward 
and rustic.  
 
Under these conditions the rustic, backward, minority had two choices (Gellner 1964: 
167). The first would be to integrate into the dominant high culture and lose their 
particular identity. The second option would be to transform their low culture into a 
high culture by leaving the centres of modernity and returning to the ethnically distinct 
provinces and seek national self-determination. This would enable the underdeveloped 
region to control its own destiny and devote resources to economic development. For 
Gellner, this is what nationalism was all about, the uneven spread of modernization.  
 
Criticisms of Gellner’s theory are based on three basic elements to his argument. The 
first element is that the theory is totalizingly epochal. The second is that Gellner argues, 
without sufficient foundation, that nationalism existed before nations. The third 
criticism is that Gellner attributes nationalism to cultural change rather than political 
action.  
                                                          
2 An extended discussion of this can be found in Ludwig von Mises ([1927] 2005, [1919] 2006) early 
works on the origins of World War One.  
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Although Miroslav Hroch (1999: 103) also believes in epochal change, he lays a 
foundation to undermine Gellner’s theory, arguing that it is historically inaccurate to 
believe that industrialization causes nationalism. Drawing on Eastern European history, 
Hroch (1996: 85) maintains that nationalist movements developed when the people 
were still living in an agrarian society.  
 
 Gellner’s (1997: 42-43) retort to Hroch was that nationalism in the Balkans was the 
result of two forces. The first was local political opportunists seeking to gain greater 
power for themselves at the expense of their Muslim overlords. The second was the 
impact of Christianity. Gellner maintained that Christianity acted as a conduit through 
which the ideas of Enlightenment and Romanticism were transfused. Subjected to these 
ideas, rebels became transformed into nationalists.  
 
Although this qualification adequately defends Gellner’s position, it also undermines 
Gellner’s emphasis upon an epochal condition. The transfusion of ideas from industrial 
society to an agrarian society means that the ideas can transcend epochs. If an epoch is 
meant to divide history into neat blocks, Gellner’s retort undermines the concept of a 
demarcated epoch. This Balkan example, demonstrates that nationalism can develop in 
many different cultures and it is not reliant on industrialization. In turn, Gellner (1997: 
15) admits that the few remaining tribal societies have often become nationalist in 
orientation. 
 
In this modification, Gellner defends his theory but undermines his epochal 
superstructure. However, testament to Gellner’s intellect, a powerful point of theory is 
revealed in his defensive acknowledgment that ‘nation’ is above all else an idea — 
which can be sold as a modular process to oppressed groups on the periphery as the 
cure-all to their woes. This demonstrates that the idea of the nation re-frames the 
material changes brought about by modernization. As a material entity, the idea has 
gone through a process of becoming naturalized into a material structure, to the point 
where people unquestionably (or unreflexively) metamorphose their identity into a 
nation.  
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This extension of Gellner’s argument indicates that the nation is an idea that moves 
beyond the material transformations and relationships that formed it. This means that 
the idea of the nation could be transported to regions that were still relatively unaffected 
by modernization. The ideas of modernity travelled faster than the material transitions 
of modernization. In doing so, the ideas of modernity acted to break down the old 
structural order, which, at that point, was withstanding the mild pressure of material 
change. With the ideas of modernization bespeaking material change, the old order 
started to decline prior to the full onslaught of modernization. In prefiguring the 
material process of modernization, the ideas of Western European modernism framed 
the emergent material order in the new region. Gellner’s logic leads to a theory of 
naturalization wherein new material structures are framed by ideas which have 
prefigured material change. For this to be possible the idea of the nation needed to have 
been naturalized and communicated as a concept of nature, which people would not 
question.  
 
Nairn: ‘Great Nationalism’ 
 
Both Tom Nairn and Benedict Anderson wrote in the wake of Ernest Gellner. These 
writers were also responding to the poverty of nationalist theory within Marxist 
orthodoxy, which held that the nation was a passing phase and that class was the true 
revolutionary agency (Anderson [1983] 1991: xi, Nairn 1977: 329). Although coming 
from the same perspective, Nairn and Anderson take differing approaches.  
 
Nairn’s initial focus was to rework Gellner’s 1964 essay ‘Nationalism’, transforming 
Gellner’s arguments on industrialization into an analysis of capitalism and 
development.3 In doing so, Nairn (1977: 334-350) saw nationalism emerging out of the 
maladies facing the colonial periphery and the hubris of the metropolitan centre, all of 
which became linked through the enforced structural phenotype of the state. The 
trajectories of uneven development uncloaked modernity’s winner-loser kaleidoscope 
and spelt-out a global future of ethnic agitation and fracturing (Nairn 1977, Nairn 1997). 
In comparison to Nairn’s focus on internal resistance, Anderson ([1983] 1991, 2000) 
                                                          
3 It is interesting to note that Gellner’s 1983 book Nations and Nationalism demonstrated an adoption of 
many of Nairn’s modifications. 
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focused on the framing of the national community through the agencies of print 
capitalism and bureaucratic systems. These systems all created a modulated sense of 
imagined community. Both of these writers moved away from Gellner’s epochal 
arguments, and, in doing so, provided further material indicating the ground for a 
process of naturalization.  
 
Tom Nairn’s understanding of nation is made more complex by the fact that he has 
radically altered many of his core opinions on nations: moving from a modernist 
position, to what he now terms a ‘neo-primordialist approach’ (Nairn and James 2005: 
7). In the following passages I will outline his original argument and his transition into a 
‘neo-primordialist’. This transition is based on his inherent belief that humans are social 
creatures, and that society is the one constant in human history. In this capacity, the 
nation becomes a manifestation of society and, in doing so it is both primordial and 
modern at the same time.  
 
In Gellner’s theory of the nation, the uneven spread of industrialization/modernization 
occurred within the prism of an empire-state, making nationalism the agency of 
breakdown in the empire-state. This limited the conceptual framework of Gellner. By 
comparison Tom Nairn modified Gellner’s theory, focusing on the spread of capital 
rather than the spread of culture and industrialization. Nairn saw that nationalism arose 
as a response to the impact of colonial capital, and in opposition to the false promise of 
metropolitan empire. He argued that: “in these less-developed lands the elites soon 
discovered that tranquil incorporation in the cosmopolitan technocracy was possible for 
only a few of them at a time” (Nairn 1977: 339). The essence of this argument is that 
the European empires were built on a contract between European colonist and the native 
elite.4 However as a contract between elites, it was a select few that had this 
opportunity: 
 
The others, the majority, saw themselves excluded from the action, rather then muted politely to 
join in, trampled over rather then through the rules of the game; exploited rather then made 
partners. It was no consolation to be told that patience was in order, that things would even up in 
                                                          
4 David Cannadine (2002) argues that the British Empire existed as a means of dividing the British elite 
from the British working class and therefore acted as a reconstituted ‘Ancient Regime’. Benedict 
Anderson ([1983] 1991) and Edward Said (1994) maintain that the colonial elites were not equal to 
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the next generation, or the one after that ... Given the violence and rapidity of the changes in act, 
patience and time were no longer human possibilities anyway (Nairn 1977: 339)..  
 
In response to the unjust onslaught of capitalism, the excluded “prophetic elites” used 
popularism to gain the support of the majority and “take things into their own hands” — 
this created the beginnings of nationalism. This was ‘the Gellner aspect’ of Nairn’s 
theory, but he argued that this constituted an “anti-imperial theory” of nationalism, and 
that as a theory of nationalism, it was incomplete and overstated. This concept of 
nationalism was based on only one form of uneven spread, and ignored the internal 
uneven dilemma of capitalism. At the same time as nationalism arose in the periphery, it 
also arose in the centre as a means of stabilising the internal class struggle. Nationalism 
for the centre became the desire for empire over the periphery:  
 
In this general sense, nationalism was obviously generated as a compensatory reaction on the 
periphery. Its ideal intensification corresponded to the absence of a material reality: the 
economic and social institutions of modernity, those developmental arms now being wielded 
with such effect by England, France and later on by the other territories that achieved them. It 
was the absence of these arms, and despair about getting them, which made the compensation 
ideological weapon of nationalism a necessity: the idealist motor of the forced march out of 
backwardness or dependency (Nairn 1977: 343). 
 
In many respects, Tom Nairn’s early work on the nation constituted a theory of the 
‘other’, with the ‘other’ becoming the entity that capitalism necessitated. At the same 
time, imperial nationalism unified its internal space by promoting a jingoistic 
‘nationism’. This jingoism involved an obsessive coveting of territories for colonial 
occupation. Colonialism became a symbol of development and in part represented an 
anxiety of economic status. This anxiety swept the metropole, becoming acute amongst 
the late starters such as Germany and Italy. As a resistance to this ‘Great Nationism’ the 
oppressed that were subject to the tyrannies of ‘Great nationism’ developed their own 
resistance nationalism.  
 
 The crux of Break-up of Britain was that modern nationalism (nationalism post-1945) 
constituted a response to the new dilemmas of capitalism. This meant that nationalism, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
European elites and therefore were not allowed into the apex of empire. This meant that independence 
was the only solution.  
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be it the old jingoistic nationalism or the new ethnic nationalism, was a symptom of 
market forces. British history was the perfect model of this theory. This argument held 
that Britain had no meaning without the empire. As a nation, Britain had gained 
legitimacy through the capitalist contract, commonly called the ‘Act of Union’. This 
contract was the original ‘corporation merger’, its aim was similar to that of today’s 
corporate mergers: namely to increase shareholder wealth. Britannia’s path to mammon 
was achieved by a series of raider-type take-over bids and rent-seeker activities that 
divested the wealth of the periphery and enriched the incorporated metropolis. 
However, ‘market pressure’ (i.e. the ‘Atlantic Charter’) forced the divulgence of 
acquisitions, and the ‘great nationism’ of Britannia was reduced to a feeble relic 
cowering behind the then new Bretton-Woods global order. With empire gone, the 
reason for ‘great nationism’ was over. The new market environment made Britain’s 
purpose questionable, break-up seemed the logical next step. For Nairn, there was a 
direct correlation between the end of empire and the rise of internal separatism.  
 
These arguments constitute Tom Nairn’s early theory on the formation of nations, or 
Tom Nairn Mark I. More recently he has argued that there is something missing from 
this analysis of nation as being a mere response to capitalism (Nairn 1997). 
Increasingly, as the Cold War ended, Nairn supported ethnic separatism as a path to the 
future. This controversial approach dated back to Break-up, wherein he argued that 
Ulster Unionists, with all their archaic ceremonies, were examples of the future. This 
was going beyond the modernist claims of Gellner. Gellner believed the age of 
nationalism was over and that humanity was entering into a new period of 
cosmopolitanism.5 However, for Nairn, the future constituted an endless fracturing of 
identity as people attempted to control the market. For Nairn, the orthodox 
interpretation of Marx was partly wrong; it was not class but the nation that was the 
great resister of capitalism.  
 
Tom Nairn’s particular arguments on the nation emanated from his attempt to rectify his 
own internal dilemmas over socialism and the nation. This meant that Nairn walked the 
path of rationality by deconstructing the nation, but as a self-aware Scottish patriot he 
connected with the internal irrational beliefs of nationalism (Cocks 2005). This 
                                                          
5 The liberal current of Emanuel Kant ran strong in Gellner, but Nairn (2004) was much more optimistic 
about the role of nations in human history.  
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produced a dilemma in Nairn’s political thought. The acceptance of orthodox modernist 
rationality would mean that his beloved national identity was a mere product of 
capitalism. As a socialist, this would mean that his deep sense of belonging was in 
reality a capitalist ruse.6 Therefore his politics plus his own sense of national belonging 
lead to the conclusion that there had to be something more to the nation than a response 
to capitalism.  
 
At this point, Nairn can refer back to Marx and Marx’s desire to understand ‘species 
being’. For Nairn, the nation must have been a deep social condition that extended into 
our DNA. Following this train of thought, Nairn’s modernist position slowly evolved 
into a neo-primodalist view of the nation (Nairn and James 2005: 7). But this is not an 
ethnic primordial position, but rather belief that there is a deep internal structure in the 
human condition based on social belonging and locality. It is society and belonging that 
is transformed into the modern nation.  
 
In making this argument Nairn rejected pure materialism as the total explanatory tool. 
Instead, his position that nation is innate in someway leaves more questions than 
answers. The primary question being: ‘what is the innate condition of the nation?’ This 
is a project that he is still working on and revolves around the human nature dilemma. 
What Nairn’s approach indicates is that the nation is the modern incarnation of early 
concepts of identity, locality and belonging, which over time were transformed into 
modern nations. Although materialism explains the necessity of the nation, it does not 
explain why the nation was accepted when other forms of social identity could have 
equally been accepted. Therefore, Nairn’s approach argues that a process of 
transformation occurs and that this transformation is framed by humanity’s earlier 
concepts of the social collective. In this respect the nation becomes the naturalized 
ideology of the collective, wherein the nation was morphed on top of early concepts of 
collective identity.  
 
Anderson: Imagined Communities 
 
                                                          
6 There is a parallel with Max Weber and Ernest Gellner here. The story goes that Weber was too much of 
a nationalist to fully understand nationalism, whilst Gellner was not nationalist enough to fully 
understand nationalism (McCrone 1998). It appears Tom Nairn has taken this issue by the horns.  
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In the wake of Gellner and Nairn (Mark I), Benedict Anderson wrote his Imagined 
Communities (Anderson [1983] 1991). Like Gellner and Nairn, Anderson saw the 
nation as being a modern creation. Imagined Communities sparked a revolution in 
thinking, and the terminology “imagined communities” appeared to correspond to the 
post-modernist wave of thinking that dominated debate from the late 1970s to the mid-
1990s. As previously argued this is a misunderstanding of Anderson’s terminology. 
Anderson comes out of the Marxist tradition; his approach was to ground culture into 
the general material aspects of life. His approach to cultural theory is very similar to his 
contemporaries, Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton. This view examined culture as 
a production from different levels of material engagement. This cultural production 
reflected the general mode of production in society. Imagined Communities needs to be 
seen in these terms.  
 
Imagined Communities consists of two dominant themes. The first being the origins of 
the nation, whilst the second is the global spread of nationalism. Together they create a 
spatial pattern of development in which the nation is developed, modularly copied and 
spread as nationalism. Rather than being a comprehensive theory, Anderson examines 
themes around the grammar of the nation and examples of how nationalism spread as a 
global phenomenon. This framework creates a disjuncture between the evolution of the 
nation and the spread of nationalism. This disjuncture can be summarized in the 
question: “Why did the ‘idea’ of nation spread?” Although similar and interconnected; 
the nation and nationalism are two different topics. Anderson’s argument jumps from 
explaining the development of the nation, as a material form, to examining the spatial 
spread of nationalism. Like Gellner and Nairn before him, there is a theoretical space. 
This theoretical space is a naturalized jump between the cultural origins of the nation 
and the spread of nationalism.  
 
Anderson ([1983] 1991: 45) attributes the rise of nationalism to “unself-conscious 
processes resulting from the explosive interaction between capitalism, technology and 
human linguistic diversity”. Like Gellner, Anderson focused on the relationship 
between capitalism and linguistic culture. The key to nationalism for Gellner was the 
difference between official high-culture and low culture. Nationalism was the means of 
transforming a low culture into a high culture. This approach placed emphasis on the 
state in the choice of an official language. Anderson is more nuanced, focusing on the 
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competitive process of the market. This nuance placed distance between the state and 
the nation. Anderson showed that the nation was a symptom of wider social change and 
not just a result of the state’s interaction with capitalism as Gellner had portrayed. 
 
Book and newspaper publishing was a capitalist enterprize that Anderson saw as 
fundamental to the emergence of a national consciousness. In the late Middle Ages, the 
relatively quick saturation of the elitist Latin market forced printers to look for new 
‘vernacular’ markets, markets that were “potentially huge” (Anderson [1983] 1991: 38). 
Capitalist cost-saving as much as officialdom decided which ‘vernaculars’ would 
become standardized as official languages. The print-capitalists initially published in the 
biggest markets they could find. These large marketplaces were located in the political 
centres of Europe, such as London and Paris. The dialects from these areas became 
standard vernaculars. “Their disadvantaged cousins, still assimilable to the emerging 
print-language … above all because they were unsuccessful (or only relatively 
successful) in insisting on their own print-form” (Anderson [1983] 1991: 45). This 
standardization meant that: 
 
speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or 
even impossible to understand one another in conversation, became capable of comprehending 
one another via print and paper. In the process, they gradually became aware of the hundreds of 
thousands, even millions, of people in their particular language-field, and at the same time that 
only those hundreds of thousands, or millions, so belonged. These fellow readers … [became] 
the embryo of the nationally imagined community (Anderson [1983] 1991: 44). 
  
Anderson captures the subtlety of collective consciousness. With similar nuance he 
argued that the creoles in the Americas were the pioneers of nationalism. He argued that 
creole elites undertook a “pilgrimage” of career development as they moved from one 
official post to the next.  
 
On his upward-spiralling road he encounters as eager fellow-pilgrims his functionary colleagues, 
from places and families he has scarcely heard of and surely hopes never to have to see. But in 
experiencing them as travelling-companions, a consciousness of connectedness emerges 
(Anderson [1983] 1991: 55-56). 
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Like print-capitalism, the pilgrimage of the creole official created a community of 
national consciousness. In both of these instances, Anderson focuses on the collective 
experiences of material relationships as the source of national consciousness. Using 
these explanatory techniques, Anderson proposes two other models of national 
consciousness: the European ethnic state ([1983] 1991: ch 5), and official 
nationalism/imperialism ([1983] 1991: ch 6). These three modular forms constitute a 
nationalist market-place stocked with pre-packaged nationalisms formulated for every 
occasion to serve the impoverished and subjected.  
 
There are a series of criticism that can be made against this modular approach. A 
common critique is that it is Eurocentric (Chatterjee 1999, Parekh 1995). Partha 
Chatterjee (1996: 216) asks the question: “If nationalisms in the rest of the world have 
to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular forms already made 
available to them … what do they have left to imagine?”. This critique of Anderson’s 
premise is important because it signifies that the postcolonial world is bound (by its 
historical lateness) to be a perpetual consumer of modernism rather than the inventor. 
Chatterjee focuses on Indian nationalism and found Indian nationalism to be 
contradictory. Indian nationalism established itself as being in opposition to British 
colonialism; however, British colonialism was perpetuated through British nationalism. 
Therefore, India’s anti-colonial nationalism was based in the same epistemological 
foundations as British imperialism, and British imperialism was in turn supported by 
British nationalism (Chatterjee 1996: 38). Although Chatterjee underlined problems 
with Anderson’s modular model, his own research found that the concept of nation did 
transfer from West to East.  
 
The modular approach also smudges the difference between the nation and nationalism. 
Anderson outlines multiple ways in which an identity is realized. But why is this 
identity seen as pertaining to a nation? What framework of ideas informs the creole 
elites and readers of (the) vernacular novels that they are experiencing the nation? And 
finally, how does this consciousness become a politicized identity? To answer each of 
these questions, the proto-nationalist needs to realize that they exist in a world of 
nations. In realising their own consciousness they have to realize the consciousness of 
others. The nation had to be naturalized before, or rather as it came to be imagined.  
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Putting it Together: The Place for the Natural Nation 
 
Within each of the above critiques, the problem of transferring national consciousness 
to that of the nation emerges. Studies of nationalism have generally examined this 
transition from one particular angle — that of the internal creation of nationalism. This 
internal approach misses a key problem in the global transferral of the ideas of the 
‘nation’. A nation cannot exist as a nation in isolation. The nation is a means of framing 
identity globally, yet the theorising of the nation has focused on models for the internal 
development of national consciousness. This consciousness could have been expressed 
in other formats, such as socialism, cosmopolitanism, republicanism and empire. This 
thesis examines empire as an alternative form of consciousness to the nation. In the 
early-nineteenth century, empire appeared to be the dominant form of identity. Yet the 
nation crept into the social understanding and undermined the imperial ideal. How did 
the nation supplant empire during a period in which empires dominated?  
  
Ernest Gellner’s arguments are primarily concerned with the transition from empire and 
the absolutist state to nationalism. This transition he saw as a process of building 
nations through nationalism. His argument is that nations do not exist until the ideology 
of nationalism creates them. On a wider level, the ‘invention of tradition’ argument 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger [1983] 2000) also assumes the nationalist construction of the 
nation. This creates a clear problem of logic. If nationalism creates nations, how can it 
create what it doesn’t know exists? In simple terms, if nobody knows what a nation is, 
how can it be created by nationalism? For Gellner’s argument to work, the nation needs 
to be accepted as a system of understanding identity globally. In answering critics, his 
later work led down this path: viewing the nation as a transportable current of thought. 
Gellner’s points indicate that the nation was transported and naturalized as a means of 
understanding society before its politicisation as nationalism.  
  
In Gellner, Nairn and Anderson, the nation emerges as a response to the pressures of 
modernity on the empire states of early modern Europe. What Tom Nairn refers to as 
‘great nationalism’ has been the focus of past theorising. Ernest Gellner, Benedict 
Anderson, Partha Chatterjee and others all made similar renditions of Nairn’s basic 
argument on ‘great nationalism’. In blunt terms the ‘great nationalism’ explanation of 
the relationship between empire and nation is a Hegelian framework of action and 
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reaction. The ‘great nation’ gains its identity from the acquisition of colonies (Nairn 
1977). In reaction the colonized form an identity in opposition to the domineering ‘great 
nation’ (Chatterjee 1999). Chatterjee, Anderson and Nairn (2005) point to a basic 
problem in this framework: ‘who is imagining whom?’ Is the colonial state the source 
of the imagined nation (Anderson [1983] 1991, Anderson 2000)? Or do the colonized 
imagine their own nation independently of the imperialists (Chatterjee 1999)? The 
‘great nationalism’ approach envisions the nation as an internal creation, that although 
responding to external stimuli, the nation is a block responding to material forces. The 
nation can only be formed, in this action/reaction motion, if the nation is already seen as 
a natural structure. Before the nation could be adopted, it needed to have already 
emerged within social and political thinking as a naturalized reality. The nation needed 
to have emerged as a mode of thought within the structure of empire.  
 
The nation became embedded in multiple aspects of people’s lives. The result was that 
the nationalist assumed the nation to be natural. This naturalism made the nation appear 
both historically distant and then (as now) a current reality. This Janus effect of looking 
both backwards and forwards meant the nation was an aspect in everyday transactions. 
These everyday transactions continually emphasized the natural logic of the nation. 
Therefore the nation could emerge without necessitating any reflective processes.  
 
This thesis argues that the elites in the metropole and the colonists on the periphery 
developed a global perspective of the nation in concurrence with the expansion of 
empire, and not just as an oppositional ideology. The nation became a common means 
of understanding cultural difference. The reasonably specific means of describing 
identity and politics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries did not exist in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries. However, the modernization of political thought 
was occurring reflectively within the expansion of empire. Colonial officials and travel 
writers were engaging in the political thinking of the metropole. Modern social-political 
ideas of liberalism, materialism and biology came to be bound up with the nation and 
the expansion of empire. This thesis shows that these ideas were developed not just 
through the metropole responding to the periphery, but rather the periphery and the 
metropole were related in a two-way relationship in which the nation became the 
dominant means of understanding identity and difference. A world of nations came to 
be imagined in which individual nations had a naturalized space.  
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Nation as a Naturalized Ideology 
 
Within Gellner’s, Nairn’s and Anderson’s theories there is an implicit theoretical space 
for a process of naturalization. This naturalization is a process of discursive 
transformation, wherein a social construct is transformed into a natural reality, to the 
point where the construct is not questioned and deemed a natural condition. As a 
naturalized fact, the social construct takes on the characteristics of a hard fact and 
becomes an agent framing future reality. In essence, naturalization is the unconscious 
creation of an entity. The fact that it is unconscious allows for the assumption that the 
entity is natural.  
 
In a similar vein to the above definition, Chris Smaje (2000) has argued that race and 
caste have been misinterpreted by conventional social theory and need to be seen in 
terms of a process of naturalization. Conventional social theory views race and caste as 
a symptom of a particular social relationship, promoting an “implicitly egalitarian view 
that there is no inherent essence or substance which makes some kinds of people 
superior to others” (Smaje 2000: 3). However, in doing so, most social theory fails to 
understand the relationship in which hierarchy is accepted. From this, Smaje argues that 
“relations and essences are better seen as mutually entailed moments in ideologies of a 
particular kind — ideologies of natural hierarchy” (Smaje 2000: 3). Smaje’s argument is 
that race and caste become natural. And that sociology is based around destroying the 
belief that they are natural rather than understanding what forms naturalization.  
 
Naturalization could be viewed as a process of ideology formation. Certainly this is the 
view that Smaje takes in relation to race and caste. In arguing that race and caste come 
to constitute a naturalized ideology, Smaje holds that these systems of identity serve 
powerful groups in society. This fits in with doctrinaire critiques of ideology. In terms 
of race and caste, the evidence for this is irrefutable; but it is not as easy to apply the 
logic of naturalized ideology to the nation. There are advantages for some groups in 
applying the term ‘nation’, such as populists seeking support or conservatives appealing 
to ideas of cultural tradition. These clear advantages existed at particular times; 
however, as a term, ‘nation’ continued to gain meaning through popular usage even 
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when it served no clear advantage to any group. At least, in the orthodox sense of tying 
ideas to particular authority forces, ideology is too harsh a term to describe nation.7  
 
This apparent harshness of ideology, as an explanation for naturalization, is ultimately 
dependent on what we consider an ideology to be. There are many problems with the 
term ‘ideology’ in social and political thought. Coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1796, 
ideology in its original sense was the scientific study of ideas, but it soon lost this 
meaning. Robert Eccleshall (1984: 24) observes that it changed to “assume a meaning 
opposite from its original usage;” meaning instead “erroneous knowledge that was 
contrary to scientific truth”. In one sense, Eccleshall is referring to the dogmatic 
everyday political usage of ideology; in which ideology is said to blind people to 
reason. This pejorative usage of ideology is one of the biggest problems for studies of 
ideology. Clifford Geertz (1964: 47) captured this pejorative dilemma in the study of 
ideology, with his dictum: “I have a social philosophy; you have political opinions; they 
have an ideology”. This pejorative usage results in unhelpfully grand claims based on 
narrow definitions, such as Daniel Bell’s (1962) End of Ideology or Francis Fukuyama’s 
(1992) End of History. These claims can paper-over the deeper grammar of politics and 
sociology, dismissing the key processes in which ideas are communicated.  
 
Within pejorative ideology, there is the glimmer of a naturalization theory. Ideology as 
“erroneous knowledge” means that it is a claim to truth. As a pejorative accusation, 
ideology is what is purported to be true, but outsiders see it as false. In a similar vein, 
Martin Seliger (1977: 130) maintains that ideology is an unmasking process 
characterized by “scepticism about what others believe and the knowledge of what 
causes distortion in the beliefs of others”. Ideology creates a circular logic, in which 
practices are taken as natural and legitimized as being natural.  
 
This circular definition of ideology is the traditional Marxist definition, in which 
ideology is a system of authority, that parades itself as neutrality, when in fact it is an 
orthodoxy which supports a system of authority (Seliger 1977). By comparison, Karl 
Mannheim ([1929] 1985) established a more liberal view of ideology. Although 
maintaining a similarity to the Marxist definition; by using the argument that ideology 
                                                          
7 Although ideology doesn’t adequately apply to the nation, it does apply to nationalism which, as 
signified by the ‘ism’, is the ideology of the nation.  
Chapter 1 – The Nation as Natural 
 36
was a system of thought that defends a particular social order and that broadly express 
the interests of its dominant or ruling group, Mannheim divided ideology into 
‘particular’ and ‘total’ conceptions. ‘Particular’ ideology was the political ideology 
possessed by individuals and groups, whilst ‘total’ ideology was the overwhelming 
‘world-view’ or Weltanschauung of historically located society. In considering this 
‘total’ view of ideology, which breaks away from the limited politicized definitions of 
ideology and encompasses general views about society, we can start to see how the 
nation could be naturalized as an ideology.  
 
Similar to Mannheim’s ‘total’ view of ideology, a wider view of ideology emerged 
within Marxist literary criticism. This approach is derived from Marx and Engels’ 
arguments that “consciousness does not determine life: life determines consciousness” 
(Eagleton 2002: 4). This means that all forms of cultural product are connected to 
material ways of being (Williams 1986: 217). Drawing on material consciousness, neo-
Marxist writing on ideology has focused on the ‘common sense’ element to ideology, 
which essentially denotes ideology as everything (Althusser 1984, Larrain 1979, 
Thompson 1990). This ‘common sense’ notion of ideology focuses on unquestioned 
traditions and beliefs of society and its role in maintaining the dominant political order. 
These interpretations of ideology are heavily indebted to Antonio Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony and Max Horkheimer’s and Theodor W. Adorno’s critical theory.  
 
These approaches to ideology fall into two categories. The first is based on a narrow 
concept linked to political dogma and a reasonably clear political message. The second 
is based on a broad concept of ideology wherein ideology assumes a ‘common sense’ 
role in popular culture. It is implicit in everyday practices and action, all of which 
continue to reinforce a sense of identity and order. The central difference between these 
two notions of ideology is the concept of reflective purpose. In the first approach to 
ideology, there is a mechanized organizational capacity for the deliberate construction 
of dogma. This mechanism means that people recognize it as being ideological. By 
comparison, the ‘common sense’ approach to ideology means that ideology is an 
unintentional generation that is inherent in cultural products and symbolizes and 
supports the dominant power relationships of the society in which it is generated 
(Eagleton 2002). This ‘common sense’ approach is what Smaje (2000) draws on in 
arguing that race and caste represents a naturalized ideology.  
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This ‘common sense’ approach to ideology has lead to arguments that ideology is 
everything. Two observations can be made on this. Firstly in becoming everything 
ideology loses some of its utility as a source of analysis (Kumar 2006a: 170). Secondly, 
ideology starts to resemble a discourse. Like ‘ideology’, ‘discourse’ is a term that is 
subject to over-use, being a general descriptive term used by most social theorists to 
describe general groups of ideas unified under a common theme of logic, whilst also 
having a more particular meaning with post-structuralist theory. Post-structuralism 
views discourse as something like an underlining message, therefore in its general usage 
(and more particular usage), discourse can appear as only marginally different to 
ideology (Kumar 2006a: 173). For Michel Foucault (2002), discourse was a form of 
power,8 as a form of power it places emphasis on the normative condition of society. 
This normative condition is the way in which signs are created and the labelling of 
people and things occur. This all informs a general social discourse. The post-
structuralist approach downplays the material aspect of life.  
 
Teun A. Van Dijk (2006) looked at the relationship between discourse and ideology. 
For Van Dijk there were clear differences between ideology and discourse. Van Dijk 
limited ideologies to belief systems shared by a group, as being the foundational beliefs 
and attitude of the group. The distinction between ideology and discourse falls within 
the distinction of “social groups, on the one hand, and cultural communities on the 
other” (Dijk 2006: 119). ‘Social groups’ he argued have ideologies because they have 
“goals and interests in relation to other groups” whilst ‘cultural communities’ “have 
other general beliefs, such as knowledge, norms and values” (Dijk 2006: 119-120). 
Within this distinction Van Dijk is clearly limiting ideology to the political, and 
discourse to the cultural. In terms of understanding where the nation fits within this 
distinction, some problems are evident. The nation is a ‘cultural community’ by all 
definitions, but it is also a social group that has attitudes to others. Using Van Dijk’s 
argument an ethnic group has a discourse, whilst a nation has an ideology, namely 
nationalism. However, is the nation itself, an ideology?  
 
                                                          
8 Although this is the way that Foucault describes this power, it could also be described as order. 
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In explaining the nation as an ‘imagined community’, Benedict Anderson was focusing 
on these discursive/ideological themes, whilst also connecting them to the material 
transformations of the early modern period, such as the state and emergence of print 
capitalism. Anderson’s phrase the ‘imagined community’ has taken on a life of its own. 
The term ‘imagined community’ is an overlay describing the material effects on 
individuals that Gellner and Nairn had outlined. How does theoretical literature answer 
the question: ‘Is the nation an ideology?’ 
 
Firstly, as well as being a community of practice the nation is an idea. As an idea it has 
a major bearing on peoples’ lives. It defines their identity, thereby giving the perception 
of an absolute social identity. Secondly, all definitions of ideology link ideology to 
politics. Likewise, the nation is a political claim. A nation is a claim to social-political 
identity, which is made clearly when compared to ethnicity. Although ethnicity is also 
social identity, less regularly does ethnicity become the focus of rights, and when it 
does the ethnicity has often been re-branded as a nation. Therefore the nation involves 
an ideological claim to political purpose. Thirdly, the nation is a world-view. A nation 
cannot exist in isolation. The nation exists in relation to other nations. Although issues 
of dominance and subservience enter into the comparison (usually in relation to 
nationalist ideologies) the nation always exists in a world of nations thereby making the 
nation an ideological view by the global community. 
  
Finally, ideology as opposed to discourse connects the nation to the material processes 
that were transforming society in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. From Fredrich 
List to Karl Marx, from Ernest Gellner to Tom Nairn, and from Liah Greenfeld to 
Benedict Anderson, theorists of nations and nationalism have focused on connections 
between the nation and economic change. Each of these theoretical arguments has 
focused on how material changes have developed the modern nation. Likewise, the 
traditions on ideology outlined by Marx, Gramsi, Adorno, Horkheimer and Althusser, 
and others, all indicate that material changes are supported by ideological changes. 
 
In each of these points the nation can be seen as an ideology that has similarities to 
nationalism, and at times runs concurrently, but it is different and distinct. Unlike chest-
thumping nationalism, engaging with the nation involves living with a surreptitious 
ideology that became accepted as natural over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
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Although it was accepted, the nation was not the only solution to modern material 
conditions. An ‘imagined community’ does not necessarily need to be a nation. Many 
other forms of society were tried, and these were often deliberate rational exercises in 
social creation. There are many such examples: cosmopolitan republicanism (that 
existed in the early days of the French Revolution), and socialist internationalism (an 
idea that was pursued with vigour by socialists and communists for 150 years), or even 
religion (which has regularly had revivals as social ways of being). The example that I 
look at in this thesis is empire and its quasi-cosmopolitanism. Each of these alternative 
social forms readily corresponds to an ideologue view of ideology, being actively 
produced by intellectuals and elites. Each of these failed largely because they depended 
on elitist support. They did not capture the popular imagination as being natural. By 
comparison the nation emerged in each one of these projects, in an assumed capacity as 
a natural feature.   
 
 
Interpreting Ideology within Culture (Textual Methodology) 
 
The broad definition of ideology outlined above, defines what we assume to be natural. 
Cultural theorists of ideology seek to understand ideology through cultural production. 
They examine the symptoms of ideology within cultural products. Therefore textural or 
cultural deconstruction, over time, can show the evolution and transformation of an 
ideology.  
 
The orthodox notion of superstructure emphasized the economic base as the 
determining factor. Antonio Gramsci wanted to move beyond this primitive 
determinism by arguing that the inclusive role of law, culture and science existed within 
the material superstructure. This interpretation placed superstructures in the plural, 
meaning that superstructures were built on an economic base but constituted an historic 
block. The Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’ marks another divergence from 
orthodoxy. The orthodox notion held that the common sense of the masses was a ‘false 
consciousness’ that promoted an exploitative society. In comparison, Gramsci held that 
‘common sense’ was a ‘contradictory consciousness’, an incoherent mix of beliefs 
Chapter 1 – The Nation as Natural 
 40
containing the germ of the coherent, self-reflective ‘good senses’ that should guide a 
socialist and democratic society.  
 
In making this argument, Gramsci places importance on intellectual advocacy in 
creating a hegemonic ideology. This move places ideas as a social force, the success of 
which is dependent on its projection of ‘common sense’, but in placing emphasis on 
advocacy, ideas are not totally determined by the economic base. Advocacy 
reintroduces the traditional sense of politics (as a system of undetermined negotiation) 
into a Marxist argument.  
 
Equally concerned with the question of cultural meaning were the critical theorists Max 
Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. Horkheimer and Adorno focused on connections 
between entertainment and politics. Their central argument was that a mass 
entertainment was constituted as ‘cultural industry’ and this had unwittingly enabled the 
creation of modern mass ideologies. The mass production of entertainment in the form 
of popular films, magazines, and books, allowed individuals to enter the world of 
imagination and escapism. This pathway to escapism reduced individuals’ abilities to 
think rationally and critically about their environment.  
 
Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s notion of ‘cultural industries’ is dependent on the 
assumption that people were more critical prior to mass communication than they were 
after its consolidation. This is ultimately an impossible point to prove and, when 
contextualized, it becomes a little unconvincing, being dependent on the stereotype of 
the working class as being the ignorant ‘great unwashed’. The real success of 
Horkheimer and Adorno was the idea that ideology could be transmitted passively 
through popular culture. In Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s thesis, popular culture acted as 
a mechanism to transmit passive messages that appeared as ‘common sense’. This 
presents a strong logical connection with Gramsci’s work, whereby we can see 
hegemony occurring through the support of popular culture. It is through ideology that 
individuals gain a sense of who they are.  
 
Although ideology defines who we are, Raymond Williams (1986: 29) argues that we 
need to approach the hegemonic aspect of ideology with caution:  
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General ideologies, in their full depth and elaboration, have indeed to be seen as among the most 
remarkable forms of collective cultural production. But then it is precisely because all significant 
ideologies are indeed this deep and elaborated that the concept cannot be abstracted as some kind 
of ‘informing spirit’, at the roots of all cultural production. 
 
Williams points to the nuance of ideology. Ideology is a product of material forces, but 
it is also an agent within those material forces. For Williams, this ability to be both a 
product and an agency give culture its own material value. Williams (1986: 29) goes on 
“but it is very different from describing all cultural production as ‘ideology’, or as 
‘directed by ideology’, because what is then omitted, as in the idealist uses of ‘culture’, 
is the set of complex real processes by which a ‘culture’ or an ‘ideology’ is itself 
produced.” For Williams the difference is between the ideological and ideology. Culture 
can be ideological, and therefore reflect dominant ideologies but that does not mean that 
culture is itself an ideology. Williams emphasizes the nuance of ideology and culture, 
with culture being a reflection of ideological forms.  
 
This thesis examines the nation within cultural production. This thesis looks for the 
nation within dominant ideological manifestations such as writings on empire, 
materialism and biology. These manifestations are overtly ideological, however, the 
thesis examines how, within these political arguments, ideas of the nation can be seen to 
change over time. This thesis also examines the nation within travel writings and 
popular culture, portraying the pervasiveness of the nation as a naturalized ideology. In 
doing so this thesis is following Raymond Williams’ argument that “to study ‘an 
ideology’ and what ‘it’ produces is a recognizable form of idealist philosophy.” This 
means that the cultural historian studies “the social practices and social relations which 
produce not only ‘a culture’ or ‘an ideology’ but, more significantly, those dynamic 
actual states and works within which there are not only continuities and persistent 
determinations but also tensions, conflicts, resolutions and irresolutions, innovations 
and actual changes” (Williams 1986: 29). In other words, the present thesis is developed 
as a history of ideas (ideologies), but one which attempts to understand the naturalising 
of these ideas in the dynamic of changing practices, writings and other expressions of 
empire in a particular period.  
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I am examining the naturalising of the nation during its emergence within the prism of 
modernist empires. As a history of ideas, this thesis covers the late-eighteenth century 
and early to mid-nineteenth century. In years, this thesis can be set within the 100 years 
from 1770 to 1870. Like all time-frames this 100 years did not exist in isolation, 
therefore Chapters Two, Three and Four draw on earlier ideas. Ideas such as Aristotle’s 
ideas on the human body and the ancient philosophic ideal of the ‘chain of being’; or 
Saint Augustine’s view of sovereignty from the fifth-century; or the way in which 
Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and other seventeenth-century writers reflect a 
transformation in thought from ancient and medieval world-views into modern political 
thinking. At times in these three chapters, extensive emphasis is placed on analysing the 
impact of these ideas. Such elaborations are necessary to place the emergence of the 
naturalized nation within an historical time-frame. My thesis focuses on the 
naturalization of the nation between the years 1770 and 1870, but this naturalization 
was a process that started much earlier, therefore those earlier events need to be 
examined to place those key 100 years into context.  
 
This time-period covers global key milestones in the emergence of the modern nation. 
The American Revolution, the first of the modern revolutions, began in 1776 and the 
French Revolution beginning in 1789. Historians have long-argued that these 
revolutions were key points in the emergence of the modern nation. Yet they are not the 
only major transformations that were occurring. With the decline of Britain’s empire in 
the Americas, a new opportunity for empire emerged in Asia. India became the centre of 
this empire, but Southeast Asia became part of its farthest reaches. This second empire 
in Asia adopted elements of the old traditional forms of empire, but also had radically 
new themes connected to ideas on the nation. The nineteenth century saw the dramatic 
expansion of capital, global trade and communications technologies. It also saw 
dramatic transformation in ways of seeing the body, courtesy of developments in 
medicine and a general improvement in knowledge of biology and the natural world. 
These developments also fed into ideas on the nation, particularly ideas on the racial 
nation.  
 
The nineteenth century also saw the rise of nationalism as a major source of state 
formation. Much of the racial theorising of the nation occurred simultaneously to the 
nationalist struggles within Europe. From the 1848 revolutions that swept through 
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Europe, nationalism became a key political ideology of the nineteenth century being 
used by both liberal reformers and conservative defenders of the old order. This was 
also a time of major ideological change. Liberalism, nationalism, socialism and 
communism all derive from the turbulent politics of the nineteenth century. The 
tensions between these new forces and the old order can be seen in the following 1891 
passage by C.P. Lucus:  
 
The world in past time tried both small and large communities, but the small states were usually 
too municipal to develop into great nations, and the large empire were usually too artificial and 
too regardless of natural limits to become one whole. So the town communities of ancient time 
and the Middle Ages, with the one exception of Rome, ended as they began, and the military 
empires usually broke up when individual rulers died. It is the difficult work of the latest phase 
of history to try, with the help of railways and telegraphs, to reap the advantages and to avoid the 
defects of both systems. It is for the good of the world to be divided into few areas, within each 
of which there may be uniformity of law and government. But such divisions can only be 
permanent, if they are mapped out, however imperfectly, according to geography and race 
(Lucus 1891: ix). 
 
Lucus clearly saw the tension between the old order of empire and new logic of the 
racial nation. He went on to argue that the struggle of his age would be to “adopt a 
system”, that empire “which was born in a despotic age to a time of democratic 
equality” (Lucus 1891: ix). Lucus clearly saw the tension between geography, race, 
nation and empire. He placed his faith in the material transformations of his day, 
namely the ability to compress time and space through communications. He saw this as 
the solution to the weaknesses of empire. Lucus placed the idea of nations and races and 
empires in history as a constant, yet he also recognized their newness in his own 
tumultuous times. This period of turmoil and fluctuation is manifest in Lucus’s own 
narrative. He was an imperialist, who in 1891 wrote an introduction to a new edition of 
George C. Lewis’s 1841 anti-imperialist treaties on dependencies. Lucus commented 
that the events of the nineteenth century had relegated Lewis’s critique as a ‘little 
England’ oddity. Lucus saw nation and empire moving in unison. This difference in 
ideas and interpretation between Lewis and Lucus (60 years apart) is indicative in the 
changing ideas of empire and nation in the nineteenth century. Lewis understood the 
obsolescence of empire, but failed to understand the emergence of nation; Lucus 
understood the emergence of nation, but failed to understand the obsolescence of 
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empire. Therefore the period between 1770 and 1870 was a melting pot for the modern 
nation and it was linked to the plight of empire.  
 
This period also saw an increasing awareness of what could be termed historiography. 
Intellectual thought in the Enlightenment and early-nineteenth century was as much 
about analysing the emergence of European innovation as it was of innovation itself 
(O'Brien 1997). Writers such as Edward Gibbon, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson and 
David Hume wrote in a context of being historically aware (Pocock 1999). Their 
writings address the emergence of ideas (ideologies) in their time, out of their 
reflections on historical and material practices. Therefore, this thesis examines the 
emergence of the naturalised nation in the reflective process of thinking about empire, 
economy and biology during the Enlightenment and the nineteenth century. A key 
aspect of this was the ideas of the barbarian, the savage and barbarism. These ideas 
emerged out of European historiography, and in this capacity they were both old and 
new; being old concepts that gained new meaning through modernity and colonialism 
(Meek 1976, Pocock 2005). The barbarian grounded the European nations in time and 
therefore constructed a sense of origin and particularism. Equally the savage and the 
barbarian placed non-European cultures in time. These ideas emanating out of early 
historiography are key aspects of the naturalization of the nation between the years 1770 
and 1870.  
 
In examining the naturalization of the nation this thesis draws on a range of writers from 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Chapters Two, Three and Four draw on dominant 
writers from the imperial metropole, such as Adam Smith, Edward Gibbon, David 
Hume, Thomas Malthus, John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, James Cowles Prichard, 
Robert Knox and many other lesser-known figures. In these chapters I will be 
examining writings that reflect the dominant political discussions of the time. Some of 
these writings focus on the nation, nationality or empire; but many of them do not. 
Although some of these writings are not directly concerned with the nation or empire, 
and focus on other political or social issues, in each case the emergence of the nation as 
an ideology exists within them. In Part Two of this thesis I examine the nation in 
representations of Southeast Asia. This section draws on colonial officials such as, 
Stamford Raffles, John Crawfurd and James Brooke who produced encyclopaedic 
accounts of their experiences in Asia. Chapter Five further draws on the themes 
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presented in Chapter Two of this thesis, and explores the structure of the British Empire 
in Southeast Asia, focusing on how empire was interpreted and how the structure of 
empire promoted the idea of the nation. Chapter Six reflects on the material in Chapters 
Three and Four, exploring the transformation of economic and material conceptions of 
the nation into racial conceptions of the nation in Southeast Asia. This argument if 
further examined in Chapter Seven, which focuses on the idea of primordialism and the 
idea of the tribe in naturalising the nation in Southeast Asia. Finally Chapter Eight 
explores how the naturalising of the nation created tensions between radical liberals 
over the rights of nation and the purpose of empire.  
 
The vast focus of this thesis has meant that I have used dominant historical figures to 
illustrate the naturalization of the nation. However, I am also examining the writing of 
junior officials, ethnologists/naturalists and early travel writers who covered Southeast 
Asia and reflected more broadly on nations in Southeast Asia. Therefore this study does 
not claim to be an exhaustive account of the process of naturalization, but rather 
examines a range of literature that illustrates the naturalization of the nation in 
metropolitan political thought and also at the farthest reaches of the empire.  
 
The contention of this thesis is that the nation was naturalized within the context of 
empire. The complex grammar of the modernist British Empire that divided the world 
into spheres of civilization and barbarism, yet retained a special place for barbarians 
within the core, allowed for the naturalization of nations within the context of empire.  
 

Chapter 2 - Nations and Empires, or 
an Empire of Nations 
 
Britain poses a problem in examining naturalization of the nation. As a nation, Britain is 
not a unified identity. By comparison, the French are the French, and although they 
have the historical remains of competing nations such as the Bretons or the Corsicans, 
these nations are on the periphery. If Corsica sought cessation, a French nation would 
still exist. Likewise Germany, a creation of the late-nineteenth century, is reasonably at 
ease in assuming that all German citizens are also German nationals. Although ethic 
minorities exist, and Germany is a federation, none of these identities threaten to tear 
the German nation apart. This is not the case for Britain. The problem, as Krishan 
Kumar (2003: 1) points out, is evidenced in that common mistake: “English, I mean 
British”. That slip of the tongue, a perplexing oddity for foreigners, is an ongoing 
reminder of the multinational identity that is Britain. Officially Britain is a composite of 
four nations, England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. To this list we can also 
add a few extra territorially and historically defined ethnicities such as the Cornish or 
Protestant loyalists and Catholic Irish — all of which leads to a complex case for 
national unity.  
  
Unlike most other nations, there is no British ethnicity. The British nation is constructed 
from other groups which also claim to be nations. These nations compromise their own 
individual self-determinations to present ‘the unified’ British nation. Yet as Kumar 
maintains, this is a ruse; the “general rule … is to see all the major events and 
achievements of national life as English. Other ethnic groups are brought on in minor or 
supporting roles” (Kumar 2003: 2). Kumar’s thesis is that the Englishness emerged in 
the context of Britishness.  
 
The English saw themselves in the mirror of the larger enterprises in which they were engaged 
for most of their history. They found their identity as constructors of Great Britain, Creator of 
the British Empire, pioneers of the world’s first industrial civilization (Kumar 2003: ix). 
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Linda Colley (1992) makes a similar argument that the pursuit of empire forged the 
British national identity. In a series of wars, conflicts and general rivalry with its 
European neighbours, a British identity was born in opposition to external neighbours. 
These issues of external rivalry and the internal flow-on effects, lead Liah Greenfeld to 
argue that England was the world’s first nation (Greenfeld 1993). Greenfeld goes 
further, arguing that it was this rivalry that spored the birth of capitalism (Greenfeld 
2003). Therefore Greenfeld boldly maintains the nation is the source of modernity. 
Despite their differences, collectively, Kumar, Colley and Greenfeld present a similar 
theme: that Britain emerged in response to external threats (Colley and Greenfeld), and 
that according to Kumar, these threats became the English project for the creation of 
Britain.  
 
Despite this unity in theoretical narrative, Greenfeld breaks the mould. Her focus is on 
England rather than Britain. But, by focusing on England, rather than Britain, Greenfeld 
interconnects with Krishan Kumar’s argument on the relationship between England and 
Britain. Kumar’s (2006: 5) proposal maintains that, from its conception, “the English 
state” was “primarily an imperial state, and the English people, … an imperial people”. 
For Kumar, Britain was the identity of empire: an empire that the English created to 
hide their own imperial hegemony. This empire identity had utility beyond the English’s 
aspirations. In many ways, the Scottish were the greatest supporters of empire (Nairn 
2004). The empire was “Britannia incorporated”, a joint stock enterprise in which the 
elite of England, Scotland and to lesser extent Wales and Ireland could prosper from the 
global enterprise of plunder (Schama 2001).  
 
The subservient periphery nations placed as much emphasis on building this British 
identity as the English, if not more. This leads to problems in locating the empire’s 
identity. If the British Empire was a means of fulfilling other national agendas, is 
Britian a nation? Linda Colley (1992) and Tom Nairn (1977) both argue that it was a 
nation; but a nation that had a particular reason for being, only in the context of empire. 
But can an empire be a nation?  
 
Pondering this same issue, Krishan Kumar (2003: 30) reworked Ernest Gellner’s (1983) 
claim that nationalism creates nations, arguing that the pursuit of an English empire 
created the British nation. This pursuit of empire was presented as a missionary task, 
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and thereby became a missionary nationalism. This nationalism “finds its principles not 
so much in equating state and nation as in extending the supposed benefits of a 
particular nation’s rule and civilization to other peoples” (Kumar 2003: 31). This is the 
exception for empires, rather than the rule. There is a basic tension between nation and 
empire; as Gellner argued, empires are multinational and consist of multiple cultural-
linguistic groupings. A policy of nationalising the empire strikes at the heart of its being 
(Kumar 2003: 33). If the nation strikes at the heart of an empire’s being, this assumes 
that empire has an identity that is very different to that of the nation. Although we know 
that empires can create nations, we are still left with the question: ‘What is the identity 
of empire?’ This question is fundamental in understanding how the nation emerges in 
the context of empire.  
 
This chapter examines the intersection between empire, civilization and the barbarian. 
This chapter argues that the idea of empire was linked to the act of creating civilization 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The creation of civilization was made 
complex by virtue of historiography of empire, which placed the barbarian at the centre 
of the imperial metropole. The complex relationship between empire and the barbarian 
meant that empire became the means of civilising the barbarian tribe into the modern 
nation. In exploring this interaction, this chapter also examines empire as an expression 
of cosmopolitanism and the fault-line that emerged between civilising cosmopolitanism 
and the barbarian tribal nation.  
 
This chapter examines these ideas through the writings of Edward Gibbon and John 
Stuart Mill. Both of these men were intrinsically connected to the idea of empire. 
Edward Gibbon wrote his classic history: the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire 
(Gibbon [1788] 1997), in the late-eighteenth century. This account was a dominant 
force in nineteenth-century thinking on empire, with British imperialists casting 
themselves as cultural successors to the Roman Empire. Gibbon is still today treated by 
specialists across many fields as a “contemporary and equal who may be paid the 
compliment of criticism” (Pocock 1999: 1). Despite this Gibbon is a dominant historical 
figure in the Enlightenment, therefore Gibbon’s history is as much a reflection on 
Enlightenment thinking as it is Roman History (Pocock 1999: 1). Likewise, John Stuart 
Mill was a dominant force in nineteenth-century British intellectual life. He is also 
representative of the contradictions within nineteenth-century liberalism towards empire 
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(Mehta 2004, Parekh 1995) whilst also being a trail-blazing theorist in linking 
nationality to politics (Varouxakis 2002: 1). Therefore, these two men encapsulate ideas 
on empire and the nation between 1770 and 1870. The themes of this chapter frame the 
scope of ideas of this thesis, explaining the broad relationship between the civilising 
empire and the barbarian nations.  
 
Empire, the Other and the Nation 
 
Like Ernest Gellner, Tom Nairn and Benedict Anderson’s theories, there is an open 
space in Krishan Kumar’s theory on the relationship between an empire and a nation. 
This space is the problem ‘how did the idea of the nation get there in the first place?’, 
and this is the naturalization problem as is the question of otherness.  
All the theoretical writing on nations and nationalisms places importance on the ‘other’. 
It is an integral part of nations that they need other nations to gain their sense of 
nationhood. This is Linda Colley’s argument on Britain’s identity. By comparison, 
empires don’t have this framework. They see the world in terms of civilization and 
barbarism (Lal 2004: 4-9, Pocock 1999, Pocock 2005). A framework of civilization and 
barbarism is still an ‘us’ and ‘them’ division. However, unlike the national sense of 
identity, an empire’s identity emerges in the relationship between order and chaos. For 
example, beyond the Great Wall of China were the barbarians. Beyond Hadrian’s Wall 
were the barbarians. Within these walls was order and civilization, whilst outside these 
walls there was chaos.  
 
This relationship between order and chaos was often represented in religious terms. The 
Ancient Egyptian Empire was ideologically sustained by a religion that framed the 
pharaoh’s role as the creator of order. This religious undercurrent to order and 
civilization was present in all the Ancient empires. It is the basic theme running 
throughout St. Augustine’s ([c.426] 1952) City of God, wherein he addressed the role of 
the state and religion in suppressing chaos. For Augustine ([c.426] 1952: 207), “the long 
duration of the Roman Empire” preserved society from barbarism and chaos, but this 
was a result of “the one true God”. Although a monotheist Christian, Augustine was 
maintaining the traditional approach of legitimising the state through religion. For St. 
Augustine ([c.426] 1952: 134) “every man” was basically barbarous at heart, for 
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“however laudable he lives”, he “yields in some points to the lust of the flesh”; 
therefore, it was the role of religion to provide an overlying civilization providing order. 
This belief in original sin, or inherent barbarism became a cornerstone of medieval 
Christian political philosophy (Brown 1978: 32-36, Rembaum 1982, Ullmann 1966). 
This distinction also survived into the transition to modern political philosophy. 
Although probably an atheist, Thomas Hobbes’s ([1651] 1985) belief in the leviathan to 
suppress humans’ destructive urge for self-interest was also a theory of order and 
chaos.9 In this, pre-national world-view the word ‘empire’ only meant state.10 All states 
                                                          
9 Hobbes is usually seen as a major break from medieval and renaissance thought and was influenced by 
the scientific ideas of his time (Sorell 1986). In the confines of renaissance thought, Hobbes clearly is a 
break from the past. However, Quentin Skinner argues that Hobbes’s arguments should be seen more as a 
critique of Renaissance Humanism emanating from Renaissance Humanism, rather than being based on 
new methodologies of knowledge (Skinner 2002: 38-39). My argument is that if we step back from this 
debate, and view Hobbes in a much broader context, he is concerned with similar issues to that of 
Augustine: those being order and chaos. Michael Oakeshott (1991: 278-279) expresses a vision of Hobbes 
in this context:  
In the history of political philosophy there have been two opposed conceptions of the source of 
the predicament of man from which civil society springs as a deliverance: one conceived the 
predicament to arise out of the nature of man, the other conceived it to arise out of a defect in the 
nature of man. Plato, who went to what he believed to be the nature of man for the ground and 
structure of the polis, is an example of the first. And Spinoza, with his insistence on the principle 
that nothing in nature must be attributed to a defect of it ... For Augustine, on the other hand, the 
predicament arises from a defect in human nature, from sin, Where does Hobbes stand in this 
respect? The widely-accepted interpretation of Hobbes’s view is that, for him, the predicament 
springs from the egoistical character of man and that therefore it is vice and depravity that create 
the chaos. But when we look closer, what was distinguished as egoism (a moral defect) turns out 
to be neither moral nor a defect … Man is, by nature, the victim of solipsism; he is an individua 
substantia distinguished by incommunicability. And when this is understood, we are in a 
position to accept Hobbes’s own denial of a doctrine of the natural depravity of man; and he 
appears to take his place, on this question, beside Plato and Spinoza.  
Although Oakeshott maintains that Hobbes is not arguing the same point as Augustine, Oakeshott does 
demonstrate the similarity of themes between Augustine and Hobbes respective arguments. From this 
distance, the only, but substantial difference, between these schools of thought is whether the nature of 
man is a ‘defect’. With this perspective in mind, it is easy to argue that Hobbes was continuing an old 
debate from a slightly changed perspective.  
10 This distinction is a legal one. The word ‘empire’ derives from imperium (the right to govern) and 
impāerre (the right to command). Therefore, until the modern period, empire was always connected to the 
existence of an emperor. This interpretation of imperium has been connected with sovereignty, although 
sovereignty did not emerge in Roman law. Sovereignty derives from Old French, meaning absolute or 
supreme authority. Writers such as Richard Koebner (1961)  and more recently David Armatage (2000) , 
have pointed to this connection. Armitage (1998: 104) states:  
From supreme authority, imperium became used to denote any power that recognized no 
superior and, by extension, a political community that was self-governing and acknowledged no 
higher allegiance, on the analogy of the universalist supremacy of the Roman Empire, and its 
Carolingian, Ottoman, and later successors. It was but a short step from this to the assertion that 
an empire was an absolute monarchy under a single head like the Spanish monarchy, an empire 
in form if not in name.   
There is certainly an association of ideas. But although sovereignty has a strong similarity to imperium, it 
is not the same. There is a disjuncture between the legal principle of imperium and the political idea of 
empire. J.G.A. Pocock argues that there was a break from the tradition of translation imperii, which is the 
“notion of an unbroken continuity between past and present forms of universal human governance 
connected with Roman rule and its association with the Respublica Christiana” (Nederman 2005: 3). This 
break was followed by association of empire with state. Pocock states “there is before us a transformation 
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were empires, because the act of state or government created order and protected the 
people from chaos. Until the late-eighteenth century, the word ‘empire’ was used in the 
same way sovereignty is used today (Armitage 1998: 102-103, Miller 1994).11  
 
Edmund Burke’s Reflections is also presented in this binary framework of order and 
chaos. For Burke ([1790] 1968: 127) the French Revolution had created chaos rather 
than freedom, authorising “treasons, robberies, rapes, assassinations, slaughters, and 
burning throughout their harassed land”. Yet the revolutionaries believed this chaos was 
a “currency for the support of an empire” (Burke [1790] 1968: 126). Burke’s basic 
premise through his counter-revolutionary polemic was that revolution crossed that 
basic divide between order and chaos. The revolutionaries assumed that individual 
freedom would create natural order, in doing so they saw “the medicine of the state 
corrupted into its poison” (Burke [1790] 1968: 126). Burke’s arguments on tradition and 
organic society was a theoretic superstructure built on this binary base of order and 
chaos. However, the introduction of the notion of tradition does indicate a change. For 
tradition is culture. The essence of Burke’s approach to culture was that it was grounded 
in a geographical territory and established through history. This cultural view of politics 
became fundamental to forging a national identity.  
 
The interrelationship between empire and nation within the framework of order and 
chaos, became a key dynamic in the nineteenth century. The process was said to require 
the transfer of a tribe-nation from chaos to order (Thom 1995). This occurred in the 
context of imperial expansion (Pocock 2005). 
 
Cosmopolitanism of Empire 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of our subject, in which imperium will be exercised by ‘extensive’ or ‘enormous’ monarchies — Spanish, 
French and Anglo-British —… lying west of the Italian German theatre in which the rivalries of 
translated empire had been played out. The ‘deline and fall of the Roman empire’ will be rewritten in the 
perspectives this states system supplies” (Pocock 2003: 239-240). Pocock’s argument is that the story of 
the Roman Empire was rewritten in the post-Renaissance period, therefore empire as the legal idea of 
imperium that linked empire to Rome, hence the Holy Roman Empire, was replaced with a structural 
notion of empire based on monarchy and territorial control of peoples.    
11 A good example of this is Thomas Pownall’s (1752) Principles of Polity, Being the Grounds and 
Reasons of Civil Empire, in which Pownall uses the word empire to signify the union of a collection of 
independent communities into one body. An important point of Pownall’s empire is that it does not have a 
centre. There is no centre-periphery relationship.  
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By framing civilization against the ethnic barbarians on the periphery, empires define 
themselves as an orderly constant through time (Mehta 2004: 106-111). Despite this, 
internal ethnic-tribal identities have always existed within empires.12 By all definitions, 
empires are large and therefore encompass different cultural-linguistic groups. 
However, these cultural-linguistic identities are downplayed. Deepak Lal is blunt in his 
praise of empire’s ethnic inclusiveness, maintaining “empires are the best means for 
saving us from the disorder caused by nationalists” (Lal 2004: 178). For Lal, cultural 
politics is just the hunting ground for “predatory nationalist elites” who use nationalism 
as a means of stripping the wealth from the people (Lal 2004: 175). He argues that 
empires are a form of cosmopolitanism, (Lal 2004: 178-183) in which Rome, Ancient 
China and India are models. Lal views the identity of empire as cosmopolitanism, but 
this, I would suggest, is cosmopolitanism in retrospect. There is a problem in 
identifying traditional empires self-consciously as cosmopolitan. Deepak Lal’s 
argument ultimately rests upon a distinction between liberty and democracy: negative 
liberty, as in an individual’s right to property codified by rule of law. This is the 
foundations of liberty in an empire. By comparison, he argues that democracy is a 
problem, leading to populism and therefore nationalism. Economic liberty created 
individuality and therefore negates the need for populism. This individualism removes 
politics from culture, and thereby creates a multi-ethnic unity.13 The depoliticization of 
culture is a constant theme of empires, but this depoliticization of culture, is not the 
same as the removal of culture (Kumar 2003: 33). The description of empire can appear 
as cosmopolitan, but writers have been cautious about declaring it cosmopolitan until 
the twentieth-century. Even then there remains a lingering timidity. 
 
This caution in connecting empires with cosmopolitanism has lead to an implicit 
discourse on empire, in which historians, and to a lesser extent political theorists, 
describe cosmopolitan practices within empires. One example of this practice of implicit 
cosmopolitanism is Edward Gibbon’s Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ([1788] 
1997). Gibbon’s work emerged at a key moment in time, when the British Empire 
                                                          
12 Barbarians can be internal. Ernest Gellner’s arguments about low culture indicate internal divisions of 
barbarian chaos existing within the ordered empire. 
13 The early work of Ludwig Von Mises ([1927] 2005, [1919] 2006) focuses on the relationship between 
laissez faire economics and the nation. In many respects, Mises prefiguring Gellner, arguing that empires 
could not be maintained against the movement of nationalism. He could also see the danger in this, 
envisioning that it would lead to major conflict in Eastern Europe. He argued that laissez faire economics 
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appeared to be in decline after the loss of American colonies. Yet Gibbon did not see 
the British Empire as being in decline, for he saw it as being a very different type of 
empire to the Roman Empire (Winks 1999: 3). Gibbon was also writing just before 
Britain was to engage in its great nineteenth-century imperial expansion. He also set the 
tone for the study of empire and the writing of grand histories (Winks 1999: 4). John 
Crawfurd (who is discussed in Part Two of this thesis) wrote The History of the Indian 
Archipelago (1820). Crawfurd was writing on a topic that had very little connection to 
Gibbon, yet he paid homage to Gibbon, peppering his work with quotes from Gibbon. 
Therefore Gibbon was an historical figure; and his work shaped nineteenth-century 
ideas on scholarship and empire.  
 
Gibbon argued that empires created unity, and he was adamant that this unity was not at 
the expense of local culture. The empire was structured in such a way as to separate 
politics from ethnicity. The essence of this policy was the polytheist religion of the early 
Roman Empire, in which “The devout polytheist, though fondly attached to his national 
rites, admitted with implicit faith the different religions of the earth” (Gibbon [1788] 
1997i: 53). Polytheism meant that the expression of ethnic identity could be global and 
local at the same time. As such, it was a unique structure that unified whilst also 
portraying divisions, Gibbon ([1788] 1997i: 54) commented on this: 
 
The deities of a thousand groves and a thousand streams possessed, in peace, their local and 
respective influence; nor could the Roman who deprecated the wrath of the Tiber, deride the 
Egyptian who presented his offering to the beneficent genius of the Nile. The visible powers of 
Nature, the planets, and the elements, were the same throughout the universe … Such was the 
mild spirit of antiquity that the nations were less attentive to the difference than to the 
resemblance of their religious worship.  
 
Polythesism created a kind of cosmopolitanism, in which “Rome gradually became the 
common temple of her subjects; and the freedom of the city was bestowed on all the 
gods of mankind” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 57). All ethnic identities could practice their 
culture whilst also connecting with the imperial culture. Religion was separated from 
politics and therefore divided identity from politics. A key aspect of Gibbon’s argument 
was that Christianity broke this separation between religion and politics and undermined 
                                                                                                                                                                          
was the answer because it separated the idea of nation and state, thereby allowing multiculturalism to 
flourish based on the market. 
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the source of imperial-local unity. Drawing on Hume’s Natural History of Religion 
(1757) and Bossuet’s Universal History (1730), Gibbon ([1788] 1997i: 53) maintained 
that monotheist religions had an “intolerant spirit”, and when the Christians were 
eventually in power they proselytized and outlawed pagan rights. In doing so, they 
unleashed this ethnic tension becoming a milestone in the decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire.  
 
Gibbon connected a healthy empire with universal tolerance and cosmopolitan mobility. 
Similarly Ernest Gellner maintained that pre-modern empires were “agro-literate 
societies” in which there is a great stress on cultural differentiation rather than on 
homogeneity” (Gellner 1983: 10). This basic observation was made by David Hume in 
the mid-eighteenth century: “When a monarch extends his dominions by conquest, he 
soon learns to consider his old and his new subjects as on the same footing; because, in 
reality, all his subjects are to him the same” (Hume [1742] 1998: 17). By the nineteenth 
century John Stuart Mill ([1861] 1998: 451) was also describing empires in implicit 
cosmopolitan terms claiming that “it is a step, as far as it goes, towards universal peace, 
and general friendly co-operation among nations”. In terms of social mobility between 
nations, Mill ([1861] 1998: 453) saw it as an imperative that: 
  
If we prevent the leading men of a community from standing forth to the world as its chiefs and 
representatives in the general councils of mankind, we owe it both to their legitimate ambition, 
and to the just pride of the community, to give them in return an equal chance of occupying the 
same prominent position in a nation of greater power and importance.  
 
These previous accounts were all implicit accounts of cosmopolitanism. The move to 
more explicitly describing empire as cosmopolitan occurs in the early-twentieth century, 
with advocates of empire proclaiming that “to-day the words ‘Empire’ and 
‘Imperialism’ fill the place in everyday speech that was once filled by “Nation’ and 
‘Nationality” (Monypenny [1905] 1998: 5), and that empire was a move to “global 
cosmopolitanism” (Monypenny [1905] 1998: 17). With the decline of the modernist 
empires in the 1950s, John Plamenatz (1960) had committed to the term 
‘cosmopolitanism’ to describe imperial unity. This was retrospective cosmopolitanism. 
The previous pages demonstrate that commentators on empire have gone to great 
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lengths to describe the identity structure of empire as cosmopolitan-like, but rarely 
calling it cosmopolitan.  
 
The second problem with equating empire and cosmopolitanism is that 
cosmopolitanism emerged in the eighteenth-century as an antipathetic concept to both 
empire and the nation, tradition and belonging. As a response to nation and empire, 
there is a contradictory tension in representations that compare these three themes. An 
example of this tension is Mary Burges’s (1800) dialogue between ‘Mr Good-intent’ 
and ‘Mr Cosmopolitan’. The dialogue begins with “the stranger, whose name was Mr. 
Cosmopolitan” who “mocked at the words of Good-intent” and attempted to “convince” 
‘Good-intent’ of “his folly in preferring his own country to the other regions of the 
world; seeing that it was formed but of earth and water, as they were, and was inferior 
to many among them in pleasantness and fertility” (Burges 1800: 161). ‘Mr 
Cosmopolitan’ attacks the idea of tradition and belonging, arguing “that attachment to 
the soil which gave” of a man’s birth “renders him contented with the lot which has 
fallen to him” (Burges 1800: 162). Although ‘Mr Cosmopolitan’ was attacking 
patriotism and nationalism as harbingers of tradition, Burges avoided making a direct 
connection between tradition and the nation.  
 
When looking for a place to stay the night, ‘Good-intent’ informed ‘Mr Cosmopolitan’ 
“I have already determined where I shall lodge … where, my ancestors have been 
hospitably entertained before me; where I know that the Laws of my Prince are more 
respected than in any other quarter of the town; where his statutes are preserved in their 
greatest purity and where the most visible marks of his favour have for ages been 
bestowed” (Burges 1800: 161-162). Although framed by ancestors, the focus is on 
tradition and order (as manifest by the ‘Laws of my Prince’). As the dialogue goes on to 
demonstrate, the boundaries of the nation prove to be imprecise. ‘Good-intent’s’ nation 
resembles empire bounded by tradition more than a culturally specific nation. ‘Good-
intent’ offers ‘Cosmopolitan’ a lodging exclaiming “if all places are as indifferent to 
you as you assert them to be, you will do better to accompany me to the lodging which I 
have chosen, than to wander idly about in search of another, without any preference to 
direct your choice”. The irony of ‘Good-intent’s’ actions is that it was a cosmopolitan 
act to offer ‘Mr Cosmopolitan’ a lodging. What ‘Good-intent’ shows is that the 
tradition-bound empire was highly cosmopolitan, even if it rejected the liberal 
Chapter 2 – Nations and Empires, or an Empire of Nations 
 57
cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. This is the cosmopolitanism of the Ancient 
Regime, Jerzy Lukowski (2003: 13) comments:  
 
It can be a misleading shorthand to pin nobles down in terms of ‘national’ categories during a 
century which only began to invent nationalism towards its end. For those in a position to make 
use of it, there was European-wide scope for geographical mobility… The ability to speak 
French, to a lesser extent German or Italian or Latin, virtually guaranteed those with such 
mastery entry into a cosmopolitan world.  
 
In this Noblesse world the act of cosmopolitanism was tradition-bound custom-courtesy 
towards a social equal. This was the implicit cosmopolitan world that Mary Burges’s 
‘Mr Good-intent’ was from, and trying to save, whilst living in the explicit 
cosmopolitanism of the French Revolution. Burges’s narrative is divided by the implicit 
and explicit expressions of cosmopolitanism, but Burges’s narrative concludes that both 
of these representations result in the solidification of the nation and the death of 
cosmopolitanism After refusing ‘Good-intent’s offer, Burges (1800: 163) shows the 
follies of cosmopolitanism and the necessity for belonging: 
 
But as for Mr Cosmopolitan, he wandered about from one street to another, not occupying 
himself with any business, and meeting with none who cared to hold any converse with him; till 
at last the men of the fair, suspected that he had come among them with some mischievous 
design, had him taken up, and would have sent him to prison as a vagrant, had he not confessed 
that he belonged to French-row: so there they sent him, and there he was glad to remain. 
 
The cosmopolitan was little more than an idealistic vagrant, and according to Burges 
even the idealist vagrant had to choose a nation — in ‘Cosmopolitan’s’ case it was the 
French. Although Burges didn’t want to admit it, however, Good-intent was a 
cosmopolitan. This tension between empire and cosmopolitanism can be found 
throughout all eighteenth and nineteenth-century representations of empire.14 Although 
                                                          
14 On face value this would appear to be a major claim, but it has been long recognized by historians that 
the Ancient Regime was a cosmopolitan entity based on “an international solidarity obtained in noble 
Europe, grounded on landed estates and cemented by marriage alliances” (Gershoy 1944: 26). Karen 
O’Brien (1997) had argued that the major Enlightenment histories were cosmopolitan in direction and 
emerged out of this elite cosmopolitan environment. This was a very narrow definition of 
cosmopolitanism, and to many writers is not cosmopolitanism at all. In a recent study on early modern 
cosmopolitanism, Margaret Jacob (2006: 3) argues that in the “seventeenth and eighteenth centuries … 
cosmopolitan idealism became thinkable, if not fashionable”. Cosmopolitanism emerged out of the social 
practices of the time, “both science and merchant life have long been associated with inculcating a 
cosmopolitan affect” but “both associations have merit, but need qualification… International commerce 
helped but … the potential of mercantile exchange to instil cosmopolitan mores rested on many variables. 
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implicitly describing the cosmopolitanism of the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon never 
referred to the empire as cosmopolitan.15  
 
Outside of the order-chaos framework, the form that identity was proclaimed to take in 
communities was not pursued in relation to empires. Identity was irrelevant. Empires 
were an identity void. Linda Colley’s and Liah Greenfield’s argument is that the British 
nation filled this identity void. The dialogue between ‘Mr Good-intent’ and ‘Mr 
Cosmopolitan’ demonstrates this transition. Tradition became linked to an idea of 
nation, but despite the national framework, ‘Good-intent’ was still inclusively offering 
‘Cosmopolitan’ a lodging. ‘Good-intent’ symbolizes the (cosmopolitan) goodness 
inherent within empire-nations, yet in the political grammar of the day empire-nations 
remained awkwardly distinct from direct philosophies of cosmopolitanism. 
 
Nations of Barbarians and Empires of Civilization 
 
The nineteenth century saw the solidification of the nation as the centre-point of 
collective political belonging within European politics. Whilst this process was 
occurring, a much older form of identity politics was also at play. The classic distinction 
between barbarians and civilization (which went back to Roman, Greek and classical 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Science too contributed, but the most avowedly cosmopolitan voices in its early modern camp were often 
alchemical — not the first practitioner who come to mind when we think about the scientific” (Jacob 
2006:3). Jacob concludes her argument by maintaining that these social practices created a solidified 
translational block of thinkers and activists “which spelt trouble for empires, monarchs, and their states or 
colonies throughout the Atlantic world” (Jacob 2006: 4). There is a difference in focus between Jacob’s 
argument and mine. Jacob focuses on the emergence of cosmopolitanism outside of the Ancient Regime’s 
centres of power, and that this became a major threat to the Ancient Regime. My argument is that, 
structurally defined, the Ancient Regime was cosmopolitan. However, as Jacob maintains there is a 
tension emerging between the new democratic forces that draw on cosmopolitan ideas and the particular 
cosmopolitanism of the Ancient Regime.  
15 Although Gibbon never explicitly referred to the Roman Empire as cosmopolitan, Karen O’Brien 
(1997) and Jeremy Black (2002) have argued that Gibbon was a cosmopolitan. This debate revolves 
around differing letters he wrote to people over the course of his life which created contradictory 
accounts. For example in his youth he declared that “he preferred patriotism to hypocritical 
cosmopolitanism”, but as an older man he declared “As a Citizen of the World, a character to which I am 
every day rising or sinking, I must rejoice in every agreement that diminishes the separation between 
neighbouring countries, which softens their prejudices, unites their interests and industry, and renders 
their future hostilities less frequent and less implacable” (O'Brien 1997: 170).  The problem with this 
analysis of Gibbon’s cosmopolitanism is that it confuses traditional noblesse with the modern meaning of 
cosmopolitanism. Gibbon was a cosmopolitan, being at home as much in France and Switzerland as he 
was in Britain. However, Gibbon was a classic example of the cosmopolitanism of the Ancient Regime 
and his writings reflect this. He saw Europe as a united entity, divided by the barbarian tribe-nations. 
Gibbon’s vision of empire is a cosmopolitan one, but it is a traditional noblesse interpretation of 
cosmopolitanism. 
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visions of political association) shaped much of the discourse on colonial policy and 
arguably internal policy (Salter 2002). Empire was used to describe the absolutist state 
and, as Linda Colley, Krishan Kumar and Tom Nairn have argued, the British 
Empire/State underwent a transformation from cosmopolitan identity into a nationalist 
identity. This occurred within a context of empire, an empire that preserved and built 
civilization in a relationship with barbarism. Many contemporary representations of the 
barbarians and the civilized have a tendency to present this discourse as a dichotomy 
(Gong 1984, Salter 2002), wherein the civilized differentiate themselves from the 
barbarian. Although this is a basic distinction, eighteenth and nineteenth-century liberal 
political theory also embraced the barbarian as the expression of freedom.16 This meant 
that the barbarian was needed in conjunction with order (empire) to drive civilization.  
 
Within this ‘Faustian’ tango, nations were naturalized within the integral order of 
empire. Empire was seen through national divisions. A key element of this was a 
connection in ideas between the nation, freedom and barbarism. The changing nature of 
this relationship is visible in the similar, yet differing, concepts of the nation and empire 
expressed by Edward Gibbon and John Stuart Mill. Both of these men saw empire as 
the order of civilization over the chaos of barbarism. Conversely they both saw the 
barbarians as being the epitome of liberty. Despite their theories on empire being very 
similar, their idea of the nation was different. Gibbon held a pre-modern view of the 
nation that had pejorative medieval overtones. By comparison Mill was at the forefront 
of the modern view of the nation and self-determination. These two figures, similar in 
many ways, illustrate the transformation in the idea of the nation over a ‘100-year’ 
period in the context of the British Empire.  
 
Gibbon clearly linked empire with civilization, maintaining that “the empire of Rome 
comprehended the fairest part of the earth, and the most civilized portion of mankind” 
(Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 31). Gibbon described the empire as the limits of civilization, 
                                                          
16 The connection between barbarism and freedom continued well into the twentieth-century Friedrich 
Hayek’s ‘Entrepreneurial Man’ which was at the heart of his theory of libertarianism was, for example, an 
extension on values he assumed existed in pre-civilization:  
After abandoning hunting life, most of our direct ancestors, at the beginning of Neolithic culture, 
took to agriculture and soon to urban life perhaps less than three thousand years or one hundred 
generations ago. It is not surprising that in some respects man’s biological equipment has not 
kept pace with that rapid change, that the adoption of his non-rational part has lagged somewhat, 
and that many of his instincts and emotions are still more adapted to the life of a hunter than to 
life in civilization (Hayek [1960] 2006: 37). 
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which “Nature seemed to have placed as its permanent bulwarks and boundaries”, filled 
in the north “with a hardy race of barbarians” and to the south a climate that “soon 
repelled invaders”. Civilization was expressed as the fruits of empire, in which its 
“peaceful inhabitants enjoyed and abused the advantages of wealth and luxury” (Gibbon 
[1788] 1997i: 31).  
 
Gibbon saw luxury as a key attribute of civilization. He maintained that “agriculture” 
was “the foundation of manufactures” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 73). “Under the Roman 
Empire, the labour of an industrious and ingenious people was variously, but 
incessantly employed, in the service of the rich” with the rich being land-owners 
(Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 73). Gibbon drew on Adam Smith’s arguments on the origins of 
division of labour (Pocock 1999: 309-319), maintaining that “in the present imperfect 
condition of society, luxury, though it may proceed from vice or folly, seems to be the 
only means that can correct the unequal distribution of property” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 
73).  
 
This system of distribution sponsored “the diligent mechanic, and the skilful artist”. 
These obtained “no share in the division of the earth”, but “receive a voluntary tax from 
the possessors of land”, and the desire for more luxury drives landowners to “improve 
those estates” so “they may purchase additional pleasures”. This was a pump in which 
the “commerce of luxury … restored to the industrious subjects [of] the provinces sums 
which were exacted from them by the arms and authority of Rome” (Gibbon [1788] 
1997i: 73). 
 
In Gibbon’s eyes, civilization was the economy of luxury, yet he admitted that this 
existed in “every society” and as such, was not purely dependent on empire, but it 
“acted with much more diffusive energy in the Roman world” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 
73). This difference was that empire was a closed system that produced civilization. 
Outside of the empire there was no luxury, only barbarism. This economy of luxury 
created an element of civil society for “as long as the circulation was confined within 
the bounds of the empire, it impressed the political machine with a new degree of 
activity, and its consequences, sometimes beneficial, could never become pernicious” 
(Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 73). Empire was a mega marketplace of luxury: fuelling an 
internal economy of distribution.  
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Whilst propagating the political order of empire, this particular economy of distribution 
was also dependent upon it. Empire represents the dichotomous difference that was 
“preceded by ages of violence and rapine” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 62). The basis of this 
order was military oppression: the “terror of the Roman arms added weight and dignity 
to the moderation of the emperors” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 37). Although military terror 
was the ultimate sanction — and the source of the centre’s exploitation of the provinces 
fuelling the economy of luxury — the terror was enamoured with the “image of a free 
constitution” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 31). This constitution “was preserved with decent 
reverence”, in which “the gentle but powerful influence of [the] laws and manners had 
gradually cemented the union of the provinces” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 31). This 
mixture of violence and moderation was the key to the empire’s success, but it 
introduces key political ideas of authority and freedom into the mix of empire and 
identity. The long-term survival of an empire depended on the delicate mix of freedom 
and authority. These were twin opposites, but for Gibbon the payoff was pure 
happiness: 
 
If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world, during which the condition of 
the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which 
elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 93).  
 
Gibbon was aware that eighteenth-century Europe represented a different political 
situation to that of Rome, yet it was still a continuum: these “provinces once united 
under” the Romans are “at present, divided into some many independent and hostile 
states” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 44). His argument was not with the political structure of 
power, but rather the structure of civilization, the central difference being that Gibbon’s 
world was divided by multiple points of civilization. These multiple points were not a 
constant, they only existed “at present”; in time they could be a unity again (Gibbon 
[1788] 1997i: 44, O'Brien 1997: 169-171). By comparison, he attributed Rome as the 
sole source of civilization during the period of the empire.17 Although the political order 
of Rome was repressive, it was dependent on legitimising itself as the sole provider of 
civilization: “as soon as the barbarians were reconciled to obedience, their minds were 
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opened to any new impressions of knowledge and politeness” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 
60). 
 
There are two undercurrents to this particular order. The first was individual liberty and 
the second was the existence and natural liberty of nations. Gibbon viewed both of these 
characteristics (individual liberty and national liberty) as attributes of barbarism rather 
than civilization. Civilization was about the suppression or ordering of these 
characteristics, for example:  
 
In the purer ages of the commonwealth, the use of arms was reserved for those ranks of citizens 
who had a country to love, a property to defend, and some share in enacting those laws, which it 
was [in] their interest, as well as duty, to maintain. (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 37).  
 
This collective military action is dependent on an interest to preserve freedom. Gibbon 
([1788] 1997i: 37) saw “patriotism” as deriving “from a strong sense of our own interest 
in the preservation and prosperity of the free government of which we are members”. 
This connection between freedom and patriotism was a positive aspect of barbarism. 
Examples included were the “morasses of Germany … filled with a hardy race of 
barbarians, who despised life when it was separated from freedom” (Gibbon [1788] 
1997i: 32), or the “various tribes of Britons” who “possessed valour without conduct, 
and the love of freedom without the spirit of union” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 33). 
 
Empire created luxury through the destruction of natural freedom. The result was that 
“vanquished nations, blended into one great people” and “resigned the hope” and “even 
the wish, of resuming their independence” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 65). The destruction 
of freedom was not limited to the provinces, but went to the heart of Rome itself: “The 
principles of a free constitution” were “irrecoverably lost, when the legislative power is 
nominated by the executive” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 79). In exchange for the loss of 
freedom, “the people of Rome … demanded only bread and public shows; and were 
supplied with both by the liberal hand of Augustus” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 78).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
17 Gibbons ([1788] 1997i: 44) full statement was: “We shall now endeavour, with clearness and precision, 
to describe the provinces once united under their sway, but, at present, divided into so many independent 
and hostile states”.  
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Although Gibbon saw the creation of the empire over the republic and the unification of 
the world under one system as a positive result, he also saw it as the point in which 
moral decline could fester (O'Brien 1997: 180). Gibbon’s ideas on the reasons for 
decline were influenced by the philosophical writing of his time. Gibbon saw freedom 
as a creative force that acted as a means of building the empire. He argued that “as the 
public freedom was lost” through conquest, “war was gradually improved into an art, 
and degraded into a trade” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 37). This was in line with Adam 
Ferguson’s (1767) ideas on barbarism and the militarist spirit, Gibbon saw the 
professionalism of war as a retrograde step (Pocock 1999: 343-344). For Gibbon and 
Ferguson, a professional was an ordered product of authority. As an ordered product of 
authority, the professional lost freedom and creativity. Professionalism maintained order 
at the expense of creativity.  
 
This was the heart of Gibbon’s thesis on decline and fall. For him a strong society was a 
mix of order (empire) and freedom (barbarism). This mix created civilization. Hardship 
was a key aspect of this. Leadership was the condition of freedom, as opposed to 
luxury, the condition of empire. Gibbon maintained the decline began the moment the 
order of empire destroyed the creativity of freedom. Therefore once the empire was 
achieved “the authority of Plato and Aristotle, of Zeno and Epicurius, still reigned in the 
schools” but “their systems transmitted with blind deference from one generation of 
disciples to another” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 76). This produced “a cloud of critics, of 
compilers, of commentators,” which “darkened the face of learning, and the decline of 
genius was soon followed by the corruption of taste” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 76).  
 
The result, was that the “Roman world was … peopled by a race of pygmies”. But with 
the destruction of the old was the birth of the new, for “when the fierce giants of the 
north broke in” they “mended the puny breed”, restoring “a manly spirit of freedom” 
(Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 76). This “manly spirit of freedom” was a “revolution of ten 
centuries” from which Gibbon’s own world emerged in which “freedom” was “the 
happy parent of taste and science” (Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 77).  
 
Gibbon’s history spanned this revolution of ten centuries. The Decline and Fall ended 
with the fall of Constantinople in 1453, therefore Pocock maintains it is “a work of 
modern history” (2005: 230), in which Gibbon is presenting the birth of the modern 
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world. The “fierce giants of the north” became the agents of renewal. In doings so, the 
northerners (re)introduced the nation in European politics. The empire had destroyed the 
‘nation’ with order and luxury. Equating nations with barbarians and the civilized with 
empires, Gibbon saw the modern nation-empire as the balance between order and 
barbarism.  
 
Gibbon’s comments on the “war-like structure” of European politics gives reason to 
believe that he saw European divisions as continuing the reinvigorated process of 
barbarism. In fact the French revolution and his distain for the “dangerous multitudes” 
(Gibbon [1788] 1997i: 84) seemed to convince him that barbarism was still alive and 
well in Europe. Gibbon employs the same civilization logic that he used to chart the 
decline and fall of Rome to analyse the French Revolution. He saw the French 
Revolution as the epitome of inherent savagery and creativity, describing the 
revolutionary French as “Gallic cannibals” who were “lawless savages” that “fly before 
the enemy, hang their prisoners, and murder their officers” (Gibbon [1796] 1923: 278). 
It was the order of empire that prevented the spread of the internal savagery of 
revolution: “the firmness and vigour of government have crushed, at least for a time, the 
spirit of innovation; and I do not believe that the body of the people, especially the 
peasants, are disposed for a revolution” (Gibbon [1796] 1923: 279).  
 
There are two important points here. The first is Gibbon’s reference to the “Gallic 
cannibals”. This is the ancient name for the inhabitants of Gaul; therefore the revolution 
was the unleashing of the ancient savagery of the Gallic nation. Hence, for Gibbon, the 
nation exists as a constant, but it is the primitive agent of barbarism. The second point is 
that he linked government with the “crushing … of innovation”. Innovation is the 
primitiveness of the nation, whilst government is about crushing of innovation and 
creation of order. Gibbon was not connecting nation with state. The nation was the 
creative force of barbaric inspiration, whilst the state was the force of order and luxury.  
 
Gibbon’s use of the nation is indicative of eighteenth-century views of the nation which 
emphasise primitivism. Gibbon portrayed politics as a constant dichotomy between 
barbarism and civilization, with the nation being an expression of barbarism. However, 
there are markers to the emergence of the modern nation within his narrative. In 
connecting nation with freedom and barbarism, Gibbon was also developing the modern 
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interpretation of the nation. We can see where Gibbon’s arguments would lead. By the 
mid-nineteenth century the “fierce giants of the north” would be naturalized into 
biology, and become a superior racial bloodline. But that was for the future: Gibbon’s 
arguments on race were purely cultural. The discourse on barbarism and civilization 
was dependent on authority and freedom. What Gibbon’s arguments on civilization and 
barbarism illustrate is that the period in which he was writing was a period of transition. 
He exists in a world in which modern nationhood had not been fully formed, but his 
writings are a reflection of its emergence. 
 
Between the late-eighteenth century and the second part of the nineteenth century, both 
Edward Gibbon and John Stuart Mill saw the nation as an opposite to empire, but in 
different ways.  
 
As barbarian communities, nations carried an image of freedom from empire, and 
existed in opposition to the empire. Gibbon supported the liberal idea of freedom — 
taking from Ferguson, Gibbon saw that a mixture of freedom with prosperity created 
dynamic political forces and free legislatures. As Martin Thom (1995) maintains, the 
eighteenth-century was dominated by the republican conception of the city. The tribe-
nation would not emerge until the nineteenth century. In Europe the success of the tribe-
nation was a result of the failure of the republican idea of ‘Ancient Liberty’. Thom 
(1995) argues that the ‘Terror’ in the French Revolution tainted the idea of ‘Ancient 
Liberty’, which emphasized the public life and the role of the city. The ‘Terror’ made 
the republic of virtu a nightmare and signalled the end of the city. The tribe became the 
new means of conceiving popular democratic governance, rather than the public 
individual. 
 
Like many of his English, Scottish and French contemporaries, Gibbon was clearly 
influenced by classic republicanism; but many of the ideas surrounding the tribe-nation 
that dominated nineteenth-century Roman historiography were already present in 
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall. Although clutching to traditional conceptions of the 
primitive nation, Gibbon’s Decline and Fall bespeaks the emergence of the modern 
ethic-nation.  
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Mill on the Barbarian 
 
Seventy years after Gibbon, John Stuart Mill illustrates the changing mixed response to 
the barbarian. The trajectory that is commonly seen as limiting Mill’s foresight was 
partially set by his father, James Mill who outlined a highly structural version of 
conjectural and utilitarian history in his History of British India. For James Mill, the 
barbarian was little more than an historical staging point from which civilized society 
develops rather than an ongoing agent of renewal as Gibbon envisioned. John Stuart 
Mill is generally accredited with adopting his father’s progressive/developmental 
approach to historiography (Mehta 2004: 97), a point he readily acknowledges in his 
Autobiography (Mill [1873] 1961). The utilitarian tradition presented the barbarian as a 
rude primitive being. The barbarian needed the cold reality of empire. The expanding 
modern world was deemed too harsh for the barbarian, who would be relegated to the 
pages of evolutionary history (Mehta 2004, Parekh 1995).  
 
John Stuart Mill was writing during the height of the British Empire, when the Victorian 
Age had adopted the trappings of the ‘new Rome’. The British Empire was civilizing 
and proselytising to the barbarians, just as Gibbon had observed Rome civilizing and 
converting the Barbarians. In this imperial environment, the utilitarian tradition 
emphasized progress. The view that is generally presented is that by the mid-nineteenth 
century, the barbarian had lost much of its political meaning as the purveyor of freedom 
(Mehta 2004: 99-103). J.S Mill’s ([1859] 1998: 14) comment that the doctrine of liberty 
“is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties” and, as such, 
excludes “those backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as 
in its nonage”, is a clear example of the powerlessness of the savage (Mehta 2004: 97-
106). For the barbarian, “despotism” became “a legitimate mode of government … 
provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting 
that end” (Mill [1859] 1998: 15). 
 
This caveat on education, transformed liberalism from a discourse on individuality and 
individual rights into a legitimization of authority. For Mill maintained that “liberty … 
has no application to any state of things anterior to the time when mankind” became 
“capable of being improved by free and equal discussion” (Mill [1859] 1998: 15). Mill 
was maintaining liberty for an educated elite, a point that was aimed as much at the 
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working-class masses (Burns 1968) as it was at the barbarian. This elitism was not 
absolute: progress and education would equip the masses and the barbarian for rational 
discussion (Burns 1968, Jahn 2005: 608, Mill [1836] 1977). This authoritarian view of 
education outlined the basis for a cosmopolitan liberalism, in which individuality would 
be forged through education.  
 
This view of the barbarian as being incapable of liberty was in stark contrast to 
Gibbon’s barbarian freedom. Although Mill’s view was different to Gibbon’s, the 
distinction was not absolute. Mill still maintained the eighteenth-century quiet adoration 
for the barbarian (Jahn 2005, Mehta 2004: 100). Like Gibbon’s belief that empire and 
order ended creativity, Mill believed that civilization rendered “mediocrity the 
ascendant power among mankind”. This mediocrity was civilization minus 
individuality. Individuality was not a product of the modern world, but rather a product 
of “ancient history” a product of barbarism which had diminished “through the long 
transition from feudality to the present time” (Mill [1859] 1998: 73). In this earlier time 
“the individual was a power in himself; and if he had either great talents or a high social 
position, he was a considerable power” (Mill [1859] 1998: 73). Similar to Gibbon, Mill 
maintained that barbarism was a creative force (Jahn 2005: 610), and in many respects 
paraphrased Gibbon stating:  
 
Those nations must once have had originality; they did not start out of the ground populous, 
lettered, and versed in many of the arts of life; they made themselves all this, and were then the 
greatest and most powerful nations of the world. What are they now? The subjects or dependants 
of tribes whose forefathers wandered in the forests when theirs had magnificent palaces and 
gorgeous temples, but over whom custom exercised only a divided rule with liberty and 
progress. A people, it appears, may be progressive for a certain length of time, and then stop: 
when does it stop? When it ceases to possess individuality (Mill [1859] 1998: 78-79).. 
 
Mill raises a number of points. Primarily the evolution of civilization was a process of 
decline, fall and renewal. The ‘nations’ of the East reached civilization whilst the 
Europeans were barbarians wandering the forests. Like Gibbon’s belief that freedom 
was the source of creativity, Mill maintained that freedom created progress; therefore, 
similarly to Gibbon, Mill believed that a civilization without (barbarian) freedom 
resulted in stagnation. Although there is a strong similarity between freedom and 
barbarism in Gibbon and Mill, there is a difference in their perspectives on the nation. 
Chapter 2 – Nations and Empires, or an Empire of Nations 
 68
Gibbon projected the nation in its traditional form, relegating it to the barbarians. By 
comparison, Mill uses the nation in its modern sense, wherein the nations of the East 
succumb to the tribes of Europe. Mill had taken the same logical argument as Gibbon, 
but modernized it, so the tribes of the north had not just rejuvenated the peoples of the 
former Roman Empire, but they had tribalized the nation — thereby injecting 
individuality.  
 
Possibly Mill adopted this argument from Gibbon, but more than likely he was 
influenced by Francois Guizot’s ([1861] 2001) The History of the Origins of 
Representative Government in Europe, which Mill reviewed favourably in the 
Westminster Review (Mill [1845] 1985).18 Summarising Guizot, Mill stated: “we are 
indebted” to “the northern invaders … for one of our greatest peculiarities — the spirit 
of liberty, in the peculiar sense attached to the term in modern times: the spirit of 
personal independence, which repels the interference of the state with the private 
concerns of the individual” (Mill [1845] 1985: 383). Guizot also made a distinction 
between barbarian freedom and the ancient liberty of the “ancient republics” which can 
“be characterized as the successive sacrifice of each to all”; or the republican idea of 
patriotism and active participation in the republic (Mill [1845] 1985: 384). This meant 
that “the imaginary being, the civitas, the πόλις, demanded the annihilation of every 
individuality. Every citizen was a perfect slave of the domineering principle, and of 
those who, for the time being, were its living representatives” (Mill [1845] 1985: 384) 
Guizot’s ideas meant that individuality (negative freedom) or the right to be left alone, 
was ethnically particular to the northern tribes.  
 
Martin Thom (1995) maintains that Guizot’s view, on the tribalising of European 
politics, was a key movement of the nineteenth century and a response to the failures of 
neo-classical republicanism in the French Revolution. The feudal or the Gothic organic 
origins of liberty had been an ongoing theme in English political thought (Pocock 
1987). Since the seventeenth century, British writers had romanticized democratic 
institutions, arguing that in the “old Gothic or German countries, parliament was 
responsible for watching over the liberties of the people” (Robbins [1987] 2004: 105). 
                                                          
18 Francois Guizot was just one of a number of French writers that Martin Thom (1995) argues tribalized 
republican politics in response to the aftermath of the French Revolution. Thom’s claim is that in the 
Chapter 2 – Nations and Empires, or an Empire of Nations 
 69
One example was Reverend Samuel Johnson (1693) who argued that parliament was an 
ancient right descending back to Saxon assemblies. Likewise Robert Molesworth (1694) 
published an Account of Denmark, which was a warning to his English brethren how a 
Gothic constitution could be destroyed by the emerging absolutist monarchies. John 
Milton had founded many of his claims to the tenure of kings on the “ancient memory 
of the people’s right” in which the king was sanctioned by tribal election (Milton [1648] 
1999: 60). Edmund Burke’s idea of the organic state based on the ancient constitution 
was also derived from this seventeenth-century tradition of the tribal origins of English 
liberty (Pocock 1987). The tribal constitution had been an ongoing theme in British and 
European politics. Mill was drawing on a theme that had been an undercurrent for the 
previous 200 years: a theme that linked popular sovereignty in Europe to the tribe.  
 
Mill’s ideas on the nation demonstrate a difference to that of Gibbon’s. This difference 
meant that for Gibbon, the nation was a primal barbarian identity that ended with 
empire and order; whilst for Mill all people belong to nations, however only some 
maintained the barbarian quality of freedom. In making these claims, Mill was 
anticipating the modern views of nation appearing in the mid-nineteenth century. By 
examining nations through a pattern of rise and decline, powered by individuality and 
freedom, Mill saw the nation as travelling through time. The nation became a primordial 
entity that changed over time, but remained an entity.  
 
Mill on Empire: 
 
Over the last twenty years, a lot of scholarship has been generated on the relationship 
between John Stuart Mill and nineteenth-century British imperialism. This recent 
scholarship portrayed Mill as the defender of empire (Jahn 2005, Mehta 2004, Parekh 
1995, Said 1994, Varouxakis 2005). Uday Singh Mehta observes “as a general matter, it 
is liberal and progressive thinkers such as Bentham, both the Mills, and Macaulay, who, 
notwithstanding—indeed, on account of—their reforming schemes, endorse the empire 
as a legitimate form of political and commercial governance” and “who justify and 
accept its largely undemocratic and non-representative structure” (Mehta 2004: 2). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
nineteenth century, the politics of the city became replaced by the politics of the tribe-nation and that this 
was a paradigm shift in thinking.  
Chapter 2 – Nations and Empires, or an Empire of Nations 
 70
Substantial passages from John Stuart Mill are readily found to support this view. Mill’s 
On Liberty provides one such un-libertarian example of his defence of empire: “the 
most obvious case” for the denial of representative government, he says, is when  
 
the people have still to learn their first lesson of civilization, that of obedience. A race who have 
been trained in energy and courage by struggles with Nature and their neighbours, but who have 
not yet settled down into permanent obedience to any common superior, would be little likely to 
acquire this habit under the collective government of their own body (Mill [1861] 1998: 260). 
 
In these situations, Mill maintained that despotism was the only solution to enact 
progress. It is this paternalistic idea of progress that has led to the criticism that Mill 
favoured imperialism: an act that goes against the logic of liberalism (Mehta 2004: 97-
106). This legitimization of empire has propelled criticism further, with writers 
maintaining that Mill was a ‘racist’ (Justman 1991). Georgios Varouxakis (2005: 139) 
argues this is ironical, for: “as much as it may surprise some of his late-twentieth (and 
early-twenty-first) century critics, who see him as a ‘racist’, Mill stood accused exactly 
of the opposite charge in his own time”. Mill lived in a time when race was a common 
explanation for all sorts of social traits. As Chapter Four demonstrates, race was a 
complex idea that was still forming, and at that time did not possess the absolute 
biological meaning that it gained after the Second World War. Mill was routinely 
attacked by advocates of the biological absolutist’s views of race in nineteenth-century 
journals (Varouxakis 2005: 139). Therefore, Mill is unfairly criticized for not 
complying with late-twentieth century ideas. Like this misinterpretation of Mill’s 
position on race, critics have also too readily written Mill off as defender of imperialism 
and empire. For example Edward Said (1994: 96) uses Mill to portray liberalism in 
support of imperialism:  
 
If there was cultural resistance to the notion of an imperial mission, there was not much support 
of that resistance in the main departments of cultural thought. Liberal though he was, John Stuart 
Mill — as a telling case in point — could still say, ‘The sacred duties which civilized nations 
owe to the independence and nationality of each other, are not binding towards those to whom 
nationality and independence are certain evil, or at best a questionable good’.  
 
At the heart of Said’s critique is a misinterpretation of Mill’s perception of universalism 
and culture. Within Mill’s writing there is a subtle realization that the nation was 
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becoming a cornerstone of the modern world.19 Unlike Edward Gibbon, who saw 
empire and cosmopolitanism as possibilities, Mill’s writing on empire is consumed by 
caveats. These caveats map Mill’s attempt to come to terms with the contradiction 
between authoritarian empire and representative government. The result of this was a 
lack of confidence in the potential of empire and cosmopolitanism. Instead, Mill saw a 
move towards nation-based government and internationalism.  
 
The clearest example of this ambivalence towards empire is Mill’s examination of 
imperial federalism and prospects of the self-governed European colonies. Mill saw the 
British Empire as a “free state” that held “dependencies” (Mill [1861] 1998: 447). This 
meant that the “dependencies” were “subject … to acts of sovereign power on the part 
of the paramount country, without being equally represented (if represented at all) in its 
legislature”. Within that brief passage emerges a sharp distinction between the classical 
empire and the British Empire. As Gibbon outlined, the classical empires’ political 
borders had collapsed, and in doing so produced the cosmopolitan world. Mill’s empire 
was one of dependency relations, wherein distinct divisions emerge between the centre 
and the periphery. The periphery has an identity as a dependent. This means it is a 
subservient entity to the centre, but still an entity. It is this relationship of separateness 
and dependency that, Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991) argued, led to creole 
nationalism. Therefore, within this framework of empire, identity differences emerged. 
Mill acknowledges this by commenting:  
 
Outlining territories … may be divided into two classes. Some are composed of people of similar 
civilization to the ruling country; capable of, and ripe for, representative government: such as the 
British possessions in America and Australia. Others, like India, are still at a great distance from 
that state (Mill [1861] 1998: 447).  
 
Mill identified identity through civilization and geography (Jahn 2005: 609-610). He 
did not say that the Australian colonies had the same civilization as Britain, but rather 
they had a “similar civilization”. Mill used civilization to mean development, but in his 
framework culture is dependent on the level of development (Mehta 2004: 99-103, 
                                                          
19 John Stuart Mill would concur with Ernest Gellner’s idea that the “modern modular man” (modular 
because of their labour mobility) “is a nationalist” (Gellner 1994: 103-108). Gellner believed that modern 
rationality required linguistic and political boundaries. These boundaries were forged through 
nationalism. Although Mill’s thought on this topic is not as directed as Gellner’s, his overall direction on 
culture and political boundaries is very similar.  
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Varouxakis 2002: 60-62). Although Mill was highly exclusionary in determining who 
had rights to representative government, he saw empire as a framework of cultural-
political blocks that were dependent on a centre. Uday Sing Mehta (2004: 116) 
comments on this: “in retrospect one can say that the absence of self-consciousness 
regarding the empire’s one locality foretold its fated terminus in the face of 
nationalism”. Mehta underestimates Mill’s self-consciousness on this point. Rather than 
failing to see the rise of nationalism, Mill was consciously aware that the tide was 
turning against empire in the modern world.  
 
Mill saw arguments for and against empire; but overall, he had a general ambivalence to 
empire in comparison to his belief in the nation. His opposition to empire can be found 
in statements such as: “countries separated by half the globe do not present the natural 
conditions for being under one government, or even members of one federation” (Mill 
[1861] 1998: 450). Mill maintained that political societies needed to have “sufficiently 
the same interests” to exist as a unified body. The geographical distance meant that 
these countries, although stemming from the “same civilization”, did “not, and never 
[could] have” sufficiently similar interest to “take counsel together”. 
 
They are not part of the same public; they do not discuss and deliberate in the same arena, but 
apart, and have only a most imperfect knowledge of what passes in the minds of one another. 
They neither know each other’s objects, nor have confidence in each other’s principles of 
conduct. (Mill [1861] 1998: 450)  
 
Mill explains this as public interest, that countries can not have the same interest. But 
the same argument can be made of any large state which encompasses diverse 
communities. In maintaining that “they are not part of the same public”, Mill was 
implicitly drawing on the circular claim of the nation: that two countries cannot be 
united under the same government because they are not the same nation. This was in 
reference to the settler colonies in which Mill ([1861] 1998: 451) claimed that: 
 
Though Great Britain could do perfectly well without her colonies, and though on every 
principle of morality and time come when, after full trial of the best form of union, they 
deliberately desire to be dissevered; there are strong reasons for maintaining the present slight 
bond of connexion, so long as not disagreeable to the feelings of either party.   
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Although Mill opposed empire, he also saw benefits such as: “universal peace”, a free-
trade zone and moral influence throughout the world. However, this is not a relationship 
of empire, but rather one of nations in a dependency relationship. Mill was ambivalent 
towards empire. Empire had its uses, but these uses had a used-by date. The underlying 
theme was that the nation held deeper claims than the empire.  
 
If the white colonial settlers’ lands were nations and allowed to go their separate ways, 
what about Mill’s second category of dependency: those “incapable of representative 
government”? This ability to subdue, exclude and then deny liberal rights to the non-
white colonial peoples is an astounding act. This action legitimizes perpetual 
authoritarian dictatorship and represents the limits of liberalism. Homi Bhabha (2004: 
137) maintains that “in asserting the natural rights of empire, Mill’s proposal implicitly 
erases all that is taken as ‘second nature’ within Western civility”. Mill ([1861] 1998: 
453) argued that a despotic empire was “as legitimate as any other” form of government 
as long as empire “facilitated” the “transition to a higher state of improvement” for the 
colonized from that of “the existing state of civilization”. This meant that “there are … 
conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of 
government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them 
capable of a higher civilization” (Mill [1861] 1998: 453). For “under a native 
despotism, a good despot is a rare and transitory accident: but when the dominion they 
are under is that of a more civilized people, that people ought to be able to supply it 
constantly” (Mill [1861] 1998: 454). It was both the separateness and superior civility 
(and therefore supposed disinterest) that enabled the more civilized people to raise the 
colonized.  
 
The theory of history, or the equation between barbarism and civilization that equalled 
progress, empowered British liberal thinkers to adopt a god-like persona: whereby they 
believed they had the rational knowledge to enact tough love and develop the colonized 
for modernity (Bhabha 2004, Mehta 2004, Parekh 1995, Said 1994, Said 1995). This 
liberal hubris justified dictatorship and the usurpation of liberal rights.20 The problem 
                                                          
20 In making this critique, post-colonial critique moves into awkward common ground with the neo-liberal 
critics of John Stuart Mill, such as Friedrich Hayek ([1960] 2006, [1944] 2001). Although a classical 
liberal, Mill was also founder of social liberalism that dominated twentieth century political thought. 
Friedrich Hayek ([1960] 2006, [1944] 2001), Milton Friedman (1980) and many others criticized the 
underlying assumptions of positive liberty, which social liberalism was based upon. Mill and the social 
Chapter 2 – Nations and Empires, or an Empire of Nations 
 74
with this argument is that it focuses on one aspect of Mill’s thought. It locks the 
experience of nineteenth-century imperialism into a world of opposites, whereby ‘you 
are with us or against us’. It is a discourse in which we take the shears to long dead ‘tall 
poppies’, showing the hypocrisy of their work whilst also demonstrating the 
pervasiveness of imperialist ideology. Although this approach has revealed the culture 
of imperialism that pervaded nineteenth-century thought — and arguably continued into 
twentieth-century thought (and probably twenty-first century as well) — this approach 
misses the nuances of change. For within the pervasiveness of empire, the nation crept 
forward. The nation became the liberal response to difference; nation became the limits 
of liberalism. 
 
The slow creep of the nation is epitomized in Mill’s legitimization of empire. Mill’s 
defence of empire is surrounded by caveats. For every absolutist statement supporting 
empire, there is concurrent qualification that when added together is not an endorsement 
of empire. When discussing his vision of empire, Mill ([1861] 1998: 454) refers to it as 
“ideal” and of the “highest moral trust”. From that point onwards, Mill burdens the 
“ideal” empire with the problems of reality: the problems of governing a group deemed 
as foreign. If this “ideal” was not the prime goal of the imperialists, Mill maintained, 
they were little more than “selfish usurpers, on a par in criminality with any of those 
whose ambition and rapacity have sported from age to age with the destiny of masses of 
mankind” (Mill [1861] 1998: 454). 
 
The fact that a particular group is deemed on a different civilizational level rules out 
cosmopolitanism. Unlike the white colonials, whom Mill ([1861] 1998: 453) said were 
entitled to “an equal chance” at “occupying” a “prominent position in a nation of greater 
power and importance”, the subservient civilizations were deemed not capable of this 
equality. This meant that Mill’s empire was an empire of nations; an empire separated 
into blocks. This structure of empire differed substantially from that outlined by Edward 
Gibbon. As an empire of nations, it became an empire of foreigners.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
liberals that followed him favoured the strong guiding power of the state to alleviate disadvantage and 
create opportunities. Mill and the other social liberals can be critiqued from many angles for being 
authoritarian. The end-point of similarity for both post-colonialism and neo-liberalism is a strange union, 
whereby both groups directly oppose each other but have a strong similarity in critique.   
Chapter 2 – Nations and Empires, or an Empire of Nations 
 75
By basing the empire on nations, Mill saw that the empire was beset by national 
problems. He maintained that “it is always under great difficulties, and very 
imperfectly, that a country can be governed by foreigners; even when there is no 
extreme disparity, in habits and ideas, between the rulers and the ruled” (my emphasis) 
(Mill [1861] 1998: 455). The act of government became intertwined with the nation. 
This was a basic reality for Mill, he realized that “foreigners” did “not feel with the 
people”. The reason for this was that they could not “judge, by the light in which a thing 
appears to their own minds, or the manner in which it affects their feelings, how it will 
affect the feelings or appear to the minds of the subject population” (Mill [1861] 1998: 
455). On one level, Mill is adopting the basic liberal assumption on representative 
government — that government needs to be close to the people — but Mill goes beyond 
this, focussing on feelings and thought, leading to an almost mystical dimension to his 
views on governance. His suggestion of a bond between nation and government is an 
irrational circular argument that was contrary to the teachings of utilitarianism.21 Yet 
despite this irrationality, Mill saw that the nation had very rational consequences for the 
workings of government. Mill believed in self-government based on nationality. This 
became one of the most controversial themes in Representative Government.22 
 
Mill saw two detrimental consequences when the government and the nation were not in 
unison. On the part of the government the “danger is of despising the natives” and 
conversely “the natives” could “disbelieve … anything [that] the strangers do” could 
“be … for their good” (Mill [1861] 1998: 456). Mill spells out the unworkability of 
government, proclaiming that “the government of a people by itself has a meaning, and 
a reality; but such a thing as government of one people by another, does not and cannot 
exist” (Mill [1861] 1998: 456). John Stuart Mill was extending the logic of self-
government, or nation-based government beyond the limits of Europe and the white 
colonies to the victims of colonialism.  
 
                                                          
21 It is bizarre that Mill adopted the nation as a core aspect of representative government, although a close 
read will reveal the nation emerging in the writings of all utilitarians. They promoted the idea of 
cosmopolitan unity. Jeremy Bentham’s idea of empire was that of an expanding cosmopolitan entity. By 
comparison John Stuart Mill saw that the nation placed serious limits to the expansion of the state. Mill 
scholars attribute this to the influence of Samuel Coleridge (Turk 1988), however Mill’s support for the 
nation also reflects the general political, social and intellectual climate of late-nineteenth century Europe, 
in which the nation became a key social concept.  
22 Both Lord Acton ([1862] 1996) and James Fitzjames Stevens (1874) criticized Mill on this point.  
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Despite all the rhetoric on empire as a tool of civilization, Mill had very little 
confidence that the officials and colonists in charge of the colonies were capable of, or 
even desired to achieve this:  
 
Armed with the prestige and filled with the scornful overbearingness of the conquering nation, 
they have the feelings inspired by absolute power, without its sense of responsibility. Among a 
people like that of India, the utmost efforts of the public authorities are not enough for the 
effectual protection of the weak against the strong: and of all the strong, the European settlers are 
the strongest. [The settlers] … think the people of the country mere dirt under their feet: it seems 
to them monstrous that any rights of the natives should stand in the way of their smallest 
pretensions: the simplest act of protection to the inhabitants against any act of power on their 
part which they may consider useful to their commercial objects, they denounce, and sincerely 
regard, as an injury (Mill [1861] 1998: 458). 
 
This passage demonstrates the problem of two racial-nations bound together in a 
hierarchical colonial environment. Both sides become entrenched in their national 
differences, resulting in an abuse of power by the European colonists. These same 
sentiments, he argued, regularly infected the government, for although he maintained 
that “the Government is itself free from this spirit”, it was “never able sufficiently to 
keep it down in the young and raw” of “its own civil and military officers, over whom it 
has so much more control than over the independent residents” (Mill [1861] 1998: 459). 
In effect, Mill was stating that, although the government was not corrupt, most of the 
staff serving it were. Under these circumstances he argued that “while responsibility to 
the governed is the greatest of all securities for good government, responsibility to 
somebody else not only has no such tendency, but is as likely to produce evil as good” 
(Mill [1861] 1998: 460). This was not an endorsement of empire. Even if empire did 
succeed, Mill argued that it only had a “chance of tolerable success” (Mill [1861] 1998: 
461). Rather than being a supporter of empire, Mill was very apprehensive of the idea. 
Cosmopolitan empire was not a future to Mill. Instead the future was with the nation. 
Writing during the height of the British Empire, Mill is anticipating the decline and fall 
of empire courtesy of the nation.  
 
These two men, Gibbon and Mill, were both indicative of their respective time periods. 
Their ideas were different, yet demonstrated a continuum. Both of them had similar 
visions of history. Both of them saw that European history represented a break from 
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what they saw as a default rhythm of empires that rise and fall. These empires created 
order out of chaos, yet at the expense of suppressing freedom. Freedom was the creative 
force that drove change, establishing new empires. Yet once these empires were 
established change was suppressed: order and servitude were the defining characteristics 
of empire. Both of them subscribed to the belief that the decline of the Roman Empire 
provided a break from this pattern. They saw barbarian freedom emerging with the fall 
of Rome. As a consequence, both of them saw that the pattern of order and civilization 
was transformed. Rather than being formed by empire, civilization developed in the 
barbarian tribal states. These states maintained aspects of their barbarian past.  
 
This historiography placed the barbarian tribe at the centre of social political 
development. Yet both men saw different consequences emerging from the barbarian 
tribe. These consequences were indicative of the changing ideas of empire and the 
nation. For Gibbon, empire created cosmopolitanism. An empire unified people, 
removing the tribal barbarian nations. This meant that Gibbon saw empire as an 
expansive entity that could continue unifying people in a cosmopolitan world. It also 
meant that Gibbon saw the nation as a primal association that disappeared with social 
advancement. This was indicative of the medieval and early-modern conceptions of the 
nation.  
 
Gibbon was writing at the end of the eighteenth-century, when political beliefs that we 
would now subscribe to as being nationalism were gaining importance. His writing on 
the barbarian tribes reflected these new ideas. In Gibbon we see him placing importance 
on the idea of the tribe, yet at the same time Gibbon was also reflecting the medieval 
and early modern idea of the nation that the nation was a symptom of primitivism. 
Therefore, Gibbon saw the cosmopolitanism of empire as a future. By comparison, Mill 
was writing post-1848, in the time-period that Eric Hobsbawm (Hobsbawm 1995: 9-28) 
calls the “springtime of peoples” in which the nation became a calling cry in political 
revolutions of the time. The nation became a paramount political association in the mid 
to late-nineteenth century. Therefore Mill did not see cosmopolitan empire as having a 
future. For him the nation was a primal entity. Mill recognized that empires create 
cosmopolitanism, but in no way did Mill see this as a solution. For him the national 
divisions were inherently entrenched. Although Mill was criticized for being an 
imperialist, he saw empires as having limited potential, and that they usually caused 
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more harm than good. Mill could see that the trajectories of the modern world were 
leading to an interconnected global society, yet he did not see this as a cosmopolitan 
entity. Rather, global society was to be based on the nation.  
   
Between Gibbon (1780s) and Mill (1860s) there was a transformation in perspectives on 
empire, cosmopolitanism and the nation. Ideas on the role of the nation were 
transformed. The nation had moved from being a primitive social formation, to being a 
primal social formation. The change in the idea of the nation meant that the trajectory of 
empire also changed. Gibbon’s late eighteenth-century account of empire projected 
empire as a civilising entity; with empire consuming nations, and in so doing empire 
created an overarching cosmopolitan unity at the expense of the nation. By the 1860s 
Mill was pessimistic about the cosmopolitan potential in the modern world. He saw 
empire as being the victim of nations. Nations were the future, but at the same time he 
saw nations as reflecting primal formations. Against these primal formations, Mill saw 
empires as mere transitory entities that reduced to guiding the emergent nations that 
would shape the future.  
 
This chapter has reflected on the overall change in ideas, which is the key focus of this 
thesis. This change is the emergence of the nation as a pre-eminent social formation 
within the context of empire. The barbarian became a pathway in which this change 
emerged. The subsequent chapters reflect different aspects of how the nation emerged 
within the context of empire through changing ideas about the barbarian.  
  
 
Chapter 3 - Communities of 
Capital: Materialism and the 
Naturalization of the Nation 
 
During that period of pre-First World War euphoria — before the carnage and mud of 
trench-warfare sullied the charade of European civility — Leonard T. Hobhouse in a 
mass-produced Home University Library text on liberalism, proclaimed that:  
The modern State is the distinctive product of a unique civilization. But it is a product which is 
still in the making, and a part of the process is a struggle between new and old principles of 
social order. To understand the new, which is our main purpose, we must first cast a glance at 
the old … which — under the inspiration of liberal ideas — is slowly but surely giving place to 
the new fabric of the civic state. (Hobhouse [1911] 1927: 7), 
Hobhouse’s reflections reiterate a common belief (of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries) that liberalism transformed Western civilization. The acceptance of this belief 
is demonstrated by Karl Marx’s own theories of society, in which he stood back from 
liberalism and portrayed it as an epochal movement in history. In Marx’s hands, 
liberalism was the revelation of bourgeois class-politics, representing bourgeois 
interests in transforming politics to match the economy’s transformation. Across the 
political spectrum there was an acceptance that liberalism was intimately connected to 
the dramatic social, industrial and political changes that had occurred over the previous 
one–hundred-and-fifty years.  
 
Hobhouse’s words ‘the liberal ideal’ are indicative of the particular path that liberalism 
had taken by the late-nineteenth century. Liberalism had become little more than a 
series of principles, based around a theory of rights. In the twentieth-century, liberalism 
became predominately a legalist approach to politics, but the origins of liberalism lay in 
the broad extent of Enlightenment thought. The modern demarcation of academic 
disciplines had not emerged by the time of the European Enlightenment (Foucault 2002, 
Porter 2001, Porter 2004, Rothschild 2001: 1-6), and, as such, liberal philosophy 
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emerged out of a broad materialist theory on nature, covering psychology and the 
methodology of science, all of which contributed into a notion of politics (Porter 2004: 
3-27). Within this liberal philosophy a transformation in the understanding of the nation 
occurred.  
 
Many people have commented on the role of liberalism in forming the nation. Liah 
Greenfeld is one of the sternest advocates of this approach. For Greenfield the nation is 
the “source of individual identity within a ‘people,’ which is seen as the bearer of 
sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity” 
(Greenfeld 1993: 8). The basic sense of sovereignty means that a “national 
consciousness is inherently democratic: egalitarianism represents the essential principle 
of the social organisation it implies, and popular sovereignty its essential political 
principle” (Greenfeld 2003: 2). For Greenfeld the nation emerged first within England 
and then Britain, from which point the idea became modular and adopted by other 
peoples. Greenfeld takes this point further to argue that nationalism is the spirit behind 
capitalism (Greenfeld 2003). This argument is highly contentious, for it goes against 
mainstream economic theory which places action squarely within the domain of 
individuality and self-interest. Greenfeld’s argument is not one of action, but rather that 
of nationalist pride that was the imperative stimulating the desire for growth.  
 
The problem with Greenfeld’s argument is that traditional economic arguments 
maintain that she has the proverbial ‘cart and horse’ all wrong. Orthodoxy maintains 
that it was capitalism that created the nation not the other way round. Greenfeld raises 
important questions about the relationship between liberalism, the nation and 
capitalism; in particular that capitalism had to be based on pre-existing ideals. As it 
stands her argument has a reductionist thesis that argues that the modern nation emerged 
fully formed at a relatively early point in time, namely the sixteenth-century, just before 
the commercial and industrial revolutions. As Chapter Two demonstrates, a 
consciousness of the nation gradually emerged from the sixteenth-century up to the late-
nineteenth century (Kumar 2003). We can also see elements of a national consciousness 
as early as the ninth-century (Kumar 2003: 62-66), but this does not mean that nations 
existed as such in the modern sense of horizontal communities as we understand them 
today.   
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Like many writers on nations and nationalism, Greenfeld overcomes this by defining 
different forms of the nation: individualistic-civic, collectivist-civic and collectivistic-
ethnic. These labels are ‘ideal types’, and despite the fact that everybody engages in this 
defensive structuralism, they are of little use; because historical observations 
demonstrate that one can never find a pure example of any ‘ideal type’ — without a 
very selective view of history.23  
 
Despite this, Liah Greenfeld does identify a major transition in thought that contributed 
to the formation of modern capitalism. Her argument is that “civic nationality … is 
equated with citizenship, that is, with the in-principle, conscious acceptance of certain 
rights and obligations” (Greenfeld 2003: 2). In this capacity “the will” in individualistic-
civic nations is the “will of the majority of their citizens” and their “governments are 
representative in fact as well as in principle” (Greenfeld 2003: 2). In addition, these 
nations “cherish individual, human, rights and foster institutions which safeguard them” 
(Greenfeld 2003: 2). In this description of the nation, Greenfeld is outlining the precepts 
of classic liberalism.24  
 
Part of Greenfeld’s argument is that liberalism transformed the state from an alien entity 
into an entity for popular sovereignty, and this created the impetus for capitalism. Put in 
this way, the position comes close to orthodoxy. In Conditions of Liberty (1994), Ernest 
Gellner makes a parallel claim; and likewise Benedict Anderson argues that liberalism 
contributed to transforming the state (Anderson [1983] 1991: 67-82). This means that 
the emphasis is not on the nation creating capitalism, but rather on the relationship 
between liberalism and the state. The nation falls somewhere within this relationship.  
 
                                                          
23 For example, Liah Greenfeld (1993, 2003) presents the United States of America as the manifestation 
of an individualist-civic nation. Detractors would point to the racial inequalities and come to a different 
conclusion. Other ideal-type theories can be found across the literature on nationalism. Each of the so-
called ‘civic’ nations often engage in reflective debates about the problems of multiculturalism and, in 
turn, power resides in the hands of a particular cultural and class grouping. 
24 Greenfeld makes this claim courtesy of her narrow definition of the nation. But there is a long tradition 
of mistaking liberalism for the nation. Elisaha Mulford ([1887] 1971) made a similar argument. Mulford 
took the liberal institutions of the American State and washed them the in logic of German romanticism 
and came up with The Nation: The Foundations of Civil Order and Political Life in the United States. 
The problem with these arguments is that they are esoteric. They group a serries of ideas together under 
an organic banner, which says more about contemporary desires for a collective past than about how these 
ideas emerged.  
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Liberal theory, itself an ideology with material effects, seeks to examine politics and 
society through a rational examination of material practices. Post-structuralists have 
lambasted liberalism for this contradiction. It is not my focus to add to this literature, 
but rather to examine how liberal theory necessitated the naturalization of the nation as 
part of an interaction between two material entities: the state and liberal theory’s own 
material effects. In the early modern period, the state was transformed from its feudalist 
origins, through the doorway of absolutism into its modern sovereign shape (Anderson 
1974, Fowler and Bunck 1995, Hardt and Negri 2000, Philpott 1997, Puchala 1989). 
This transformation included the move to popular sovereignty. It has long been seen 
that the nation was an integral component of this transition (Breuilly 1994, Gellner 
1983, Giddens 1981: 182-203, Greenfeld 1993, Thom 1995). The claim to national 
sovereignty was a key issue that contributed to transforming the state. At the time it was 
seen differently, with few revolutionaries such as Tom Paine presenting the nation as 
the central issue on their agenda. The goal for these liberal revolutionaries was the 
transformation of the state, however, in making this case they made a space for the 
nation.  
 
The nation was an overcoat that united (as one entity) a range of liberal agendas to 
transform the state. These agendas primarily revolved around individual liberty 
(Robbins [1987] 2004: 1-2). An integral component of this liberal agenda was political 
theory. The eighteenth century saw the development of sophisticated liberal ideas on 
society that were grounded in a materialist conception of human existence (Porter 
2004). Liberal political and social theory both explained reality and attempted to change 
it. Figures such as Adam Smith and David Hume were not just reflecting on the 
operation of the marketplace and human nature, they were attempting to radically 
change government policy.  
 
There were two ‘material’ entities at work: the material expansion of the state, and the 
material practices of political theory.25 These two material entities were closely 
connected, yet they were different. Liberal theory was ultimately based on individuality, 
and individuality was universal. As a universal individualist theory, liberalism knew no 
                                                          
25 In the introduction, drawing on Raymond Williams (2005), I argued that theory has a material aspect. 
Liberalism was an expansive and revolutionary idea that abstracted reality into the relationship between 
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boundaries: it was an expanding materialist entity. By comparison the state was defined 
by boundaries.  The nation became materially naturalized within this spatial tension. 
The nation fulfilled a void, giving a sense of belonging in a material world. The nation 
legitimized state boundaries, whilst providing legitimate boundaries on individuality. 
The nation was not created by the state or political theory, but rather the nation was the 
naturalized result of the dialogue between these two forces.  
 
This chapter examines the evolution of the nation within materialist debates on the 
economy and the state between the 1770s and the 1840s. I examine how major figures 
in the British Enlightenment reflect, in their writings, the material tension between state, 
economy and political theory. Within this tension a space emerged; this space was filled 
by the nation.  
 
These figures include the economists Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, who in their 
respective ways developed liberal (Smith) and conservative (Malthus) arms of liberal 
political economy. Both of these men wrote against the nation in differing ways. We 
can see however, that within their respective works the logic of the nation was apparent. 
Adam Smith and his friend, and mentor, David Hume both actively reflected on the 
emergence of the nation. Hume wrote one of the first dedicated accounts on 
understanding the nation, entitled: ‘On National Characters’. Hume, like Smith and 
Malthus, reflects the materialist logic of his time. His approach to examining the 
national character was to conceive of it through material processes of the state and the 
effects of the natural economy. In doing so, Hume was conceiving the nation within the 
space defined by the tension between the state and the economy. A key aspect to 
liberalism’s handling of the tension between the state and the economy in the 
Enlightenment was the theoretical role of the savage and the barbarian. The savage and 
the barbarian were both products of the Enlightenment imagination. The savage and the 
barbarian emerged as an historical pathway. This pathway was a mechanism which 
explained the tension of the state and the economy to the then contemporary theorists. 
In doing so, these theorists linked the nation to the tribal condition.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the individual and society under the condition of reason; it was actively shaping materialism as much as it 
was a product of it.  
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This subtle emergence of the nation within liberal discourse curtailed the materialist 
logic of liberalism. This was the naturalization of the nation, the affects of which would 
become apparent when liberal political economy was faced with Fredrich List’s 
nationalist challenge. List’s nationalist critique of liberal political economy, and the 
subsequent nationalist indignation of British liberal economists, reveals the extent to 
which liberalism naturalized the nation. As the subsequent chapters portray this process 
was occurring from the metropole to the farthest reaches of the empire.  
 
Conjecturing a Material Basis to the National Character  
A society in liberal theory is a collection of individuals that have a reciprocal and 
interdependent relationship. By comparison, a nation is a community of bonding and 
collective identity that, in Burke’s terms, was a “partnership” though time (Burke 
[1790] 1968: 195). The nation gained meaning through the idea of the ‘national 
character’. It is this vague concept of a ‘collective character’ that places the nation on a 
psychological matrix beyond that of a society.  
 
The early liberal tradition demonstrated strong currents of environmental materialism, 
wherein liberals argued that a harsh environment bred harsh characters; however, 
rational intervention and the propagation of civility could mitigate this natural response 
to an environment. This was the purpose of polite liberal society to moderate and 
civilize harsh characters (Buchan 2004, Porter 2004: 113-48). This early 
environmentalist view of materialism derived from discourses on aesthetics, which 
attributed a person’s psychology and physical characteristics to climatic conditions 
(Bindman 2002: 58-70). For example, it was believed that people who lived in tropical 
climates would become lazy from the heat, and if a person were exposed to too much 
sun, they would develop Negro characteristics. These climatic environmental 
materialists also held that a cold climate would promote brutish barbaric characteristics 
in a person. Living in a cold climate and conscious of being labelled barbaric, the 
Scottish materialists took exception to the climatic theory (Bindman 2002: 69). David 
Hume ([1742] 1998: 113-125), a leading advocate of polite society, devoted an essay to 
the dissection of “national characters” as a means of disproving the climatic theory of 
social character. Hume argued that the collective character was a result of moral 
conditions, which derived from two forces: the first was government leadership whilst 
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the second was the labour conditions that forged a particular mentality.26 Therefore a 
particular type of vocation created particular mindsets. As an example, Hume argues 
that soldiers, in all forms of society, shared a similar character because of the 
precariousness of their lifestyles (Hume [1742] 1998: 114). Above all, Hume believed 
that a “national character” could be nurtured and that the propagation of a polite 
“national character” was an imperative (Hume [1742] 1998: 125).27  
 
Hume’s belief in the propagation of polite society was a common attribute of 
eighteenth-century Scottish intelligentsia who were trying to escape English-imposed 
stigmas that all Scots were uncivilized highlanders (Buchan 2004). The focus on 
profession, as a builder of character, was a change from early-eighteenth century 
approaches which held that character was formed through education alone. The 
emphasis was placed on the act of labour itself, therefore work was considered an 
educational character-building process. This meant that Hume was entrenching the 
“national character” within the material process of production.  
 
By the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries character was attributed to 
material conditions of labour. Material conditions created a particular style of labour. 
Thomas Malthus exemplifies this school of thought. His Principle of Population 
([1798] 1998) was a critique of the liberal idea of nurture and human perfectibility. 
Malthus maintained that nature was a miserable affair and that no amount of optimism 
could overcome this fact. For Malthus everything was linked to material subsistence: 
the economy of food production was the basis of life — he also included social 
characteristics in this viewpoint. He argued that “savage nations” (tribal society) 
propagated domestic slavery as a survival mechanism. The harsh treatment of women 
                                                          
26 Hume was writing in response to Italian and French writers that attributed national character to climatic 
conditions. Environmental theories of materialism were common, but Hume’s counter argument that 
labour was character-building made materialism a psychological theory. (Hume 1998: 113-126) 
27 Although Hume saw the division of labour as forming character, he was following in the footsteps of 
Joseph Addison ([1713] 2005) who believed that rational intervention could shape the national character. 
Addison effectively used his paper the Spectator to create personas and introduce refinement (Porter 
2004: 129). For Addison ([1713] 2005: 133), “reason” and “virtue” corrected humans from their state of 
“barbarity” and that this could only occur from a “suitable Education”. For Addison ([1713] 2005: 134), 
“Discourse of Morality, and Reflections upon human Nature, are the best Means we can make use of to 
improve our Minds, and gain a true Knowledge of our selves, and consequently to recover our Souls out 
of the Vice, Ignorance and Prejudice which naturally cleave to them”. Although Addison was important 
in developing ideas about moulding the collective character through education, thereby projecting 
Locke’s ([1690] 2004) psychology on a grand scale, David Hume ([1742] 1998) broke from this tradition 
by examining the collective character through material processes.  
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rendered them relatively infertile, thereby maintaining a low population; fewer mouths 
to feed meant more resources for the tribe. This principal produced a more equitable 
distribution of resources (Malthus [1798] 1998: 41-44). In turn “nomadic nations”, such 
as Central Asian peoples of the Eurasian Steps, were brutal warlike people because of 
their nomadic-herding-pastoral lifestyle (Malthus [1798] 1998: 42-52). Even modern 
democratic national characteristics, such as the American love of individual liberty, 
Malthus attributed to material conditions (Malthus [1798] 1998: 101-112). The 
Americans had liberty because of their small population and an ever-increasing frontier 
producing the availability of new land for agriculture, thereby creating more resources 
(Malthus [1798] 1998: 104-108). Ultimately his main argument was that a universal 
principle of political equality was untenable in Britain because there was not enough 
food to maintain such a system. An examination of ‘the nation’ was not a principle 
concern of Malthus, but his arguments demonstrate that liberal thinking was attributing 
the construction of national identity to modes of production.  
 
In relating character to modes of production, Malthus’s aim was to present the human 
condition as being an unchanging material law. For him, inequality was a basic part of 
nature. In presenting character as being based on production, Malthus actually 
demonstrated that people could progress, and progress occurred through the agency of 
over-production.28 Industry produced an excess of resources; this enabled equality 
through a greater distribution of resources, as was the case in America. The emphasis 
was that nature allowed for evolution through material industry. Although Malthus was 
arguing against the claims of John Locke and the liberal-Whig tradition, Malthus was 
using the materialist framework outlined by the Scottish Whigs, the most prominent of 
whom were David Hume, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson.29   
                                                          
28 Although Malthus believed progression through changes in modes of production was possible, he was 
not a modern advocate of perpetual growth. Malthus clearly believed that there was a limit to growth and 
when this point was reached misery would take over.  
29 The essence of this material framework derives from the liberal idea of sensation. Thomas Hobbes 
([1651] 1985) had argued that individual character was built through the sensation of the material 
environment. At the same time, Hobbes also believed in the innate condition of desire. It was this innate 
interest to fulfil our desires that was the basis of the Hobbesian character; therefore, in being innate, 
character was not totally a material construction for Hobbes. In comparison Locke did not believe in an 
innate condition, instead seeing people as blank pages, on which “sensation” and “reflection” created the 
individual character (Locke 2004: 109). Sensation was the material affect of nature, whilst reflection was 
the rational intervention of nurturing. The art of reflection constituted reflexivity to the sensations of 
nature. Character could be a nurtured reflection, but character was also the result of a basic material 
experience. This logic of material stimulus became anthropomorphized through the collective experience 
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Liberal political economy was increasingly attributing social development to the 
division of labour. Adam Smith saw the division of labour as an important driving force 
behind social change (Smith [1776] 1981i: 15-19). Similarly, as we have seen, David 
Hume attributed the division of labour to the construction of character and saw it as a 
positive response to desires for luxury. Likewise, Adam Ferguson saw the division of 
labour as a key development in the construction of civil society. Smith, Hume and 
Ferguson all believed that liberty was dependent on the separate sphere of power that 
was generated by the division of labour (Gellner 1994). These materialist views led 
them to see national identity as a result of the material conditions.  
 
These arguments on the division of labour show that liberal theorists were reflecting on 
the emergence of the nation. They were clearly observing the emergence of national 
sentiments and were trying to understand these sentiments within their materialist 
framework. This response demonstrates that as the nation was emerging, liberal theory 
was accommodating the nation within its overall materialist structure.  
Conjectural History 
Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and others, developed a theory of history that became known 
as conjectural history. This was a system of history in which there was scant surviving 
evidence to produce a factual narrative. Although full evidence had not survived the 
tyranny of time, conjectural historians believed a history of the past could be deduced 
from the evidence remaining. The word ‘conjectural’ means supposition or guess. That 
is exactly what the Edinburgh school did — they guessed history.  
 
Conjectural history was a staggered or ‘stadial’ theory of social development, in which 
society progressed from savage society to civil society through an engagement with 
modes of production (Meek 1976). The essence of conjectural history can be found in 
Lockean ideas of development, which profess a ‘stages’ approach to individual and 
social development. This had become a central plank of social contract theory in both 
Britain and France. In the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality ([1754] 1761) and the 
Social Contract ([1762] 1791), Rousseau reasoned that history was a series of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of a similar material condition. These similar conditions created individuals with similar characters. 
Therefore, liberal theory had outlined a materialist logic to the creation of a national character.  
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developmental social stages in which the social contract was an enduring principle. 
However, unlike Rousseau’s gloomy view of human development, conjectural 
historians were positive and focussed on the creation of civil society rather than on the 
creation of government.  
 
Focus on ‘civil society’ rather than ‘state’ was derived from Scotland’s particular 
history (Buchan 2004: 54, 234-237). By the end of the eighteenth century, Scotland was 
a nation without a state after its sovereignty was ceded to the United Kingdom in the 
Act of Union. As James Buchan (2006: 14) maintains, “Union with England had been 
the last throw of a delinquent Scots nobility which saw no future for itself in a world 
being carved up into trading cartels”. Adam Smith argued that all the British colonies 
should be included in the Union, but in each case for a different reason (Buchan 2006: 
14). The fact that economic improvement could be seen to have occurred without the 
existence of a state mercantilism, led conjectural historians to question the necessity of 
the state in relation to economic growth (Buchan 2006, Buchan 2004). In the lifetimes 
of the conjectural historians, economic improvements had accompanied improvements 
in civility; therefore civil society was based upon the material pursuit of affluence.  
 
Understood in terms of the material pursuit of affluence, the study of civil society 
became focused on economic transformations. Society developed along a stage-by-stage 
historical framework starting at savage society, which was the hunter-gatherer society; 
moving to pastoral society, which was a nomadic herding society; developing into 
agricultural society, and becoming perfected as civilized society with a developed 
commercial economy. The Scottish focus on civil society was not totally accepted in 
England. The English materialist tradition (deriving from Hobbes and Locke) places 
emphasis on a democratic civil society focusing on the state. The influence of Edmund 
Burke and the resistance to the French Revolution solidified this concept of state.30 
                                                          
30 Prior to Burke, Samuel Johnson had already laid the foundations to the conservative view of the state. 
His arguments on patriotism and civil liberty were diametrically apposed to any concept of popularism 
“for it tends the subversion of order, and lets wickedness loose upon the land, by destroying the reverence 
due to sovereign authority” (Johnson 1693: 150) and his defence of taxation squarely placed the state as 
the defender of liberty. Johnson’s essay on patriotism reflects the naturalization of the nation in liberal 
theory. Johnson was arguing against liberalism, projecting an earlier vision of patriotism based on the 
idea of a disinterested elite. In doing so, he was trying to maintain a separation between politics and the 
masses. If we read this against the grain, Johnson is arguing that liberals were appealing to the masses’ 
concerns and in doing so they were transforming the elitist conception of patriotism into a new form of 
populism that claimed a democratic ethos. Johnson was witnessing the way liberal politics was adopting a 
sense of nationalism.   
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Rather than civil society negating the role of state (as the Scots argued) the state was 
seen to be the protector of economic liberty and therefore the protector of civil society.  
 
If economic growth was seen as a product of either civil society or the mercantilist state, 
what was the role of the nation in this process? In the grammar of politics, the nation 
and civil society have a tangled historical relationship with each other. As we have seen, 
writers used the terms interchangeably (as will be seen in the second part of this thesis, 
this tradition was continued in the writings on Southeast Asia). The conjectural 
historians were no exception. Adam Smith, David Hume, Adam Ferguson and William 
Robertson all used these terms interchangeably. Yet they also show a distinct separation 
between the idea of civil society and the nation.  
 
Hume’s ([1742] 1998: 49-56) essay on Civil Liberty is a case example of the 
connections between civil society and the nation. Hume ([1742] 1998: 50) opened his 
account with a discussion on civil liberty as the productive source of the arts and 
science, arguing: 
 
It had been observed by the ancients, that all the arts and sciences arose among free nations … It 
had also been observed, that when the Greeks lost their liberty, though they increased mightily in 
riches by means of the conquests of Alexander, yet the arts, from that moment, declined among 
them, and have never since been able to raise their head in that climate. Learning was 
transplanted to Rome, the only free nation at that time in the universe; and having met with so 
favourable a soil, it made prodigious shoots for above a century; till the decay of liberty 
produced also the decay of letters, and spread a total barbarism over the world.  
 
Hume uses the nation, in the generic sense of the tribe or the group. The Greeks were a 
nation, but in other places he refers to particular city-states as also being nations. 
Hume’s use of the word ‘nation’ is reflective of the general ambiguity around the word 
‘nation’ in the eighteenth century. However, within this passage, the nation is clearly 
connected to a free state. Hume’s point is almost a paraphrase of Edward Gibbon’s 
arguments on liberty as a creative force which produced the arts, science and 
governance. Yet, Hume ([1742] 1998: 52) steps away from this point observing that: 
 
The elegance and propriety of style have been very much neglected among us. We have no 
dictionary of our language, and scarcely a tolerable grammar. The first polite prose we have was 
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writ by a man who is still alive … Men, in this country, have been so much occupied in the great 
disputes of Religion, Politics, and Philosophy, that they had no relish for the seemingly minute 
observations of grammar and criticism. 
 
Hume believed that Britain was a free country. He wrote a six-volume history 
documenting how free institutions had emerged from the barbarian customs of the 
Anglo-Saxons to the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The real success of freedom was not 
represented as art but rather commerce: “It has become an established opinion, that 
commerce can never flourish but in a free government; and this opinion seems to be 
founded on a longer and larger experience than … the arts and sciences” (Hume [1742] 
1998: 52). Hume ([1742] 1998: 53) argued that this was because: 
 
There is something hurtful to commerce inherent in the very nature of absolute government … 
commerce … is apt to decay in absolute governments, not because it is less secure, but because it 
is less honourable. A subordination of rank is absolutely necessary to the support of monarchy. 
Birth, titles, and place, must be honoured above industry and riches; and while these notions 
prevail, all the considerable traders will be tempted to throw up their commerce, in order to 
purchase some of those employments, to which privileges and honours are annexed.  
 
This was an interlinked system, whereby freedom necessitated risk therefore 
development; by comparison, absolutism created certainty and therefore style and 
stagnation. What did this mean for the nation? As commented above, Hume used the 
word ‘nation’ to symbolize group, but also (as we have seen above) Hume was a 
pioneering theorist on the characteristics of nationality. The connection between civil 
liberty in civil society and the nation can be found in his History of England (Hume 
[1778] 1983).  
 
Hume’s History of England, was a philosophic history that outlined an historical 
argument for the evolution of free institutions and civil society in England. As well as 
being a philosophic history, it was also a national history (Gillingham 2001, O'Brien 
1997: 56). There is evidence to indicate that Hume was reflectively conscious of the 
role of written history in constructing the nation. The first published volume (which 
eventually became volume five) was originally entitled the History of Great Britain 
(Hume 1754); however, Hume moved away from an interconnected history of Britain, 
favouring instead a national history of England. This change in title reflects Hume’s 
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focus on the nation. The ‘nation’ became a key underlining aspect within his arguments 
on the foundation of liberty and property. The first volume, which was the last volume 
published, portrays the essence of his arguments on the nation, freedom and property.  
 
Similar to Gibbon, Hume argues that the barbarian was the historical source of freedom. 
This freedom was founded on the political economy of barbarism: “the Britons were 
divided into many small nations or tribes; and being a military people, whose sole 
property was their arms and their cattle, it was impossible, after they had acquired a 
relish of liberty, for their princes or chieftains to establish any despotic authority over 
them” (Hume [1778] 1983i: 5). Likewise, “of all the Barbarous nations, known either in 
ancient or modern times, the Germans seem to have been the most distinguished both by 
their manners and political institutions” they “carried the highest … virtues of valour 
and love of liberty” (Hume [1778] 1983i: 15). Their economy was based on “bare 
subsistence,” and a “superior rank” was only acquired through “superior dangers and 
fatigues” (Hume [1778] 1983i: 15). Hume ([1778] 1983i: 16) exulted in the fact that: 
 
All the refined arts of life were unknown among the Germans: Tillage itself was almost wholly 
neglected: They even seem to have been anxious to prevent any improvements of that nature; 
and the leaders, by annually distributing anew all the land among the inhabitants of each village, 
kept them from attaching themselves to particular possessions, or making such progress as might 
divert their attention from military expeditions, the chief occupation of the community.  
 
Hume ([1778] 1983i: 16) revelled in his belief that the Ancient Germans saw their 
existence as being based in freedom, a virtue deriving from rapine: “to die for the 
honour of their band was their chief ambition” whilst “to survive its disgrace”. These 
beliefs were based on the political economy of plunder. Yet he also presented the 
German barbarians within the prism of the nation: “kingly government, when 
established among the Germans (for it was not universal), possessed a very limited 
authority; and though the sovereign was usually chosen from among the royal family, 
he was directed in every measure by the common consent of the nation” (my emphasis). 
In his discussion of the barbarians, Hume was linking the economy to social values; 
these were contained within a conception of the tribe-nation.  
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This conjectural theory of the barbarian was outlined in the first volume of his history of 
England, which was the last to be published. Therefore, although it is his introduction, it 
also represents Hume’s conclusion to a grand tour of the origins of English freedoms. 
Within the first thirty pages, Hume uses the barbarians to destroy the unity of pre-
Roman Britain. Out of this rubble he creates the British nations (England, Scotland and 
Wales) as separate and distinct entities. Originally the Britons had freedom, and were 
subdivided into “nations or tribes” (Hume [1778] 1983i: 5). The Romans used violence 
to destroy this freedom, thereby introducing empire and civility. “The natives, disarmed, 
dispirited, and submissive, had left all desire and even idea of their former liberty and 
independence” (Hume [1778] 1983i: 10). The few Britons who “had fiercer and more 
intractable spirits who deemed war and death itself less intolerable than servitude under 
the victors” were pushed into “Caledonia”. These Britons became the Picts. “They were 
defeated … in a decisive action, and having fixed a chain of garrisons, between the 
firths of Clyde and Forth,” the Romans “cut off the ruder and more barren parts of the 
island, and secured the Roman province from the incursions of the barbarous 
inhabitants” (Hume [1778] 1983i: 10). Using the Romans, Hume creates a scenario 
whereby the tribe-nations of the Britons become separated into the national blocks. This 
took on real meaning with the withdrawal of Rome.  
 
For Hume, the Britons had become used to luxury, as opposed to liberty; therefore, with 
the Roman withdrawal, “the abject Britons regard this present of liberty as fatal to them 
… Unaccustomed both to the perils of war, and to the cares of civil government, they 
found themselves incapable of forming or executing any measures for resisting the 
incursions of the barbarians” (Hume [1778] 1983i: 13). He paints a picture whereby the 
Britons had everything done for them, they had become totally domesticated by the 
Romans. Hume ([1778] 1983i: 13) argued that the national division of the Roman and 
non-Roman Britons (which by this stage in the story he refers to as “Picts and Scots”) 
became apparent with the withdrawal of Rome: “The Picts and Scots, finding that the 
Romans had finally relinquished Britain, now regarded the whole as their prey, and 
attacked the northern wall with redoubled forces”. Hume still refers to the Britons as 
being a collection of territorial tribes, but they are no longer the same as the Picts. 
Therefore Hume is moulding the nation of Scotland out of this tumult.  
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Into this mix come the German barbarians, in the form of the Saxons. They defeat the 
Britons who were then “shut up in the barren counties of Cornwall and Wales” (Hume 
[1778] 1983i: 24). This simple narrative creates the three nations of Britain: England, 
Scotland and Wales.31 These nations are further created through Hume’s discussion of 
historiography, whereby he criticizes the Britons accounts “by the Welsh authors” who 
invented stories to “palliate the weak resistance made at first by their countrymen”. 
Hume criticizes the Welsh accounts at every stage in his argument, in doing so he 
firmly links the Welsh to the British and makes them distinct, from the Scots and the 
Saxons.  
 
Hume’s historical construction of the separateness and distinctness of the three nations 
creates the setting for his grand argument on the evolution of English liberty from 
Saxon tribal customs. In framing his argument in this way, Hume nationalizes liberty. 
Liberty becomes a condition of the English at the expense of the Welsh (who had been 
corrupted by the Romans) and Scots. His historical reasoning forges these nations out of 
material processes that produce particular national characteristics. There is no clear 
connection between the nation and economic thought, yet as this examination of Hume 
shows, the nation was being connected to material ways of being.  
 
The central point that can be garnered from this discussion is that British political 
discourse started to ground the rhetoric of the nation to material forces. Within these 
discussions on conjectural history the aim of the nation was material development, and 
this became the purpose of politics. The then contemporary political aim of conjectural 
history in the late-eighteenth century was to provide a goal for political advancement. 
                                                          
31 This narrative was not new. Hume was heavily reliant on medieval sources. John Gillingham (2001) 
argues that Hume’s basic argument in regards to the Dark Ages and Early Medieval period was a 
development on William of Malmesbury. Gillingham (1992) also maintains that the economic reasoning 
can be found in William of Malmesbury’s ([c.1135] 1911) History of English Kings. The story can be 
taken even further, for much of this narrative is reliant on the Venerable Bede who was writing his 
account of the Dark Ages in c.731. These medieval histories that create stark differences between the 
nations of Britain lead Gillingham (1992) to argue that it was a source of English imperialism, and that 
you can date the emergence of the English nation to the twelfth century. Outside of these Early and High 
Medieval sources, there is little evidence for this narrative to be a real event. Much of the archaeological 
and linguistic work on Dark Age Britain has led a body of experts to question this narrative and the whole 
invasion thesis. For a discussion of this see Francis Pryor (2005). If this evidence is correct, the Saxon 
invasion never occurred. The emergence of the Saxon culture is seen as an adoption of a new continental 
culture, not an invasion of a continental people. However, for our purposes in examining the eighteenth 
century this new discovery that Britain is one people is irrelevant. By the eighteenth century, three 
separate ethnic groups were in existence and as Gillingham argues, the process of separation was a 
process being constructed by intellectuals since the Early Medieval period.  
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All societies were presented as being the same in respect of material development. 
Therefore it was reasoned that the purpose of government was the same anywhere in the 
world. As a universal truth, civil society (as society governed by law, intriguingly 
separate from the state) became a useful criterion legitimising British commercial 
society and explaining Britain’s frustration with foreign nations that were unco-
operative to this commercial world. Effectively, civil society naturalized capitalist 
market relations. Nations that did not comply with civil society, in the sense that they 
had not progressed beyond a particular stage or worse, showed signs that they had 
degenerated, which meant that these nations were challenging the natural material order.  
 
This belief in the material naturalness of civil society was united with a belief in the 
naturalness of the national character. The effect of this was to create a discourse of 
intervention to support civil society by educating recalcitrant national characters. In 
linking politics (as material advancement) to the national character an on tological 
connection was made between material progress and the right to independence. A nation 
only had a right to independence if it observed its obligations to nature, which was 
material progress.  
 
The Savage and the Barbarian  
 
Conjectural history revolutionized social thought. Ronald Meek (1976) argues that this 
theory emerged during the Enlightenment, as philosophers were connecting social 
groups across time and space. These groups were connected by a common productive 
relationship. As William Robertson conjectured in 1759,  
 
‘the Germans and Americans must be the same people.’ But a philosopher will satisfy himself 
with observing, ‘That the characters of nations depend on the state of society in which they live, 
and on the political institutions established among them; and that the human mind, whenever it is 
placed in the same situation, will, in ages the most distant, and countries the most remote, 
assume the same form, and be distinguished by the same manners’ (Meek 1976: 139).  
 
Meek’s argument was that the Enlightenment writers saw a similarity between the 
Germanic tribes and the indigenous Americans. This similarity underpinned conjectural 
theory and was based on the common premise of the savage as a primal social 
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condition. Meek (1976: 7) argued that although eighteenth-century advocates claimed a 
classical pedigree, the evidence for this “is much less than we might have expected, and 
…is not very easy to find unless we know what we are looking for and are fairly adept 
at reading between the lines”. Stadial theory of social development had a “sudden 
emergence” and that “its widespread acceptance and popularisation” in the 
Enlightenment “can hardly have been some accident” (1976: 35-36). Meek’s theory is 
that this “sudden emergence” was related to the dramatic social transformation 
occurring in the eighteenth century.  
 
Meek raises a key point of historiography: how ancient is ‘the savage’? And what is the 
importance of the savage? J.G.A Pocock (2005: 3) argues that the savage, “meaning the 
hunter or hunter-gatherer … was paradoxically a figure of modern history”. The savage 
became a theoretical point of conjecture for the historically questioning ‘moderns’. It 
was a point of retrospection, wherein the philosopher could deduce the original tabula 
rasa, or social form, from which complex society originated. Meek (1976: 14-15) 
attributes Hugo Grotius ([1738] 2005) as an originator of stadial theory, more so than 
the classical philosophers of the ancient world. Therefore, the savage emerges 
concurrently with the rise of natural law and contractual reasoning. Pocock (2005: 4) 
argues that this legalist idea of the “natural man” was clouded by the idea of the “sub-
human”. This was a result of a crisis of historiography:  
 
As Europeans, who believed they had no prehistory but that of patriarchal shepherd clans, took 
to the sea and mastered every arm of the global ocean, they everywhere encountered peoples 
who might be thought hunter-gatherers, or who practised those blends of village horticulture and 
fishing or hunting we now have in mind when we use the term ‘indigenous’ .... There ensued a 
complicated and disastrous history in which the will to describe such peoples as ‘savage’ (and so 
sub-human) was reinforced by stadial theory, for the reason that … progress … did not seem to 
have occurred outside Eurasia. (Pocock 2005: 3-4) 
 
Pocock raises the important point that the European perception of the past was 
formulated around the medieval idea of patriarchy, rather than modern ideas of 
history.32 The introduction of history to explain the past created the savage as a duality. 
                                                          
32 Cary J. Nederman (2005) criticizes Pocock on this point arguing that Pocock’s distinction between the 
modern/medieval divide is too absolute.  
Pocok has returned to the postulation of historical and historiographical discontinuity… 
Pocock’s principal historiographical project in volume [3] is the demonstration that the “Decline 
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In historical intellectual thought the idea of the savage fed into a hypothesis of 
contractual and social theory, whilst in culture (namely art and literature) the savage 
became a derogatory mark of primitivism feeding into ideas of race (Bindman 2002: 42-
46, Pocock 2005: 3-4). Therefore the savage was a duality. It was both economic model 
and the source of cultural identity. For historians and philosophers the savage was an 
economic model of conjectural theory. This meant that the condition of the savage was 
a universal tabula rasa, but the ‘savage’ condition varied from region to region. As 
Hume maintained, the German Barbarians were in league of their own. The condition of 
the savage and values this condition reflected was therefore determined by the mode of 
production. As an expression of values, the savage was a cultural expression. Ronald 
Meek (1976) Ter Ellingson (2001), David Bindman (2002) and J.G.A Pocock (2005) 
argue that by the intertwining of the savage as a an economic model, and with the 
savage as a cultural expression, the savage became an ideology that was superimposed 
on indigenous societies. The result was disastrous. These societies were both idealized 
and derided. Together Meek, Ellingson, Bindman and Pocock indicate that the savage 
was an expression of modernity and culture. In both respects the savage symbolized 
what it meant to be modern. Therefore, the savage became a cultural opposite of 
modernity that was defined by modernity.  
 
If the savage was a creation of modernity, was the barbarian also a creation of 
modernity? Was the barbarian the same as the savage, and as such, suffer the same 
problems of modernity that Pocock saw the savage occupying? These questions reflect 
the fact that the barbarian has been a neglected part of social theory. For example, there 
is no topic of ‘barbarian’ listed in Meek’s (1976) index. Most modern writers, focusing 
on the eighteenth-century savage, and view the barbarian and savage as being 
interchangeable. Pocock argues that the barbarian is distinctly different to the savage. 
Unlike the savage, “the barbarian inhabited both ancient and modern history” (Pocock 
2005: 3). For Pocock (2005: 3) the barbarian “linked antiquity to modernity”. The 
barbarian had been an “agent in replacing the ancient world”, and the “processes of his 
[the barbarian’s] civilising had been crucial to the replacement of the” ancient “world 
                                                                                                                                                                          
and Fall” trope highlighted by Gibbon reflects a clear-cut Renaissance invention arising from the 
innovations (or perhaps renovations) of the Florentine civic humanist circle. Pocock himself 
repeatedly invokes this claim … in order to identity “decline and fall” as a standard for 
delineating “medieval political thought” from succeeding modes of engaging in the enterprise of 
political theory.  (Nederman 2005: 3) 
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by civil society and commerce”. In answer to the question: “Who were the barbarians?”, 
Pocock (2005: 13) argues that “they are ourselves”. In the personification of the 
barbarian “primeval liberty came to be confronted and reconciled with Roman law” 
(Pocock 2005: 13). Pocock’s argument is that the barbarian brought the ancient world 
into the modern. Although the barbarian was similar to the savage, there was a distinct 
difference. The barbarian brought forward ancient liberty, therefore the barbarian 
provided a connection to ancient culture. Unlike the savage, who was primarily an 
economic model, the barbarian could be located in history and a source of cultural 
heritage.  
 
One aspect of this cultural distinction was the difference between the barbarian and 
barbarism. Barbarism is the culture of the barbarian. As a cultural expression 
‘barbarism’ was more widely used than ‘the barbarian’ in the eighteenth and nineteenth-
centuries. Any word-search of eighteenth-century political/historical text will reveal 
more hits for the word ‘barbarism’ and ‘barbarity’ than ‘the barbarian’.33 Unlike the 
condition of barbarism, ‘the barbarian’ was close to, if not being, a proper name.34 
Stemming from the ancient Greek interpretation of the word barbarian, ‘the barbarians’ 
became a generic term for non-Greek speakers; but it also had a particular European 
meaning. The name ‘barbarian’ was more often used in reference to the northern tribes 
of Europe as we have already seen in relation to David Hume’s ([1778] 1983) History 
of England.  
 
Most of the writing on the barbarian occurred within philosophic histories. As a result, 
the use of narrative clouds the conception of the ‘barbarian’. Adam Ferguson’s (1767) 
Essay of the History of Civil Society is an exception to this trend. Ferguson’s (1767) 
Civil Society was a social theory rather a philosophic history. His conception of Civil 
Society was based in the culture that emerged from the barbarian. Ferguson became a 
point of reference for most other Enlightenment philosophers commenting on the 
barbarian. To Ferguson, the barbarian epitomized freedom, but he also saw the 
barbarian as being distinct from the savage. The distinction between the savage and the 
                                                          
33 The two comprehensive full text databases I used were Thomson-Gales’ Eighteenth Century 
Collections Online and The Making of the Modern World. For further information on these databases see 
www.gale.com.  
34 Edward Gibbon or his printer almost always accorded the ‘Barbarian’ with a capital initial (Pocock 
2005: 11) underlining the tendency to see the barbarian as a proper name.  
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barbarian was based on the evolution of property. The savage was “not yet acquainted 
with property”, whilst the barbarian had “possessed themselves of herds” and “although 
not ascertained by laws” property had become “a principal object of care and desire” 
(Ferguson 1767: 123-124). Without the law controlling the barbarian desire for 
property, the barbarian was free to steal. Ferguson argued this knowledge of “poor and 
rich … must create a material difference of character”. Likewise, Ferguson saw this 
distinction as the source of the tribal nation, arguing that tribal patriotism was a basic 
human characteristic: “we love individuals on account of personal qualities; but we love 
our country, as it is a party in the division of mankind; and our zeal for its interest, is a 
predilection in behalf of the side we maintain” (Ferguson 1767: 31).  
 
There is something macabre about Ferguson’s distinction between love of individuals 
and love of a country. Ferguson’s argument is that love of country is based on our desire 
to dislike others. He saw “every nation” as a “band of robbers” that “prey without 
restraint or remorse on their neighbours” (Ferguson 1767: 150). The core characteristic 
of the nation was that of the thief. Therefore, the nation continued the barbarian desire 
for property through plunder of foreigners, but it also connected the nation to the pursuit 
of empire.  
 
Ferguson saw barbarism as a universal social form. This form was based on a particular 
mode of production. This mode of production created a particular culture.  
 
[This culture] actuated by great passions, the love of glory, and desire of victory; roused by the 
menaces of an enemy, or stung with revenge; in suspense between the prospects of ruin or 
conquest, the barbarian spends every moment of relaxation in the indulgence of sloth (Ferguson 
1767: 154).  
 
For Ferguson, the origins of the nation and civil society were with the barbarian. This 
barbarian was not quite universal. Ferguson’s (1767: 123,150) descriptions of barbarous 
societies are global, for he says “a similar spirit reigned, without exception, in all the 
barbarous nation of Europe, Asia and Africa”. However, this was the “barbarous spirit”, 
and not the barbarian. This goes back to the previously discussed distinction between 
barbarism and the barbarian. His descriptions of the barbarian are based on the 
Chapter 3 – Communities of Capital 
 99
European tribes. The barbarian was a European identity. The “barbarous spirits” that 
occupied other parts of the globe were not quite the real thing.  
 
This tradition continued into the nineteenth century. Richard Cobden often used the 
terms ‘barbarism’ and ‘barbarity’ in his political pamphlets and speeches, yet in his 
collected works he only once used the term ‘barbarian’. This was in relation to the 
Polish nation which he maintained was based on the original barbarian tribes of 
northern Europe (Cobden 1867i: 219). In its eighteenth and nineteenth-century usage, 
‘the barbarian’ inevitably reflected the primordial tribal origins of European nations.  
 
For Pocock (2005: 13) the distinction between the European barbarian and barbarism 
outside of Europe was that “‘oriental’ extension of ‘barbarism’ encountered an image of 
‘despotism’ ” whilst the “the northward extension of the term encountered the more 
problematic concept of ‘liberty’ ”. Pocock (2005: 10) argues that “Gibbon painted the 
Goths and the Persians as ‘barbarian’. “The latter peoples are ‘barbarian’ in the sense 
that they are not civilized, whereas the Persians, though ‘barbarians’, are not merely 
civilized, but ‘civilized and corrupted’ ”. Both of these interpretations of barbarism, 
Pocock argues, were drawn from antiquity. The first being barbarism of language; the 
second being Aristotle’s idea of the barbarian, who was a ‘slave by nature’. The non-
Europeans were therefore barbarians “because they do not live in free cities” (Pocock 
2005: 12). 
 
Yet there is another aspect of this extension of barbarism. In each of the above 
examples, barbarism exists as the primal culture of Europe. Travellers observed similar 
cultural forms in other parts of the world and examined non-European cultures through 
the ideas of the barbarian and barbarism. Therefore the Enlightenment’s conception of 
the barbarian underwent a global expansion. The barbarian became a state of mind, an 
expression of freedom that could be observed across time and space in all societies. The 
barbarian takes on the role of ethnicity, being an early expression of ethnicity before the 
modern concept of ethnicity emerged.35 This ‘barbarian ethnicity’ was European 
particularism; but in identifying ‘barbarism’ outside of Europe, the Europeans were 
                                                          
35 It is interesting to note the word ethnicity supports this. A 1799 dictionary lists the word ‘ethnic’ as:  
“ethnic, a. heathenish — a heathen, a pagan” (Hamilton 1799: 78). Therefore the word ‘ethnic’ has its 
origins in the pagan barbarian. 
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seeing the same foundation blocks to the nation in the non-European world. Barbarism 
was an expansionary ethnocentric vision of the world. The only difference was that 
Europeans were pure barbarians, whilst the others were barbarian-like.  
 
 
The Emperor’s New Clothes 
 
The first part of this chapter examined how the concept of the ‘nation’ crept into 
economic language as a means of describing civil society and explaining social 
differences. This described an increased use of the nation to explain identity, but it 
doesn’t explain why the process of naturalising the nation occurred. An underlying 
question remains: why did liberal theory, which is based on individuality, give a role to 
the nation? As a theory of individuality, there is no logical necessity for the nation 
within liberal theory. Yet we see the nation being naturalized within liberal theory 
throughout the nineteenth century, and eventually expressed as a central part of liberal 
theory. This question is rarely addressed by liberal theorists?36 This is partly because 
liberalism mutated in the nineteenth-century and thereby avoided the bearing of this 
question.37 Since the mid-nineteenth century, liberalism has assumed the naturalness of 
                                                          
36 Yael Tamir’s (1995: 14) work on liberal nationalism is, in her own words “an attempt to bridge the gap 
between the liberal and communitarian approaches to the question of human nature”. However, Tamir’s 
work is symptomatic of the liberal approach to the nation. The basic premise that Tamir works with is to 
assume the naturalness of the individual and the naturalness of the nation. From these two points she 
looks for areas of commonality. In assuming the naturalness of both the nation and the individual, Tamir 
avoids examining the historical construction of the idea of the nation within liberal theory. The two 
ideologies are examined as separate entities, rather than historically interlinked processes that evolved 
together. This process occurred by virtue of the fact that liberal intellectuals rhetorically espoused the 
nation whilst also basing their programmatic policies on the primacy of the individual. This political 
discourse assumed the naturalness of both the nation and the individual. In developing their arguments, 
these advocates added to the meaning of the nation and the individual, thereby constructing the modern 
nation and ideas about individuality. It was this process that allowed liberalism to naturalize the nation, 
without examining the contradictions between the cultural community of the nation and individuality.    
37 One liberal writer that did realize the problematic baring of this question in relation to self-
determination was Ludwig von Mises. Mises ([1919] 2006: 7) recognized the historical relationship 
between liberalism and the nation arguing that: 
Only since the second half of the eighteenth century did it gradually take on the significance that 
it has for us today, and not until the nineteenth century did this usage of the word become 
general. Its political significance developed step-by-step with the concept; national became a 
central point of political thought. The word and concept nation belong completely to the modern 
sphere of ideas of political and philosophical individualism; they win importance for real life 
only in modern democracy.  
However, his argument avoided the communitarian traps around the nation that would contradict his 
liberal theory, by the fact that he separated nationalism from patriotism claiming the “national aspect can 
be neither where he lives nor his attachment to the state” (Mises [1919] 2006: 7). Mises’s argument relies 
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the nation, and, therefore, the direction of global liberalism moved towards the 
proliferation of nations through self-determination. In doing so, the practice of 
liberalism has avoided the theoretical problem of the nation as a point of difference to 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
Eighteenth and nineteenth-century liberalism expressed universal cosmopolitanism as a 
basic premise. For example, Tom Paine wrote of the rights of man, not the rights of 
nations; whilst Adam Smith was scathing of national sentiments, believing they lead to 
pointless deaths and misery (Smith [1790] 2002: 269); and finally the French 
revolutionaries originally saw themselves as liberating humanity, rather than the French 
nation. In turn, when writing in the 1840s, the cosmopolitan credentials of liberalism 
was a point of criticism for the nationalist economist Fredrich List, who commented 
“Quesnay (from whom the idea of universal free trade originated) was the first who 
extended his investigations to the whole human race, without taking into consideration 
the idea of the nation” (List [1841] 1909: 97).38 Throughout the eighteenth-century and 
well into the nineteenth-century, liberalism was synonymous with cosmopolitanism.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
on a narrow definition of the nation that defined it as a “speech community” which is different to the idea 
of the equally “modern” idea of race:  
It was introduced into politics in deliberate opposition to the concept of nation. The 
individualistic idea of the national community was to be displaced by the collectivist idea of the 
racial community (Mises [1919] 2006: 8). 
Therefore liberalism and the nation co-inside to the extent that a language shapes the discourse of a 
political society. Therefore nationalism becomes the promotion of a language by the use of the state and 
nothing else. Mises’s arguments exclude any contradiction by his rejection of a connection between 
community and the nation. His arguments create further problems in relation to multi-cultural societies 
that speak multiple languages, in such instances his argument is the total minimisation of the state away 
from anything to do with language and distribution of goods (Mises [1927] 2005: 76-87).  
38 List’s criticism of Smith’s cosmopolitanism has consistently led to the criticism that List misunderstood 
Smith. Nicholson, who wrote the introductory essay to the 1885 English edition, speculated that “one 
would almost suppose that List had never read Adam Smith himself, but had taken for granted the 
Smithianismus bandied about in popular pamphlets” (Nicholson 1909). As this chapter demonstrates these 
criticisms of List are overstated and reflect the tension between liberal cosmopolitan theory and the 
nationalist reality of the time. A more recent critic of List is Liah Greenfeld. However, Greenfeld’s (2003) 
argument is essentially the same as List’s, with Greenfeld maintaining that nationalism is the stimulus 
behind economic growth. Contrary to List, Greenfeld maintains that “nationality was not a corrective or 
an addition to Smith’s vision of society, or even its central element; it was the very framework of this 
vision. The reasoning in both The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations reflected the 
eighteenth-century English national consciousness” (Greenfeld 2003: 32). Like the nineteenth century 
laissez-fare critics of List, Greenfeld overstates the argument. The way that she has presented her 
argument is that the nation and nationality was born in the late-seventeenth century in Britain. As we have 
already seen, it is not that clear cut. In terms of her argument about Smith, outside of the title Wealth of 
Nations, Smith is very critical of national sentiments; therefore Smith was actively writing against 
nationality. Although Greenfeld overstates the argument, Smith reflects the emergence of the nation 
within his writing. Greenfeld states: 
Smith presumed a uniformity in the most significant cultural element of societies—the way in 
which they defined their identities—and for that reason was able to analyse social and economic 
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For liberals of the Enlightenment, the state was a transitionary stage that was proving 
very hard to get over. Rousseau ([1756] 1917) and Kant (1796) both examined ways in 
which federation could overcome the jealous differences between states. By comparison 
the French physiocrats and the figures of the British Enlightenment all looked to a 
transcendent civil society. This civil society existed above and beyond the state, and as 
such would be a means of transcending the emerging nation-states. These strains all 
lead to the theoretical logic of liberalism: that politics was based around the individual 
and the natural cosmopolitanism of individuality. In such a theory, nation had no logical 
reason for existence. All theoretical attempts to explain the nation, as seen so far in the 
chapter, focused on presenting the nation as an accident of locality. The true state of 
humans was believed to be cosmopolitanism and universal.  
 
Despite the commitment of liberal theorists, cosmopolitanism was their biggest failure. 
Regardless of the predictions by liberal soothsayers that trade would unite the world, 
cosmopolitanism never reached the heights that were proclaimed for it. Liberalism was 
and still is a complex materialist theory preaching globalization.39 Yet the high priests 
of liberal theory apparently appeared never to notice this failure. With gusto, liberals 
made the transition from cosmopolitanists to nationalists. For example, John Stuart Mill 
was a Benthamite preacher of cosmopolitanism, but Mill is also remembered as a 
founder of liberal nationalism and one of the first advocates of self-determination.40 The 
transition occurred within Mill’s lifespan, with the naturalization of the nation being so 
subtle that nobody noticed.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                          
processes as if they took place in a cultural vacuum. The inattention to culture was culturally 
determined: it was a consequence of Smith’s untroubled national consciousness. If anything, he 
should have been accused of taking nationality too seriously (Greenfeld 2003: 32-33).  
It is not so much that Smith was ‘untroubled’ by national consciousness, but rather the fact that it is still 
emerging. Smith sees cultural identity in terms of civilizational development, and henceforth it is 
universal. However within this universal language, as this chapter demonstrates, Smith creates spatial 
pockets of theory in which the nation can be introduced. This is not because Smith is a nationalist, but 
rather there are practical limitations to the liberal world view, namely the existence of absolutist states. 
These states were transformed through the nation.    
39 The materialist advocates of liberalism such as Ohmae (1990) and Friedman (2005) are still preaching 
that economic integration will transform our political structures.  
40 Lord Acton ([1862] 1996) launched one of the first philosophical criticism of nationally as a political 
movement. Much of Acton’s attack is levelled against John Stuart Mill who embraced nationality in his 
book Representative Government ([1861] 1998). For a more recent discussion of Mill’s ideas on 
nationality and self-determination see Varouxakis (2002). 
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One group of breakaway ‘liberals’ maintained the cosmopolitan ethos. Karl Marx, 
schooled in the Hegelian logic of state, became a convert to the laissez-fare use of 
political economy.41 Marx consciously adopted the expansionist logic of capitalist 
cosmopolitan society, proclaiming that ‘all that is solid melts into air’ and that all 
political and social institutions were mere by-products of the means of production. Yet 
despite his materialist commitment, Marx still accepted the nation as a basic social 
institution. Marxists have been very aware of this contradiction and the overall problem 
of nation to their universality.42 Nevertheless, the fact that Marx could maintain this 
contradiction, without attending to its consequences is testament to how well the nation 
was accepted as a natural reality in the nineteenth-century.  
 
This section of the chapter examines how the nation undermined liberal theories of 
cosmopolitan capitalist expansion. In doing so it looks at why these theories, which 
were based on individualism, still expressed the concept of the nation. The origin of this 
global-national duality lies within the particular transition from the mercantilist theory 
of commercial expansion to the capitalist theory of commercial expansion. Political 
economy did not emerge in a pure form, by this I mean that it did not emerge as a 
theory in isolation that was built from the ground up. But rather developed as a practical 
guide to action; as a means of draining the polluted swamp of mercantilism. This left 
the indelible stain of the nation in the genealogy of liberal political economy. 
 
                                                          
41 Marx’s origins as a radical liberal are widely documented see David McLellan (1976: 7, 1972) and 
Gareth Stedman-Jones (2002: 53). Even many of the programmatic ideas within the Communist 
Manifesto (Marx and Engels [1848] 2002: 243-244) such as “a heavy progressive or graduated income 
tax”, “free ecucation for all children in public schools” or even “extension of factories and instruments of 
production owned by the State”; “the bringing into cultivation of wastelands, and the improvement of the 
soil generally in accordance with a common plan” fall under the category of radical democratic 
liberalism, many of his points became common policies in the twentieth century.   
42 Marx proclaimed that Prometheus was the first communist. If this is the case, the ravens that 
relentlessly tore Prometheus body by day, are an appropriate analogy for the relationship between 
Marxism and nationalism. The nation has continually undermined the Marxist vision of a cosmopolitan 
utopia (Connor 1984). Communism’s twentieth-century history has been continually at odds with the 
nation — events and struggles from the socialist and communist attempt to prevent World War One led 
by Jean Jaures and Rosa Luxemburg; to the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky over Stalin’s desire for 
country first approach to communism against Trotsky’s internationalism; to the struggles of socialists and 
communists against nationalists and fascists throughout 1930s Europe; to the eventual collapse of the 
Soviet Union under pressure from nationalist movements. Marxist materialist theories were continually 
challenged internally and externally by competing ideas of nationalist identity.  
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The Mercantilist Lineage  
Mercantilism has long been seen as a source of nationalist identity (Anderson 1974: 36, 
Greenfeld 2003: 43-50, Woo-Curnings 1999). The nationalist economist, Fredrich List 
(1789-1846), readily connected his nationalist political economy to mercantilism by 
claiming that before the economists emerged “there existed only a practice of political 
economy which was exercised by the State officials, administrators, and authors who 
wrote about matters of administration, occupied themselves exclusively with the 
agriculture, manufactures, commerce, and navigation of those countries to which they 
belonged” (List [1841] 1909: 97). Mercantilism was a theory of economic exchange that 
presented the state as the primary unit of the economy. In doing so, Perry Anderson 
maintains that “mercantilism was precisely a theory of the coherent intervention of the 
political state into the workings of the economy, in the joint interests of the prosperity 
of the one and the power of the other” (Anderson 1974: 36). The lineage of 
mercantilism emerged from the fact that the state was the private property of the 
monarch (Hardt and Negri 2000: 90-105). Therefore, in intervening in the market-place 
and offering mercantilist monopolies, the monarch was rationally protecting their own 
assets.  
 
By the late-eighteenth century, mercantilism had been transformed from a structure 
based around the enrichment of the monarch, to an organized system of trade that was 
meant to benefit the subjects of the state as a whole. Adam Smith concluded that the 
“ultimate objective” of mercantilism was “to enrich the country by an advantageous 
balance of trade”. In doing so he maintained, “it discourages the exportation of the 
materials of manufacture” thereby giving an advantage to domestic “workmen … 
enabling them to undersell” all “other nations in all foreign markets”. By restraining the 
export of primary produce, “commodities of no great price”, mercantilism proposes “to 
occasion a much greater and more valuable exportation of others” (Smith [1776] 1981ii: 
137). The state intervenes in the market-place to protect domestic industry. The problem 
with this, for Smith and his laissez faire followers, was that protectionism did not 
favour the majority of the population. Smith claimed that:  
 
It cannot be very difficult to determine who have been the contrivers of this whole mercantile 
system; not the consumers, we may believe, whose interest has been entirely neglected; but the 
producers, whose interest had been so carefully attended to; and among this latter class our 
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merchants and manufacturers have been by far the principal architects (Smith [1776] 1981ii: 
156).  
 
Smith’s and the physiocrats’ concerns were with the welfare of the people, rather than 
the profits of the merchants and the producers (Rothschild 2001). This is an important 
point that is often missed by commentators on Smith (Fleischacker 2005: 4-11,72-80, 
Greenfeld 2003: 6). Smith’s concern was with the ordinary people, their poverty, their 
fears of famine, and their general plight (Rothschild 2001: 81-86). Therefore his 
theories were not directly concerned with national wealth, but rather individual security 
through affluence. He did not generally have a high opinion of merchants. The oft-
quoted passage of the ‘invisible hand’ is testament to this: 
 
He intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, lead by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was no part of his intention... By pursuing his own interest he 
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote 
it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is 
an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be 
employed in dissuading them from it (Smith [1776] 1981 i: 400).  
  
Smith’s invisible hand was the hand of last resort existing as a means of stopping 
political corruption (Fleischacker 2005: 148-153, Rothschild 2001: 128, 146). It was the 
hand that transformed profiteering into cheap prices, wherein the merchant was forced 
to lower their prices in the name of self-interest. This competition would counteract any 
attempt at price-fixing. In doing so, the cheapest price was offered to the consumer, 
thereby giving the people access to luxury goods that would make their lives easer. This 
was the theory of individualism. The nation and the state are not important within 
Smith’s theory of economic development. Their only purpose in the Wealth of Nations 
was that Smith argued against their historic role. Smith’s concern was not with nations, 
but rather the people within nations. It was this concern with individuals that Fredrich 
List ([1841] 1909: 99-100) criticized.  
 
Adam Smith treats his doctrine … by making it his task to indicate the cosmopolitical idea of the 
absolute freedom of the commerce of the whole world … Adam Smith concerned himself as 
little as Quesney did with true political economy, i.e. that policy which each separate nation had 
to obey in order to make progress in its economical conditions … He speaks of the various 
systems of political economy in a separate part of his work solely for the purpose of 
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demonstrating their non-efficiency, and of providing that ‘political’ or national economy must be 
replaced by ‘cosmopolitical or world-wide economy.’ 
 
The essence of List’s criticism of Smith was that Smith’s theory was based on an 
idealized materialism of individualist exchange. List’s criticisms of this individualist 
exchange were principally expressed through rhetorical arguments that presumed the 
naturalness of the nation, such as: 
 
Thus the popular school, which … ignores the principles of nationality and national interests, … 
leaving individuals to defend them as they may solely by their own individual powers. How? Is 
the wisdom of private economy, also wisdom in national economy? Is it in the nature of 
individuals to take into consideration the wants of future centuries, as those concern the nature of 
the nation and the State? (List [1841] 1909: 133) 
 
 “Lasting national prosperity” could only occur when “the interest of individuals” had 
“been subordinated to those of the nation and where successive generations” had 
“striven for one and the same object” (List [1841] 1909: 132). List presented this point 
in the romantic language of nation, but his argument was essentially the same as Jean 
Jacques Rousseau’s ([1756] 1917) argument on the possibility of world peace; namely 
that free trade was impossible because of the sovereign political structure of states. 
List’s argument was that trade occurred in an environment of intense rivalry between 
states. Free trade was linked to political unity and argued that federalism was the only 
way to create free trade.  
 
Fredrich List was very influential in the English speaking world for developing a 
coherent economic argument for protectionism. By 1815 List was a senior Civil Servant 
in the state of Wurtemberg. He was given the task by his superiors to develop a reform 
agenda. From this point he became Professor of Practical Administration at the 
University of Tubingen and was elected to the National Assembly of Wurtemberg 
twice. List’s agitation for commercial reforms occurred in the aftermath of the 
Napoleonic War (1815-1822). This was a period of conservatism. List’s arguments were 
too revolutionary for the King’s liking and his fall from favour was quick. List was 
expelled from the Assembly, and condemned to ten months hard labour and forced to 
renounce his nationality. Therefore, a key nineteenth-century writer on the link between 
the economy and the nation became nationless. However, his argument was that 
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Wurtenberg was not a nation. Even though Germany did not exist in the 1820s, List saw 
himself as a German national,  
 
Faced with being a stateless refugee, List took refuge in the United States of America. 
He became a journalist and agitator for protective tariffs against British manufactures. 
The aim of these tariffs was to protect American industrial development. During this 
period he published a series of lectures and pamphlets on political economy, which 
were very influential in the United States (List 1827). When he returned to Europe in 
the 1830s, List was protected by his United States citizenship. In 1841 he published his 
influential National System of Political Economy ([1841] 1909). List’s National System 
was released in the wake of the repeal of the British Corn Laws. In this environment, 
British liberal economists assumed that German states would likewise drop their tariffs. 
List’s National System directly challenged the economic logic to this assumption and 
had global appeal in the 1840s. The liberal reaction in Britain was aggressive, The 
Edinburg Review (Anonymous 1847, Austin 1842) and Westminster Review 
(Anonymous 1845) published a number of articles savagely critiquing List’s arguments, 
accusing List of unleashing the barbarism of the nation into the practice of political 
economy. However the response was not all negative the protectionists within Britain 
and the wider British Empire saw List as an ally, and readily deferred to his ideas (Cole 
1860, Forbes 1847).  
 
List’s was essentially a political argument: namely that the state distorted trade, and that 
this should be encouraged. The problem with federalism was that it required the 
construction of a state. List did not see the state as an expansionist entity. For him there 
were clear limits to the state, for the state was an expression of the nation:  
 
Between each individual and entire humanity, however, stands THE NATION, with its special 
language and literature, with its peculiar origin and history, with its special manners and customs, 
laws and institutions, with the claims of all these for existence, independence, perfection, and 
continuance for the future, and with its separate territory; a society which, united by a thousand ties 
of mind and of interests, combines itself into one independent whole, which recognises the law of 
right for and within itself, and in its united character is still opposed to other societies of a similar 
kind in their national liberty, and consequently can only under the existing conditions of the world 
maintain self-existence and independence by its own power and resources. As the individual chiefly 
obtain by means of the nation and in the nation mental culture, power of production, security, and 
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prosperity, so is the civilisation of the human race only conceivable and possible by means of the 
civilisation and development of the individual nations (List [1841] 1909: 141).  
 
List blends the nation and sovereignty together, producing an ethnocentric state. At the 
same time, List’s idea of the nation has strong comparisons to the eighteenth-century 
idea of civil society. Previously in this chapter, we looked at how civil society emerged 
out of materialist arguments to explain the existence of societies. List uses the concept 
of ‘nation’ in the same way. Like a civil society, List’s nation exists as a transcending 
entity to that of the state: with the nation structuring the state in some way. However, 
there are big differences as well. The eighteenth-century idea of civil society was 
effectively used to legitimise revolution. As a materialist entity, liberal civil society was 
based on a contract that could be broken — with new civil societies being the result of 
this breach of contract.  It was the fluid nature of liberal civil society that led Edmund 
Burke to make his critique of individuality: “I must deny to be among the direct original 
rights of man in civil society; for I have in my contemplation the civil social man, and 
no other” (Burke [1790] 1968: 150). As for social being, Burke argued, “If civil society 
be made for the advantage of man, all the advantages for which it is made become his 
rights. It is an institution of beneficence” (Burke [1790] 1968: 149). Yet “in this 
partnership all men have equal rights; but not to equal things” (Burke [1790] 1968: 
150). For Burke ([1790] 1968: 150), this lack of equality to things was to be “settled by 
convention”. Civil society was an amalgam of institutions built up over time, producing 
a contract, leading to the following often quoted argument: 
 
The state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of 
pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little 
temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with 
other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal 
existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science a partnership in 
all art; a partnership in every venture, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership 
cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who 
are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. 
(Burke [1790] 1968: 194-5)  
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List’s adoption of the ‘nation’ parallels the adoption of the Burkean view of civil 
society and state.43 Therefore, although List uses the concept of the ‘nation’ in the same 
way as liberals used ‘civil society’, List’s ‘nation’ became an unbreakable contract that 
travelled through time, and therefore existed above materialism. It was this 
transcendence that allowed List to claim that materialism could be harnessed by 
government for the benefit of the nation.  
 
Although it was only originally published in German (and not published in English until 
1856), List’s National System of Political Economy created a stir within Britain when it 
was first published in 1841.44 Advocates of free trade saw List’s publication as a major 
threat to their dominance of political economy. John Stuart Mill commented that “the 
state of public feeling to which such a book recommends itself is a very serious 
consideration” (Mill [1842] 1963: 528). Since the Enlightenment, political economy had 
been the preferred battleground of reformist liberals. In the eighteenth century, 
conservatives had riled against the emerging theories of political economy as being 
revolutionary. Much of Edmund Burke’s Reflections were aimed directly at advocates 
of political economy. However, in the early-nineteenth century conservatives were 
encroaching on political economy, separating economic freedom from political 
freedom: a distinction that didn’t exist before the French Revolution (Rothschild 2001: 
57-61). With the future of the corn laws the hot political topic of the 1830s and 1840s, 
                                                          
43 List does give reference to Burke. However, it was not a substantial reference. List ([1841] 1909: 319) 
used Burke’s critique of Adam Smith: “it was that Burke declared in confidence to Adam Smith ‘that a 
nation must not be governed according to cosmopolitical systems, but according to knowledge of their 
special national interests acquired by deep research.’” 
44 The 1856 edition of List was published in the United States, and a condensed version was published in 
Melbourne Australia in 1860. List was not published in Britain until 1885. The publication of List in 
Melbourne and United States 25 years before its publication in London is not surprising. Both Australia 
and the United States were developing economies based largely on agricultural exports. George Cole, the 
Melbourne editor of List argued that: 
Victoria can never prosper until, by a judicious and careful revision of the tariff, every 
encouragement would be given to manufacturing industry; and I can only hope that whatever 
may have been ‘said’ or ‘written’ that the subject will be now taken up in a proper spirit, and that 
a tariff will be formed so as to ensure to manufacturing enterprize security that it will not be 
swamped by importations from abroad (Cole 1860: iv).  
The tone of these periphery editions is very different to that of the 1885 London edition. Both the 
American and the Melbourne editions advocate List as a real alternative economic system, in comparison 
the London edition which presents List as economic oddity. The Melbourne edition is particularly 
interesting, because the edition appears not to grasp List’s overall argument. List argued that free trade 
unified nations, and needed to be supported by a unified political system. Hence List maintained that free 
trade was an agent in the federation of Germanic states. Cole doesn’t seem grasp this same conclusion in 
relation to Australia. His argument is based totally around the development of a Victorian nation not an 
Australian nation. The fact that Cole doesn’t comment on this is testament to the fact that an Australian 
nation was not a forgone conclusion.  
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British political debate centred on the debate between free trade and protectionism. The 
free traders held a monopoly on grand theory, Mill’s previously quoted concern was 
that List could potentially change this balance. List had already been instrumental in 
pushing protectionism in the United States of America (Austin 1842: 519). The fear for 
liberals was that the protectionists would lock on to List’s nationalist arguments.  
  
John Austin was one of the leading liberal attack dogs. He was charged with 
discrediting List.45 In a series of lectures and articles, Austin proclaimed that List’s 
theories are “not a system of political economy, but a system or theory of international 
trade”, and condemned List’s arguments even further: “as a system of international 
trade, his treaties is unworthy of notice” (Austin 1842: 521). Austin was scathing of 
List, calling him Zealot and referred to List’s theory as “his pretended system” (Austin 
1842: 519,520). Austin’s defence of laissez faire was predictable and doctrinaire and 
does not concern us, what is interesting is his response to the idea of the nation.  
 
Austin concluded his attack on List by stating “Dr List … labours to diffuse a spirit of 
exclusive and barbarous nationality in the country of Liebnitz, Kant, and Lessing” 
(Austin 1842: 556). Clearly Austin felt that List was a dangerous nationalist, and we 
should also note that, relevant to our discussion on the relation between nations and 
barbarism, Austin connects the words ‘barbarous’ and ‘nationality’.  
 
Although Austin was connecting nationality to barbarism, he also objected to the label 
cosmopolitan. He mockingly stated that List was proud to discover “that the theories of 
political economy, which embrace the principle of free international trade, are properly 
theories of cosmopolitical economy”, Austin (1842: 520) writes that it is a “discovery 
which was reserved for his (List’s) own sagacity”. Unfortunately for our purposes, 
Austin (1842: 520) brushes the cosmopolitan claim aside stating: “his poor 
misconception of the doctrines which he tries to brand with the nickname of 
cosmopolitical economy, we cannot examine in the present place”. There is no lasting 
record of Austin addressing this issue; but from his defensive high-handed dismissals of 
                                                          
45 John Stuart Mill ([1842] 1963: 506) commented to Sarah Austin (John Austin’s wife) “I was very glad 
to hear from [James] Stephen the other day that an article is in preparation for the Edin. Rev. on a book 
the nature of which I well remember though I have forgotten the author. Stephen took credit to himself for 
having instigated Mr. Austin to write and publish the things which he had already spoken to him 
(Stephen) on the subject and of which he appeared to have the most genuinely sentie admiration”.  
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List, he clearly felt that political economy had nothing to do with cosmopolitanism, and 
saw List’s comments as an insult.  
 
Not withstanding the debate, the nation was as important a sense of belonging for 
Austin as much as it was for List. In fact, much of Austin’s rejection of List was based 
on nationalist arguments. List was a zealot that regarded “the manufacturing and 
commercial greatness of England with envious and bitter hostility … he misrepresents 
her commercial policy, and appeals to vulgar and malignant prejudices” (Austin 1842: 
522). Austin clearly felt that List was spreading propaganda about British/English 
commercial practices, and accuses List of being an “unscrupulous advocate” for the 
“decay” of British industry. In doing so, Austin argued that List was “not” following the 
path of a “dispassionate enquirer seeking to promote the improvement of a science or an 
art” (Austin 1842: 522). The ferocity of Austin’s attack was equally not made as a 
“dispassionate enquirer” but rather as an aggrieved nationalist. Austin’s response was 
not just based in political theory of the time, but equally in emotive nationalist 
language. Therefore Fredrich List was not only challenging laissez-faire, he was 
attacking the interests and identity of Britain.  
 
For all his esoteric acceptance of the nation, List was able to partially look through the 
fog around the nation. He saw that the key issue was cosmopolitanism — that liberal 
theory of political economy bespeaks cosmopolitan identity. List objected to this; yet he 
was too much engrossed in the nineteenth-century to see the created newness of his own 
identity — an identity that would not be formalized as German for another thirty 
years.46 Rather than develop a theory of the nation, List fell into accepting the presence 
of the nation like many social theorists of the nineteenth-century.47  
                                                          
46 Germany wasn’t unified until 1871, and then in a way that List probably would not have favoured: 
being unified by the conservative and militaristic Prussian State. 
47 Roman Szporluk (1988: 12) argues that “like Marx, List believed that the economy remained in a close 
connection with politics, especially in the modern industrial era. List was an economist who not only saw 
a reciprocal connection between politics and economics but, like Marx, also linked economics to a 
broader intellectual structure, a Weltanschauung or an ideology, a view of history and society, and a 
program for the future. Unlike Marx, however, he constructed his Weltanschauung to reflect a national, 
not class orientated, point of view.” Szporluk (1988: 8) maintains that “those who limit themselves to 
identifying liberal, conservative, and socialist positions do not always remember that these classifications 
tacitly presuppose the existence of an established polity”. This was the political conundrum that faced 
liberal thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries, that although their philosophy transcended the 
logic of borders, they had to operate in a bordered world. This was a point that List understood better than 
his British contemporaries; however, he was too close to the nation to see the constructed nature of 
nationalism.  
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Austin’s response to the cosmopolitan charge is indicative of how much liberalism had 
changed since Adam Smith published his Theory of Moral Sentiments ([1790] 2002) 
and Wealth of Nations ([1776] 1981). Austin refuted the cosmopolitan label and adopted 
the internationalist position; a position that was being adopted by liberals and socialists 
across Europe. Free trade would become the agent of internationalism:  
 
If the interest of nations were thoroughly interlaced by perfect freedom of trade, disturbances of 
their mutual commerce would be followed by intolerable evils; and, as being the most pernicious 
of all the disturbing causes, war would be feared and detested by the productive population of 
the world (Austin 1842: 544).  
 
This is essentially the liberal theory of interdependency, although Austin and his 
contemporaries don’t use that terminology. This theory papered over a gap in laissez 
faire theory. Interdependency presented an argument that theorized actions between 
nations, which essentially humanized them. Hence, Austin (1842: 544) could complain 
that: “these misconceptions of nations … inflame the hatred with which they regard one 
another” the “consequence” of which is “their childish longings for military conquest 
and glory” all of which “aggravate the stupid antipathies” springing “from differences 
of races”. But what it didn’t explain was why nations existed in the first place. By the 
1840s, liberalism had transformed from a cosmopolitan theory of individuality to an 
internationalist theory of individuality without reflectively realising, and therefore 
explaining, the jump.  
 
The Geography of Capital 
 
The previous chapter has already examined how the nation was naturalized and 
accepted as a cultural concept, but that does not explain why the political economists 
overlooked such a basic theoretical disjuncture. This disjuncture was a result of cultural 
acceptance of the nation combined with shortcomings of Enlightenment theory. As we 
have seen, the foundations of this disjuncture were with early liberal theorists, who used 
‘society’ theoretically as the mediation point between individuality and governance. 
This theoretical disjuncture was continued by Adam Smith and the liberal economists of 
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the nineteenth-century. The theoretical disjuncture is not with Adam Smith or any of his 
follower’s per se, but rather in the interaction between culture and political theory — 
they were too close to transcend this interaction.  
 
There are two threads within Adam Smith’s theory that create the space for the nation. 
Smith’s theory comprised twin components: one paradigm being social; the other being 
economic. These two theoretical paradigms were interlinked for Smith, and both 
paradigms provided a space for the nation through political expediency. Although 
liberals saw a universal world, the practical implementation of their political beliefs was 
a transformation of the state through popular sovereignty. Smith was advocating a 
universal theory of trade; but the practical method was to change state policy. The 
second paradigm relates to Smith’s basic argument against mercantilist protection. 
 
Smith argued that protectionism was unnecessary: that the market-place provided 
natural mechanisms of protection. This argument revolved around the geography of 
capitalism. It was within the spatiality of capitalist risk that the nation emerged in 
Smith’s theory of trade. Smith argued that the “wholesale merchant naturally prefers the 
home trade to the foreign trade of consumption, and the foreign trade of consumption to 
the carrying trade” (Smith [1776] 1981i: 398). Risk was the essential reason for this 
preference. The essence of Smith’s argument on capitalism was that human action was 
dictated by mercantile self-interest. Capitalism, Smith argued, depends on risk; but 
merchants try to minimize risk, and therefore, opt for protectionist measures to secure 
their profits over the risks inherent in the marketplace (Rothschild 2001: 138-146). As 
an individual hedging against risk, Smith argued that the merchant will always prefer 
the “home trade” because “his capital is never so long out of his sight as it frequently is 
in the foreign trade of consumption” (Smith [1776] 1981 i: 398).  
 
The difference in levels of risk between “home trade” and “foreign trade” was based on 
the merchant’s knowledge of the market. The merchant will “know better the character 
and situation of the persons whom he trusts, and if he should happen to be deceived, he 
knows better the laws of the country from which he must seek redress” (Smith [1776] 
1981i: 398). Therefore the knowledge of the merchant relies on two basic elements. 
One, a knowledge of who he/she can trust, which is a matter of cultural familiarity; and 
two, knowledge of the law, which is a recognition of state. Therefore, Smith implicitly 
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outlines a space for the nation-state as a cultural and political entity within a theory of 
trade.  
 
In addition to the problems of risk, there was the problem of cartage. Cartage was both 
costly and risky for “in the carrying trade, the capital of the merchant is, as it were, 
divided between two foreign countries, and no part of it is ever necessarily brought 
home, or placed under his own immediate view and command” (Smith [1776] 1981i: 
398). This created increased risks of cost and also reduced the merchants’ control over 
his/her capital. From this Smith argued that:  
 
Upon equal, or only nearly equal profits, therefore, every individual naturally inclines to employ 
his capital in the manner in which it is likely to afford the greatest support to domestic industry, 
and to give revenue and employment to the greatest number of people of his own country (Smith 
[1776] 1981i: 399). 
 
The sheer risk and cost of global trade automatically meant the domestic or national 
market would always be favoured over foreign markets. However, this goes against 
Smith’s basic argument on cartage. At the beginning of this chapter, we saw how Smith 
argued that trade first emerged along coastal regions and rivers, being originally long-
distance and across water, and then moving inland. Smith argued that the first large 
abstract communities emerged along these maritime trade routes. At this point it 
becomes evident that a spatial problem within Smith’s theory exists.  
 
The distinction between foreign and domestic trade within the merchant’s equation of 
risk becomes problematic at this point. The problem is the geographic extent of the 
state. For example, a trader in Dover would have greater knowledge of people and 
events in Calais than he would of people and events in York. In turn, the cost of 
transportation would be less between Dover and Calais. The only knowledge incentive 
to trade between Dover and York is the merchant’s familiarity with the law. In two out 
of three key respects the risk involved in trading with Calais over York favours Calais, 
which is foreign territory for an English trader. By comparison, if the trader from Dover 
was only trading within Kent, the risk calculation would be different, for the trader 
would have local knowledge and familiarity with the law. The risk calculation would 
then be relatively even, or more in favour of the trade within Kent.  
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This example raises the question, what did Smith mean by the terms ‘home’ and 
‘foreign’? His argument is based on personal knowledge, therefore, he is assuming face-
to-face connections or, to use modern terminology, Smith is using ‘street knowledge’. 
Smith’s spatial argument is the extent of a merchant’s knowledge of a particular 
marketplace. This being the case, Smith’s distinction is between local and distant rather 
than domestic and foreign. He is using the language of state borders, giving the 
impression of nation, when in fact Smith was not talking about the nation-state at all. 
  
This is a subtle point that Smith was probably not even bothered about. Although his 
theory of trade had no place for the nation, the state was already in existence. The use of 
the terms ‘home trade’ and ‘foreign’ reflected the political environment of the time. 
This issue pales into insignificance when compared with Smith’s principal objective in 
writing The Wealth of Nations. Smith was attacking the close relationship between 
merchants and government, which saw merchants pursuing political rents rather than 
the risk of trade. Large merchants pursued monopolies which guaranteed a limited 
supply of produce, which increased the cost for consumers and thereby limited the 
benefits of the marketplace. 
 
Whilst the structures of state and political controls shaped eighteenth-century trade, 
Smith outlined the potential for a radically different world, based purely on the 
materialism of the marketplace. If we took his argument further, free trade would 
dramatically change the national landscape. New communities would be formed that 
were in line with costs of cartage and other risks, but he knew that this was not an issue. 
Smith knew that it was not going to happen; political controls and rents had already 
distorted the marketplace and were shaping national communities. Although the 
underlining theory was radical, Smith’s aims were not so grandiose. His object was to 
change state policy, rather than create a manifesto for the radical transformation of 
political boundaries.  
 
What a discussion of Smith’s position demonstrates is the fundamental problem for the 
liberal perception of identity: the materialism of theory and the materialism of reality 
were out of sync. This reveals two forms of material expansionism in liberal theory: the 
expansive market versus the expansionist state. For liberal political economy is about 
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the expansion of the market. This expanding market drives social development, and in 
terms of this process, liberalism was promoting a theory of individualism and 
cosmopolitanism. However, this was in conflict with the pre-existing idea of 
mercantilism. Although mercantilism was imperial by its definition of trade, it was 
limited by the structure of state. By comparison, the market-place had no boundaries. It 
could keep expanding by virtue of its cosmopolitanism.  
 
This is the logical reality of liberal political economy; however, Smith avoided this 
logical outcome, for it was utopian. His arguments were an attempt to curtail the 
materialism of state, which was manifest as mercantilism; which Smith maintained was 
against the best interests of the people. Smith’s approach to political economy became a 
juggling act wherein he expressed the naturalness of expanding markets, whilst also 
responding to the material reality of the mercantilist state. The nation became a way of 
overcoming the problem of ‘materialist theory’ versus ‘materialist reality’, without 
admitting that the theory was utopian.  
 
This approach by Smith and his contemporaries allowed for the naturalising of the 
nation within a framework of globalized markets. This naturalization was subtle, and 
certainly not planned. John Austin’s and Fredrich List’s conflicting position over 
whether or not liberalism was based in cosmopolitanism is a symptomatic example of 
the naturalized nation within a theory of individualized globalized markets. Although 
liberal political economy was logically cosmopolitan in its expression of expanding 
markets, the materialism of state meant that cosmopolitan capitalism was inappropriate. 
The result of this was that liberalism sidestepped the issue by expressing the logic of 
global markets through internationalism rather than cosmopolitanism. 
 
This chapter has argued that, by the end of the eighteenth century, the nation was a key 
aspect within economic and material discourses. The effect of this was that by the 
nineteenth-century, the nation was seen as a natural structure within economic thought. 
Early theoretical literature on the nation intensified this naturalization process. An 
example of this early theorising of the nation can be seen in writings of David Hume. 
Hume saw the nation as evolving out of the material conditions of the environment. Yet 
whilst Hume conceived the material grounding of nations, his friend Adam Smith was 
imagining a condition of individuality that transcended the nation. Both of these figures 
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were instrumental thinkers in the development of modern liberalism. Their works draw 
on each other, yet they also reveal a discrepancy in liberal material understandings of 
the nation. Both of these writers saw the nation as being historically constructed. 
However, their works also assume the naturalness of the nation. 
 
 This discrepancy was not apparent in the eighteenth-century, although by the mid-
nineteenth-century the discrepancy was apparent. Fredrich List’s national system of 
economics unveiled the nation. List moved the nation from being a subtle passive 
structure, within economic thought, to being the dominant aspect of economic thought. 
This transformation threatened the integrity of laissez faire, with the British liberal 
champions of laissez faire quick to pounce on List for bringing the barbarism of the 
nationality into economic thought.  
 
Although List was accused of introducing barbarism and nationality into economic 
thought, the idea of the barbarian was a central aspect of conjectural and laissez faire 
theory. The nation was formed as a structure and connected to ancient history through 
the idea of the barbarian. The link between the barbarian and the nation meant that the 
nation was both historically constructed whilst being spiritually linked to freedom and a 
pre-material existence. Therefore the barbarian origins of nations presented the nation as 
a natural entity. The barbarian nation meant that liberal theory could see the nation as 
natural and constructed at the same time. These ideas are further explored in Chapters 
Five to Seven, which examine the role the barbarian nation played within colonial 
discourse and the idea of the empire.  
 

Chapter 4 - Biology, Race and the 
Nation as Nature 
 
One of the most intriguing, disturbing, and influential figures of nineteenth-century 
anthropology was Robert Knox. Although too radical for many of his contemporaries, 
Knox’s work became a centre-point of the London Anthropological Society and was 
highly influential at the time (Desmond 1989: 425). This alone would make Knox of 
key significance, but Knox is also important chronologically, as Knox’s polemic, the 
Races of Men ([1850] 1862) was published at a point in time when the British Empire 
(and European politics more broadly) was undergoing a directional change. 
Philosophically Knox’s work represents a transformation in thought (Desmond 1989: 
388-389) where the debate on race moved from a discussion on human variation and 
slavery to a discourse on race as the agent of history. Prior to Knox, race had already 
been politicized by the abolitionists and the pro-slavery lobby. Knox’s revolutionary 
contribution was that he was one of the first people to racialize politics: making race the 
prime agent of politics.  
 
Knox’s claim was that “race in human affairs is everything: …literature, science, art —
in a word, civilization, depends on it” (Knox [1850] 1862: v). In this capacity, race 
became the rhythm of history. As a rhythm, race adopts a divine quality in which a 
race’s destiny was preordained at the moment of creation. Knox argued that the “fait of 
nations cannot always be regulated by chance” (Knox [1850] 1862: 5). Although 
Knox’s references to creation lead towards the scriptural interpretation, Knox avoids the 
discussion of creation. He was generally very critical of religion, believing that religion 
had a desire to control natural racial desires. In this endeavour he believed religion was 
largely impotent, with nature prevailing; and despite Knox’s atheist overtones, there is 
an inherent religiousness to his claims. For Knox, race was the true religion; with all 
religions being reduced to façades that fulfil natural racial desires.  
 
Despite Knox’s ([1850] 1862: 7) belief in the crucial role of race, he does admit that 
race was a radically new idea and was being used “in a new sense”. He recognized the 
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controversial nature of his theory stating that it “runs counter to nearly all the chronicles 
or events called histories: it overturns the theories of statesmen, of theologians, of 
philanthropists of all shades” (Knox [1850] 1862: v). Although a racial theorist, Knox 
does show insight foreseeing the primodialist dilemma that plagues the philosophy of 
ethno-nationalism. The ethno-nationalist is plagued with the logically awkward belief of 
nation being the rhythm of history, but historical evidence fails to support this claim. 
Knox can be seen as one of the first modern ethno-nationalists.  
 
Racial beliefs became a paramount force in social thought during the period covered by 
the second half of this thesis (1830-1870). The paramountcy of race occurred in a 
particular historical context. It emerged out of political turmoil; but it drew on the 
positive enlightenment theories of the eighteenth-century. Knox’s Races of Men 
personifies the totality of racial thought and enlightenment traditions. The Races of Men 
was first published in 1850. Two years after the nationalist revolutions of 1848, when 
the political turmoil was still rippling throughout Europe. These revolutions drew on the 
same Enlightenment ideas that inspired the American and French Revolutions. However 
they were also a response to the turbulent economic transformation that was occurring. 
Nation and race became ways of conceiving and politicising the changing times.  
 
In Britain issues of national ferment were beginning to plague the Union. The troubles 
in Ireland were being fuelled by economic hardships, brought about by Ireland being 
peripheral to the growth in the industrial revolution. This was coupled with occupation-
like laws on tenancy and other aspects of civil life that separated the English from the 
Irish. This all conspired to create a widespread feeling of alienation and disenchantment 
with British rule in Ireland. Nationalist politics presented an alluring sentiment of 
opposition to the tyrannies of the then contemporary times throughout Europe. For 
Knox, the logic was simple: the conflicts in Europe and Ireland were examples of racial 
war brought about by the intermixing of races.   
 
Knox was expressing the feeling of his times, with the 1840s and 1850s being seen as 
the birth of the modern nationalist era (Gildea 1988). Knox was part of a wave of 
theorising that emerged in the 1850s to explain these events, with Marxism, 
conservatism, and radical liberalism being the other notable examples. Each of the 
aforementioned theories sought to contextualize the events of 1848. They became the 
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key ideologies powering the modern world. Knox’s arguments on race were no 
different. His ideas, and similar contemporary sentiments, feed into late-nineteenth 
century Social Darwinism (Desmond 1989: 5-7, Hawkins 1997, Williams 2005: 92-99). 
For Knox the lesson of 1848 was the relation between one government and one race. 
The year 1848 represented the uprising of the “Celtic race of France”. The Celts were 
accompanied by the “Italian races” all rising “against the barbarous savage Tedeschi, 
who under the assumed name of Germans, to which they have not the most distant 
claim, lorded it over Italy”, whilst the “Saxon element of the German race … demanded 
freedom, and a division from the barbarous Slavonian” (Knox [1850] 1862: 22). Knox’s 
world view was a vision of racial self-determination, within a prism of continual racial 
conflict. Knox was also maintaining the eighteenth-century theme of linking the nation 
to the barbarian. In turn Knox presented the barbarian as the personification of self-
determined freedom and the source of the nation.  
 
Knox’s ideas on race were extreme and unpalatable by his own admission, but they 
were also indicative of a trend that interpreted the nation as a biological entity. This 
trend in biological thinking was manifest in the ethnocentric conceptions of nation that 
dominated the late-nineteenth century (Fredrickson 2003, Hawkins 1997, Williams 
2005, Young 1997). This biological view presented the nation as a homogeneous 
structure bound by a primordial origin in nature.48 This homogeneous structure was 
suspended in a landscape of continuous struggle with other primordial nations. This 
nineteenth-century vision was a radical break from the ideas of the nation that 
dominated the eighteenth-century. In this break, ‘society’ was transformed from a 
relatively inclusive structure to an uncompromising structure based on a belief in the 
givenness of nature.  
 
Race justified continuous occupation. With the emphasis on biologically defined beings 
separated into different groups, universal humanity ceased to exist. This meant that 
people lost the moral grounds to aspire to universal equality. Through biological 
arguments, people could be effectively reduced to a perpetual state of childhood, 
incapable of self-governance (this will be examined further in the second half of the 
thesis). This conception had a dual function of maintaining a liberal persona of dutiful 
                                                          
48 The word ethnic was already starting to come into use by 1870, replacing the word race in some 
anthropological quarters. (Dunn 1875) 
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governance, whilst allowing occupation and exploitation. This justification of 
exploitation became the intellectual ‘saving grace’ that justified the continued existence 
of empire.  
 
How did this dramatic change occur? And how does it relate to the naturalizing of the 
nation? These are the questions that this chapter addresses. These questions address the 
construction of biological primordialism within the nation. Biological conceptions of 
the nation did not supplant the earlier eighteenth-century conceptions of the nation that 
had focused on cultural change and education. Instead, they became an overlaying 
conception of the nation, being simultaneously imprinted on (and conceived by) the 
early conception of the nation. 
 
This chapter argues that biological theory fed into modern conceptions of the nation and 
was linked to empire. Culture and biology became interlocked, with biological theory 
developing from liberal understandings of culture with the emergence of biological 
race-nations being testament to this interlocked relationship. The eighteenth-century 
concept of nurture and culture was the nucleus of biological theory, and as such, 
biological racial theory was based on cultural ideas of nurtured change. The early 
materialist arguments of Erasmus Darwin,49 Lord Monbodo, Jean Baptist Lamark, 
Robert Boyle and many others, were all based on the ideas of a liberal education and 
reflective rationalism in creating meaningful progressive change. Nature was seen as a 
natural form of liberal education, where an individual’s characteristics were nurtured by 
their environment. The early biological interpretations of race derived from this pillar of 
liberal thought, with the nation being seen as a result of environmental conditions.  
 
For the naturalization of the racial-ethnic nation to be possible a new form of history 
was constructed. This history was the offspring of an interaction between the 
Enlightenment ideas of political tradition, natural history and the classical idea of the 
‘Great Chain of Being’. This transformed humanity’s understanding of the past. It 
moved from being seen through dynastic history or religious history, to an 
understanding of a biological racial heritage. This heritage was inherently collective and 
                                                          
49 Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) was Charles Darwin’s grandfather and developed a theory of evolution 
based on Lamarckian principles of reflexive social change. 
Chapter 4 – Biology, Race and the Nation as Nature 
 123
primordial. More particularly it removed the nation from the political sphere of the 
social contract, transforming nation into a natural object of ‘blood and belonging’.  
 
This collectivist biological form of history occurred in concurrence with the ‘particular 
institution’ of slavery. It was the moral and political conundrum of African-American 
slavery that transformed racial theory from a vague study of anatomy and aesthetic 
physiology into a broad theory of social difference. The project of racially separating 
Africans resulted in the racialization of everybody. Slavery was a driving force that 
contributed to creating early anthropology/ethnography (Moore and Desmond 2004).50 
Leading British writers on anthropology and biology took an active part in abolition 
politics, both ‘for’ and ‘against’. Through this process a tradition emerged that 
connected race to political community (Porter 2004: 211-217). This association became 
a kernel aspect of the racial and social Darwinist writers of the 1860s and 1870s 
(Hawkins 1997).  
 
Although seeing nation as biologically driven, this process continually drew on the 
liberal beliefs of culture. Erroneously, cultural practices and beliefs (which unlike the 
static concept of race, are continually changing) were naturalized through this biological 
historicism as primordial biological facts. The effect of this was to naturalize the nation 
(which is a social entity) as a biological primordial structure. This naturalization was an 
overlay that drew on (and reinterpreted) earlier liberal notions of the nation. This 
biological overlay provided the basis for legitimising perpetual colonial governance.  
 
The Chain of Being 
 
The origins of the biological conception of the nation resided in the 
scientific/philosophical concept of the ‘chain of being’. This was a theory that had its 
origins in classical Greek thought (Lovejoy 1957: 24-66), but during the Enlightenment 
it became a hot topic of debate feeding into the materialist views that were powering the 
revolutions in scientific and social thinking (Lovejoy 1957, Porter 2001, Porter 2004, 
                                                          
50 Slavery was a moral issue, but morality depended on the definition of human. For example if it was 
acceptable to kick a dog or whip a horse, donkey or ox, why not kick and whip a subhuman? All of the 
early ethnologists were also moral philosophers (Desmond 1989: 2-8). Therefore justifications and 
critiques of the vexatious issue of slavery mushroomed into biological theory and the science of race.  
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Uglow 2002).51 ‘The chain of being’ transformed the way that people conceived of 
connections between living creatures. There were multiple aspects of this tradition. It 
was a means of understanding order through relationships. Therefore, as well as being a 
means of questioning a human’s place in nature, the ‘chain of being’ could be used to 
legitimize both vertical (traditional hierarchies) and horizontal (egalitarian by virtue of 
universal connections) relations. Vertical hierarchies were legitimized through the 
‘chain of being’ that listed subservience before God or gods, all of which were 
interconnected and had to maintain this order of subservience to prevent disaster. By 
comparison, the horizontal ‘chain of being’ was much more egalitarian, by expressing 
universal material connections of biological inter-relatedness.52 This horizontal 
interpretation suggests that all living creatures were connected materially in a direct 
chain of matter. This was distinctly different from the theological vertical tradition 
which saw God (as the creator) as being the central link between all entities. Being a 
vision of unity, the ‘chain of being’ should have been a unifying system of 
cosmopolitan thought that accepted diversity through an interconnected structure. 
Instead, the ‘chain of being’ set in motion a train of thought that would accentuate 
                                                          
51 For Roy Porter (2004) the root of the problem can be seen in the Greek foundations of western 
medicine. Greek medicine was inherently atheist and materialist. Rather than being based in spiritual 
logic, like most ancient systems of medicine, Greek medicine attributed illness to conditions in the natural 
world.  The body was like nature, a law governed entity wherein disease was a systemic irregularity 
(Porter 2004: 45). Health depended on the balance of humours or key fluids in the body. It was believed 
an analysis of these fluids would provide an explanation for all manner of conditions, be it sexual, racial 
or psychological (Porter 2004: 46). These substances were found in all animals, constituting natural 
material substances.  Herein lies the classical logic of the ‘chain of being’. Nature was made of matter: 
humans, plants and animals were all made of these substances and in decay returned to basic matter. 
Therefore, matter was the base substance connecting the ‘chain of being’. The difference between objects 
was in their form. Matter could be constructed into all sorts of different forms, in the same way as a 
carpenter transforms the form of a tree into the form of a table (Porter 2004: 49). This connection between 
plants, animals and humans created a blasphemous problem for theologians and philosophers alike.  In 
comparison Arthur Lovejoy (1957) takes a deeper approach and a broader perspective of what constituted 
the ‘chain of being’. For him the ‘chain of being’ goes to the nature of being itself. It is the ongoing 
interrelationship between the ‘otherworldliness and the this-worldliness’: 
It is the theory of ideas culminating in a frank mysticism. His [Plato’s] deepest and “most 
serious” conviction … is, “by reason of the weakness inherent in language,” incapable of 
adequate expression in words; and he therefore never has attempted, and never will attempt, 
really to convey it by mere writing or speech to other men. It can be gained only by a sudden 
illumination, in a soul prepared for it by austerity of life and discipline of the intellect. 
Nevertheless, “there is a certain true argument” which both leads towards it and makes clear 
why, in itself, it must remain ineffable. What that argument shows is that the true objects of 
ration knowledge, the only genuine realities, are the immutable essences of things — of circles 
and all figures, of all bodies, of all living creatures, of all affections of the soul, of the good and 
the fair and the just (Lovejoy 1957: 34). 
The essence of this argument is that rationality leads to mysticism and that all are connected within the 
‘chain of being’.   
52 Although these chains are not always material, the Hindu and Buddhist conception of reincarnation is 
also a ‘chain of being’ that can be both vertical and horizontal.  
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difference, feeding into the discourse of the nation and making it a biological condition 
that was conceived both vertically and horizontally .  
 
As a discipline, biology emerged out of natural history, which from the classical era to 
the eighteenth-century was little more than a system of classification. The hierarchical 
system of classifying plants and animals outlined by Aristotle was transformed by Carl 
Linnaeus into taxonomy: the system that underpins the modern biological method. 
Linnaeus’s system was a downward progression from classes to orders, genera, species, 
and varieties; this made it a filing-cabinet method of recognising individual flora and 
fauna. In doing so, Linnaeus outlined a system that placed flora and fauna within a 
context of coherently related groups. But Linnaeus did not stop with plants and animals. 
In the revized edition of Systema Naturae, he attempted to apply his method to the 
classification of humans, placing humans in the order of primates and creating four 
varieties that corresponded to the four continents (Bindman 2002: 61). This had 
dramatic theological ramifications: placing humans and animals within the same 
system. Although it was seen as a challenge to the traditional hierarchy, Linnaeus’s 
system was constructed on theological themes that expressed the vertical ‘chain of 
being’, namely that lower orders were subservient to higher orders.53  
 
This system was a secularising extension of the ‘great chain of being’. By implication a 
‘chain’ meant connection, indicating that humans were part of a wider system of 
interrelated relationships that were dependent on the same substances. The hierarchical 
connotations underpinning the ‘chain of being’ insinuated evolution but at the same 
time suggested subservience, by virtue of hierarchy. This hierarchical evolution that 
implied subservience of lower orders to higher orders was a key aspect of the later 
Social Darwinists (Hawkins 1997). As we saw in Chapter Two, evolutionary ideas 
permeated the logic of rationality. Rationality was seen as an agent of change, and ideas 
such as this had atheist overtones. If rationality could create an evolutionary concept of 
culture and character, the same logical connection could insert evolutionary ideas into 
biology.  
  
                                                          
53 Linnaeus constructed his own theology that was a mixture of natural history and traditional 
Christianity. The theology faculty at Uppsala University criticized Linnaeus for conflating God and 
nature (Koerner 1999: 88-90).  
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These materialist questions focused on the constitution of the mind. If the ‘chain of 
being’ was correct, rationality became a biological issue. However, theology had 
consistently maintained that the mind was what differentiated humans from animals 
(Hazard 1965). It is in this discussion on the role of the mind that the ‘chain of being’ is 
established as part of biological history. 
 
Descartes’s dualism provided the escape clause to this rationalist biological dilemma, 
sanctifying the material world and ethereal world as two distinct spheres (Hazard 1965, 
Porter 2004). The material world was the world of instinct and biology, whilst the 
ethereal world of the soul was the sphere of rationality and intelligence. This became a 
theological tightrope expressed by a founder of modern biological theory Count de 
Buffon ([1749-67] 1812: 96):  
 
The first and most difficult step, in arriving at a proper knowledge of ourselves, is to acquire distinct 
ideas of the two substances of which we are composed. Simply to affirm, that the one is immaterial, 
unextended, and immortal, and that the other is material, extended, and mortal, is only denying those 
qualities to the one, which we know the other possesses.  
 
Buffon spoke from the prescribed orthodoxy. For him, duality was logical common 
sense. The defence depended on the logical notion of thought generated from sensation, 
of which Buffon maintained: “there is no resemblance between sensations and the 
objects which produce them, is not this a sufficient proof that the nature of the soul is 
different from that of matter” (Buffon [1749-67] 1812: 98). The evidence that Buffon 
([1749-67] 1812: 99) cites for the distinction between mind and matter is the mind’s 
different modes of existence:  
 
The mind has one mode of perception when we sleep, and another when we are awake; after death, 
she will perceive in a manner still more different; and the objects of sensation, or matter in general, 
may then have no more existence with regard to her, than our bodies, with which we have no further 
connexion. 
 
For Buffon, the fact that the mind could exist in multiple states meant that the mind had 
multiple forms whilst “bodies, as well as all external objects, have many forms, each of 
which is compounded, divisible, and destructible” (Buffon [1749-67] 1812: 100). In 
comparison he argued, the mind was indestructible, because even a person who was 
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deprived of all “three instruments of sensation” would still be able to think. Therefore 
“the mind would still exist” (Buffon [1749-67] 1812: 100). 
 
Buffon’s urge to resist the materialist onslaught was admirable, but within this defence 
we can see a revolution in thought occurring; a revolution which would transform the 
way people would conceive of their collective past. Buffon took an indignant stance; 
being perplexed at the unfolding debate, believing that it was insulting to humanity.54  
The problem, Buffon ([1749-67] 1812: 102) believed, was people’s obsession with 
form:  
 
Man, it is true, resembles the other animals in the material part of his being; and, in the enumeration 
of natural existences, we are obliged to rank him in the class of animals. But, in nature, there are 
neither classes nor genera; all are mere independent individuals. Classes and genera are only the 
arbitrary operations of our own fancy: and, though we place man in one of these classes, we change 
not his nature; we derogate not from his dignity; we alter not his real condition; we only assign him 
the first rank among being which resemble him solely in the material part of his existence.  
  
The obsession with the biology of humanity, rather than holistic duality which was the 
cornerstone of Cartesian philosophy, had meant that biology was taking on a life of its 
own. For Buffon, biology was a very different concept to the direction which 
practitioners were taking it. The essence of this difference is ‘classification’ versus 
‘explanation’. Buffon’s mammoth text (all eleven volumes) was not written for the 
purpose of explanation, but rather to document and list the different objects in the 
natural world. This was the classic positivist interpretation of Aristotle, wherein the 
philosopher is a mere collector.  
 
The method of education dictated that students followed Aristotle religiously. When 
Buffon, Linnaeus and others were creating the Enlightenment revolution in biology, 
they did so within the basic mindset of the collector. They saw the collection itself as 
the end point.  
 
                                                          
54 Buffon ([1749-67] 1812: 102) exclaimed: “Why thus preposterously debase him, by considering him 
merely as an animal, while his nature is so different, and so superior to that of the brutes, that nothing but 
the most brutal ignorance could ever dream of confounding them?”  
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In the history of thought, the Enlightenment was an intersection between pre-modern 
and modern thought. In materialist terms it was an intersection at the moment of 
industrial change. This materialist intersection is reflected in the purpose of early 
biology. The ancient tradition of positivist collection was partly spurred by the need to 
find herbal remedies for the myriad of pathogens that plagued humanity.55 This was the 
practical edge of biology, whereby the naturalist was part of the wider tradition of 
knowing the landscape.56  
 
The essence of this was that in pursuing knowledge of the landscape, naturalists 
developed a framework for a philosophy of nature. This philosophy emerged in the 
form of the natural sciences, and would provide a new avenue for imagining the 
historical abstract. In the realms of biology, the narrative of social organization moved 
beyond the study of individuals and events to the study of the deep social condition — 
that the key to understanding humanity could be found in its material construction. The 
transformation of early modern natural history into biology was made possible by early 
philosophies of political theory and psychology.  
 
Natural history moved from being a system of classification — a collection of 
butterflies in a gentleman’s study — to a system of time and a vertical form of ordering. 
In doing so it became a modern theory of history, a new way of understanding time and 
incorporating new ways of conceiving of a hierarchal order. However one element was 
missing: agency. Linnaeus’s system of classification indicated time and the logic of 
change, but another component was necessary to give biological theory a sense of 
change over time. This was evolution, and it had its origins in social theory. 
 
Rationalism and Biological Change 
 
                                                          
55 According to Lisbet Koerner (1999), it was this industrial imperative that drove Carl Linnaeus to 
develop his system of taxonomy. Linnaeus’s central research was a program to bring the spices of the 
orient to Sweden and devising the means to propagate them in the northern climes. This industrial desire 
for agricultural innovation spurred Linnaeus to develop his early notions of taxonomy into the binomial 
nomeclature. It was only late in life that Linnaeus realized the deeper implications of his system (Koerner 
1999). 
56 The essence of this basic practice of positivism descends back to hunter-gather’s dependence on 
knowing their landscape (Brody 2002, Diamond 1998). 
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The idea that biology was a system of change — bound by time — fundamentally 
transformed the study of the human condition. The human condition was no longer tied 
to iron laws, but, rather, was seen as a mutable entity that was potentially capable of 
improvement. This was a paradigm shift, a transformation in ways of seeing nature. 
Nature had been interpreted as a constant. The scientific discoveries of seventeenth and 
early-eighteenth centuries, although disputing esoteric and theocentric views of nature, 
generally supported the idea that nature was a constant. From Galileo to Newton, the 
dominant scientific trajectories focused on understanding the patterns of nature. By the 
late-eighteenth century, science was increasingly being viewed as an historical process 
(Rudwick 2005). National differences between people had been rationalized according 
to scripture or differences in religion. Now biology alone could explain social 
differences between societies. It became conceivable that the nation was biological.  
 
This growing directional shift owed a great deal to the seventeenth-century social theory 
of John Locke. The scientific arguments on mutable progression were substantially 
drawing on Locke’s arguments on experience (as the basis of rationality) in stimulating 
change (Porter 2001, Porter 2004). Events became collections of experience. These 
were historical processes that could be mapped as a changing dynamic. It was this 
psychological/philosophic logic that transformed early-modern natural history/biology.  
 
James Burnett (who became Lord Monboddo) is an example of the indebtedness early 
biology had to John Locke’s social ideas. Monboddo was one of the first people to 
devise a comprehensive theory of evolution. It was not a theory based on genetics or 
biology; rather, it was a theory based on language and the power of language. Language 
transformed biology. Monboddo argued “that language [was] not natural to man”. This 
was “proved, first, from the origin and nature of the Ideas expressed by Language; and, 
secondly, from the nature of articulation” (Monboddo 1773: 2). Language was an 
acquired habit that humans had learnt as part of their association with each other, and 
“that the political state was necessary for the invention of Language.” But a political 
state “is not natural to man, any more than language, to which it gave birth” (Monboddo 
1773: 4).  
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Monboddo uses the concept of the ‘primitive’ in a very different way from that of many 
of his contemporaries57. Monboddo’s argument is a development upon Locke, and he 
devotes two chapters to discussing Locke. In Lockeian fashion, Monboddo holds that 
people are progressive beings that have been forced to evolve by their environment.58  
 
Monboddo stressed that his argument did not contradict divine involvement in human 
origins, but the implication of Monboddo’s logic was clearly materialist. In volume one 
of Origin of Language, Monboddo argued that humans existed in the same capacity as 
other animals.59 All animals were divided into two forms: solitary or gregarious. 
Humans were somewhere between the two. This was in contrast to the Hobbesian 
position on human nature, and moves away from social contract positions on social 
theory.60 Monboddo rejected Hobbes’ solitary argument on the grounds that Hobbes 
“did not know what man was by nature”. Claiming that Hobbes’s argument was based 
on “all the habits and opinions that he acquire[d] in civil life” and “supposed, that, 
previous to the institution of society, he had all the desires and passions that he now 
has” (Monboddo 1773: 203). This critique of Hobbes revealed a different notion of 
what constituted nature.  
 
                                                          
57 Primitivism was a common theme at the time and a belief in the ‘state of nature’ was a common aspect 
of eighteenth-century thought, usually existing as an image of Arcadia. The natural nobility of this 
environment was depicted as heroic in scale and the source of epic poetry (Buchan 2004, Kersey 2005, 
Pearce 1945). The idea of a ‘natural man’ who lived in a state of eternal bliss had powered the discourse 
of natural law and had become a central dichotomous component of political theory, being used skilfully 
by Rousseau to demonstrate the corruption of modern society. This theory of natural man is often 
wrongly termed ‘the noble savage’ and that Rousseau was the originator of the ‘noble savage’. Ter 
Ellingson (2001: xv) argues that Rousseau never used the term ‘noble savage’ and that the ‘noble savage’ 
originated much earlier, and was first coined by Marc Lescarbot in 1609. Ellingson’s argument is that 
contrary to popular perception, the ‘noble savage’ did not play a major role in eighteenth-century thought. 
He argues that it was reintroduced by John Crawfurd for racist purposes. Ellingson’s argument is sound, 
very few of the eighteenth-century writers use the term ‘noble savage’, however, the name ‘noble savage’ 
is a term that encompasses a set of ideas, beliefs and practices about interpretations on tribal society. 
These ideas, beliefs and practices are rife in eighteenth and nineteenth-century thought. Therefore 
although the ‘noble savage’ as a term does not emerge as a common term until the second half of the 
nineteenth century, it is a modern term reflectively applied to an ideology that was commonplace.   
58 Coming from Monboddo, this argument is rather bizarre, for he did not believe that modern society 
could ever match the achievements of the classical Greek world (Daiches, et al. 1986: 19). Despite his 
general pessimism towards the moderns (which was based on ascetics and philosophic principles rather 
than technological), Monboddo developed an evolutionary theory of society based on rationality.  
59 This is not an evolutionary theory holding that all creatures descended from a common ancestor, but 
rather all species transform and mutate, thereby developing into divergent varieties of the same genus.   
60 Logically the social contract is an erroneous theory for human development, because it presupposes a 
fully developed social system (Gellner 1995). Monboddo’s achievement was to present rationality as an 
evolutionary development. Showing how interest can be mutated into rationality and therefore into a 
social system.  
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Hobbes was only concerned with ‘nature’ as human nature. When Hobbes referred to 
nature he was not referring to the natural world. By comparison Monboddo’s notion of 
‘nature’ was a deeper concept that was representative in the natural world at large. For 
Monboddo, the Enlightenment represented not just the dualistic laws of humanity and 
nature, but instead a unitary argument: humanity within nature, which was more 
representative of the social Darwinist logic of the late-nineteenth century.61 The sum 
total of this difference was necessity as a process driving social change. Hobbes saw the 
world through eternal dialectic forces. By comparison, Monboddo placed his theory of 
nature firmly in the realm of necessitated change. For Monboddo, this meant that human 
nature was a construct of the solitary and gregarious natural world:  
 
Man participates so much of the gregarious animal as to have no aversion to the society of his 
fellow-creatures, for less to be the natural enemy of his own species, as certain species are of others; 
and that he also has so much of the nature of the solitary wild beast, that he has no natural 
propensity to enter into society, but was urged to it by motives (Monboddo 1773: 204). 
 
Monboddo’s evidence is reflective of the general transformation of natural history into 
modern biological theory. Social theory is not presented as being based on a contract 
that relies on innate rationality; instead Monboddo placed social theory on a biological 
plain that is forever changing and adapting. This argument naturalizes all human social 
behaviour, placing it in the same context as an animal’s instinctive behaviour.  To 
Monboddo the physical characteristics of humans are evidence that humans are a blend 
of solitary and gregarious characteristics of the natural world. 
 
What induces me to think that he [man] is of this mixed kind, is the formation of his teeth and 
intestines. He has teeth for tearing, and others for grinding; whereas the solitary beast of prey has 
only teeth for tearing; and the frugivorous animals (so I call those who feed only on grain and or 
herbage) have only grinders, such as the ox and sheep; or if they have teeth which serve sometimes 
for tearing, such as those of the horse, they are not nearly so much incisive as those of man, which, 
by one nation that has been discovered upon the coast of New Guinea, are used as an offensive 
weapon; for we are told, they bite those they attack, like dogs. As to the intestines, the animals of 
prey have short guts, the frugivorous have them long; but man has them of a middle length betwixt 
the two. And conformity to this structure of his body, it is well known that man can live, wither 
upon the fruits of the earth, or upon the flesh of other animals. His nails, too, seem to place him in a 
                                                          
61 But even the social Darwinist logic is conservative when compared to Monboddo’s use of nature, 
which in some ways is more in keeping with the ‘age of Aquarius’ than the ‘age of Enlightenment’ 
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middle state betwixt those two kinds of animals. The frugivorous have no nails at all; the 
carnivorous have crooked nails or talons (Monboddo 1773: 204-5).  
 
This use of anatomical evidence is symptomatic of the break from the tradition of 
natural law philosophy, which assumed natural rights without any explanation of their 
origins. The emergence of the positivist theory of scientific research increasingly 
focused on the changing structure of the natural world. Therefore, Monboddo was 
absorbing the scientific methodology to demonstrate the constructed nature of social 
institutions. In doing so, the human condition was grounded in the natural animal world. 
 
Monboddo achieves this grounding, not by any Hobbesian debasement of human 
activity to that of the animal, but instead by attributing the natural world with virtues of 
a liberal education, wherein nature works according to the Lockeian principles of 
stimulus, with stimulus evolving into rationality. Monboddo’s argument solidly embeds 
the human condition within the wider framework of nature. As part of this argument, 
Monboddo enshrines the human condition within the human anatomy. There is no 
duality for Monboddo. Therefore human anatomy became the agent for social change.  
 
In making these claims, Monboddo reduces the notions of rationality, language and 
politics that were held as being distinctly human, into characteristics that are derived 
from necessity, which other animals had to greater or lesser extents. On one level, this 
removed divisions with the natural world, but on the human level it accentuates 
difference. Social differences become a physiological issue rather than a cultural issue.  
 
Nature became the agent of liberalism. Monboddo’s theory was not a break from the 
social contract, but rather he naturalized liberalism within nature. On one level, this 
provides a necessary legitimization of contract theory; but on another level it causes 
problems for the interpretation of diversity, thereby counteracting the liberal tenet of 
tolerance. Universal approaches to individualism break down. Biological differences 
create potential caveats on universalism. These created biological barriers between 
people. One lineage of the nation as a primordial racial entity directly descends from 
this naturalization of liberal theory.  
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Structuralism: Doctors and Racialization of Social Theory 
 
Monboddo’s approach, of seeing nature through the lens of liberal theory became a 
common attribute of British biological theory. Each of the evolutionary theories 
emerging out of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries were connected to artefacts of 
liberal thought. Monboddo was not the only Enlightenment figure to combine the social 
theory of rationality and civil society with natural history, but he was the first to publish 
a theory of human evolution. Later Jean Baptiste Lamarck ([1809] 2003) and Erasmus 
Darwin (1794) (Charles Darwin’s Grandfather) also formulated theories of biological 
evolution. Both of these theories followed in Monboddo’s wake, connecting evolution 
with rationality and nurtured change. As theories of evolution, Lamarck and Darwin 
both maintain that evolution was a biological process that was shaped by habit. Rational 
action therefore would shape future evolutionary changes. Central to this theory of 
evolution was a belief in reflexivity, that an organism would reflexivily change its 
habits to suite its environment. These habits affected the physiology of the organism 
and, in turn, these changes were then passed on to the next generation. Therefore, this 
approach saw reflexive education as passing through the hereditary barrier. The 
Monboddo/Lamarck/Darwin approach to evolution, which gave organisms control over 
their destiny, would be superseded by Charles Darwin’s concept of natural selection, 
which removed the evolutionary agency from the hands of the organism, and, instead, 
giving agency to freak mutations that suited environmental pressure.  
 
The significance of Monboddo, Lamarck and Erasmus Darwin was that they 
transformed natural history and anatomy into a concept of biological theory. They 
collected diverse observations on the natural and social world, which had been collected 
by travellers and naturalists. Each of them united these observations into reasonable 
coherent theories. These theories provided materialist explanations of social and 
biological change over time. This approach transformed natural history into biological 
theory.  
 
They presented the human condition in a new historical understanding. From the late-
eighteenth century onwards, humanity had a biological history as well as a political and 
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religious history.62 This created a new concept of the collective. Political unification 
ceased to be the only form of social cohesion. The increasing awareness of biological 
connections and divisions created a whole new conditioning for understanding social 
cohesion. It was increasingly possible to conceive a cohesive national society as a 
biologically unified society. Any form of social difference or political dissent could be 
considered as a symptom of biological difference.  
 
In the nineteenth-century, biology and medicine became growth areas within the British 
academe. There were practical reasons for this. Medicine held the promise of relieving 
pain and suffering, but the physician’s services did not come free. In the class-based 
society of nineteenth-century Britain — that also held some remaining legacies of 
Aristocratic feudalism which dictated what was an honourable profession (Hirschman 
1877, Hirschman 1977, Wiener 1981) — medicine became a desirable profession that 
was profitable whilst also being honourable (Desmond 1989: 10-12). In this capacity, 
medicine became a tried and trusted path to social advancement.  
 
As the empire was growing, doctors became the essential support-team that maintained 
the health of the governors, diplomats, merchants, and soldiers abroad. However, the 
principal universities of Cambridge and Oxford were generally disinterested in 
providing patronage to the experimental sciences (Rose and Rose 1970: 19). Science 
was predominantly the domain of wealthy amateurs, with very few institutions 
supporting professional scientists (Rose and Rose 1970: 16-36). The medical profession 
was predominately represented in this amateur class of scientists (Cardwell 1957). The 
nature of the profession was a probable reason for this. Their profession gave them 
access to chemistry, their surgeries provided a primitive laboratory, they were well 
educated, and most importantly of all was their industry’s relationship between time and 
production. They had the freedom to research because their type of work was not tied to 
                                                          
62 There was a realization that a biological history existed, and that was distinctly different from religious 
or political history. This biological history was part of the wider geological understanding of history that 
was emerging, of which Martin Rudwick (2005: 6) comments that:  
What was involved in the reconstruction of geohistory, far more importantly than any occasional 
and local conflict with religious beliefs, was a new and surprising conception of the natural 
world. Rather than being essentially stable and bound by unchanging “laws of nature”—ever 
since an initial act of creation, or else from uncreated eternity— one major part of nature, the 
earth itself came to be seen as a product of nature’s own history. 
Science transformed perceptions of the past and what constituted the role of history. Human history was 
no longer a series of events, but rather a story within a greater story in which the ability to conceive of 
history, beginning was seen as descending further and further.  
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factory orientated time production. These conditions favoured medicine over other 
professions for the patronage of scientific enquiry.63 This materialist pedagogy was 
informed by liberal ideas on the construction of society, but the relationship between 
liberalism and biology would go full-circle and transform perceptions of society and the 
nation.  
 
Location was a key attribute to this process. Medicine was not a university subject in 
England in the early-nineteenth century, instead it was an articled trade that was taught 
in hospitals (Lawrence 1991). However, in Scotland it was the prime attraction of 
Edinburgh University (Buchan 2004, Desmond 1989: 12).64 Most of the leading early-
nineteenth century British ethnologists and biologists had attended Edinburgh 
University.65 Throughout Europe, Edinburgh was seen as one of the centres of the 
Enlightenment and was a hotbed of both social and political thought (Buchan 2004). As 
a centre of medical training, Edinburgh became a point of intersection between social 
theory and biological theory.66 It was in environments like this that synergies between 
social theory and biology occurred (Desmond 1989).  
 
Many of these graduates were trained in biology and were politically and intellectually 
active in broader social issues (Desmond 1989). Class issues played a role in this. 
Although medicine was an honourable trade in hierarchical nineteenth-century Britain, 
increasingly, the medical profession’s leanings were predominantly towards the 
emerging middle class. Adrian Desmond (1989: 12) comments: 
                                                          
63 Richard Cull summarized this when explaining the racial/ethnological theorist James Cowles Prichard’s 
motivation for becoming a doctor, stating: “The young ethnologist chose Medicine as his profession, not 
from any special liking for it, but because he deemed it to be more favourable than commerce for the 
pursuit of that knowledge to which he was now devoted” (Cull 1855: xxii). 
64 Other than Edinburgh University, medicine was not a university subject. “Apprenticeship was the time-
honoured route to the apothecary’s trade and the surgeon’s craft and survived well into the nineteenth 
century” (Lawrence 1991: 48). The practice of apprenticeship was seen as perpetuating conservative 
hierarchies, the University of London was founded to change this (Desmond 1989: 25-30). Adrian 
Desmond (1989: 32) comments:  
The medical elite in 1820 comprised the knightly physicians and surgeons attending a few 
wealthy or noble patients. The physician, in particular, was still judged more by his breeding and 
“moral” education than his medical expertise. His initial Oxford or Cambridge studies were in 
classics, these being more important than medical knowledge to place him on a cultural par with 
his noble patrons.  
65 Charles Darwin, James Cowles Prichard and Thomas Hodgkin were all students at Edinburgh, whilst 
Robert Knox was a student and leading lecturer at Edinburgh University.   
66 Prichard is probably the clearest example of this. His Researches in the Physical History of Mankind 
(1848) was an elaborated version of his Masters thesis at Edinburgh University (Moore and Desmond 
2004: 708).  
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By the mid-1820s a tartan army of “Scotch” graduates was marching south (to some alarm), 
armed with the new French doctrines and a new set of grievances, to staff the secular London 
University (f. 1826) and start up a second front against the medical corporations.  
 
The Birmingham Lunar Society is a good example of this association between industry 
and medicine, with the membership drawn from these two groups (Uglow 2002). 
Doctors were often directly faced with the social ills of society. In many case this 
further instilled a politicization of their work. 67 
 
The materialist-biological training of these intellectuals meant that the biological mode 
of history was carried forward into wider debates on political and social change. Social 
issues were seen through a primordial biological lens, leading to racial interpretation of 
social issues. Robert Knox is a classic example of this phenomenon. Knox was 
professor of Anatomy at Edinburgh University, but was also a radical advocate of 
democracy and republicanism. Knox saw these social issues as having racial and 
biological meaning. Political attitudes were not universal, but rather they were related to 
particular racial groups. In the eighteenth-century There are many other examples of 
politicized doctors, such as Erasmus Darwin, David Hartley, and Joseph Priestly; whilst 
in the nineteenth-century, figures such as John Crawfurd, William Lawrence, James 
Cowles Prichard, John Hodgkin, Charles Darwin, and Thomas Huxley were all doctors 
with a political bent. Biological interpretations of social issues became totalising 
material solutions.  
 
These solutions placed insurmountable divisions between people, such as the racial 
arguments of Robert Knox and the other early anthropologists. By comparison, the 
earlier beliefs and discourses on differences all allowed for change (Foucault 1975). An 
individual could change their practices to conform to social norms.68 The new biological 
                                                          
67 An analogy to post-colonial politics in the post-World War Two era is revealing on this point. Many 
anti-imperial activists and post-colonial leaders were doctors by training. This was often the only 
profession which was open to educated individuals. In many instances their profession, which often 
involved working with the poor, promoted militant activism. The case of Che Guevara is a classic 
example of this. Adrian Desmond argues that this association with the dispossessed has structural class 
explanation. “An increase in poverty depressed the GP’s pay”, and therefore the radicalism of doctors 
“served quite distinct middle-class professional ends” (Desmond 1989: 31, 32). 
68 A good example was the Spanish Inquisition, which although brutal, aimed at coercive education to 
make people change their heretical ways and conform to orthodoxy. 
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theories increased the caveats on an individual’s ability to change. The biological nature 
of these caveats meant that it was impossible for people to conform: conformity 
required people to change their biology. By using nature as a concept in social theories, 
social cohesion was naturalized and solidified within the racial nation, but between 
groups the natural divisions became insurmountable chasms, and tradition had gone full 
circle. What had started as a rational theory of social change, which liberated people 
from nature, became a theory of totalising division; and divisions between people had 
been absolutely naturalized through biology.  
 
Evolution and Abolition 
 
The slow creep and transformation of humanist thinking into biological thinking took a 
dramatic leap in the public imagination. Slavery contextualized the debate on race in the 
English-speaking world. The religious debates surrounding the ‘great chain of being’ 
were swept from centre stage as the abolitionist and pro-slavery camps moved their 
arguments from theology to science. The racial unity of humanity moved from the 
cultural position of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment to the biological battlefield of 
nineteenth-century science.  
 
Slavery brought forth deep moral and political issues around fundamental ethical 
divisions between humans and animals. By using science to answer this vexatious 
question, scientific theories of human diversity became constructed within the politics 
of slavery; with the protagonists using science to bolster the claims for their respective 
sides. Each side could wield a formidable array of experts.69 The net result was that the 
natural history of humans was tied to the political debate of slavery. Although the 
debate would be ‘lost and won’, the conduct of the debate formed a mode of thought in 
which national identity became considered to be biological. Biological conceptions of 
the nation were framed around the issue of exploitation and domination. This meant that 
the biology of nations became a key issue in the ideological debates of the British 
                                                          
69 Yet these experts were shown at the time to be little more than ideologues promoting scientific theories 
based on political beliefs. A good example was the Miscegenation theory that was a deliberate hoax 
conceived by three journalists to show the poverty behind the scientific arguments. The theory held that a 
new copper colour race would emerge in America out of the mixing of the different races. The theory was 
designed to create a political bombshell between the pro-slavery democrats and the anti-slavery 
republicans. Many of the racial theorists believed it was a serious theory (Ellingson 2001: 324-330).   
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Empire. This point will be examined in the later chapters, but the emergence throughout 
the empire of anthropological and orientalist societies that studied the racial “origins of 
oriental nations” (Y 1830) demonstrates the importance of biological racial thought to 
the empire.  
 
The abolition movement emerged from radical Christian scriptural teachings. Since the 
sixteenth-century, when Bartolome de Las Casas argued that the native Americans 
could not be enslaved because they were not known in the biblical world, religion had 
been the prime legitimization and critique of slavery (Davis 1970, Fredrickson 2003, 
Thomas 1997). Slavery had been a norm in Western civilization since its origins in the 
ancient Middle East (Davis 1970: 50). There were clear historical roots that gave a 
cultural legitimization to servitude; but, during the renaissance, theologians and legal 
scholars focused attention on legitimising slavery (Ward and Lott 2002). The desire to 
legitimize an institution, which was already a customary tradition, demonstrates that 
slavery had ceased to be a ‘cultural given’ by the nineteenth-century and had become a 
contested area of social discourse (Smaje 2000).70  
 
The institution of slavery had traditionally been legally constrained to the subjugation of 
the losers of a just war and the sale of oneself or one’s child into bondage (Davis 1970). 
This meant that slavery was directed to neighbouring societies or marginalized social 
groups within the same society. The Atlantic Slave Trade was a radical break from this, 
with Africans being used as slaves: They were not involved in a conflict with European 
societies. In response to changes in the practice of slavery, a religious and legal 
justifications developed to re-naturalize the contradictions that were emerging (Davis 
1970).  
 
Biologically defining people also has origins in the eighteenth-century study of 
aesthetics. Aesthetics is the study of beauty, but in the eighteenth-century it played an 
important role in political discourse. Social divisions became manifest through aesthetic 
theory, with aesthetics becoming the symbol of a healthy civil society (Bindman 2002). 
                                                          
70 Arguably the move to legitimize slavery is an example of the paradigm change within the ideology. 
Slavery’s naturalism was no-longer an unquestioned given, because of the structural transformation of 
what was a traditional institution. Slavery was transformed from a traditional practice of servitude to 
global trade and a key component in the capitalist global economy. This transformation of a traditional 
practice changed people’s perception of the practice leading to its naturalism being questioned. 
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Since classical times, nobility was signified as naturally beautiful; henceforth, in the 
eighteenth century the noble savage became a symbol of beauty. This beauty was more 
than skin deep. It became an esoteric beauty, a beauty that extended to the soul. The 
noble savage became a symbol of the uncorrupted.71  
 
The study of aesthetics became a key component of eighteenth-century natural history. 
It was the initial basis on which difference was assessed and occurred through 
physiognomy and phrenology. Physiognomy was the study of facial expressions. This 
was popularized as a scientific study by John Caspar Lavater ([1772] c.1785). Lavater 
argued that facial expressions and physique were representative of an individual’s 
mental character. As the nineteenth-century progressed, physiognomy descended into 
quackery, but it had a legacy. The techniques of examining physical markers and the 
principles that character was revealed through physical characteristics, was absorbed by 
anatomists and ethnologists in the early study of race (Bindman 2002). Physiognomy 
grounded the human character in observable physical characteristics.72 These arguments 
became absorbed in the politics of slavery.  
 
Lord Kames (Henry Home) was a key link between racial biology and slavery. In his 
Sketches of the History of Man (1774), Kames argued that human variety must have 
been a result of multiple creations of God. However, Kames moved from religion to 
                                                          
71 The noble savage was an individual in the ‘state of nature’ that had not been corrupted by society. 
Rousseau’s (1761) Discourse on Inequality was symptomatic of this aesthetic belief, although Rousseau 
never actually used the phrase ‘noble savage’ (Ellingson 2001). It was a belief that spurred many 
movements. Rousseau’s Arcadian state of nature, became both the source of revolutionary modernism 
and also conservative romanticism. This eighteenth-century move to the aesthetic also spurred the early 
discourse on race. Writers such as Anthony Ashley Cooper the 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury ([1714] 2001), 
Joseph Adderson ([1713] 2005), Francis Hutchenson ([1726] 2004) and Edmund Burke ([1759] 1998) 
had all argued that beauty was a symptom of virtue, as part of their project of cultivating social civility.  
This was individual aesthetics, but would become the groundwork for collective aesthetics that originated 
in artistic movements. Drawing on the eighteenth-century obsession that drew a connection between 
aesthetics and virtue, David Bindman (2002) has argued that the origins of human taxonomy emerged 
from these Enlightenment ideals. Bindman’s argument is that collective human taxonomy originated in 
art textbooks: practical manuals that facilitated the drawing of human anatomy. Works such as Johann 
Winckelmann’s Reflections on the imitation of Greek works in painting and sculpture (1765), were the 
foundation-stones that connected character to human form. Bindman maintains it was through the work of 
John Caspar Lavater’s aesthetics that art was driven into biology. In Lavater’s work we see the 
connection between individual aesthetics and collective aesthetics. Lavater’s main works were 
Physiognomy ([1772] c.1785) and Essays on Physiognomy ([1775-8] 1789). In his Essays, Lavater 
focuses on revealing an individuals character through facial expressions, this was four volumes of in-
depth detail on faces and what they reveal. In comparion his earlier work, Physiognomy, was much 
briefer, focusing on how physiognomy related to collective character. 
72 Works such as Robert Knox’s  Great Artists and Great Anatomists (1852), is an example of the 
crossover between aesthetic theory and early racial theory. 
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biology, speculating in Monboddo-fashion that African negro’s were related to orang-
utans. This point will become important to later discussion on the nation and race in 
Southeast Asia in Chapter Seven of this thesis. This was selective evolutionary theory 
that was derogatory in its purpose and structure, and resulted in the biological 
legitimization of servitude. Evolution was for degenerates, in comparison Europeans 
were as God intended them. In biological terms, Kames’s theory meant that Africans 
and Asians were mentally inferior, but biologically superior in tropical climates. This 
biological/psychological connection legitimized the servitude of Africans on biological 
grounds rather than religious grounds. It was a clear break from the past. The new 
sciences presented the African Negros as ‘beasts of burden’ which were impervious to 
questions of morality.73  
 
Kames’s biological arguments did not stand alone. They were supported by arguments 
on the creation of property, commerce and development of art. Biological arguments on 
race occurred in a wider discussion on the creation of political societies. Kames’s 
arguments prefigured Robert Knox’s ethnocentric arguments (Knox’s argument would 
occur some seventy years later). Kames’s represented one of the first attempts to 
primordialize political society’s biologically homogeneous entities. In doing so, Kames 
was connecting into the traditional hierarchical view of the ‘chain of being’, albeit in a 
modernist form. In effect, Kames was one of the first writers to use biology to remove 
the nation from its liberal origins in cosmopolitism and education.  
 
Kames sparked an uproar, becoming the apologist for slavery (Porter 2004: 249) and 
was soon challenged by the abolition movement.74 Kames had highlighted a method of 
side-stepping the abolitionists’ arguments on religious moralism. Thomas Clarkson’s 
influential Essay on Slavery and Commerce in Humans (1786), which was a summary 
of the abolitionists arguments, depended on the recognition of Africans as humans with 
equal natural-law rights to Europeans. Kames, and the pro-slavery lobby, used the new 
science of biology as a means of politically defending exploitation through a process of 
biological naturalization. This act transformed the study of race in Europe, for it 
                                                          
73 The irony with Kame’s derogatory view of Negros was that he was one of the great ethicists of the 
eighteenth-century. However, for Kame, Negros were clearly not real humans.  
74 One such text was Samuel Smith’s An Essay on the Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in 
the Human Species (1778), that used the climatic theory to explain diversity and was scathing of Kames.  
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revealed the political utility of biological arguments within politics. It was the structure 
of slavery that drove the links between biology, race and nation.75  
 
Although race was initially used to support slavery, the founders of British 
Anthropology seized the emerging science as a potent tool in the abolitionist movement. 
The politicization of race marks a shift in the discourse. Prior to its politicization, the 
study of race was a relatively impotent science and its advocates were quick to argue 
that it had very little baring on political events (Bindman 2002: 12, 16-17). Race was 
like all forms of natural history, an occupation for gentlemen who liked categorising 
living creatures and placing specimens on their walls. Practitioners saw no difference 
between racks of butterflies adorning a study, to that of a collection of human skulls.76 
When race became a political tool it became connected with the wider discourse of mass 
politics and political emancipation. Race became a primordial naturalising concept in 
the wider discourse of collective political emancipation which, from the American 
Revolution onwards, moved from individual emancipation to national emancipation. 
From the early-nineteenth century onwards, biological conceptions of race and nation 
became a surrogate for mass democracy.77  
 
Two such writers that encapsulate the shift in thought were James Cowles Prichard and 
William Lawrence. Both of these men adopted a firm abolitionist stance, holding to the 
monogenesis theory of human diversity; and argued that ethnology had inherent 
political bearing. In taking this stance, these men demonstrated the political utility of 
                                                          
75 The striking thing about the eighteenth-century debate surrounding the natural history of humans was 
its continental European persona (Bindman 2002). Besides for Rousseau, European writers hadn’t made 
strong political claims on the back of natural history. In comparison, the pervasiveness of slavery in the 
Anglo-American economy dictated that the debate was political from the mid-eighteenth century in both 
Britain and America. The central reason for this was structural. Excluding Spain and Portugal, the issue of 
Atlantic slavery was of little concern to continental European powers. The Germanic states had no 
colonial territories and were not part of the Atlantic slave trade. By the end of the eighteenth-century, the 
Dutch had a minimal involvement in the Atlantic slave trade; however, the issue of slavery also plagued 
their colony in Java, but this slave trade was predominantly sustained by indigenous Asian demands and 
was very different to the Atlantic slave trade. In a similar vein, the Revolution in Hati and the Louisiana-
land purchase meant that the French were also removed from the Atlantic slave trade. The main 
continental writers on race had little pecuniary involvement in race; their main point of ideological 
conflict was religious. Therefore, although in many cases they took a polygenes approach to race, most of 
them were cosmopolitans and had argued that their work had no political ramifications.  
76 It is worth noting that this was not limited to Africans, Native Americans, or Asians; samples of 
Europeans were also collected for comparisons.  
77 This point has been made many times, particularly in relation in twentieth-century phenomenon of 
ethno-nationalism (Anderson 1991, Kedourie 1960, Mann 2005, Nairn 1997, Nairn 1996). The concept of 
race was just the first incarnation of this false democracy.  
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racial arguments. In using science to liberate, they created a precedent in which the 
reverse could also occur: science would also be used to legitimize hierarchies and 
practices of racial servitude.  
 
If anybody can be attributed as the founder of modern Anglo-American anthropology it 
is James Cowles Prichard.78 Well into the 1870s, British ethnologists and racial writers 
maintained a mantra of gratitude to Prichard. Today, Prichard’s only main historical 
relevance is that he proved the unity of the human race through the concept of hybridity.  
 
Cutting through the kaleidoscope of descriptive diatribes about race, Prichard saw the 
kernel question as a definitional problem. He aimed to provide clear definitions of 
species, genus, tribe and race. The words “genus”, “species” and “kind” had all 
originated with similar meanings. He argued that “these terms came at length to be 
applied, by unscientific observers, to particular assortments of organized beings”. This 
flippancy moved into popular language and intensified the problem (Prichard 1848: 
106-107). Prichard realized that biological thinking was inadvertently transforming 
people’s conceptions of race. False conceptions naturalized divisions as real, when in 
fact they were non-existent. By linking the word ‘race’ to ‘species’ a biological division 
was being created between peoples that removed any issues of morality.  
 
The words ‘race’ and ‘tribe’ were used for people, animals and plants. When people 
refer to race, Prichard argued, they meant species (Prichard 1848: 105-9). As synonyms, 
‘race’ and ‘species’ became defined through whether or not human physical differences 
could be considered primordial (which meant god-given).79 In this capacity, race and 
species were also different from variety, of which there could be many within a species. 
Prichard used the example of dogs and domestic cats; both of which had varieties within 
species, therefore varieties within a species were mere tribes (Prichard 1848: 107). By 
framing the debate around the question ‘were races tribes or species?’, Prichard 
removed dubious biological/political connections over slavery. In doing so he 
naturalized the concept of tribes into biological entities (which since the time of John 
                                                          
78 Prichard himself was quick to acknowledge his own importance, giving himself the following footnote 
in 1836: “The comparative physiology and psychology of different races of men had never been made 
expressly the subject of inquiry, until the publication of my work” (Prichard 1848: vi). This meant that 
Prichard took a very traditional stance towards the ‘chain of being’, seeing it in religious terms only. 
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Locke  ([1698] 2004) and Robert Filmler (1680) tribes had been seen as basic social 
structures). This was a no-win situation for cosmopolitanism; the nation, as a biological 
entity, was being naturalized as a fact through each angle of biology’s politicization. 
 
Prichard’s battlefield of choice was definitions. These distinctions established a logical 
base from which he could undermine the advocates of polygenesis (the separate creation 
of races). Prichard’s definitional work meant that the polygenesis advocates were 
arguing that race meant species. Early-nineteenth century perspectives on anatomical 
difference meant the polygenesis advocates appeared to be on strong ground. There 
were clear physical differences between Negros, Europeans and Asians. This system, 
Prichard argued, was imprecise; with the real definition of species being whether or not 
two animals could reproduce effectively. This raised the question of hybridity. For 
thousands of years people had been breeding hybrid animals such as mules, wherein 
two species from the same genus could reproduce, but the offspring were infertile. This 
meant the clear distinction over whether or not the different races were separate species, 
gravitated around whether interracial offspring were fertile or infertile.80  
  
As a founder of British anthropology, Prichard established the discipline with a political 
purpose in mind. The older he became, the more certain he became that anthropology 
was political. In 1848 he published a popular and accessible account of his life’s 
research, but it had a greater purpose. The introductory chapter was a polemic advocacy, 
wherein Prichard (1855: 6-7) raged against moral tyrannies of the polygenesis camp: 
 
They maintain that the ultimate lot of the ruder tribes is a state of perpetual servitude; and that, if 
in some instances they should continue to repel the attempts of the civilised nations to subdue 
them, they will at length be rooted out and exterminated in every country on the shores of which 
Europeans shall have set their feet. These half-men, half-brutes … were made to be the domestic 
slaves of the lordly caste, under whose protection they are susceptible of some small 
improvement, comparable to that which is attained by our horses and dogs … If the Negro and 
the Australian are not our fellow-creatures and of one family with ourselves, but beings of an 
inferior order, and if duties towards them were not contemplated, as we may in that case 
presume them not to have been, in any of the positive commands on which the morality of the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
79 Prichard was never in favour of evolution, hence for him, primordialism meant characteristics that were 
existent at the moment of God’s act of creation (Prichard 1848: 109).  
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Christian world is founded, our relations to these tribes will appear to be not very different from 
those which might be imagined to subsist between us and a race of oranges … We thus come 
near to an apology for the practice of kidnapping, at which our forefathers connived, though it 
did not occur to them to defend it on so reasonable a ground … Those who hold that the Negro is 
of a distinct species from our own, and of a different and inferior grade in the scale of organised 
beings … observe that it cannot be much more criminal to destroy such creatures when they 
annoy us than to extirpate wolves or bears; nor do they strongly reprobate the conduct of some 
white people in our Australian colony, who are said to have shot occasionally the poor miserable 
savages of that country as food for their dogs. I shall not pretend that in my own mind I regard 
the question now to be discussed as one of which the decision is a matter of indifference either to 
religion or humanity.  
  
For Prichard, anthropology was a tool of morality in the defence of the vulnerable. 
Prichard conceived anthropology as an emancipatory discipline. He wrote the above 
passage after the successful abolition of slavery throughout the British Empire in 1833. 
Yet Prichard, like many of the abolitionists, was moving beyond slavery, casting a 
critical eye over European colonialism and imperialism generally and its brutal impact 
on indigenous societies. He died in 1848, four years after this anti-colonial critique, 
making it hard to tell where Prichard would have taken the issue further. The nature of 
this introduction indicates that colonial imperialism was weighing heavily on his mind.  
 
It is not surprising that Prichard was moving towards an anti-colonial critique. His 
approach to race was based on principles of a liberal education that focused on 
individual achievement, and the opportunities for all to improve. As it was being 
practiced, colonialism was the antipathy of these ideals. It had produced slavery in 
America, and, as Prichard’s argument made clear, in Australia colonialism was 
producing the genocide of the Aboriginal population.  
 
Prichard’s approach was part of a wider approach in ethnology/anthropology in favour 
of imperial protection. Thomas Hodgkin, who had also been heavily involved in the 
Abolitionist struggle, was a follower of Prichard and implemented many of Prichard’s 
political objectives, founding both the Aborigines Protection Society (1837) and the 
Ethnological Society of London (1844). Hodgkin’s idea was to reform imperialism by 
                                                                                                                                                                          
80 This was a conclusive argument that should have buried the polygenesis argument, but amazingly 
polygenesis arguments continued until long after Charles Darwin published Origin of the Species ([1859] 
2003). 
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giving it a higher purpose. In this capacity the Aborigines Protection Society influenced 
policy in Africa, arguing that parts of Africa should be colonized on humanitarian 
grounds (Porter 1999: 209).  
 
Prichard saw race as a cultural condition, wherein people responded to their local 
environment, producing cultural and physical traits. He argued that: 
  
There is nothing more probable than the supposition, that the average degree of perfection in the 
development of the brain as of other parts of the system, differs in different nations with the 
diversities of climate and other elements of the external condition, and with the degrees of social 
culture. It is probable that the condition of men in civilized society produces some modification 
in the intellectual capabilities of the race (Prichard 1848: 216). 
 
This was the classic liberal notion of stimulus and education. It could have been taken 
directly from Locke, Adderson or Hume. More importantly, this idea of race did not 
infer inferiority, with Prichard stating “it will be quite sufficient for my present 
argument, if it is allowed, that there are some Negroes whose mental faculties fully 
attain the standard of European intellect” (Prichard 1848: 216).81 In arguing against race 
as species, Prichard was defending and advancing liberal cosmopolitanism. By 
demonstrating the unity of the human species, Prichard proved cosmopolitanism, whilst 
attributing national differences to five basic tribal groups that were a construction of 
cultural and environmental conditioning. Prichard’s work is an attempt to navigate 
liberalism through the dilemmas of nation and race. However, the particular way this 
occurred meant that the nation and liberalism became tied to a biological way of being.  
 
Although Prichard understood the political and moral imperative of race and nation, he 
saw humans as biologically equal. Prichard was an anti-racial theorist. Staying true to 
eighteenth-century principles, Prichard swum against the tide of racial materialist ideas 
which pervaded his time. William Lawrence was a contemporary of Prichard, but in him 
we can see the move to racial theory. Lawrence attributed human inferiorities to the 
hereditary biological condition. Eric Hobsbawm (1995: 288) argued that Lawrence 
                                                          
81 Prichard’s liberal belief in cosmopolitan individualism was not surprising. It can be read into his family 
background. He grew up in a Quaker family (hence his aversion to slavery) which was involved in 
mercantile foreign trading. His farther was an autodidactic self-made man who had, through his own 
efforts, rapidly moved up the social ladder (Cull 1855). The family’s pathway to success was through the 
liberal pillars of individual effort and education. 
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bespoke Darwinism. Lawrence followed in the footsteps of Prichard, publishing his 
arguments in 1819. There is very little overall difference in their respective political 
stances, with both being opponents of polygenesis and slavery. In his younger days, 
Lawrence was an active liberal radical who regularly denounced the government in his 
anatomy lectures (Desmond 1989, Ellingson 2001, Mudford 1968).82  
 
Although Lawrence favoured monogenesis and was opposed to slavery, he did not share 
Prichard’s view that all people were naturally equal. Lawrence marks a break from the 
eighteenth-century. It is his derogatory fusion between politics, cultural observation and 
anatomical/physiological science that sets the tone for the racial extremists such as 
Robert Knox and the Social Darwinists of the late-nineteenth century. In connecting 
cultural observations with politics and biology, Lawrence synthesized race as a 
hereditary structure that determined the future.  
 
 Lawrence’s ([1819] 1848: 83) purpose was to “present occasion, to consider man as an 
object of zoology;—to describe him as a subject of the animal kingdom”. But in 
considering Man an animal, Lawrence was not making a Proto-Darwinian view of the 
‘chain of being’.83 He castigated Monboddo (1773), Rousseau (1761) and White (1799) 
for connecting humans with apes. To Lawrence, these arguments legitimized slavery 
and oppression. They linked Negros with monkeys and created degenerative versions of 
humanity, commenting: “I do not hesitate to assert that the notion of specific identity 
between the African and orang-outang … is as false philosophically, as the moral and 
political consequences, to which it would lead are shocking and detestable” (Lawrence 
[1819] 1848: 87). Lawrence could clearly see that the evolutionary association, which 
                                                          
82 Lawrence was well-known for his radical political views. After its first publication, Lawrence’s 
Lectures on Comparative Anatomy became the centre of controversy, in which Lawrence was projected as 
“an enemy of church and state and a corrupter of the youth” (Mudford 1968: 433). His Lectures became 
subject to a civil-court case over copyright, in which he was accused of “denyied Christianity and 
Revelation, which was contrary to public policy and morality” In 1817-18 Lawrence was professor of 
anatomy and surgery at the Royal College of Surgeons, on publishing his Lectures he was threatened with 
dismissal. He subsequently withdrew his Lecturers from sale. However, a series of pirated copies came 
out shortly after. Lawrence took the pirate publisher to court, suing for infringement of copyright. The 
publishers defence was that Lawrence’s arguments “denied Christianity and Revelation, which was 
contrary to public policy and morality” and, as such, Lawrence was not entitled to copyright. The court 
upheld the defence and the book was published, along with a re-release of Lawrence’s own editions. 
83 Although Lawrence castigates evolutionary theories, he developed a natural selection type theory of 
biological and social change. He came to this theory though studying mental illness and its hereditary 
nature. Some authors have argued that this constituted an evolutionary theory (Darlington 1959, 
Hobsbawm 1995: 288). It is clear Lawrence had evolutionary ideas, but he continually attacks evolution, 
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placed Africans on a lesser rung than the Europeans, legitimising servitude. This stance 
politically tied Lawrence to the idea of creation. Despite this Lawrence ([1819] 1848: 
342) also saw Negros as being lesser beings:  
 
The retreating forehead and the depressed vertex of the dark varieties of man make me strongly 
doubt whether they are susceptible of these high destinies; — whether they are capable of 
fathoming the depths of science; of understanding and appreciating the doctrines and the 
mysteries of our religion. These obstacles will, I fear, be too powerful for missionaries and Bible 
societies … To expect that the Americans or Africans can be raised by any culture to an equal 
height in moral sentiments and intellectual energy with Europeans, appears to me quite as 
unreasonable as it would be to hope that the bull-dog may equal the greyhound in speed.  
 
Lawrence saw the races as biologically unequal. Lawrence agreed with the view 
Prichard held that the human races were one species, and that this was proved by the 
principle of hybridity; but whilst Prichard just saw race as neutral variation, Lawrence 
followed Rousseau in believing that change was degeneration. Lawrence maintained the 
eighteenth-century liberal-materialist position, that human variation was dependent on 
social conditions. Nevertheless, he saw that the social condition could degenerate as 
well as improve. Lawrence broke from the past by arguing that social degeneration 
became biological and, as a result, that degeneration became entrenched. It is at this 
point that Lawrence can be seen as a proto-Darwinist. He believed this degeneration 
could cross the generational barrier, biologically enshrining the degeneration.  
 
Lawrence argued that domestication was the key to human variety. He attributed “the 
differences” in “physical organisation … moral and intellectual qualities” between 
human beings as “analogous in kind and degree … to breeds … of domestic animals” 
(Lawrence [1819] 1848: 375). From this Lawrence concluded that race can be 
“accounted for” by “the same principles”. It was the servile condition of domestic 
animals that enabled breading for variation. Excluding the breading of slaves, it was 
culture that determined human diversity. Lawrence substantially quoted Alexander von 
Humboldt ([1811] 1822) 84 to make his point: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
therefore, although he developed an explanation of biological change, he didn’t place it in a evolutionary 
context.  
84 Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1835) was a German naturalist and geographer that explored South 
America between the years 1799-1804. His resulting book Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain 
([1811] 1822) was influential in the early-nineteenth century, being a comprehensive account on the 
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Intellectual cultivation is what contributes most to diversify the features. In barbarous nations 
there is rather a physiognomy peculiar to the tribe or horde than to any individual. When we 
compare our domestic animals with those which inhabit our forests, we make the same 
observation ([1819] 1848:368).  
 
Similar to Edward Gibbon’s theory of the relationship between empire and barbarism 
that facilitated progress discussed in the previous chapters, Lawrence emphasized the 
inherent barbarism of people and the importance of individualism in the differentiation 
of races. Lawrence ([1819] 1848: 360) argued that barbarism was not a biologically 
inferior condition, maintaining that “most of the modern European nations existed in a 
more or less complete state of barbarism within times of which we have the most 
authentic records”. Lawrence saw that the barbarian of Europe and the barbarian of 
Africa existed in similar social conditions. Yet he commented that the Europeans had 
maintained a “permanence” of character and complexion despite becoming a 
“progressive civilization” that to “this day [they] resemble the portraits of their 
ancestors, drawn by Caesar and Tacitus”. Lawrence ([1819] 1848: 360) argued that the 
barbarism of Europe had a global reach, and that this supported racial unity: 
 
These tribes owe their origin to the Mongols, and retain in the north those marks of their descent, 
which we find so strongly expressed in the Chinese, under the widely different latitudes of the 
south. At the same time, the parent tribes live in the middle of Asia, equally removed from the 
former and the latter. 
 
In connecting Europe with Asia, Lawrence was not claiming that Europeans were 
superior because they were not barbarians, but rather because they were barbarians. 
Lawrence was making similar claims to the historians and political economists we 
examined in the previous two chapters. Lawrence tribalizes European identity. The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
progress, results and effects of colonialism in Spanish America. James Mill ([1817] 1820), Stamford 
Raffles (1835, [1817] 1965),  John Crawfurd (1820) and Charles Darwin ([1879] 2004) both regularly 
deferred to Humboldt to make comparative arguments about the affects of colonialism on all parties 
involved. Humboldt’s work crossed between geography, history, ethnology and political economy. This 
gave the work a theoretical potency that was attractive to comparative theorists. It was also very useful in 
racial theory. John Stuart Mill gave the following backhanded complement to Humboldt: 
Of late years moral geography has been permitted to fall a little into oblivion; the world even 
seemed disposed to believe that the essence of principle is its universality; that virtue and vice 
depend neither upon parallels nor meridians; and that Humboldt’s isothermal lines mark 
temperature only, and do not convey the slightest information respecting a nation’s capacity for 
justice and freedom (Mill 1963 xxxi: 360-361).  
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Europeans are descendents of rampaging Mongol hordes and Celtic aborigines. They 
are as much Asian as they are European, but they possessed a superior barbarian culture 
that enabled progress. Lawrence linked this barbarian culture to the nation. The 
Germans were the Mongols, the French the Franks and Celts, and the British were the 
Celts. Lawrence’s theories rest on a belief in the primordial nation. This primordial 
nation was a root barbarian culture (Lawrence [1819] 1848: 361-363). This culture to a 
large degree pre-determined the future.  
 
Culture shaped the “state of domestication” and climate (acting by “accident”) in 
shaping variations. Lawrence saw that these forces shaped the appearance and character 
of races: determining their future. Therefore he concluded “that the human … like that 
of the cow, sheep, horse, and pig, and others,” are shaped by breeding (Lawrence [1819] 
1848: 375).  
 
These arguments were a progression on the liberal notions of individuality, materialism, 
nurturing of culture. Liberal ideas of the cultivated identity were adopted within racial 
writing. Once this approach was transformed into biology, it became totalising and lost 
the nuance of change. Lawrence is a transition figure. His thought is essentially 
eighteenth-century, focusing on domestication/socialization as a force for degeneracy 
and improvement. However, rather than maintaining the optimism of eighteenth-century 
writers, Lawrence sees socialization permeating the hereditary barrier. This destroyed 
equality of ability. In making this argument, Lawrence destroys the polygenesis position 
and creates racism — Robert Knox and Arthur Gobineau were the next step.  
 
Primordial Bloodlust  
 
Robert Knox was in clear opposition to the ideas of Prichard and Lawrence. Politically, 
the study of race became divided into two opposing camps in the 1850s. The 
Ethnological Society founded by Thomas Hodgkin, after the death of Prichard, 
maintained the humanitarian/protectionist stance that Prichard had championed. This 
changed in the late 1850s and early 1860s, when John Crawfurd (who was instrumental 
in the colonization of Southeast Asia and is discussed in the following chapters) and 
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James Hunt mounted a coup within the organization; moving it away from its 
humanitarian and Quaker roots, towards a more ‘scientific’ approach to race — this 
could be termed racism, justified by pseudoscience (Ellingson 2001: 235-271). This was 
still too moderate for James Hunt, who founded the breakaway London Anthropological 
Society, which was dedicated to following Knox’s approach to race (Hunt 1868: 433). 
 
Knox’s ideas were a break from previous conceptions of race. Race had been a 
physiological concept, whilst in Knox’s hands race was a psychological concept. 
Psychological arguments had been made before, but usually in a derogatory sense that 
legitimized persecution. By comparison, as I began to discuss earlier, Knox presented 
race as a universal theory of psychology. This psychology (which was never explained, 
in a fashion beyond the polemic) had, in Knox’s mind, a psychic relationship with 
territorial landscapes. Races had particular homelands and the health of a race (both 
moral and physical) was dependent on staying within this homeland. This theory, which 
was influential, had profound implications for the direction of the British Empire.  
 
Knox’s arguments about indignity and the rejection of foreign governance was a 
xenophobe’s theory of anti-imperialism. Knox presented frightening scenarios that 
predicted the physical and moral degeneration of colonists.  
 
The inordinate self-esteem of the Saxon will be especially shocked thereby, nor will he listen with 
composure to a theory which tells him, proves to him, that his race cannot domineer over the earth — 
cannot even exist permanently on any continent to which he is not indigenous — cannot ever become 
native, true-born Americans — can-not hold in permanency any portion of any continent but the one 
on which he first originated.”(Knox [1850] 1862: vi) 
 
Knox’s criticisms questioned the premise of civil governance, which (as discussed in 
Chapters Two and Three) was a cornerstone of the early-nineteenth century British 
Empire. 
 
To admit the full importance of race, militating as it does against the thousand-and-one prejudices of 
the so-called civilized state of man; opposed as it is to the Utopian views based on education, 
religion and government (Knox [1850] 1862: 24).  
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His theory of race, which saw self-determination as the natural desire of race — no 
matter how brutal this process would be — undermined the liberal traditions behind the 
British Empire. The liberal traditions of education and good governance, which were the 
foundation of domestic unity within Britain, were being exported throughout the world. 
According to Knox, these were erroneous fantasies. These anti-imperialist sentiments 
have led to arguments on views such as Knox’s and the similar sentiments held by the 
Frenchman, Arthur de Gobineau, although racist, constitutes an anti-imperialist theory 
(Adas 1989, Hawkins 1997: 185). Knox was not an anti-imperialist; he glorified 
conquest and invasion, stating: “I offer the English invasion of Hindostan [sic] in 
proof—the invasion of Scinde and Affghan, the Plunder of China. A profitable war is a 
pleasant thing for a Saxon nation; and a crusade against the heathen has always been 
declared praiseworthy” (Knox [1850] 1862: 4). This indicates no anti-imperialist theory, 
making empire natural to Knox. Therefore empire serves no other purpose than the 
gratification of sadistic racial desires.85  
 
Like Lawrence, Knox tribalized the racial nation through the barbarian. Knox took the 
naturalising of the barbarian to another level. In Gibbon and Mill, barbarism was 
cultural and could be lost through luxury. Similarly, in Lawrence, the barbarian was 
primal, being the essence of every nation. Lawrence saw the barbarian as the root of 
culture. By comparison, Knox saw barbarism as biologically locked inside the racial 
character, and unlike Gibbon, Lawrence and Mill, Knox saw barbarism as specific to the 
Europeans. It was this innate racial barbarism of the European nations that enabled them 
to plunder the nations of the world.  
 
Knox represents the sum-total of liberal radicalism. He was a construct of radical liberal 
individualism and racial bigotry. He preached the virtues of inter-racial war and 
genocide, whilst arguing the futility of colonialism and imperialism: purely because he 
believed that no race could be successfully transported. Although disturbing, Knox’s 
arguments reek of liberal notions on governance, individuality and education. Knox 
                                                          
85 Adrian Desmond (1989: 388-389) implies that Knox’s extreme racial views did not develop until after 
the young liberal Knox came up against the Edinburgh medical and intellectual establishment and was 
rejected for his outspoken atheism. This slight was compounded by his involvement with Burke and Hare 
scandal, whereby Knox paid Burke and Hare to supply him corpses for his anatomy classes. Unable to 
fulfil Knox’s insatiable demand, Burke and Hare became serial killers to provide Knox with the supply of 
bodies. Knox’s career did not recover. It was after this that Knox “expunged the last vestiges of 
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takes culture and transforms it into biology. He creates primordial groups, which have 
their own psychology that underpins their political destiny. But it is through 
primodialism that Knox pursues liberal objectives. Race becomes a condition of 
governmentality. Knox transformed race into a theory of human agency. For him, 
governance needed to be based on race. Race was linked to territory, and races could 
not change territory. For Knox races could not blend and produce a hybrid race because 
the hybrid is infertile and degenerate. Knox integrated national stereotypes with 
race/nation to create a primordial condition that was uncompromising. This 
demonstrates the tribalising of identity beliefs that held sway as the nineteenth-century 
progressed. For Knox and his followers, empire ceased to be defined as order and 
civilization. Instead empire became an act of racial bloodlust.  
 
Social Darwinism 
 
Charles Darwin emerged as a cultural and scientific phenomenon at a key historical 
moment in time, when nationalism had become a dominant force in politics. Robert 
Knox published his racial polemic nine years earlier, and in 1862 Lord Acton predicted 
that the future of European politics was dependent on the ideologies of nationality and 
popularism. In 1859, the same year as the start of the Italian wars of unification, when 
the age of nationalism was engulfing Europe, Charles Darwin published Origin of the 
Species. Darwin knew that the notion of evolution was a powder-keg if related to the 
human condition. Previously, evolutionary theorists had faced social isolation. 
Conscious of his social status, Darwin followed the cautious path, outlining natural 
selection without reference to humans (Moore and Desmond 2004). Despite this, 
Darwin, like Prichard and Lawrence before him, was consumed by the immorality of 
slavery.86 Moore and Desmond (2004) have argued that this was the fundamental 
imperative behind Darwin’s writing of Origin. The fact that Darwin did not discuss race 
and human evolution in Origin, didn’t fool anybody. As soon as it was published, 
supporters and protagonists related it to humans. In the ten years following Origin, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
progressivism and environmentalism from his ethnology” (Desmond 1989: 388). Therefore Knox’s racial 
determinism emerges out of his personal resentments and bitterness. 
86 Moore and Desmond (2004) argue that his was as much a family legacy as Charles Darwin’s own 
convictions. Both the Darwins and the Wedgwoods (which Charles Darwin married into) were leading 
abolitionist families. 
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human evolution was championed by Darwin’s friends with Darwin maintaining an 
awkward silence. Darwin decided that he needed to make his stance clear and published 
the Descent of Man in 1871, the same year that Germany was united.87  
 
In outlining human evolution, Descent was a social theory that reflected the nationalist 
beliefs of the time. Social Darwinism was already an intellectual industry, with Herbert 
Spencer publishing Principles of Biology in 1864.88 Darwin’s own use of ‘nation’, 
‘race’ and ‘human evolution’ reflected the uneasy nexus between nation as a cultural 
community and nation as a biological construct. Although Darwin used the phrase 
‘survival of the fittest’, he was uncomfortable with the term.89 The Descent of Man was 
a tug of war, with Darwin reflecting the naturalness of nations whilst simultaneously 
arguing the socially constructed nature of the nation. The paradoxical nature of this 
argument extends even further, with Darwin arguing that social construction is also a 
process of natural selection.  
 
A key thread in Darwin’s naturalization of the nation and nationalism was his use of 
natural selection as a means of behavioural analysis. In Origin, natural selection was 
primarily related to biological variation in form, with the behaviour of animals 
marginally touched-on and usually in relation to sex. By comparison, when tackling 
human diversity, Darwin focused on the social aspect of humans. 
 
Darwin took it ‘as a given’ that humans were communal beings and that this communal 
demeanour evolved through natural selection. Community and intellect were the 
evolutionary advantages of humans that made up for their “small strength and speed” 
and “want of natural weapons”. Community was the basic evolutionary resource: 
“man’s … social qualities” enabled “him to give and receive aid from his fellow-men” 
                                                          
87 The first edition was published in 1871. I am using the second edition ([1879] 2004).  
88 The first edition appeared as successive instalments between January 1863 and October 1864. I am 
using the revised edition ([1874] 1884). 
89 The phrase “survival of the fittest” was first coined in 1864 by Herbert Spencer in his Principles of 
Biology ([1874] 1884). Darwin adopted the term in his fifth edition of Origin in 1869. Therefore “survival 
of the fittest” was as a late edition, which Darwin had some reservations in using for good reason. Joseph 
Carroll (2003: 34) comments:  
Darwin adopted Spencer’s phrase only on the tacit understanding that it would serve as a 
shorthand term implying all the content in his own concept of natural selection, but if one takes 
Spencer’s phrase at face value, it strips out the elements of heritable variations and differential 
reproductive success. In order to avoid giving occasion for confusion, it is probably a good idea 
simply to avoid using the phrase.  
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(Darwin [1879] 2004: 84). The condition of the barbarian was not ‘solitary brutish and 
short’. Darwin saw humans as inherently social, “though still remaining in a barbarous 
state”. This was a major break from the individualist arguments of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth-centuries. People were not atoms, but biologically hard-wired to work 
collectively. Darwin argued that group psychology was an integral part of human 
natural selection, maintaining that early humans: 
 
Would have felt uneasy when separated from their comrades, for whom they would have felt 
some degree of love; they would have warned each other of danger, and have given mutural aid 
in attack or defense. All this implies some degree of sympathy, fidelity, and courage. Such social 
qualities, the paramount importance of which to the lower animals is disputed by no one, were 
no doubt acquired by the progenitors of man in a similar manner, namely, through natural 
selection, aided by inherited habit.  
 
Group cohesion became a natural facet. Political theorists from Hobbes and Locke to 
Hume, Bentham and the Mills, had attributed collective social identity to being a 
mixture of environmental conditions and as being a by-product of power. Power 
produced governance, which through a mixture of historical accident and ‘force of will’ 
forged a common social identity. To the philosophers community had been rational: a 
creation of self-interest. In rejecting the idea of the solitary barbarian in ‘war against 
all’, Darwin argued that natural selection was a deeper form of rationality that existed 
beyond reflective reasoning. Community was only rational to the extent that it was an 
evolutionary construction. Natural selection meant that social identity was a natural 
animal instinct with which humans had evolved.   
 
A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, 
fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to 
sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this 
would be natural selection (Darwin 2004 [1879]: 157).  
 
Natural selection favoured patriotism. Patriotism was social value that emphasized self-
sacrifice in the name of the group. Humans had evolved to place the group as more 
important than the individual. Darwin was attributing the key aspects of nationalism 
(individual devotion to the collective) as a natural biological fact. This presents 
patriotism as the underlining component in the ‘rhythm of history’, of which he states:  
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All that we know about savages… show that from the remotest times successful tribes have 
supplanted other tribes. Relics of extinct or forgotten tribes have been discovered throughout the 
regions of the earth… At the present day civilised nations are everywhere supplanting barbarous 
nations (Darwin 2004 [1879]: 153). 
 
Darwin combined the ancient savage and civilized nations and tribes to make a general 
statement about the role of patriotism in social change. The fact that Darwin’s theory 
was monogenesis theory gave it an even greater descriptive force. It meant that all tribes 
were connected in a ‘chain of being’ and that patriotism was the common denominator 
from the most ‘savage’ tribe to the most ‘civilized’ nation. The historical role of 
patriotism meant that nationalism was the natural force that drove natural selection. Far 
from being a construction of power and tradition, Darwin saw the nation as a 
fundamental structure in the human condition.  
 
Through the logic of natural selection, the nation became a natural biological fact 
underpinning social change. As previously stated, Darwin’s notion of natural selection 
within Descent is an uneasy negotiation between what Darwin attributes to ‘art’ (social 
construction) and what he attributes to biology (natural selection). This uneasy 
negotiation was the continuation of the liberal themes of nurture and culture in the 
construction of the nation, which was present in all the racial writers of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth-centuries.   
 
In Origin, natural selection was a force of instinct, which was not rational. This is the 
Malthusian/laissez-fare element in Darwin’s thought; the Meta rationality in which 
order is created without conscious rationality. Nature rewards a suitable structure by the 
fact that structure survives on to the next generation, whilst an unsuitable structure will 
face extinction. In Origin, the world worked according to this laissez-fare mechanism. It 
is this theory that marks Origin as being distinctly different to the Lamarckian theories 
of evolution that placed importance on rational intervention. In comparison to Origin, 
Descent presents a more Lamarckian vision of human evolution. Conflict between the 
tribes was as much about the mastery of ‘art’ as much as it was about instinct (Darwin 
2004 [1879]: 153). Darwin saw that the distinct difference between ‘savage’ nations and 
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‘civilized’ nations was art. Art, Darwin (2004 [1879]: 167) argued, was not transferred 
through hereditary mechanisms: 
 
The western nations of Europe, who now so immeasurably surpass their former savage 
progenitors, and stand at the summit of civilisation, owe little or none of their superiority to 
direct inheritance from old Greeks, though they own much to the written works of that 
wonderful people. 
  
Darwin calls forth the perpetual theme of barbarism. The Greeks were cultural ancestors 
of Western Europe, but European superiority was not dependent on them. The 
Europeans became the copiers and perfectors of Greek culture, but it was ‘savage 
heritage of early Western Europe that spurred progress. Darwin was reiterating Gibbon. 
Progress required savagery and education. Education was a means of circumventing 
nature. It changed the natural pattern of natural selection. Darwin termed this process 
‘art’, yet he didn’t elaborate any further on art as a social theory.  
 
Most of the arguments on the evolutionary role of art are mere observational sentences 
that are lost in the continual mantra of natural selection. Darwin creates a confusing 
situation. He never develops a theory of social change, yet believes it to exist and 
proclaims that ‘art’ was an integral part of natural selection. Culture becomes subsumed 
within biology. This leaves a legacy wherein the nation becomes an overarching 
primordial concept driving social change. The nation becomes natural and beyond the 
process of reflection. 
 
 
Biological theories of race changed perceptions on social identity, naturalising pre-
existing hierarchies in a revolutionary way. For example, the ancient concept of the 
‘chain of being’ legitimized hierarchical divisions through esoteric beliefs in divine 
order, yet once the ‘chain’ became biologically defined, hierarchy became secularized 
and modern. The body became the prison that held people within the hierarchical 
‘chain’. This biological conception of hierarchy became a legitimising force in the 
projection of empire. Chapters Six, Seven and Eight of this thesis examine how this 
biological conception of identity became a way of seeing Southeast Asia. However, 
although this was a new way of seeing empire, these chapters argue that it was based on 
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traditional cultural markers of order and civilization (which were outlined in Chapter 
Two). These markers became racialized. Therefore the barbarian lost its cultural 
conditionality, and became a pre-ordained perpetual racial condition.  
 
The nation became intertwined with these racial beliefs. The nation became a natural 
quality that was hardwired into people’s biology. This transition in thought was a 
transformation of earlier ideas about nation and culture. Racial ideas of identity were 
radical interpretations of eighteenth-century liberalism. Racial theory absorbed the 
liberal approach to the nation, yet lost its nuances. Racial theory reduced change to 
biological agents. Racial theory eventually accepted the biological unity of humanity, 
yet at the same time it enshrined inequality through the primordial barbarian.  
 
The barbarian came to be seen as the universal and primal condition, yet it also became 
an exclusive condition with different races having a different barbarian character. The 
barbarian became the primal aspect of the nation: the nation its pure racial condition. 
This barbarian became the eternal condition that continually shaped a nation’s destiny. 
Racial theory legitimized barbarity; in doing so the barbarities within empire-building 
became legitimate transactions.  
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Part Two: 
Southeast Asian 
Imaginings 

Chapter 5 - Dreaming Liberalism, 
Colonialism and the Governance of 
Nations 
 
The second section of this thesis examines the impact of the nation in the process of 
colonising Southeast Asia. The process of naturalising the nation within Britain ran 
simultaneously with the colonising of Southeast Asia. This naturalization of the British 
nation was inseparably linked to the expansion of English-speaking society across the 
globe (Cannadine 2002: xvii, Ferguson 2004). This made the nineteenth-century 
ideologies of ‘nation’ and ‘empire’ concurrent political manifestations. In making this 
argument, I am not just reiterating a well-developed argument that the construction of 
the British nation occurred in an imperial context. This argument has been observed 
many times before, notably by J.A. Hobson in Imperialism: A Study ([1902] 1968: 269) 
but was also understood by David Hume ([1742] 1998: 21-22) in the eighteenth century. 
Instead, this chapter maintains that empire spread a fundamental British belief in the 
nation as the expression of society. As the empire was expanding, the British were 
interpreting the societies they encountered as nations. This had political ramifications 
for the construction of empire. In particular the nation became a basic aspect of 
international political life.  
 
The nation became a key component in expressing a global system of power, and the 
idea of the nation became a conjunction between two forms of empire that were 
contradictory in nature. The first was the age-old geo-political structure of empire: the 
empire of the expansionary state. The second was a much more ambiguous notion of 
empire: it focused on empire as a civic entity. This view portrayed empire as having a 
liberal purpose which was progressive, and fundamentally based on trade (Ferguson 
2004: xx-xxi). These two interpretations of empire were run concurrently in eighteenth 
and nineteenth-century debates on empire. This concurrence created a tension over 
direction, but the nation became the point of commonality between these two threads. 
Through the nation geo-politics could be legitimized. The British saw that they could 
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intervene with the purpose of fulfilling a foreign nation’s destiny. Empire could exist 
whilst also preserving local identity. This clothed empire in a cloak of benevolence that 
fulfilled its geo-political needs, whilst also doing good deeds.  
 
These two threads of empire were played out in Southeast Asia. Jointly, exploitation 
and liberal governance were key components to the colonial experience in Southeast 
Asia. This entailed a nation-building project in which a nation was identified, unified, 
and forged into a colonial state. It was belief in the nation as a fundamental social 
institution that shaped the political geography of British colonial Southeast Asia.  
 
This chapter builds on the themes explored in Chapter Two of this thesis. In particular 
this chapter examines how the nation emerged within the structure of empire. In arguing 
this point, this chapter examines three aspects to the structure of empire. The first aspect 
was the laissez faire critique of mercantilism. The central claim of this critique was that 
the evils of mercantilism introduced the competitiveness of the nation into Asia. This 
critique also became one of the first critiques of empire, which accentuated the nation as 
a resistance to the creation of an empire. The second aspect of this chapter is to examine 
how the nation emerged within the geopolitics of the corporate empire that was the East 
India Company. The third aspect of this chapter was the ethnocentric construction of the 
East India Company that projected the empire as a series of nations. 
 
Mercantilism, Colonials and Construction of the Nation 
 
British involvement in Southeast Asia originated in a strategic defence of its Indian 
interests. It is the structure of this involvement that created a role for the nation within 
the system of empire. In the mid-eighteenth century, the British Empire was focused on 
North America. The empire’s involvement in Asia was a sideshow consisting of a few 
trading outposts in India, to which the British Government paid little attention. British 
interests in India were managed by the East India Company, a private company that had 
a monopoly charter to manage British trade in Asia. Long-distance trade in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not easy. It required massive logistical 
planning and practice to transport goods over long distances. The journey and the 
transporting of goods, was made more precarious by treacherous waters, the slowness of 
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vessels, and continual threat of piracy. The India trade required the establishment of 
outposts that were self-sufficient to cover the long periods between trading voyages. 
This meant that the East India Company had to become an organization which had a 
military capacity as a means of defence and an overarching system of governance to 
arrange the logistics and military support, “investing the company with a portion of 
sovereign authority” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 218).  
 
British involvement in Asia took a dramatic turn in the mid-eighteenth century, courtesy 
of rapturous company officials. East India Company officials, pursuing their own path 
to wealth, moved the company’s direction from trade to governance. Taxation rents 
were a much easier form of income than the perils of trade. But behind these blatant acts 
of plunder lay the geo-political games of Anglo-French rivalry (Frost 2003, Marshall 
1998, Schama 2001: 492-496). Britain and France both used local Indian politics as a 
means of trying to exclude each other from the lucrative Indian trade. By the end of the 
Seven Years War, Britain had gained territorial control of Bengal, creating new strategic 
problems. Without a clear intentional policy, Britain had gained a territorial empire 
(thousands of miles away from Europe) that was surrounded by hostile forces. In 
response to this security threat, Britain embarked on a policy of strategic defence by 
building a series of naval bases and ports, to defend their Indian empire, in case of 
another war with France (Frost 2003). It was this search for bases that brought Britain’s 
presence into Southeast Asia.  
 
The strategic ports were isolated territorial strongholds and, for John Crawfurd (1820iii: 
232), these strongholds challenged native independence, being an attempt “to raise an 
independent authority within … [a] kingdom”. As independent authorities, these 
strongholds occurred in a matrix of other territorial-political entities. Although they 
were fortified, the security of the stronghold was not just dependent on defences. More 
importantly their security was maintained by the company’s relationship with 
surrounding native polities. These machinations lead Crawfurd (1820iii: 229) to 
comment that “the animosity of the European nations against each other, and their 
machinations against the native… [was] impossible to read without disgust”. 
Crawfurd’s annoyance was aimed at the damage these conflicts inflicted on the native 
states, which were forced to take sides; as a result, many suffered internal civil wars. 
Crawfurd (1820iii: 229-232) attributed Aceh’s fall from regional hegemony to this 
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internal pressure. Crawfurd was a colonial official, his concern with welfare of the 
native states demonstrates the impact that European national differences were having in 
Asia. It also demonstrates that colonial actors were considering the idea of the nation as 
an important aspect in understanding Asia. For the European traders, not only were they 
fighting European wars on foreign soil, they were also playing for high returns. These 
destabilising wars were beneficial for market share. By virtue of the mercantilist 
structure of trade (as outlined in Chapter Three), the relationship between the competing 
European trading companies was nationalist in nature. This resulted in the recognition 
of competing entities (Asian as well as European), all vying for security and increased 
trade. This meant that the Europeans saw each other as nations, and by virtue of 
association, the Asian polities adopted similar characteristics to British strategies for 
supremacy.  
 
This need for security necessitated in negotiations over sovereign jurisdictions. The fact 
that the Europeans were engaged in local politics as a means of protecting their 
strongholds from the prying eyes of other European trading companies, extended the 
distinctions of sovereignty even furhter.  
 
Crawfurd was scathing in his critique of this mercantilist involvement in local politics. 
In his arguments against mercantilism, Crawfurd developed a sophisticated theory on 
the evolution of colonialism. His thesis was a materialist study of the inter-relationship 
between sovereign power, economics and nationalism. Crawfurd (1820iii: 220) argued 
that “the treaties which” European companies “entered into with these governments had 
for their object to exclude all rivalry or competition, to obtain the staple products of 
industry at their own prices, and to possess the exclusive monopoly of the native market 
for their own imagined advantage”. These mercantilist treaties were commercial in their 
nature, but the economic and political environment meant that these treaties were also 
political. These treaties were not negotiated on equal terms, being “violently or 
surreptitiously obtained” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 220), the result of which, was that native 
states attempted to “evade the flagrant injustices, as well as absurdity, which an 
adherence to” these treaties “implied” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 220). But being a political 
treaty, the European traders “exercised sovereign authority” to defend the “perfidious 
violation of their rights,” punishing “to the utmost of their power” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 
220).  
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The sin of mercantilism was the linking of sovereignty to economics. This led to 
ridiculous clauses, which undermined the natural rights of people in Southeast Asia to 
sell to whoever they chose. Crawfurd recognized the natural independence of Southeast 
Asian states, by virtue that these people saw themselves as being independent. His claim 
was that treaties on trading relations, which did not stipulate free trade, effectively 
removed the independence of native states, giving sovereign rights to the European 
companies with whom these Asian states made treaties. As pseudo-states, the 
companies enforced their rights with military power. Crawfurd interpreted the native 
states as pursuing a nationalist struggle for independence as a response, commenting “in 
the struggle which ensued, the independence of most of the natives of the Archipelago 
was subdued, and their commerce and industry subjected to the will of the monopolists” 
(Crawfurd 1820iii: 220) 
 
Crawfurd argues that mercantilism led to the territorial occupation of Southeast Asia, 
and the subjugation of Southeast Asian nations. In pursuing this policy, the mercantilists 
destroyed the vibrant economy of Southeast Asia. With “the country depopulated and 
exhausted by wars” the “incentives to industry and production” were “removed” 
(Crawfurd 1820iii: 221). Independence “spontaneously” created “incentive to industry 
and production”. But faced with territorial control of wasteland, “the monopolist” 
responded by “converting the population of each particular country into predial slaves 
… to cultivate the most favoured products of their soil, and deliver these exclusively to 
the monopolist, at such prices as the latter might be pleased to grant” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 
221).  
 
Crawfurd saw mercantilism as the ruthless pursuit of profit that creates an empire out of 
state. This structure resulted in the destruction of the economy and resulted in the 
creation of an exploitative empire. Crawfurd saw this as a disaster for all parties 
involved. For the economy to thrive, Crawfurd believed nations needed their 
independence. However, Crawfurd saw the issue was more complex than mere 
withdrawal. Crawfurd’s economic arguments are disjointed.90 This political theory is 
                                                          
90 Crawfurd is an explosion of ideas. Arguably a good editor could have given a bit more organization to 
Crawfurd’s often contradictory ideas. Ironically Crawfurd is a case of ‘physician heal thyself’ for he 
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often separated by large tracts of historical narrative. As a result, Crawfurd is often 
interpreted as an exploitative imperialist arguing for the subjugation of Southeast Asia 
(Quilty 1998) or as a calculating racist (Ellingson 2001).  Crawfurd does make these 
claims, but he also castigates colonialism and recognizes the inherent independence of 
Southeast Asian societies. Crawfurd’s arguments need to be seen in a wider context. As 
Emma Rothschild maintains “our sense of the familiarity of eighteenth-century thought 
is an illusion” for we “know how the story ends” (Rothschild 2001: 44).  
 
Rothschild’s point is that in the early-nineteenth century, the distinction between right 
and left did not exist as we understand it today. The model of Adam Smith as the father 
of conservative economics is a twentieth-century interpretation of enlightenment 
economics — a distinction that wasn’t apparent at the time. Crawfurd published History 
of the Indian Archipelago in 1820, four years after William Owen published a New 
View of Society; when William Cobbett had only just made the transition from radical 
conservative to a socialist; and, nearly thirty years before Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels would write the Communist Manifesto. Crawfurd was writing during a period 
when political rhetoric was still in a state of flux.  
 
Crawfurd was a radical liberal writing about issues that had no immediate connection to 
domestic issues of a redistributive political economy. He was inherently concerned with 
the plight of people in Southeast Asia. His solution to this predicament was global trade. 
Although he believed that “no control ought to be attempted over … independent 
governments” in Asia and that a “friendly and equal correspondence [be] maintained 
with them”, he was well aware that Southeast Asia was politically devastated (Crawfurd 
1820iii: 270). For Crawfurd, nearly 200 years of colonial mercantilism had devastated 
Asia’s political structures. This, in turn, had impeded the development of civilization in 
Southeast Asia. Therefore civilization and independence needed to be encouraged.  
 
Both Crawfurd’s ideas were following in Stamford Raffles’s footsteps. Likewise, 
Raffles believed that Southeast Asia could not cope with independence. He advocated a 
guided independence modelled on the ancient empire of Majpaht, in which “Malay 
chiefs, though possessing the titles of Sultan, or Rajah, and in full possession of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
criticized Raffles ([1817] 1965) History of Java for being “hastily written, and not very well arranged” 
with the “style being … diffuse and frequently careless” (Crawfurd 1819: 413).  
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authority within their own domains, yet all held of a superior, or Suzerain, who was 
King of the ancient and powerful state of Majopahit … who had the title of Bitara” 
(Raffles 1835i: 79). He argued that the British could reintroduce the legal structures of 
this empire, giving the Governor General of India the title Bitara, which “would give a 
general right of superintendence over, and interference with, all the Malay states” 
(Raffles 1835i: 80). Raffles and Crawfurd both argued that benign colonialism would 
improve systems of governance and strengthen the state structures and national 
characters of Southeast Asian nations.  
 
Both Raffles and Crawfurd maintained that mercantilism had damaged the pre-
European trading systems and led to the territorial acquisition of Southeast Asia. Raffles 
and Crawfurd proposed a reversion back to the entrepôt system of trade, in which “no 
control ought to be attempted over … independent governments …[in] the 
neighbourhood, but a friendly and equal correspondence maintained with them”. In 
forming these entrepôts, the principle of free trade needed to be paramount. In support 
of this argument, Crawfurd maintained “above all things, the imposition of treaties 
requiring exclusive privileges, or exemption from duties, ought to be avoided” 
(Crawfurd 1820iii: 270). 
 
Mercantilism shaped the colonial structures of empire in Southeast Asia. There was no 
increasing frontier in Asia, but rather a speckled political landscape. This landscape led 
to the recognition of independent political entities. The economic doctrine of 
mercantilism increasingly transformed the political structures of Asian societies to that 
of colonial servitude. Colonialism led advocates of free trade, such as Raffles and 
Crawfurd, to place importance on the nation as an inherent structure within the 
marketplace.91 This created an economic logic for the independence of nations in 
                                                          
91 Crawfurd’s belief in the nation as a natural entity in the market place was a step beyond many of his 
free marketeer contemporaries. But like many of the free marketeers, Crawfurd was Scottish. The Scottish 
connection is very important for understanding the evolution of laissez faire (Buchan 2004: 54-55).  Key 
to this was the Jacobite rebellion (Buchan 2004: 300-301). With the failure of the rebellion, Scotland 
became committed to unionism. The post-1745 generation became the central force pushing for laissez 
faire approaches to government. In Crawfurd we see the recognition of laissez faire government and 
recognition of the potentials for a nationalist revolution.  
 
The Crawfurd family history reflects this thought process. He was born on the island of Islay in the Inner 
Hebrides and was raised in the town of Bowmore, therefore Crawfurd was a highlander “still able to 
speak and think in Gaelic” (Keith 1917: 17). However, his relationship to the Hebrides was more 
complex. His paternal family heritage was that of a Lowland Southerner from Ayrshire (Editorial 1868). 
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Southeast Asia. But these nations existed in the imaginations of people like Raffles and 
Crawfurd. Both men realized these were theoretical nations: the structures were not 
there to make them independent entities; therefore a dose of educational colonialism 
was Dr Crawfurd’s advice. Through colonialism, theoretical nations would be 
transformed into real nations.  
 
The Geography of Empire 
 
The search for naval bases was the prime imperative of the British Government and the 
East India Company (Frost 2003), but this was coupled with a transformation in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Crawfurd’s highland heritage was from his maternal side, with his mother being a Campbell from Islay. 
His father (Samuel Crawfurd) moved from the South to the Highlands after “visiting Islay, married 
Margret Campbell, daughter of James Campbell, of Ballinaby, the proprietor of a small estate which had 
been for several generations in the family” (therefore John Crawfurd could be called a Creole). Samuel 
Crawfurd was a doctor and moved into an underdeveloped landscape, which under the Laird of Islay, 
Daniel Campbell, was being rapidly modernized. Laird Campbell, like all the Campbells in Islay were not 
traditional Lairds. They purchased the island in 1614 from the McDonalds, but were seen by the locals as 
landlords rather than Clan leaders, and failed to command the allegiance of the islanders during the civil 
wars of the 1640s (Caldwell 29/6/2007).  Daniel Campbell of Shawfield purchased Islay from the 
Campbells of Cowdor in 1726 for 10,000l (Caldwell 29/6/2007, Teignmouth 1836ii: 304). Therefore it is 
fair to say that by the late-eighteenth century the ruling elite of the island were Lowlanders or 
Highlanders from other areas that were not bound by tradition to the landscape and the people. In 
comparison Baron Teignmouth (1836ii: 308) commented “the farmers in Islay are chiefly natives of the 
island, or from the adjacent countries: there are among them few Lowlanders”. Of these natives 
Teignmouth (1836ii: 309) commented “I visited some other poor hovels, and found among the inmates 
only two who could speak English: they had a singularly wild appearance, and stared at me like savages”. 
Therefore although the Campbells were immersed in Highland culture, they were actively promoting the 
internal colonization of the Highlands, with the Highlanders themselves being considered ethnically 
different and considered as savages.  
 
Daniel Campbell embraced the capitalist transformation of landownership in the Highlands, reducing all 
the retainers to the rank of mere tenants. He also built the town of Bowmore in 1768 as a commercial 
fishing port. It was the only town in Islay in the eighteenth-century, with a contemporary source 
commenting: “the only town in the island which deserve the name is Bowmore; well-furnished with shops 
and a pier” (Teignmouth 1836ii: 311). Samuel Crawfurd went to Islay as part of the internal colonization 
of the time, practicing as a doctor as well as purchasing land. He was noted by James MacDonald (1811: 
67) (who conducted a survey of agricultural improvements for the Board of Agriculture) for “caring on 
[land] improvements with vigour and success”. Therefore, John Crawfurd grew-up in the remnants of a 
tribal-feudal society in which capitalist farming and commercial practices were being introduced, 
radically changing social relations and increasingly creating ethnic divisions that were being seen 
vertically in terms of the civilized and savage.  
 
Therefore, John Crawfurd’s family heritage and childhood reflected the colonising of the highlands post-
1745. Crawfurd’s own family is indicative of the ethno-political divisions that divided Scotland in the 
eighteenth century. Crawfurd’s childhood experiences of internal colonialism and his ability to become a 
native highlander, who could associate with the dispossessed, combined with his only family history of 
ethno-political struggles that just preceded his childhood, would have meant that Crawfurd was aware of 
the loss of ones nation through the expansion of empire. Did he draw on this experience to imagine the 
effect of mercantilism in Southeast Asia? This theme is certainly common amongst the Scottish 
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nature of trade in Southeast Asia which led the British to a re-engagement with 
Southeast Asian politics. In the 1770s Britain had one trading factory in Southeast Asia 
at Bencoolen, a small port on the west coast of Sumatra. Bencoolen was a seventeenth-
century legacy, when British traders had access to the spice trade in the Indonesian 
archipelago. This trade effectively ended in 1682 when the Dutch forced the East India 
Company out of the Archipelago. Although the Company was excluded from the main 
game in the Archipelago, Bencoolen had become a profitable factory for ‘country 
traders’, who were British traders that were not part of the East India Company (Tarling 
1999). 
 
The growing role of ‘country traders’ was symptomatic of the change in British 
economic policy, from mercantilism to free trade. The East India Company was a 
mercantilist enterprize, which meant it was granted exclusive rights to British trade in 
Asia. This mercantilist logic was a driving force behind the conflicts between European 
traders in Asia, wherein each trader used the mercantilist logic of trade as a race to the 
bottom (which was total saturation to the point that the foreign market took on the 
structure of a domestic market) rather than the capitalist logic of forever expanding 
markets. The European trading companies saw themselves as being in a fight to the 
death, hence leading to the security dilemmas that were driving the need for bases. 
Although Mercantilism was nationalist in its trading structure, it inhibited the civil 
society aspect of the nation. The fact that the company had exclusive rights meant that 
other British traders were excluded from trading in Asia.  
 
The company’s monopoly, which covered all trade from the Cape of Good Hope to the 
Cape Horn, was curtailed under the administration of William Pitt (the younger) (Frost 
2003). Pitt and his cabinet were converts to Adams Smith’s ideas of free trade. Jointly 
they pushed for a curtailing of the company’s monopoly over British trade, and in 
relation to foreign trade they maintained that “nothing can be greater insanity than our 
being jealous of or averse to other Nations trading to our Asiatic Possessions” (Frost 
2003: 176). After being elected into government 1784,92 Pitt made his objective clear, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
intellectuals. More than most of his English contemporaries, Crawfurd demonstrates an understanding of 
nationalist feelings of loss and the effect that this can have. 
92 In 1783 Pitt held a minority government supported by George III 
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however he was limited in what he could do until the company’s charter came up for 
renewal in 1793.  
 
In 1791 Pitt finally succeeded in giving greater freedoms to British traders independent 
of the East India Company. The growth in ‘country traders’ was spurred in relation to 
the growing China trade. The ‘country traders’ developed a trading system between 
Britain, Southeast Asia and China, that traded British goods into Southeast Asia and 
Burma in return for goods that they could sell in China, such as opium, tin, pepper, 
birds’-nests and trepang (sea-cucumbers) (Kathirithamby-Wells 1999: 258). These 
measures were necessitated by the fact that early British industrial revolution 
manufactures were not wanted in China, and Chinese governments demanded that 
Chinese goods should be paid for in Silver. This transformation in trade made Southeast 
Asia an important staging post in the global trade system, necessitating a convergence 
with the security concerns of the East India Company and the British navy.  
 
Prior to the liberalization of British trade, the practicalities of over-reach meant that the 
East India Company had already engaged in partnerships with ‘country traders’ in 
Southeast Asia. The strategic reality that the Company had few bases in Southeast Asia 
meant that British commodities needed to be traded in local ports, a task that was easy 
to delegate to ‘country traders’, who developed patronage relationships with local rulers 
(Kathirithamby-Wells 1999: 259). The East India Company’s trading post of Bencoolen 
and the locally-controlled Sumatran trading ports of Natal and Tapanuli became thriving 
hubs in the trade of opium and pepper, wherein ‘country traders’ acted as agents of the 
Company in the greater China trade (Kathirithamby-Wells 1999: 259).  
 
The security demands of the East India Company were a similar concern for the 
‘country traders’. Like the East India Company, the ‘country traders’ needed secure 
bases from which they could venture. The local ports were hazardous, with the traders 
being dependent on the security provided by local rulers. These ports lacked dry-dock 
facilities and secure storage for commodities such as opium. There were three key 
strategic problems for the British in Southeast Asia: one, Bencoolen was not on a direct 
route for the China trade; two, its port couldn’t protect shipping during the monsoon; 
and three, it was strategically out of the way and its inadequate port facilities meant that 
Bencoolen was useless in curtailing French power in the region (Stockwell 1999: 372). 
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The acquisition of Penang in 1786 was seen as a solution to these problems. The 
following account of the strategic case for colonising Penang was made by Sir Home 
Popham (1805: 35-36).93  
 
Under a consideration of the advantages that Prince of Wales Island [Penang] already appears to 
possess, I cannot but think it the best situation for a Marine Establishment, and a Military Post. 
Moreover, if the French, combined with the Tippoo, were to acquire great power on the Malabar 
Cosat, Bombay, so detached [is Penang] from the principal force of Britain the East Indies, 
might in that event fall … They would thus command the Straights of Malacca, consequently 
annoy our present Trade with China and the Eastern parts of India, and prevent a much greater 
increase of Commerce, which we have now the means of securing. … As the Enemy is already 
in possession of Batavia, which is an excellent station to command the Straights of Sunda, it 
becomes an additional and a very cogent reason, why we should do all in our power to make 
Prince of Wales Island impregnable; for if they get that Island, it will enable them also to 
command the Straights of Malacca, and oblige our China Trade from Europe and India to go 
through the Eastern Passage, which is a very Circuitous, and in some respects a dangerous route.  
 
Its acquisition was testament to the growing role of the ‘country traders’. It being 
founded by Francis Light, a ‘country trader’ engaged in trade with Sumatra, the 
northern Malay states and Siam; Popham was also a ‘country trader’ for a brief period 
of time, whilst serving as a naval officer: a glaring conflict of interest even in his day.94 
Crawfurd saw Penang as “the first European settlement ever made in the Indian 
Archipelago on principles of true wisdom and liberality” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 242). The 
acquisition was also a repetitive example of the strategic problems that faced the East 
India Company with all their bases, in the sense that it necessitated the recognition of 
nations within the colonial framework. Trade with Malay states was a precarious 
enterprize, for the Sultans were the dominant traders; therefore, liberal laissez fare trade 
in the absence of government did not exist. The Malay states were active agents in 
commerce and therefore the ‘country traders’ became pulled into the problems of local 
political pressures. It was in this context that Francis Light acquired Penang. The Sultan 
                                                          
93 Popham’s own identity is tantamount to the emerging importance of the nation. Although he was a hero 
of the Royal Navy, he belonged to the Knights of the Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem which was 
the remnants of medieval international order of Crusaders, whilst also being a Fellow of the Royal 
Society (Popham 1805). Popham’s affiliations were a blend of the traditional and the modern, he was an 
active parliamentarian (Popham 2004), yet was part of an order that venerated tradition and took a strong 
line against any form of mass politics (Seward [1972] 1995). 
94 One of Popham’s ships was the L'Etrusco, which he purchased with two partners (one Swiss and one 
French) the ship was seized by an English frigate as prize of war for contravention of the East India 
Company's charter (Popham 2004).   
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of Kedah offered Penang to Light on the pretext that he would gain protection from the 
expansionist policies of the Bugis of Selangor (from the south), and Thai aggression 
from the north (Kathirithamby-Wells 1999: 259-260). Penang had been offered earlier 
to the British in 1771, but the Company refused to give political and military support to 
the Sultans of Kedah. When the same demands were made after 1786, the Company 
merely refused to honour defensive clauses in the agreement to cede Penang. Being an 
island, isolated from mainland politics, the company was practically able to dishonour 
Light’s agreements.  
 
The ‘country traders’ traded across a political patchwork of competing jurisdictions. 
These competing native states all combined the sovereign authority of force to 
strengthen their commercial position. By its very nature, this atmosphere was inherently 
unstable. The British traders wanted to exist in a civil society framework in which they 
could trade freely without political considerations. This environment did not exist, 
hence their involvement in this patchwork political landscape. Their interventions were 
not as individuals, but rather as British nationals; therefore the context of the patchwork 
was changing from rival sultans to rival structures defined by national groupings. 
 
 
Nation in the Structure of the East India Company State 
 
British interests in Asia were not state interests, but rather private capitalist interests run 
by the East India Company. This was the common approach to colonial expansion in 
Asia, but represented a new form of empire that differed substantially to earlier forms of 
empire. Krishan Kumar (2005) argues that, since its conception, the British State was an 
empire. It conquered neighbouring kingdoms and integrated them within a system of 
royal unity. Britain was the empire of state, wherein the state took direct control of 
territory. The system of empire in North America, although it had private capitalist 
aspects, conformed to this classic model of empire that was effectively a very large 
state, with the colonies being governed by the state. In comparison the growth of 
Empire in Asia was initiated by private endeavours.  
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The distinction between the empire of the state and the empire of private capital is an 
important one. These two systems of power approach subjected peoples very 
differently. In the empire-state model, all subjects are the same. In comparison the 
corporate colonial state created distinct spheres of difference, thereby creating an 
empire of separate components that were seen as such. A subject of the East India 
Company ‘state’ was not a subject of the British State but rather their relationship was 
indirect, being subjects of subjects. The Asian subjects of the Company owed adherence 
to the company’s laws, but the company was subservient to the British State. This 
created the basic system of difference that marked the colonial state in Southeast Asia 
(Chatterjee 1999). This indirect system of governance between the British State and the 
Asian colonies created a particular relationship that created a space for the nation and 
made the nation a fundamental structure in the empire.  
 
This space for the ‘nation’, which was created by the particular structure of the East 
India Company, was created around the corporate system of governance. In an empire-
state, governance is essentially a class or caste structure. The governing class that 
administers the empire-state is marked as being different to that of the normal subjects. 
But the fact that they are a class or caste means that the governing class is part of the 
same kinship structure as the rest of the people (Smaje 2000). In comparison, the 
company state had no kinship structure. There is an inherently different sociology to an 
empire-state than there is to that of a corporate empire.  
 
This sociological difference has a deep grounding in the identity of the company 
official. The officials were not unified through a particular class or caste group. Many of 
them came from the impoverished elements of aristocratic families, but not in every 
case. The term ‘nabob’ was symptomatic of the company official. The nabob was the 
particular derogatory British term used to describe company officials who had gained 
enormous wealth and then returned to Britain. The nabob then used their wealth to 
establish themselves as figures of social standing (Ahmed 2002). The key stigma facing 
the nabob was that they did not have an aristocratic lineage — they were self-made men 
that used capital and plunder to climb the social-ladder. The fact that they were not a 
unified class group in Britain meant that their only unity as a group was that they were 
British.  
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In Asia, the sociology of the Company official was more complex. In India and 
Southeast Asia a caste system was in existence. The company effectively placed itself 
within that caste structure, with company officials being at the apex of the system 
(Dirks 2001). But in doing so, the Company injected a concept of the nation into the 
caste system. The Company officials were marked by the fact that they were the top of 
the caste system and were not part of the kinship group that underwrote the caste 
system. The Company official was not making a home in India or Asia, therefore he 
was not becoming part of the local kinship community on an individual basis. The 
official’s legitimacy within the caste system was on a collective basis that had very little 
individual meaning. In addition the lack of class unity within the East India Company 
created further problems for integration into the caste system. The Company official 
was labelled a nabob in Britain for their lack of ‘breeding’, which in a sociological 
sense meant a lack of unifying rituals and hereditary claims that placed the official in 
the aristocracy. The lack of kinship markers defining the Company official meant that 
the official’s legitimacy within the caste system was reduced to the common 
denominator: they were flying the British flag. As officials, the Company’s agents 
governed on the bases of their national grouping rather than a caste grouping.  
 
The particular social structure of the Company official in India made empire possible. 
The mix of divisions within India emphasized ethnic distinctions. Crawfurd commented 
that “it is singular, indeed, to remark how completely such distinctions are kept up”. He 
argued that it was “only among[st] the very lowest classes that there is much 
intermixture” (Crawfurd 1829: 73). Crawfurd saw these divisions as a “complete 
obstacle, for ages, to the establishment of any thing like a national government” and as 
such, enshrined the position of the British. Crawfurd understood that the idea of the 
nation was a threat to the principles of empire. He saw that if the differing nations, 
castes and classes could unite the empire would suffer a blow, with the Eurasians or 
creoles being the potential source of an Indian nation (Crawfurd 1829: 73). Yet he 
commented with a touch of pathos: “This is the formidable body that is to wrest the 
dominion of a hundred millions of people from us!” This group he argued were the most 
disenchanted: not being entitled to the rights of Europeans whilst also not being entitled 
to the rights of the natives. Unlike Benedict Anderson’s argument on creole 
nationalism, it was not the creoles semi-inclusion into the structure of empire, but rather 
their total exclusion that Crawfurd saw as the source of any potential nationalist struggle 
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(Crawfurd 1829: 75). In 1829 he believed this group was too few in number to be any 
real threat:  
 
They cannot … overthrow our dominion, however we may maltreat them, but the presence of a 
mass of discontented persons, as they must necessarily be, cannot but contribute, more or less, to 
its insecurity (Crawfurd 1829: 75) 
 
Crawfurd could see the changing dynamics of politics. The Creole nation was a threat to 
empire. The Creole was a threat because this group had the ability to mediate between 
groups — they represented the future.95 Crawfurd’s discussion of the nation, caste and 
class within India demonstrates that the Company was emphasising divisions between 
groups. In doing so they were creating the space for the nation in the superstructure of 
the British Empire. This structure would remain for the duration of the empire, with the 
same structure continuing after the British state took over the East India Company. 
There were a number of spin-offs from this nation-based superstructure. One such spin-
off was the logic of Social Darwinism. The fact that the nation was placed within a 
hierarchal caste system meant that the British nation had already assumed the future role 
allocated to it in Social Darwinist logic. Ethnocentrism was built into the architecture of 
British Imperialism. The empire was seen as a construction of different nations. This 
left a central question: What was Britain’s role in this empire of nations.  
 
This chapter has examined how the nation emerged within the economic, geographical 
and political construction of the British Empire in Asia. Although the empire did not 
explicitly attempt to create and recognize the nation, its particular construction created 
logical spaces that were filled by the idea of the nation. This space created tensions, 
which John Crawfurd and others realized could form nationalist tensions within the 
structure of empire. This structure also introduced the idea of a hierarchy of nations, 
which (as we see in the following chapters) evolved into a biological conception of the 
hierarchy of racial-nations. The following two chapters examine the creation of this 
hierarchy of racial-nations. 
                                                          
95 Crawfurd was essentially bespeaking the modern perspective of hybridity that is a common point of 
analysis in multicultural societies. This is another example of Crawfurd’s sociological abilities.  

Chapter 6 - National Character 
from Political Economy to Race in 
Southeast Asia 
 
The empire-builders in Southeast Asia, such as Captain Lightfoot, William Marsden, 
Stamford Raffles, John Crawfurd and Charles Brooke were increasingly driven by a 
belief in the nation as an expression of civil society. This chapter explores the transition 
from the nation as a concept of civil society (that was mutable and provided a global 
recognition of individual equality through the nation), to a concept of the nation as a 
hierarchal system of biology that legitimized the imposition of imperial servitude.  
 
This chapter develops the themes explored in Chapter Three, as applied to Southeast 
Asia. In Chapter Three we explored how the nation became interlined to the theoretical 
conceptions of material processes in forming human experience/development. This 
theoretical model generally went by the name conjectural history. This chapter begins 
by examining how conjectural history was used to understand the formation of nations 
in Asia. As was the case in Chapter Three, the barbarian played a key role in projecting 
the nation on to Southeast Asia. However, similar to the competing ideas of the 
barbarian (explored in Chapters Two and Three), the barbarian was a duality. This 
chapter develops these earlier competing themes of the barbarian to explore the 
transition from economic thought to racial thought.  
 
This transition can be seen in the writings of William Marsden, Stamford Raffles, John 
Crawfurd, John Anderson, Charles Brooke, and George Windsor Earl. Some of these 
men, such as Marsden, Raffles, Crawfurd and Brooke, were leading colonial officials. 
William Marsden was the principal secretary of the East India Company’s station at 
Bencoolen on the west coast of Sumatra from 1771 to 1779. He was effectively the 
governor, although he didn’t possess that titular rank. Stamford Raffles had also been a 
governor in the British colony of Bencoolen, but would go on to become colonial 
governor of Java during the Napoleonic Wars and the founder of Singapore. Both of 
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these men engaged in the wider literati culture of the time and were seen as authorities 
on Southeast Asian culture. Their inability to influence colonial policy in London was 
the prime mover in driving them to publish on Asian culture. Crawfurd was the protégé 
of Marsden and Raffles, but had been exposed to a wider education prior to holding 
colonial office. Crawfurd was educated at Edinburgh University as a doctor during the 
university’s heyday as a leading centre or biological and racial thought. Crawfurd would 
later become the President of the London Ethnological Society. He also attempted to re-
establish the reputation of Robert Knox after the Burke and Hare scandal (Ellingson 
2001: 279, 286). As such, Crawfurd represents a transition figure between the 
‘inclusive’ vision of a liberal empire outlined by Marsden and Raffles and the (later) 
hierarchical Empire of the late Victorian age that emphasized Social Darwinism.  
 
John Anderson was also part of this early tradition; however, he was a low-level official 
given the task of formulating policy on Sumatra and the Malay peninsular in relation to 
Siamese power in the region. Anderson maintained that Britain should champion the 
cause of Malay independence from both Dutch imperialism and Siamese imperialism. 
Anderson, unlike Marsden, Raffles and Crawfurd, was too junior to implement his 
ideas, and his writing was an extension of his official duties rather than an attempt to 
objectively study Southeast Asia (Reid 1971: v). In this capacity, Anderson’s work is a 
reflection of early official work on Southeast Asia.  
 
The liberal ideals of Marsden, Raffles and Crawfurd continued into the 1830s and 1840s 
in the imperial dreams of James Brooke. Brooke was a mixture of adventurer and 
reformer, who established an independent regime in Sarawak based on a mixture of 
British and traditional laws (Tarling 1992). In doing so, Brooke maintained the general 
liberal objectives of Marsden, Raffles and Crawfurd in an attempt to enact a benign 
imperialism that would educate the native inhabitants.  
 
For the above historical figures, the problem in Southeast Asia was that the Asian 
nations were degenerate. These nations were divided and had lost individual initiative, 
courtesy of their corrupt political structure. This loss of initiative and piratical political 
structure was part of a wider belief in social ‘decline and fall’. Therefore, Malay nations 
would engage in criminal acts such as piracy rather than legitimate commerce. This 
creative role of empire was a dominant theme in the colonial processes established by 
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Raffles and Brooke, but it led to a problem: what is the purpose of empire once the 
native has learnt the lessons of liberal governance? This question had the power to 
destroy the legitimacy of the British Empire and, by the 1840s, was raised as a critique 
of colonialism in Southeast Asia by Joseph Hume and Richard Cobden. This critique 
will be addressed in Chapter Seven, but the response to this critique was already being 
established prior to problems arising from the critique. Race became the legitimising 
factor for the British Empire’s presence in Southeast Asia.  
 
Brooke and Earl represent the last gasp of benign liberal imperialism. The tango-like 
duality: governing in the name of an enlightened vision, whilst also adapting local 
customs to British institutions. This maintained the integrity of practical native 
independence; whilst the reality was the imposition of imperial governance. This liberal 
dream ended in failure, but in this failure, the logic of the nation would adopt new 
meanings relating to biology.  
 
Biological conceptions of the nation legitimized perpetual servitude. These racial 
arguments were already being established by John Crawfurd and others who argued that 
the biology of the natives in Southeast Asia meant that the nations there were in a 
perpetual state of childhood or, in some cases, degeneracy. The naturalization and use of 
the nation became a key component of the colonial process. 
National Characterization and Conjectural History in Southeast Asia 
 
Beyond the practice of trade and diplomacy, separate political states were theorized as 
civil societies (as outlined in Chapters Two and Three). This tradition had emerged 
from a myriad of seventeenth-century writers, and used as a theoretical starting point to 
understand political systems in Asia. James Mill had made civil society a key theme in 
his History of India ([1817] 1820), and Marsden ([1811] 1966) and Raffles ([1817] 
1965) had likewise based much of their analysis on civil society. Civil society was part 
of a wider movement in theorising called conjectural history (expanded in Chapter 
Three). Conjectural history was a pivotal point of meaning in William Marsden’s 
History of Sumatra ([1811] 1966).96 Using the evolutionary idea of civil society, 
                                                          
96 Marsden ([1811] 1966: 204) doesn’t use the term conjectural history, instead he refers to the 
development of civil society. I am using the term conjectural to refer to a type of social theory that was 
pervasive in the late-eighteenth century British Enlightenment.  
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Marsden ([1811] 1966: 204) examined the peoples of Sumatra in relation to other 
nations in the world, placing them on a five-staged system of development.  
 
Though far distant from that point to which the polished states of Europe have aspired, they yet 
look down, with an interval almost as great, on the savage tribes of Africa and America. Perhaps 
if we distinguish mankind summarily into five classes; but of which each would admit of 
numberless subdivisions; we might assign a third place, to the more civilized Sumatrian, and a 
fourth, to the remainder. 
 
The Sumatrans were representative of a particular stage in human development, and 
could be “considered as a people occupying a certain rank in the scale of civil society” 
(Marsden [1811] 1966: 204). Movement on this scale was based on material progress; 
and Marsden alludes to this, stating:  
 
As mankind are by nature so prone to imitation, it may seem surprising that these people have 
not derived a greater share of improvement, in manners and arts, from their long connection with 
Europeans…. Some probable cause of this backwardness may be suggested. We carry on few or 
no species of manufacture at our settlements; every thing is imported ready wrought to its 
highest perfection; and the natives, therefore, have no opportunity of examining the first process, 
or the progress of the work (Marsden [1811] 1966: 205).  
 
Art and manners are placed as subservient too — and as side effects of — technological 
advancement in Marsden’s thinking. The connection between art and manners to 
material development corresponds to the materialistic nature of conjectural history. 
Raffles makes a similar acknowledgement when comparing the Javanese, Malays and 
Bugis nations, stating:  
 
The comparative advancement of these three nations in the arts of civilized life, seems to be 
directly as the fertility of the soil they occupied, or the inducements they held out to foreign 
intercourse; and inversely, as the indulgence of their own roving, adventurous spirit, and 
piratical habits. The arts never fix their roots but in a crowded population, and a crowded 
population is generally created only on a fertile territory (Raffles [1817] 1965: 58).  
 
Like Marsden, Raffles places emphasis on productivity and technological development. 
The view of Marsden and Raffles was in contrast to that of the racial theorists, including 
Darwin who saw art and manners as being either instruments of, or, reflections of, 
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biological conditions determining the progress of the racial nation. John Crawfurd, the 
understudy of Marsden and Raffles is indicative of this change, representing both at 
different stages of his life. Explicit in the arguments of Marsden and Raffles is a belief 
that the nation is materially developed, and as such the nation was dependent on 
materials for the production of character, but the nation’s character limits the nation’s 
capacity to develop further on the scale of civil society. Based on the raw materials of 
wealth (agriculture and resources), this reasoning provided an explanation why the 
Javanese (who farmed on very fertile soil) appeared more civilized than the Battacks of 
Sumatra (Quilty 1998).  
 
Conjectural history began with the barbarian, with the barbarian being the theoretical 
base. Yet unlike the earlier ‘state of nature’ arguments, conjectural history carried the 
barbarian through. As explained in Chapter Three, the barbarian (like the savage) was a 
product of modern thought. Yet unlike the savage, the barbarian did have a history that 
preceded the Enlightenment. The barbarian was a product of the ancient world, and was 
a cultural idea that represented an opposition to empire. Schooled in Enlightenment 
philosophies of Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith and David Hume, John Crawfurd 
maintained that through linguistics “we can trace the progress of the savage state to 
semi-barbarism”. That is the transformation of the savage into the barbarian. Crawfurd 
(1820ii: 96) saw the barbarian was the basis of linguistic culture. This position is 
common across British theoretical writing in the early-nineteenth century. This basic 
barbarian culture is improved as “the numerous dialects of the first savages unite to 
form one more copious and improved tongue” (Crawfurd 1820ii: 96). Therefore, 
Crawfurd maintained that “in the infancy of society, in every part of the world, men are 
broken into small communities”. These communities were “numerous in proportion to 
their barbarism, and, as they improve[d], tribes and hordes become nations, extensive 
according to the degree of their civilization” (Crawfurd 1820ii: 79). The nation was 
based on the barbarian core. This core was brought forward with development, with the 
barbarian risk-taker and lover of freedom continuing. This was a blessing and a curse.  
 
Metropolitan thought during the early-nineteenth century focused on the northern 
barbarian as the nucleus of freedom and capitalism (Chapters Two and Three). But in 
Southeast Asia, traders and colonists were confronted with the barbarian. The Southeast 
Asian barbarian was not a pure barbarian but rather a “degenerate” barbarian. Marsden 
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([1811] 1966: 207) aptly makes this claim: “the Malay inhabitants have an appearance 
of degeneracy, and this renders their character totally different from that which we 
conceive of a savage, however, justly their ferocious spirit of plunder on the eastern 
coast, may have drawn upon them that name”. Like Marsden, Raffles and Crawfurd are 
clear that Southeast Asian nations were degenerates. Their savagery was not a pure 
savagery but rather a depravity.  
 
The need for order was the key, if the barbarian was to progress. The problem for 
Southeast Asia, according to Raffles, Marsden and Crawfurd, was that there had been 
too many empires. There were too many ‘decline and falls’ leading to barbarism as an 
endemic way of life. Crawfurd moved down the racial path, arguing there was a 
particularism to Southeast Asian barbarism commenting:  
 
The feebleness, unskilfulness, and barbarism even of the most improved of the nation of the 
Indian islands, have always prevented them from establishing permanent empire, and the most 
considerable states have been but of momentary duration. (Crawfurd 1820iii: 25) 
  
Crawfurd saw the Southeast Asian inhabitants as having weak character. Their problem 
was a lack of order to their character. As a result they were unable to create long-term 
empires and states. Crawfurd saw empire as the opposite of barbarism, but like Gibbon, 
Crawfurd saw the success of an empire as being based on the barbarian culture. When 
combined with order, barbarian culture created civil society.  
 
Civil society in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries was a parallel concept 
to nation; being in many respects the pathway to developing a conception of the nation 
beyond the pejorative. John Crawfurd’s History of the Indian Archipelago (1820) is an 
example of the parallel relationship between civil society and the nation. Unlike his 
mentors, Marsden and Raffles, Crawfurd rarely uses the term civil society, preferring 
instead to use the term ‘nation’. Although strong similarities exist, Crawfurd’s use of 
the nation is slightly different to the civil society model, with Crawfurd also using the 
term ‘polity’. He uses ‘social polity’ to distinguish a politicized society, but this is 
broken into conjectural levels of social development (Crawfurd 1820iii: 5). A 
wandering tribe is the most basic level of polity (Crawfurd 1820iii: 5-6). It is 
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transformed into a nation on the “formation of permanent residences,” at which point “a 
village and a nation were synonymous terms” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 6). 
 
The village or nation thus formed would necessarily require a form of polity for the maintenance 
of internal order, for attack, and for defence; and for this purpose would elect an elder for their 
government, — officer to assist him, — and, perhaps, a priest or astrologer to make their peace 
with Heaven (Crawfurd 1820iii: 7). 
 
Crawfurd distinguishes the emergence of governance as being distinctly different to the 
emergence of the nation, with the nation preceding the establishment of governance. 
The nation being the barbarian core needs order to thrive. This is the parallel between 
civil society and the nation. Crawfurd consistently takes the position that nation existed 
as a separate entity to the state. This position is most notable in Crawfurd’s critique of 
mercantilism. His critique argued that it is trade which is based on sovereign power and 
mercantilism inhibits the general wealth of the nation by limiting individual freedoms. 
In comparison free trade increases the wealth of the nation by increasing individual 
wealth. These arguments are consistent throughout volume three of his History of the 
Indian Archipelago (1820). Crawfurd used the nation in the same way as many of his 
contemporaries used civil society. In doing so, the nation became a structure that 
transcended the mere whims of government.  
 
This view of the materialist theory of civil society meant that Southeast Asian nations 
were characterized as exemplifying a lower form of social development. The British 
stereotyping of the Malays as warlike pirates, who had a particular fascination with 
individual honour and who were governed by despotic Sultans, was a depiction 
envisioning a barbarian core to Malay society. This barbarian core was an early 
conception of Malay ethnicity. In his classification of the Sumatrans, Marsden ([1811] 
1966: 204) didn’t make an analogy of the Sumatrans to the feudal societies of Europe, 
arguing instead that the developed Sumatran states “should rank [with] the nations on 
the northern coast of Africa, and the more polished Arabs”.  
 
The aristocratic pretensions of the Malays are promoted in British representations of the 
Malays. Raffles, Marsden and Crawfurd do refer to the Malay elite as an aristocracy that 
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practiced savage rights. However, for British writers, the Malays exist in a pre-feudal 
condition reminiscent of the barbarian hordes. 
 
Their generally wandering and predatory life induces them to follow the fortune of a favourite 
Chief, and to form themselves into a variety of separate clans. They may not be inaptly 
compared, as far as their habits and notions go, to some of the borderers in North Britain, not 
many centuries ago. (Raffles 1835i: 258) 
 
Pierre Poivre was a French traveller. His book, Travels of a Philosopher (1770) reached 
three editions in Britain by 1770. Sections were published in the leading British political 
journal The Annual Register and these argued that Malays were possessed by a feudal 
condition:  
 
Travellers, who make observations on the Malais, are astonished to find, in the centre of Asia, 
under the scorching climate of the line, the laws, the manners, the customs, and the prejudices of 
the ancient inhabitants of the north of Europe. The Malais are governed by feudal laws, that 
capricious system, conceived for the defence of the liberty of a few against the tyranny of one, 
whilst the multitude is subjected to slavery and oppression (Poivre 1770: 1). 
 
Poivre was a former missionary in Into-China who became enticed by the opportunities 
of mercantile trade but, like all enlightened individuals of the eighteenth-century, he 
also considered himself as philosopher. Poivre believed that civilization was dependent 
on agriculture; however, in a rather circular argument, he deemed that the progressive 
force of agriculture languishes in the hands of those “still too much slaves to the 
prejudices of their ancient barbarity” (Poivre 1770: 2). In a similar vain, John Crawfurd 
also saw agriculture as the key to social development (Crawfurd 1820i: 15). But 
agriculture also created problems. On one level it was the basis of all servitude, with 
Crawfurd taking a stance very close to Jean Jacques Rousseau97 and Edward Gibbon:  
 
In that portion of the globe … man … no sooner acquires a little industry and a little property, 
than he is made a slave on account of them, just as he himself enslaves the docile and laborious 
animals, while the useless savages of the desert or forest enjoy their freedom (Crawfurd 1820iii: 
4). 
                                                          
97 There is an irony to this, for Crawfurd was very critical of Rousseau latter in life for being simplistic in 
this universal connection between property and evolution. Ter Ellingson (2001: 290-303) argues that it 
was Crawfurd who created the myth that Rousseau wrote about the ‘noble savage’, when in fact, 
Rousseau never actually wrote about the noble savage.  
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Crawfurd was at one with his contemporaries in romanticising the freedom of the 
barbarian; but in making this argument, there is a marked difference from Rousseau’s 
concept of servitude in the Origins of Inequality (1761) and the Social Contract (1791). 
Both Rousseau and Gibbon saw servitude as a condition of industry. Crawfurd was 
geographically locating the social development of Asia, and, in so doing, was marking it 
as separate to other regions of the globe. According to Crawfurd, Asia had a particular 
mode of economic development that differed from conventional economic theory.98 
Therefore, Crawfurd was carefully deploying material arguments to present a case for 
Asian exceptionalism. 
 
There are multiple layers to Crawfurd’s Asiatic particularism. On one level, Crawfurd 
makes a racial distinction, arguing that this is a particular trait of the Asiatic race. This 
concept of race is complex, and will be fully examined later in the chapter. Crawfurd’s 
primary distinction is material. That the particularism of the Indian Archipelago is 
courtesy of “the softness and fruitfulness of the climate,” which, in Malthusian-style, he 
argued was “the consequent facility of living with little exertion; in a word, to the 
absence of that wholesome discipline by which man, in severer regions, is bread to 
habits of hardihood, enterprize, and independence” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 4).99 Crawfurd 
believed environment had a powerful impact on the creation of the barbarian. This 
environment forged the basic barbarian character.  
 
Crawfurd praised the fertile environment of the tropics, in which crops grew easily. 
Unlike many of his contemporaries who saw the tropics as alien (Savage 1984), 
Crawfurd appeared at ease and comfortable with the tropical climate. He saw the tropics 
as a health environment, that which would alleviate the diseases of old age (such as 
rheumatism) and good living (gout) (Crawfurd 1820iii). Despite his praise for the 
overall conditions, Crawfurd believed this was too much of a good thing, with “the 
possession of wealth, the necessary consequence of a soil of great fertility, encouraged 
in Java the progress of absolute power, by strengthening the hands of those in authority” 
                                                          
98 There is a strong correlation to Karl Marx’s idea of Asiatic mode of production. There is no evidence 
that Marx read Crawfurd in his footnotes. The connection is probably James Mill. Marx does refer to 
Mill’s ([1817] 1820) History of India, and Crawfurd likewise defers to Mill. Mill was the first to put 
forward this idea of a particular Asian mode of development, that somehow Asia followed the wrong 
pathway.  
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(Crawfurd 1820iii: 24). Crawfurd’s theory of authority was grounded in material 
economics. He maintained that the productive nature of the land created a system of 
exploitation that was particular to Southeast Asia.  
 
The legitimate impost exacted as the reward of superintending the water of irrigation, increases 
in the progress of arbitrary power, and, accordingly, among every tribe where the right of 
property in the land is established, that is, among the whole of the civilized tribes, the sovereign, 
in one shape or another, comes at length to be considered as the sole proprietor, and the people 
as labouring it for his benefit (Crawfurd 1820iii: 47).  
 
The management of the land created systems of sovereignty. This was sovereignty of 
ownership. Crawfurd believed that the collective good, which had initiated with systems 
of agriculture, had disappeared in Asia. The peasantry in the ‘civilized tribes’ were 
transformed into virtual slaves working for the raja. Crawfurd believed that this was a 
conjectural level of social development, stating: “the agriculture of the Indian islands 
cannot be deemed to be in a more favourable situation than that of Europe in the middle 
ages, when the soil was cultivated by wretched bondmen, or tenants at will, whose 
condition was little better” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 61). He was adamant that Southeast Asia 
took a wrong turn, resulting in this detrimental system of authority being perpetuated 
rather than broken. However, Crawfurd was ambiguous when it came to explaining why 
this particularism emerged. He regularly defers to environmental explanations, such as 
the climate, and follows Adam Ferguson (1767) in speculating that it is the fault of a 
society based on rice production rather than grain production (Crawfurd 1820i: 15). 
These were all material rationalist reasons that did not stipulate any difference between 
the Asians and Europeans, but Crawfurd also regularly referred to race as a reason for 
the particularism of Asia: a perception which he became more ardent in advocating later 
in life. These possibilities are not united in an overall argument, which makes racial 
explanations the explanation of last resort. He argued the perpetuation of this system of 
authority stifled innovation and negated any entrepreneurial sprit that the peasants held. 
 
The proportion exacted as tax depends on the fertility of the soil, the extent of improvement, and 
the amount of the population. The encroachments of the sovereign advance with the 
improvement of the society, and the peasant is ultimately left with no more than a bare 
subsistence (Crawfurd 1820iii: 47). 
                                                                                                                                                                          
99 One suspects Crawfurd was thinking of his own highland origins in this statement, see footnote 91. 
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Using laissez fare theory, Crawfurd reveals the problem of sovereignty in the 
archipelago. Sovereignty had become a synonym for ‘ownership’ rather than 
governance in the public interest. Taxation (a principle Crawfurd was generally against) 
had been reduced to rent, wherein it was “spent, in short, upon the court, its officers, or 
agents, and not a farthing returns to be added to agricultural capital and to the 
improvement of the land” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 62). Quoting Adam Smith’s ideas on 
national wealth, Crawfurd maintains “Java, and every other country of the Archipelago, 
are really poor countries, and must, in spite of a soil the most eminently gifted, always 
continue so while a land-tax … is persevered” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 63). This system of 
land tax destroyed any real notion of private property (Crawfurd 1820iii: 54-67). And 
for the advancement of the archipelago, it would be necessary “to establish a right of 
private property” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 63), transform the notion of government and create 
a general environment that favours free trade (Crawfurd 1829).  
 
As a keen admirer of Adam Smith, Raffles also believed that free trade promoted 
civilization (Raffles [1817] 1965i: 230-32). As governor of Java, Raffles undertook a 
radical transformation of the taxation and land-rent system as a means of crippling and 
destroying the Javanese aristocracy, which he believed was hindering Javanese 
development (Bastin 1957). The similarities in Raffles’ and Crawfurd’s thought reflects 
the wider imperial project of free trade. During the early part of the nineteenth-century a 
struggle occurred within Britain over the benefits of free trade versus protectionism. 
The empire became one aspect in this wider debate. Focus is often placed on the Corn 
Laws as the central struggle in this debate, but imperial governance was equally divided 
between protectionism and free trade. Britain’s relationships with the United States of 
America, Europe, India and the Southeast Asian states were all aspects of this wider 
debate. Debate raged in India between advocates of free trade, who wanted to maintain 
British involvement as a trading empire, and followers of Robert Clive, Warren 
Hastings, and more importantly Richard Wellesley, who had shaped British policy in 
India as a policy of extraction through taxation (James 1997: 187-206). Clive and 
Hastings had begun the territorial conquest of India, but it was Wellesley that had 
radically transformed the East India Company’s direction from aggressive trading to 
colonial governance.  
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The free traders gained a dominance progressively, as the free trade reformers gained 
dominance throughout Britain. The project of free trade was much wider than the 
modern concept of free trade. Central to this project was the end of slavery and 
bondage, this was not limited to the African-American slave trade, but included forms 
of bondage in India and Southeast Asia.100 Colonial Office officials in Whitehall, such 
as James Stephen, actively worked to end the slave trade by promoting colonial 
governors on their zeal to end the bondage in native societies as well as the British 
Empire (Porter 1999: 205). The free trade reforms became linked with the wider 
utilitarian movement. For the utilitarians all people were theoretically the same, free 
trade was the focal point of this policy, which allowing people to pursue their material 
interests.  
 
This policy of universal free trade became a justification for empire. Edmund Burke had 
castigated the British East India Company in his campaign to impeach Warren Hastings. 
In doing so he aimed to create the “Magna Charta of Hindostan” (Porter 1999: 199). 
Burke’s emphasis was on restraining British interests in India and maintaining support 
for traditional Indian customs.101 Liberal reformers saw many of these customs as 
regressive and harmful to the individualism that utilitarianism held so dear. Between 
1815 and the Indian Mutiny of 1857 there was an official policy of modernising Indian 
society along utilitarian lines (Burroughs 1999: 174, Chatterjee 1999, Mehta 2004, 
Stokes 1959). Tradition was seen as a problem to free trade. Tradition created social 
divisions that prevented people pursuing their own incentives. This directly affected the 
viability of free trade. For trade to occur without military might forcing commodity 
transfers, local customs (that impeded trade) needed to be transformed. This meant that 
imperialism became an essential tool in transforming native social attitudes to make free 
trade possible.  
 
                                                          
100 A good primary account of slavery in the British Empire is anonymously written Slavery and the Slave 
Trade in British India : with notices of the existence of these evils in Ceylon, Malacca, and Penang : 
drawn from official documents (1841). 
101 Uday Sing Mehta argues that it was Burke rather than the Utilitarians that saw grounds for rights 
outside of Empire, arguing:  
Despite the weighty ballast of the nation, Burke knew and understood that it was not assured a 
guarantee of permanence… The simple reason for Burke’s sympathy for India and his deep 
worries regarding the British colonial extension in it was because he recognized in India the 
ingredients of nationhood and sensed in Britain a disregard for the conditions of its own 
nationhood (Mehta 2004: 189).  
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The conjectural levels of social development were dependent on the maintenance of 
liberal ideas of individualism drawn from the barbarian core. This became the true path 
of civilization (Meek 1976). It also meant that the racial divisions of the late-nineteenth 
century, which created the biological duality that separated the European from the 
native, were in opposition to the laissez fair belief of the early-eighteenth century. The 
liberal reformers generally maintained the universal equality of humans, with their 
opposition to slavery being their utmost example, but they also argued that social 
customs meant that most native societies were incapable of reaching their equality. The 
native was equal before god, but as a human-equal (to Europeans) the native’s equality 
was potentially dependent on the natives’ realization of their own individuality and 
willingness to participate in free trade. In this form of universalism, equality was 
reduced from a natural right to a theoretical framework of social development. The 
liberal logic of empire gave the native two choices: recognize free trade and partake in 
the system, or be taught how to partake in the system (Mehta 2004).  
  
Marsden, Raffles and Crawfurd reflect an approach to studying identity that revolved 
around a belief in an acquired cultured identity. Central to this idea was a belief in the 
barbarian character and its transformation through different forms of conditioning and 
authority. The barbarian core to a culture was carried forward through this transition. 
The success of this transition was dependent on the material conditions and governance 
structures. Humans are presented as being universally the same. All human social 
structures are derived from the barbarian. These material transformations of the 
barbarian were seen as conjectural levels of social development. This conjectural 
framework, within the greater logic of free trade, was a basic conception of the nation, 
wherein the nation was the developed version of the barbarian. This barbarian was 
transformed successfully through strong government, supported by civil society and a 
free trade system. This free trade system was the developed freedom of the barbarian. 
 
National Character and Piracy 
 
Central to the British discourse on national identity in Southeast Asia was the idea of 
the Malays. From the early to mid-nineteenth century, British colonial policy supported 
the independence of the Malay states (Tarling 1969: 53). By the late-nineteenth century 
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this independence had become subjugation, with the British establishing the Federation 
of Malay States as a ‘colonial state’ encompassing the Malay peninsular (1895). This 
eventual colonization of the Malays occurred under the pretext of protecting the Malays: 
protection from Siamese aggression (Tarling 1969), and protection from the economic 
threat of immigrant labour (Abraham 2004: 177-195, Sundaram 1986), and finally in 
the name of protecting the Malays in the new modernized economy (Abraham 2004: 40-
62, Alatas 1977, Cannadine 2002: 59, Hirschman 1986: 332). British imperialism in 
Southeast Asia was presented as a project of modernising and protecting Malay 
sovereignty. A central component in this project was the characterization of the Malay 
identity.  
 
In the early-nineteenth century, the Malays were viewed as the dominant national group 
in Southeast Asia and extended far beyond the Malay peninsular, with early travel 
accounts placing the Malays across the entire archipelago. Invariably, whenever the 
Malays are discussed, they are characterized as lazy, leading to the cliché: ‘the lazy 
Malay’ (Alatas 1977). The other common trait attributed to the Malays was ‘running 
amok’; in which the Malay became engulfed in a fanatically crazed trance that 
transformed a placid individual into a mindless killer that destroyed everything in its 
wake. This irrationality was part of a dual stereotype, in which the Malay was also seen 
as a weak character that was incapable of work. This dual stereotype presented an image 
of the Malay being lazy and mentally unhinged. This was also a symbol of the 
barbarian. Raffles ([1817] 1965i: 298) connects this phenomenon mainly to military 
attacks:  
 
The phrenzy generally known by the term muck or amok, is only another form of that fit to 
desperation which bears the same name among the military, and under the influence of which 
they rush upon the enemy, or attack a battery, in the manner of a forlorn hope.  
 
Quoting others, Raffles maintains that amok can also occur as a result of “any slight 
offence” in which the Malay “will run amok to be revenged; and even if they are run 
through and through with a lance, they will advance until they close with their 
adversary” (Raffles [1817] 1965i: xxv). Raffles argued that amok was an act of honour. 
Later writers present amok as a bizarre curiosity, and a symptom of the barbaric 
depravity, such as the following: 
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The people of Java indulge to excess in the use of this drug [opium]. Upon such of them, as well 
natives as slaves, as have been rendered desperate by the pressure of misfortune or 
disappointment, it operates in a frightful manner, giving them an artificial courage, and 
rendering them frantic, in which state they sally fourth in all the horrors of despair, to attack the 
object of their hatred, crying amok! Amok! Which signifies Kill! Kill! Thus infuriated they 
indiscriminately stab every person they meet, till self-preservation at length renders it necessary 
to destroy them. (Morewood 1824: 95) 
 
Rather than a true barbarian trait of freedom and honour, amok becomes a drug-induced 
depravity: a coward’s form of barbarism. By mid-century, amok was almost a tourist 
attraction, with every writer on Southeast Asia feeling the need to comment on amok. 
John Turnbull Thomson (1865: 48-49) commented on this fascination with amok 
arguing that there were two forms of amok:  
 
The Amok of the battle-field, and the Amok of the peaceful city or village. In the descriptions of 
battles, the Malay historians make their greatest heroes terrible amokers; and by do doing, they 
ascribe to them desperate bravery… This is the Malay “amok” of the battle-field… The “amok” 
of the peaceful city or village has other features. It has not the brilliancy of bravery, but the 
darkness of insanity, as its instigator. Thus, if the maniac were to slay father or mother, wife or 
children (and this sometimes happens in happy England)… The peculiar feature of this species 
of “amok” is in the indiscriminate slaughter of all persons encountered by the maniac, and the 
cause of this is not to be ascribed to the maniac, but to the crowded state of native villages, and 
the gregarious mode of life of some of their inhabitants. In England, people dwell in walled and 
secure houses and rooms; a dangerous maniac’s career is confined to these; but, as the Malay 
may be said to live in the open air, the maniac Malay is more widely dangerous.  
 
Thomson argued that any form of amok was very rare, only occurring, to his 
knowledge, three times during his numerous years in Malaya in the 1840s. Thomson 
focuses on the second type of amok rather than the first type, thereby linking amok to 
insanity rather than honour. He also claims that amok should be seen as a primordial 
character trade because “their histories prove that the Malays amoked when their 
religion was idolatrous” (Thomson 1865: 50). This meant that the killing of Europeans 
during an amok became an act of insanity not anti-colonial resistance. The domestic 
nature of empire meant that barbarism was excluded as a means of resistance from 
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within the boundaries of the empire.102 Therefore, amok became an historical tradition 
that was separated from contemporary reality. The then contemporary amoks did not 
occur on the battlefield, but in the village, therefore rather than being acts of honour, 
they became acts of insanity. The transformation of amok is indicative of the 
transformation of the Malay from the barbarian to the degenerate barbarian.  
 
These depictions of the Malays go to the heart of the liberal dilemma of nature and 
nurture, the role of custom and the capacity of the native to have independence. 
Characterization of the Malays highlighted their irrationality. This lack of rational 
control was not presented as an innate ‘natural’ condition, but rather a cultural 
condition. This meant the Malays were capable of being transformed into rational 
beings capable of self-government.  
 
The Malays were seen as coastal people, living off fishing, trade and piracy. Despite 
Malay being the language of commerce in the region and the structure of political power 
in Malay society was dependent on control of ports (Reid 1975), the Malays were not 
considered a maritime trading community, with John Anderson commenting: “The 
maritime Malays are, in short, neither a useful or industrious people, and upon the 
whole, contribute more to harass and obstruct commerce, than to facilitate its 
operations” (Anderson [1840] 1971: 71). Anderson was limiting commerce to British 
perceptions of trade. In doing so, native trade was de-legitimized, whilst British systems 
of trade were placed as the central aspect of social development.  
 
As the nineteenth-century progressed the reference to piracy became a necessity. But 
Marsden ([1811] 1966) didn’t consider piracy a major issue, mentioning it only twice 
(and in each instance briefly) throughout the 479 pages of his book on Sumatra. 
Anderson however saw piracy as an endemic problem, whilst Raffles sighted piracy as 
an endogenous cause of the degradation the Malay character.  
 
The prevalence of piracy on the Malayan Coasts, and the light in which it was viewed as an 
honourable occupation, worthy of being followed by young princes and nobles, is an evil of 
ancient date, and intimately connected with the Malayan habits (Raffles [1817] 1965: 232). 
                                                          
102 Empire transcends our concepts of international and domestic politics. For it transforms aspects of 
international politics into domestic politics.  
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Clearly Raffles didn’t agree that piracy was an honourable occupation. This reference to 
piracy summarizes Raffles’s concerns with the Malays as a commercial nation. Piracy 
was against the culture of civility. Unlike European piracy which was a fringe activity, 
Malay piracy was a central part of society derived from the nobility itself. This official 
sanctioning meant that piracy went to the heart of the Malay character, being 
romanticized in “old Malayan romances” and in “fragments of their traditional history” 
which “constantly refer with pride to piratical cruises” (Raffles [1817] 1965: 232). 
Implicit within Raffles’s words is a belief that the Malays do not understand the concept 
of honest work, preferring the opportunities of plunder to that of the grind of industry.  
 
The suppression of piracy and more general notion of ‘outrage’ became a constant 
policy of the Straits’ government (Tarling 1969: 53). The strategic structure of this 
policy was marked by the rejection of territorial control, instead the British favoured 
maintaining influence over the Malay states. In doing so, the British policy maintained 
the independence of the Malay states through an attempt to redefine Malay 
independence within the confines of British hegemonic policing. In suppressing piracy 
and inter-state disputes, the British were actively transforming the nature of Southeast 
Asian commerce and statehood.  
 
In the 1960s and 1970s there was a change in the historiography of Southeast Asia. 
Many new studies of early-nineteenth century Southeast Asia became highly critical of 
the British and Dutch use of the word ‘piracy’ to legitimize imperialism in Southeast 
Asia (Tarling 1999: 410). By crushing what they defined as piracy, the British destroyed 
roving sea gypsy populations and the long tradition of roving armed maritime 
populations that were considered a challenge to British trade. This literature 
demonstrated that the word ‘pirate’ was a politicized tool of imperialism which was 
used to destroy native power bases (Tarling 1999). Local traders that did not trade 
within the security confines of free trade presented a potential challenge, demonstrating 
that free trade was dependent on British naval hegemony. Liberalism had to be enforced 
through imperialism to create a universal system, which demonstrates the limits of 
liberalism. Liberalism produced cultural divisions, but these cultural divisions needed to 
conform to the liberal norms of an atomistic individual. 
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James Brooke’s creation of a private state in the guise of a ‘traditional’ Malay kingdom 
was one of the more glowing examples of this policy, wherein Brooke claimed to be 
creating a polity protecting indigenous customs, destroying piracy, whilst at the same 
time creating an environment for commerce to flourish (Mundy 1848, Templer 1853i: 
4-13). These were enlightened liberal dreams, that existed to serve indigenous society; 
but indigenous society had to be transformed so that it would not threaten Brooke’s 
broader commercial objectives. This meant that liberalism promoted indigenous rights, 
but within the confines of what liberalism dictated. Native rejection of liberal policies 
was not tolerated and any opposition was defined as piracy and ‘justly’ crushed (Rubin 
1998: 241-265).  
 
References to piracy corresponded to the discussion of Malay barbarism, which 
progressively acted as a means of characterising the Malays’ basic character. In doing 
so, the Malays became an objective for the creation of the ‘benign’ nurturing 
governance of empire. Marsden states: “The Malay may … be compared to the buffalo 
and the tiger. In his domestic state, he is indolent, stubborn, and voluptuous as the 
former, and in his adventurous life, he is insidious, blood-thirsty, and rapacious as the 
latter” (Marsden [1811] 1966: 208). Marsden links this bloodthirsty nature to a desire 
for honour:  
 
They retain a strong share of pride, but not of that laudable kind which restrains men from the 
commission of mean and fraudulent actions. They possess much low cunning and plausible 
duplicity, and know how to dissemble the strongest passions and most inveterate antipathy, 
beneath the utmost composure of features, till the opportunity of gratifying their resentment 
offers (Marsden [1811] 1966: 207). 
 
Marsden’s focus on honour presents the Malays as degenerate barbarians who love 
freedom but lack any aspect of civilization and the creativity of the original barbarians. 
In a similar vein, Crawfurd (1820i: 72) links this piratical urge to lack of progress in 
Malay civilization, stating: “those acts of piracy, and other lawless attacks on the 
property of strangers, insidiously perpetrated in accordance with the spirit of the 
aggressions of all people in such a state of society, are the results”. The characterization 
of the Malays demonstrates that character was not seen as being innate, but was 
attributed to material conditions. These material conditions were made worse by 
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inefficient, corrupt and brutal leadership structures. Marsden, Raffles, Crawfurd and 
Anderson are clear that the primary reason for the Malay’s bad habits was a lack of free 
trade and bad leadership from the Malay aristocracy. These habits were regressive, 
marking a degeneracy of civilization into barbarism.  
 
Free Trade, the Barbarian and the Need for Empire 
 
In 1817 Raffles was disappointed. His colony of Java had been given back to the Dutch, 
who, according to Raffles ([1817] 1965i: 230), would continue to pursue “a policy in 
the Eastern Isle …to exclude ... all foreign trade… [which] led to the vigilant 
suppression of all attempts at competition and independence on the part of the inferior 
state”. Raffles (1835i: 87) maintained this had been “contrary to all principles of natural 
justice, and unworthy of any enlightened and civilized nation” and a barrier to the 
promotion of Southeast Asian nations, even acting as a means of degenerating nations 
further.  
 
Raffles argued that the British Empire had a higher purpose “to uphold the weak, to put 
down lawless force, to lighten the chain of the slave, to sustain the honour of the British 
arms and British good faith; to promote the arts, sciences, and literature, to establish 
humane institutions” (Raffles [1817] 1965: vi). He acknowledged that British policy did 
not always uphold these high ideals: “our intercourse with them had been carried on 
almost exclusively through the medium of adventurers, little acquainted with either the 
country or people, who have been frequently more remarkable for boldness than 
principle” (Raffles [1817] 1965: 231). Raffles was promoting a new vision of the 
empire. The essence of which was the introduction of free commerce as a means of 
recreating the former grandeur of Java.  
 
John Anderson’s central works Acheen and the Ports of the North and East coasts of 
Sumatra ([1840] 1971), and Political and Commercial Considerations Relative to the 
Malayan Peninsula and the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca (1824), are 
both focused on the protection of Malay sovereignty. Like Raffles, Crawfurd and 
Brooke, Anderson believed that free trade would improve the national character of these 
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nations (Anderson [1840] 1971: 172-6). Under British protection, Anderson believed 
these nations would become good trading partners (Anderson [1840] 1971: 1-12). 
 
Central to all these arguments was a belief in free trade. However advocates were faced 
with the dilemma that free trade could not operate in Southeast Asia without the 
protection of the British Empire. Crawfurd epitomizes this free trade dilemma. He held 
that nations were a natural aspect of the marketplace. If the independence of a nation 
was taken away, the economic dynamism of that nation would diminish: therefore 
nations were natural. Mercantilism was designed to exploit and subjugate foreign 
nations. Hence, free-trade political economists were recognising the natural logic of 
nationhood and self-determination as they were expanding the principle of free trade 
into Asia.  
 
Like all free trade liberalism, Crawfurd’s arguments were theoretical models. A point 
which he was well aware of, for although he believed free trade would slowly transform 
Southeast Asia, Crawfurd recognized it was dependant on security of property rights:  
 
With the poor, scattered, and semibarbarous nations of the Archipelago, naturally too 
unobservant of the principle of international law, it cannot be expected that the distant and 
inexperienced trader of Europe should be able to conduct directly a commerce either very 
extensive, secure, or agreeable. It will be necessary, both to his convenience and security, as well 
as to those of the native trader, that the intercourse between them should be conducted by an 
intermediate class in whom both can repose confidence. A colonial establishment becomes the 
only means of effecting this object (Crawfurd 1820iii: 263).  
 
The barbarian needed empire to be creative. Crawfurd’s view of global trade was very 
modern. For him international law, rather than domestic law, should govern the trading 
relations between states. This structure meant that nations would be recognized and 
independence maintained, therefore free commerce would continue without political 
interference.103 The problem as Crawfurd articulates is that the nations of Southeast 
Asia were not at a developed-enough stage to recognize international law. Crawfurd 
                                                          
103 Crawfurd’s notion of international law is different to the modern notion of international law. 
Essentially, international law was the reciprocal recognition of individual rights within the ‘comity of 
nations’, coupled with freedom of the seas. This meant that individuals, as foreign citizens, were entitled 
to protection in foreign countries. In turn they were entitled to unimpeded access to foreign countries 
through international waters.  
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encapsulates the general feeling of free trade advocates in Southeast Asia, that (to create 
free trade) colonialism needs to be established to provide the rule of law and modernize 
the nations of Southeast Asia so that they could be independent.  
 
Racial Determinism and the Nation as a Tool of Imperialism 
The wheels to the liberal empire progressively fell off during the 1860s. The decisive 
moment of change was the Indian revolt of 1857. Prior to that, the Utilitarian movement 
had held considerable sway on Indian and Asian policy (Mehta 2004, Stokes 1959). 
After 1857, a new mood swept across colonial policy. The Indian Revolt was blamed on 
the Utilitarians’ reforming measures and on Free Traders (Chatterjee 1999, Ferguson 
2004).104 From this point on, British policy focused on reinforcing the traditions of India 
and Asia, and, in doing so, they reshaped traditions (such as caste and ethnicity) and 
entrenching them in a way that never existed in the pre-colonial period (Abraham 2004, 
Cannadine 2002, Chakrabarty 2002, Chatterjee 1999, Dirks 2001).  
 
In Southeast Asia, the nature of imperial rule also changed. Although Raffles, Marsden, 
Crawfurd, Anderson and Brooke all held the vision to transform the Malay Archipelago, 
the East India Company had starved liberal colonialists’ dreams of funds105 and had 
maintained a non-interventionist policy (McIntyre 1967). With the end of the East India 
Company (in 1867) the Colonial Office took over responsibility for the three 
settlements of Singapore, Penang and Province Wellesley. Over the following ten years 
Britain practically annexed the Malay States through treaty relationships wherein the 
Colonial office appointed British officers to reside as advisors to the Malay states 
(Stockwell 1999). These advisors increasingly took over the role of governing the 
states, with the Sultans being pensioned-off and reduced to traditional figureheads. This 
period was marked by a very different colonial belief.  
 
                                                          
104 Interestingly for our purposes, Crawfurd (1859) blamed the revolt on the creation of a multicultural 
empire in India, he argued that rather than having an Indian army, the British Empire in India should 
create smaller armies based on the nations of India. His reasoning was that the revolt occurred because 
there was a failure to recognized the ethnic-national differences within India. 
105 Raffles ([1817] 1965), Crawfurd (1828, 1820, 1829) and Anderson ([1840] 1971) all make clear that 
their publications on Southeast Asia were partly an attempt to change the companies policy and increase 
the availably to capital to colonize Southeast Asia. 
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The non-European peoples of the archipelago were no longer seen as barbarians that 
needed a firm liberal education, instead the characterizations of the lazy native had 
become an entrenched ideology (Abraham 2004, Alatas 1977). Ideologies about racial 
inferiority justified colonial expansion. By comparison to the early-nineteenth century, 
these beliefs were based on Social Darwinist premises in which the native could not 
progress. No longer was the prospect of independent modernized Asian nations on the 
agenda. The colonial ideology of the late-nineteenth century used the principle of the 
race-nation to legitimize perpetual servitude. The race-nation created a disjuncture, 
wherein the barbarian was relegated to biology. No longer was it a social condition, but 
rather a racial inferiority. 
 
Although 1857 was a defining moment, it was not an epochal transition. The movement 
to a racialized empire was an outgrowth of the same liberal attitudes that had sought to 
modernize Southeast Asia. The problematic nature of liberal imperialism is played out 
throughout the writings of John Crawfurd. As previously stated, Crawfurd’s work reads 
as a contradiction. In one voice, he is the universal atomist, whilst also having the 
nucleus of being a racial supremacist. Crawfurd saw that colonialism had the potential 
to create multi-racial societies, in which their diversity would give them a dynamic 
commercial quality.  
 
They would naturally become great emporia. The native trader would find them the best and 
safest market to repair to, and the scattered productions of the Archipelago would be 
accumulated and stored at them in quality for the convenience of the distant and inexperienced 
trader of Europe. The European voyager would find them also the best market for his goods 
(Crawfurd 1820iii: 271). 
 
Arguably this is a racial division of labour but being a follower of Adam Smith, 
Crawfurd saw a division of labour as being a positive exercise.106 Division of labour 
                                                          
106 Marry Quilty (1998: 103) paints Crawfurd as wanting to create a racial apartheid system of labour in 
Southeast Asia.  Quilty’s argument is based on Crawfurd’s regular accusations that natives are inferior. 
The problem with this is that he also says the opposite as well, for example: “we have to legislate for 
Europeans, for Chinese, and for a mixed mass of native inhabitants. The law should make no distinction 
between them” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 63). Later in life, Crawfurd’s work with the London Anthropological 
society indicates that he did lose his belief in the universality of humans; but in 1820 he clearly saw 
Southeast Asian’s as equal. An illustration of the change in Crawfurd is his reference to slavery. In the 
1820s he was a strong opponent of slavery; however, by the 1860s his views had totally changed. 
Commenting on the potential of a slave revolt disrupting Britain’s cotton supply Crawfurd commented: 
“the masters are, in this case, of a superior race to the slaves; they are more numerous, in the proportion 
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was not seen as exploitation. Labour was a pathway to civilization and a means of 
increasing the wealth and sophistication of the population: 
 
By means of them (colonies) the arts, institutions, morals, and integrity of Europe, might in time 
be communicated to the natives of these distant regions. while they might contribute still earlier 
to give occupation to the population of those parts of the European world (Crawfurd 1820iii: 
272).  
 
In this colonial context, Crawfurd (1820iii: 67) was adamant that citizens of the colony 
should be equal, stating: 
 
Differences of colour and language are the great obstacles to the happiness, improvement, and 
civilization of mankind.... We have the fatal example of the Spanish colonies of America to warn 
us against the danger and impolicy of laws, the tendency of which is to create castes. No Specific 
regulation should, therefore, exist for the peculiar protection of any one class... Every class 
                                                                                                                                                                          
of the two to one; they are armed, while the slaves are unarmed; they are in possession of power, and they 
are organised” (Crawfurd 1861:  400). In the same article he went on to speculate that if the cotton supply 
dried up, plantations could be created in Australia using Indian labour. These are the arguments of a 
pragmatist only interested in the availability of the resource. By this time Crawfurd was 78 years old, 
whilst he was only 37 when he published his History of the Indian Archipelago. By that time the whole 
notion of race had changed, as seen in Chapter Four. Crawfurd’s own political transformations are 
indicative of the transformations in attitudes to race and resource acquisition over time in the British 
Empire. In 1820 the ideas about the division of labour were very different to that of the 1860s.  
 
It has to be remembered that the ‘division of labour’ had a Janus twist in early liberal theory. Adam 
Smith’s famous analogy of pin production demonstrated its utility as a means of increasing production 
and wealth. Smith saw divisions of labour as symbol of national productivity, as seen in Chapter Three. 
He argued that global trade created divisions of labour, thereby creating social development. Smith 
maintained that “by opening a new and inexhaustible market to all the commodities of Europe, it gave 
occasion to new divisions of labour and improvements of art, which, in the narrow circle of the ancient 
commerce, could never have taken place for want of a market to take off the greater part of their produce” 
(Smith 1981i: 392). For Smith, the opening of the American market through colonization created stimulus 
in Europe that drove new manufactures and therefore an increased division of labour. Crawfurd was 
arguing that a similar event would occur in Asia, but in reverse. Crawfurd was arguing that Asia had 
improved access to the European market; therefore, this would stimulate an increased division of labour 
in Asia.  
 
The division of labour also had a dark side. Smith acknowledged that the division of labour retarded an 
individual’s place in society. William Playfair was even more critical, stating “ ‘when a person’s whole 
attention is bestowed on the 17th part of a pin’ he says, it is hardly surprising that peoples are ‘exceedingly 
stupid,’ ”(Rothschild 2001: 97). For both Playfair and Smith, education was the pathway out of the 
‘division of labour’. This was not the rationalist pathway of skill advancement, but rather education 
providing the mechanism of mental escape. Smith saw this education as being “a consequence of 
economic advancement”; therefore, the division of labour provided the mechanism to escape its own 
discomforting pains (Rothschild 2001: 98).  The free traders’ aim was to increase the real wages of 
labouring classes. As Rothschild (2001: 11) maintains “the high price of labour, for Smith, increases the 
industriousness and the ‘good spirits’ of the labourer; it inspires “the comfortable hope of bettering his 
condition, and of ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty’”.  Crawfurd’s arguments are consistent 
with, his attacks on mercantilism for creating exploitation and his promoting of the idea of education in 
Southeast Asia. Therefore he did not see the division of labour as being an oppressive force in 1820.   
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should be permitted to enter freely into contracts with another; and the dark-coloured races 
should not be looked upon as minors under the guardianship of the state, or their imbecility will 
be increased and perpetuated [my emphasis]. 
 
In addition to this, Crawfurd argued that his model colony should be democratically 
governed, based on a limited suffrage in which only naturalized citizens can vote 
(Crawfurd 1820iii: 269). In terms of race relations this is an ambiguous area for 
Crawfurd. He argued that the only reason why a “free government” (based on the 
“representative system”) could not be created was due to the impracticality of language; 
of which, he states, “at Penang, it is reckoned that there are twenty-two languages 
spoke, and at Batavia there are many more” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 269). Despite the 
problem of language, Crawfurd still maintained that a “representative body” was 
necessary for the “right of imposing taxes” and that “representatives” should be “chosen 
alike from all the classes of inhabitants” (Crawfurd 1820iii: 269). From these comments 
it is clear that Crawfurd held to the belief of individual equality. Despite this, Crawfurd 
also argued that race explains the inferiority of Southeast Asian peoples, with sweeping 
statements such as the following: 
  
With respect to their intellectual faculties, the Indian islanders may be pronounced slow of 
comprehension, but of sound, though narrow judgment. In quickness, acuteness, and 
comprehensiveness of understanding, they are far short of the civilized nations of Europe, and in 
subtlety they are not less inferior to the Hindus and Chinese (Crawfurd 1820i: 44-46). 
 
Statements such as the above, which dominate the first volume of Crawfurd’s History of 
the Indian Archipelago (1820), are symptomatic of the hierarchical racial concepts that 
dominated the late-nineteenth century, yet they were written in 1820. Later in his life, 
Crawfurd adopted this hierarchical position. He became a leading ethnologist, was 
president of the London Ethnological Society and was aligned to Robert Knox’s faction 
of anthropology (Ellingson 2001). He followed the polygenesis position that “mankind 
consists of many originally created species” (Crawfurd 1861: 354) and adopted Knox’s 
position on race, arguing that the races had naturally differing “physical and intellectual 
characters” in which “we may safely believe that each race was created by Divine 
power to suit the climate in which it was located” (Crawfurd 1861: 154, 156). This 
argument is a continuity with his earlier statements made in the 1820s, such as “it will 
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be found that the physical constitution of every race is best adapted for the climate it 
inhabits” (Crawfurd 1820i: 5).  
 
Although there is continuity in Crawfurd’s concept of race, there was also a total 
transformation in his ideas. The following passage demonstrates Crawfurd’s ideas on 
race and climate held by him in the 1820s.  
 
The cause of this phenomenon is in the softness and fruitfulness of the climate… in a word, to 
the absence of that wholesome discipline by which man, in severer regions, is bred to habits of 
hardihood, enterprise, and independence, and certainly not in any imagined innate feebleness of 
frame, for, on examination, it will be bound that the physical constitution of every race is best 
adapted for the climate it inhabits (Crawfurd 1820iii: 4-5).  
 
In the 1820s, Crawfurd did not refer to any ‘Divine plan’ tailoring races to a particular 
environment, but instead to an environment that shapes the physical and mental capacity 
of those that live in it.107 In 1820, Crawfurd was critical of Creole Europeans in Java, 
stating that “Creole and mixed races partake at least as much of the native character as 
of that of the genuine Hollander”. However he attributed this not to race, but rather lack 
of “a liberal education” and “living under a suspicious and perverse order of 
government, as a privileged caste, exercising a tyranny over the great body of the 
population, and entirely served by slaves” (Crawfurd 1820i: 140). The emphasis was 
not on racial biology, but on social conditioning.  
 
In comparison, he argued in 1863 that, “when the union is between races of equal 
quality, there is no ascertainable difference in the character of the offspring… But 
should it be between races of unequal quality, the higher race undergoes deterioration, 
and the lower improvement” (Crawfurd 1863: 202). The central difference is that the 
early Crawfurd maintained that the social environment of education and governance 
was responsible for improvement or degeneracy regardless of whether the races were 
mixed or not; in comparison, the latter Crawfurd held that biology determined the 
outcome of inter-racial mixing. This transformation in Crawfurd’s ideals corresponds to 
                                                          
107 There are strong similarities between his 1820s writing and the later Darwinian ideas of natural 
selection, but by the time Origin of the Species was written, Crawfurd had changed his mind. By that time 
he maintained that creatures could not adapt to their environment, but were divinely created or bread for a 
particular environment (Crawfurd 1865, Crawfurd 1869).  
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the overall transformation of imperial ideology from a liberal vision of creating modern 
nations to a racial vision of inherent inferiority of non-European nations. 
 
Crawfurd’s transition from a colonial official championing free trade in Southeast Asia 
and India to becoming one of Britain’s leading ethnologists was not uncommon; George 
Windsor Earl made a similar transition. Between 1836 and 1846 Earl published three 
books on the economic prospects of Southeast Asia and Northern Australia.108 By the 
late 1840s he became consumed with ethnology, publishing a number of articles in J. F. 
Logan's Journal of the Indian Archipelago and publishing Native Races of the Indian 
Archipelago: the Papuans in 1853. He was also elected as a corresponding member of 
the Ethnological Society (Reece 2004). Earl progressively moved away from the 
universal attitudes of political economy to the study of ethnology.  
 
Why does Earl make this transition? He argued that ethnography was one of the most 
“important sciences to be invented”, and that increasingly “statesmen consider… it 
necessary to refer to the pages of the ethnographer” so that they “may learn how [the] 
collisions with the native races of distance possessions … may be best avoided” (Earl 
1853: iii-iv). For these conflicts he argues “too often lead to desolating and expensive 
wars” (Earl 1853: iv). Earl was not just concerned with the cost of the wars, Earl was 
also a follower of Prichard’s philanthropic approach to ethnology and didn’t want to see 
massacres of indigenous peoples. For Earl, a landmark example of co-existence was the 
colony of Port Essington. Financially Port Essington was a disaster, but to Earl its 
success was measured in other respects. The achievement of this colony was that it 
developed a “system which enabled a party of civilized men to dwell for so long a 
period in daily intercourse with savages, without a single collision having occurred” 
(Earl 1853: 237). Earl maintained that this example was of “great ethnographical value” 
and that it was a “result to which history does not furnish a parallel” (Earl 1853: 237).  
 
Essington represents two liberal currents for Earl, both of which would converge in his 
writing. Colonialism was about political economy, but at the same time he believed it 
needed to recognize the sanctity of human life. This could only occur by recognising 
and understanding human divisions. Therefore ethnology was about creating an ethical 
                                                          
108 Observations on the Commercial and Agricultural Capabilities of the North Coast of New Holland 
(1836) The Eastern Seas (1837) Enterprise in Tropical Australia (1846). 
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colonialism. Earl’s final book A Handbook for Colonists in Tropical Australia (1865) 
unifies these two streams of thought, providing a guide book outlining how colonialism 
should occur, in Earl’s mind, creating win-win situations for all involved.  
 
Earl’s studies of the relationship between ethnology and colonialism are a result of the 
limits of liberalism. He saw race and nation emerging in the space at the end of 
civilization. For Earl, the cultural universalism of liberalism broke down at the point of 
cultural difference. At this point an imperial government needed to be formed to 
overcome this difference. Although he believed in the unity of imperial governance, he 
saw that the model of his time was not working. Ethnology would provide the integral 
means of understanding the differences between nations, and make imperial governance 
work. Like Crawfurd, Earl was developing an understanding of the nation on the 
boundaries of materialism.  
 
This liberal notion of identity formed nations at points where opposition emerged to 
civilising liberalism, therefore the barbarian became the limits of inclusiveness. 
Whenever there was a perceived cultural disjunction with the assumed universalism of 
liberalism, a nation emerged. Therefore these writers were territorialising difference. 
This territorialization reached new levels under Alfred Russel Wallace. Wallace is 
remembered for his independent discovery of natural selection to that of Charles 
Darwin. Wallace also theorized the biological disjuncture between Asia and Australasia, 
known as the ‘Wallace Line’. This line marks a relatively clear separation between the 
ecology of Asia and Australia. However, Wallace also believed it related to humans. 
This line divided the islands of Timor and Papua, along with Australia, from the rest of 
Asia. The people on these islands were distinctly different from the others in the Malay 
Archipelago. In making this argument, Wallace was following in the footsteps of Earl 
and Crawfurd, who both discussed the dark negro peoples of Southeast Asia. But where 
Wallace was so different to Earl and Crawfurd was his use of materialist and biological 
theory. Earl and Crawfurd saw a connection between the various marginalized 
indigenous communities throughout Southeast Asia, which they termed ‘negroes’. 
Many ethnologists believed there was a universal connection between all negroes, 
which Wallace ([1869] 1962: 454-455) refuted in the following manner: 
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The resemblance both in physical and mental characteristics had often struck myself, but the 
difficulties in the way of accepting it as probable or possible have hitherto prevented me from 
giving full weight to those resemblances. Geographical, zoological, and ethnological 
considerations render it almost certain that, if these two races ever had a common origin, it could 
only have been at a period far more remote than any which has yet been assigned to the antiquity 
of the human race. And even if their unity could be proved, it would in no way affect my 
argument for the close affinity of the Papuan and Polynesian races, and the radical distinctness 
of both from the Malay.  
 
Wallace approached race through testing theories of human migration against zoological 
migration all of which were governed through natural selection. In doing so, he 
territorialized the races of Southeast Asia and linked them to the biological landscape: 
 
The Malays proper inhabit the Malay peninsula, and almost all the coastal regions of Borneo and 
Sumatra. They all speak the Malay language, or dialects of it… The Javanese inhabit Java, part 
of Sumatra, Madura, Bali, and part of Lombock. They speak the Javanese and Kawi 
languages…The Bugis are the inhabitants of the grater parts of Celebes, and there seems to be an 
allied people in Sumbawa… The fourth great race is that of the Tagalas in the Philippine Islands 
(Wallace [1869] 1962: 446-447).  
 
This description was not new, with similar variants being made by Crawfurd and Earl. 
Crawfurd and Earl based their arguments primarily on languages and some physical 
observations; but Wallace (by adding the theory of natural selection to account for 
hybrid peoples, and adding accompanying zoological evidence) presented these people 
as territorially and racially bound into distinct cultural blocks.109 Wallace went further 
than mere ethnographic distinctions. In his conclusion to The Malay Archipelago, 
Wallace ([1869] 1962: 455) equipped these cultural-biological groupings with political 
claims of disenfranchizement:  
 
If the past history of these varied races is obscure and uncertain, the future is no less so. The 
more numerous Malay race seems well adapted to survive… even when his country and 
government have passed into the hands of Europeans. If the tide of colonization should be turned 
to New Guinea, there can be little doubt of the early extinction of the Papuan race. A warlike and 
energetic people, who will not submit to national slavery or to domestic servitude, must 
disappear before the white man.  
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The free barbarian could not survive in the modern world as a slave. Although Wallace 
envisages the servitude of the Malays and the extinction of the Papuans, he was also 
outlining the grounds to their claims of independence. Even as the subjugation is 
becoming total, Wallace envisages the cultural-biological grounds for independence. 
Wallace takes this claim even further and undermines the whole architecture for the 
civilising mission of empire. Wallace was a socialist. As a socialist he questioned the 
success of the “vast manufacturing system, our gigantic commerce, our crowded towns 
and cities” all of which “support and continually renew a mass of human misery and 
crime absolutely greater than has ever existed before” (Wallace [1869] 1962: 457).  
 
This material advancement was a degeneration on the social condition of “uncivilized 
man”. In a few pages, Wallace embraces the cultural logic of separate nations, outlines 
their political claim to independence and reveals the ugly face of civilization. These 
lines all speak the natural logic of nations without a reflective identification.  
 
John Crawfurd’s History of the Indian Archipelago (1820) was indicative of a 
crossroad. Although there is a unity to his conception of race and nation in 1820, it 
represented two potential futures. The first potential future that Crawfurd favoured in 
1820, was one of cosmopolitan liberalism. In this cosmopolitan liberal empire the races 
were allowed to mix. Degenerate barbarism was reformed with the market-based civil 
society. Civil society allowed the inherent freedom of the barbarian to flourish, whilst 
being guided by the order of empire. This created new nations and improved old ones. 
The second vision of a potential future was one of racial hierarchy, in which European 
colonialism created an apartheid system of control in which non-European peoples 
existed to service the needs of Europeans. In this context nation was bound in race and 
biology. In the 1820s, Crawfurd argued against this system on the grounds of political 
economy and rational unity of humans; but, interestingly, by the 1860s his writings (like 
his contemporaries) were devoid of political economy. Crawfurd, Earl and many others 
became focused on race and the divine biological divisions between races. In both 
                                                                                                                                                                          
109 Excluding the Bugis of the Celebes, the modern political nations of Southeast Asia correspond to 
Wallace’s outline. And the few exceptions that exist are subject to separatist movements wanting 
independence. 
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periods, Crawfurd was symptomatic of his times and reflected the dominant ideas of the 
nation on to Southeast Asia.  
  
Chapter 7 - Ethnography, Race and 
Evolution: Degenerate Barbaric 
Savages or Primordial Savage 
Barbarians 
 
Race and biology dramatically altered the way Europeans saw the peoples of Southeast 
Asia. The cosmopolitan concepts of the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries were 
transformed into racial chasms that defined nations as biological objects. A symptom of 
this transformation was the traveller’s perception of the orang-utan. As seen in Chapter 
Four, the orang-utan had long been a point of discussion for evolutionary theories: be 
they biological or social. By the 1830s, few ethnologists believed the orang-utan was a 
degenerate or primitive human as Lord Monboddo believed (see Chapter Four). That is 
not to say that people did not wonder about a missing link, and that a connection was 
made between Negros and orang-utans. Travellers continually reflected on this point 
and, by association, linked the hunter-gatherer tribes that lived in the Jungles of Asia 
with this perceived missing link (Boon 1990: 19-27).  
 
The travel writer in the nineteenth-century gave a general commentary on culture and 
environment, as Roy Bridges argues the travel writer had to “describe and interpret for 
[their] readers a geographical area together with its natural attributes and its human 
society and culture” (Bridges 2002: 53). Therefore ethnology was immersed within a 
discussion on the environment (Savage 1984). This corresponded to the wider 
ethnological and racial debates on national character being a product of the environment 
(discussed in chapter four). The result is that travel writers speculated about the impact 
of the environment on the identity of the people the travel writer was observing. James 
Boon characterizes this as the theme of ‘man’ and ‘nature’, in which natural history 
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encompasses humans as part of nature. For Boon an example of this tradition was 
Alfred Russel Wallace (discussed in the previous chapter). Wallace was a naturalist and 
travel writer who was also a leading scientific theorist. For our purposes, what is 
interesting about Wallace is that he gave detailed ethnographic discussions of the people 
he saw in Southeast Asia, whilst he also gave the first detailed study of the Orang-utan. 
Boon (1990: 16) comments on Wallace that:  
 
The theme of man and nature in Wallace extends beyond issues of natural selection and vagaries 
in distribution and diffusion. He depicts more than simple contradictions (or discourtesies) 
between natural regions and the dispersal of cultures. In special moments we shall savour, 
Wallace suggests an affinity between human and animal groups, but at the point where the latter 
transforms into nature’s most wondrous extremes.  
 
Boon’s argument is that this affinity is not presented in explicit form, like that made by 
Monboddo in the eighteenth-century, but rather as an implicit connection. In this regard 
Boon’s argument focuses on post-modern ideas of discourse; that there was a discourse 
that connected native peoples with apes. Discourse, in the post-modern sense, focuses 
on assumptions surrounding a particular issue. These assumptions, sometimes called 
norms, frame the issue and dictate the conclusions before the issue is analysed. 
Therefore Boon’s argument is that, although Wallace and his contemporaries dismissed 
the orang-utan as an exact missing link, their discourse of analysis presents tribal 
societies as being affiliated with the orang-utan. Therefore, Wallace and his 
contemporaries could explicitly dismiss a connection between tribal society and the 
orang-utan, but implicitly make such an argument through discourse. Boon (1990: 24-
25) goes on to argue:  
 
Neither Indonesian peoples themselves nor the history of their documentation cooperated very 
well with this negative quest. Earlier “missing link” formulations tended to usher the famous 
orang-utan (orang hutan = forest dweller or wild man) toward the human as much as to push 
human groups down. Reputed cannibalism cropped up in the literate Battak of Sumatra; 
headhunting was hard to isolate. And notorious amok-running and ritual suicide (as in the courts 
of Bali and Java) occurred at every level of civilization and “savagery”. 
 
The ‘missing-link’, cannibalism, headhunting and the amok, were all favourite topics of 
Europeans projecting Southeast Asia in the nineteenth-century. As Boon argues’ they 
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presented an image of degeneracy whereby the Asian was a degenerate. This 
degeneracy was an affront and therefore necessitated paternalistic colonialism. Boon 
(1990: 25) continues:  
 
No two criteria of degeneracy — physiological, psychological, cultural—pointed precisely in the 
same direction. No nonliterate people perfectly filled the bill of the Renaissance’s “diabolical”, 
the Enlightenment’s taxonomic “missing link”, or the social evolutionist’s “beastliest and 
oldest”. Over the centuries Indonesian cultures refracted changes of degeneracy whose 
symptoms proved difficult to “fix”, because their symbols kept dispersing.  
 
Although written in a post-modern style, Boon’s arguments are a reflection of what is 
now accepted as orthodoxy. Syed Alatas’s (1977) Myth of the Lazy Native, Edward 
Said’s ([1978] 1995) Orientalism, Homi Bhahba’s ([1994] 2004) The Location of 
Culture and from an earlier generation Frantz Fanon’s ([1952] 1970) Black Skin White 
Masks, are all classic post-colonial works that identify how European culture presented 
the native as degenerate. There are many other classic works I could have mentioned; 
however the point I am making is that this argument has become mainstream. Even the 
conservative historian Niall Ferguson’s (2004: 113) readily comments that: 
 
 The Victorians … dreamt not just of ruling the world, but of redeeming it. It was no longer 
enough for them to exploit other races; now the aim became to improve them. Native people 
themselves would cease to be exploited, but their cultures — superstitious, backward, heathen — 
would have to go. 
 
It is clear that the culture of the British Empire depicted tribal and non-European 
peoples as inferior. This was the distinction between civilization and barbarism, which 
in contemporary cultural analysis of empires, nations and ethnicity is commonly 
referred to as the ‘other’. These arguments focus on the ‘other’ as the binary opposite to 
the civilized. Therefore the ‘other’ is opposed to civilization and is therefore degenerate. 
I am not disputing that the other is presented as different to the civilized, but it has been 
the argument of this thesis that the British Empire was not framed as a traditional 
empire. The distinction between civilization and barbarism was made more complex 
because of the emergence of the nation.  
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The nation emerged as a process of naturalization. Within this naturalization was the 
barbarian and the savage. They were theoretical conjectures, but both the barbarian and 
the savage could be seen as an historical phenomenon and, then as a, a contemporary 
reality. Above all, the barbarian was not just the ‘other’, it was also the primordial 
‘self’. Therefore, the nation raised issues of the limits of what was human. This chapter 
examines two streams of naturalization of the nation in Southeast Asia. These streams 
are observed by exploring nineteenth-century ethnology and natural history in Southeast 
Asia. The first of these streams was the process by which nineteenth-century observers 
assumed the naturalness of nations within the landscape, this stream has been covered in 
the previous chapters. This first stream embedded the nation within the tribe, in doing 
so the nation was seen as the common-sense form of the social-political community. 
The second stream, which will be the key focus of this chapter, is the obverse side of the 
first stream. By tribalising the nation, culture became bound within a ‘chain of being’ to 
primordialism. This was distinctly different to earlier conceptions of civilization verses 
barbarism. As we have already seen in this thesis, the nation became linked to the 
barbarian; with barbarism being drawn within the nation, rather than excluded from the 
nation.  
 
By naturalising culture through primordialism, new questions emerge; for example, 
what are the natural limits of the nation? If the nation is a tribal condition that descends 
back to the mythical mists of time, the nation becomes linked to the ‘chain of being’. 
Therefore questions emerged about how primordial was the nation? This chapter begins 
by focusing on attempts to theorize ethnology in Southeast Asia in the 1830s and 1840s. 
These attempts to theorize ethnology naturalized the nation within these two streams. 
This chapter then proceeds to examine the extreme limits of primordialism by 
examining nineteenth-century accounts of the orang-utan.  
 
It was this ambiguousness around the status of the orang-utan that presents it as an 
interesting example of the nineteenth-century intersection between the nation, race, 
civilization and barbarism. The orang-utan was an object of science and popular culture, 
primarily because of its closeness to humans. It was observed in conjunction with the 
theory of race. In this capacity, the orang-utan became connected to a view of the 
natural order. The orang-utan became a transcendent bridge between the natural world 
and the human world; in doing so, the orang-utan legitimized the dehumanising of tribal 
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society, yet it also connected civilized society to primordial society. In this process the 
orang-utan was humanized, and taught table manners whilst attributed with a form of 
politics in its relations with the indigenous peoples. The orang-utan was presented as a 
tribe, or as an animal with the same qualities as a tribe. Therefore the orang-utan was 
imagined as the limits of a tribal-nation, how far human groups can descend into 
barbarism and still be considered civilized.  
 
Theorising Ethnology in Southeast Asia: Primordialising Culture and the 
Nation 
 
On the 16th January 1830, the first article of three subsequent instalments appeared in 
the Government Gazette for Prince of Wales Island, Singapore and Malacca. The 
article was written under the Nom de plume of ‘Y’, it was entitled Floreat Scientia et 
Literatera (Y 1830), however in the subsequent instalments the editor, or the author, 
decided to be a little more explicit in the title and renamed the series Sketch for a 
Literary Society at Penang (Y 1830, Y 1830). Yet, the title still didn’t embrace exactly 
what the author was trying to convey. ‘Y’ (1830) introduced his them as follows: 
 
The Asiatic Society of Calcutta affords a brilliant example of what may be achieved by talent 
and perseverance [sic], directed by judgment, and aided by an intimate acquaintance with the 
languages manners, and feelings of the people amongst whom inquires are to be made … 
Madras and Bombay have given birth to Literary Societies, which, if we are to Judge from their 
progress hitherto, offer promise of increasing excellence; and lastly, the Royal Asiatic Society of 
Great Britain has opened a bright prospect to the Orientalist, to the general Scholar and the 
Philosopher.  
 
The focus of this society would be broad; covering “Geography, Statistics, History, 
Laws, Literature,” and to the productions of the various countries embraced under the 
general titles “Indo-Chinese and Malayan” and “to the languages, manners, arts and 
sciences existing amongst the Nation inhabiting so wide a range” (Y 1830). This is the 
broad orintalist project covering every aspect of Southeast Asian landscape and society. 
However, the author steps back from this broad project and instead limited his focus on 
what we would now refer to as the ethnology of Southeast Asia stating: 
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Led by the lights derived from language, and philosophical investigation, we many be enabled in 
time to arrive at rational conclusions regarding the origin and affiliation of the many interesting 
nations and tribes around us (Y 1830).  
 
The nation and the tribe are the key themes running throughout the authors prose. 
Therefore the purpose of this proposed society was the examination of oriental nations: 
their origins and connections to each other. The author goes on to argue that the purpose 
of the society should be to gain “fair pictures of a national mind”. For the author, 
“Geography, Statistics, History, Laws, and Literature” were all pieces in the jigsaw-
puzzle of the “national mind”. These could be pieced together to reclaim nations from 
being “a blank in the History of the world”. The author was proposing the use of 
conjectural history to fill in these blanks.  
 
The articles were predominantly concerned with the idea of nations in Southeast Asia, 
yet the title does not embrace this; the title’s focus was on literature, when their focus is 
in fact ethnology and anthropology. The reason for this becomes apparent when we 
consider the date this society was proposed: 1830. In 1830 there was no comparable 
society for the study of ethnology and anthropology; for example, the Aborigines 
Protection Society was not formed until 1837 and Thomas Hodgkin didn’t form the 
Ethnological Society of London until 1844. Therefore our anonymous author, who was 
actively naturalising the nation from the island of Penang, was in front of developments 
in the imperial metropole by fourteen years. Therefore the author’s choice of title 
“literary society” was a reflection of the fact that the words ethnology and anthropology 
were still in their infancy, and did not substantially reflect the study of race, nation and 
culture.  
 
The society that the author desired, would not emerge until 1847 with the founding of 
the Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia by James Logan. The Journal 
lasted until 1863 and in 1877 a new journal emerged the Journal of the Straits Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society. These journals reflected the leading role Southeast Asia 
was playing in the study of ethnology; for example even though the Ethnological 
Society of London was founded in 1844, it did not publish a Journal until 1848, 
therefore the study of ethnology was being driven just has hard, if not harder in the 
Straits’ colonies (the imperial periphery) than in London (the imperial centre). In 
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addition, the newspapers for Prince of Wales Island (Penang), Malacca and Singapore 
all carried ethnographic articles on the surrounding peoples and places.110  
 
The anonymous author of Floreat Scientia et Literatera (Y 1830) had high hopes. He 
did not see his proposed society as being an appendage to India,111 but rather considered 
that this society should be an “Auxiliary only to the Royal Asiatic Society at home” 
(original emphasis) (Y 1830). This assertion for independence from India, also speaks 
of a burgeoning cultural identity in the Straits Settlements; with the author viewing this 
identity as being distinct from India. The fact that the author comments that similar 
societies have been formed in Madras and Bombay is indicative of the fact that the 
imperial periphery were actively naturalising the nation as part of the imperial project. 
The author openly states this commenting: “the British occupation of that territory 
[Burma] will no doubt be the means of eliciting whatever of interest its moral and 
physical condition are capable of affording” (Y 1830). Ethnology was emerging on the 
imperial periphery as part of the imperial project. This meant that the nation was being 
naturalized as a natural and commonsense condition of humans from the metropole to 
the farthest reaches.  
 
We cannot dismiss this process of naturalising the nation in Southeast Asia as a 
projection of the ‘other’. Our author (Y 1830, Y 1830, Y 1830) was more nuanced and 
holistic than simple projections of the civilized and the barbaric, stating:  
 
Led by the lights derived from language, and philosophical investigation, we may be enabled in 
time to arrive at rational conclusions regarding the origin and affiliation of the many interesting 
nations and tribes around us. They will claim our regard as notions of our species which in many 
instances have attended to that peculiar stage of civilization where the traits of the savage, 
though not orientated entirely, are yet blended and softened by way of the conventional 
obligations and refinements existing in a more advanced stage of Society, and where the half 
grown mind reveals on a literature of its own — one though which may be caught glimpses of 
the science and literary acquisitions of the remaining ages (Y 1830).  
 
                                                          
110 The newspapers were: The Government Gazette, Prince of Wales Island, Singapore, and Malacca; 
Pinang Gazette and Straits Chronicle; Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser; Singapore 
Chronicle and Commercial Register; Straits Times.  
111 The author got his wish. The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia was independent of 
India, and the subsequent Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society was indeed an “Auxiliary only to 
the Royal Asiatic Society”. 
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Our author (Y) outlines two methodologies for understanding the nation and its 
connection to the tribe. The first methodology was to employ language and philosophy 
to develop scientific “rational conclusions regarding the origin and affiliation of the 
many interesting nations and tribes around us”. He gives an example of the potentials of 
this methodology stating: “The language of one of these tribes, which has in process of 
time grown up into a nation (the Siamese) has been found to prevail in the Khamti 
country lately discovered, or visited by Lieut. Wilcox” (Y 1830). Therefore language 
and philosophy, or the theory of social development (that has been examined in chapters 
three and four), became the objective mechanism by which the “origin and affiliations 
of … nations and tribes” and the “national mind” could be deduced.  
 
The dominant post-modern influenced analysis of nineteenth-century anthropology 
would hold that the employment of language and philosophy was a symptom of 
distance, whereby the colonizer knew the oriental better than the oriental knew 
themselves; this was because the colonizer had rationality and was therefore removed 
from the oriental.112 However this was not the reasoning our author used. ‘Y’ argued 
that showing interest in other peoples was a “notion of our species” and that “traits of 
the savage” still existed with the imperial culture despite being “blended and softened 
by way of the conventional obligations and refinements existing in a more advanced 
stage of Society”. Therefore it was not just rational science, but the belief that the 
                                                          
112 Edward Said ([1978] 1995: 42) comments on the use of language and theory:  
In Europe there was a vast literature about the Orient inherited from the European past. What is 
distinctive about the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, which is where this study 
assumes modern Orientalism to have begun, is that an Oriental renaissance took place… 
Suddenly it seemed to a wide variety of thinkers, politicians, and artists that a new awareness of 
the Orient, which extended from China to the Meditettanean, had arisen. This awareness was 
partly the result of newly discovered and translated Oriental texts in languages like Sanskrit, 
Zend, and Arabic; it was also the result of a newly perceived relationship between the Orient and 
the West. For my purposes here, the keynote of the relationship was set for the Near East and 
Europe by the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1789, an invasion which was in many ways the 
very model of a truly scientific appropriation of one culture by another, apparently stronger one.  
Said’s influence and the concept of the ‘other’ has played an important role in understanding the 
construction of ethnicity in Southeast Asia (Legge: 44-45), with many studies written over the previous 
thirty years examining the colonial ‘invention’ of ethnicity as a construction of opposites (Abraham 2004, 
Alatas 1977, Anderson 1991, Anderson 2000, Boon 1982, Boon 1990, Quilty 1998).  This is certainly one 
aspect; however by looking at opposites we overlook aspects of the construction of ethnicity. This 
analysis of the ‘other’ actually views ethnicity as construction of traditional empires not the mercantile 
capitalist empires of the nineteenth century. As discussed in Chapter Two, a traditional empire views 
identity as a distinction between the civilized and the barbaric. In comparison, as this thesis has been 
arguing, the empires of the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries did not exclude the barbarian. They saw 
the barbarian as existing within them, rather than the barbarian being expunged from them.  Therefore 
although there are distinctions of the ‘other’ being created, it is rarely absolute, and was only possible 
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savage still existed within civilized society that allowed civilized society to enquire in to 
the nation and the tribe.  
 
The connection between the savage and the civilized, between the tribe and the nation, 
was the second methodology that our author (‘Y’) outlined. In comparison to the 
scientific methodology, the second methodology was very unscientific; it was a 
romantic approach of which ‘Y’ (1830) commented:  
 
We shall here find an imagination fruitful in metaphor and soaring to heights to which our colder 
rules forbid our ascending, yet in this very redundancy we shall discover matter of interest, since 
flights of fancy offer pretty fair pictures of a national mind.  
 
The romantic imagination emanating from the internal barbarian allowed the ethnologist 
to understand the comparative construction of the tribe and the nation. As the writer 
states, this methodology was against the ‘cold rules’ of science. The validity of such a 
methodology is not our concern. What the author demonstrates is that the nation is 
being naturalized as a primal tribal condition that is universal. In naturalising the nation 
as common sense, our anonymous author is grounding the naturalising process to the 
primordial condition. For example in describing political subjugation (of a nation he 
doesn’t actually name) ‘Y’ (1830) states: “such is the effect of slavery, that like the 
domesticated tenant of the forest, the human animal under it loses in a few generations 
the spirit which animated his free career”. The author links the nation to the tribe and 
freedom, but above all to the animal condition. Therefore in naturalising the nation to 
the tribe, humanity becomes interlinked in the ‘chain of being’ creating questions about 
how primordial is the human? For example: 
 
On the Malayan Peninsula the history and institutions of many petty states afford subjects for 
investigation, and it need scarcely be mentioned that the existence of woolly headed and negro 
featured tribes in the forests in our vicinity, and in the Islands of the Indian Archipelago, is a 
problem in the history of our Species which remains to be solved. The other aboriginal 
inhabitants too of these regions claim regard —those tribes which although differing little from 
the Malays in feature and external conformation yet speak a different language, and preserve a 
wild independence (Y 1830).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
because the nation and the tribe were seen as universal characteristics which created a common ‘chain of 
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This is the classic passage that implicitly links Southeast Asian societies to the orang-
utan. The author discusses the ‘petty’ Malay societies, then the “woolly headed … 
negro … tribes of the forests” and finally the “aboriginal inhabitants” with their “wild 
independence”. In discussing these as a block, the author is creating a ‘chain of being’ 
connecting these nations and tribes to a primordial core. However, in stating “is a 
problem in the history of our Species which remains to be solved” he is also connecting 
himself to this ‘chain of being’. Therefore the savage and barbarian were not the totally 
distinctive ‘other’. The savage, the barbarian and the civilized were all connected by the 
‘chain of being’ that was the primordialism of the nation. However, this raised questions 
on the extent to which the nation could be primordially naturalized. Or, in other words, 
‘how primitive was the nation?’ It is at this point that debate on the orang-utan enters 
into perceptions of the nation, and will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.  
 
Humanising the Orang-utan 
 
The physical similarity between the humans and the orang-utan was always the first 
point of comparison, and reason why the orang-utan had captivated the public 
imagination. In 1834 Richard Harlan and Dr M. Burrough believed they found a new 
species of orang-utan along the India-Burma border (Harlan and Burrough 1834: 53). 
Today we know this species as the Hoolock a type of gibbon, but in 1834 it was seen as 
a humanoid ape, and as such an orang-utan. The word ‘orang-utan’ had a different 
meaning in the early-nineteenth century to its modern-day usage. Throughout the 
eighteenth-century the word ‘orang-outang’ referred to any large ape that was humanoid 
in appearance (Schwartz 2005: 17) and this tradition continued into the nineteenth-
century.113 In 1818 the English satirist Thomas Love Peacock published Melincourt; or, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
being’.  
113 Thomas Newbold’s Statistical Account of the Straits Settlement addressed this tendency to refer to all 
large apes as Orang-utan, with Newbold (1839i: 432) commenting:  
Beginning with the Mammalia, the order Quadrumana ranks first. It has been stated that the great 
Orang Utan is found there, but I much question whether this has been ascertained by naturalists. 
It is far from improbable that the Pongo Wormbii, a variety of Simia, has been mistaken for it. 
Of the genus Hylobates are the Siamang, or the Simia Syndactyla of Raffles; the Black Unka, or 
Simia Lar, of Vigors; the White Unka, or Hylobates agilis of F. Cuvier; the Chimpanse, or Simia 
Troglodytes, of Linnsus. Of the genus Semnopithecus are the Chingkou, or Simia cristata, of 
Raffles; the Lotong, or Semnopithecus Maurus, of F. Cuvier; the Kra, or Simia fascicularis; and 
of the genus Macacus, the Broh, or Simia carpolegus. Of the genus Loris are two species, the 
Kukang, or Lemur turdigradus, and the Nycticebus Javanicus, the latter of which, however, I 
have not seen. The former of these animals is termed by the Malays Kamalasan, from its 
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sir Oran Haut-ton, in which Oran Haut-ton was an orang-outang that was captured in 
Angola and integrated into High Society, and was elected a Member of Parliament for 
the rotten borough of Onevote.114 Peacock’s satire was a jibe at the pomposity of the 
aristocracy with Haut-ton being the French word for high mannered, but Peacock was 
also a follower of Lord Monboddo (Joukovsky 1980). It shows the extent to which the 
orang-utan was a broad social symbol, signifing the ambiguity between humans and 
apes.  
 
In 1819, a year after Peacock published his satirical account of Haut-ton, Peacock’s 
musings were parodied by reality. John McLeod was a ships surgeon and shared a 
return voyage to England with an orang-utan and believed that the orang-utan was 
“remarkable” for its “possession in many respects” of “a strong resemblance to man” 
(McLeod 1819: 314). McLeod seriously considered he was sharing a voyage with the 
orang-utan, which had been introduced “into genteel society” and had been “indulging 
in a high style of living” (McLeod 1819: 316). This extended to “grog” and “spirits”, 
which the orang-outang had taken a particular liking to and “repeatedly… helped 
himself” leading to the orang-outang being “turned out of the boatswain’s mess, for 
taking more than his allowance” (McLeod 1819: 317). McLeod totally integrated the 
orang-utan into the ships’ society, holding that “his usual conduct was … rather a grave 
and sedate character, and is much inclined to be social, and on good terms, with every 
body” (McLeod 1819: 317). McLeod went further, stating “he would often rifle and 
examine the pockets of his friends in quest of nuts and biscuits, which they sometimes 
carried for him” (McLeod 1819: 318). McLeod indicates that he maintained his 
‘friendship’ with the orang-outang, giving further details of its integration into British 
society being “taught to sip his tea or coffee” and had “discovered a taste for a pot of 
porter” (McLeod 1819: 317).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
supposed bashfulness in hiding its face, or rather screening its eyes from light, its habits being 
nocturnal. 432 vol 1 
Although Newbold is rigorous in defining the different forms of ape and separating them out, some of 
these apes, such as the ‘Chimpanse’ (which does not exist in the Malayan Peninsula) demonstrate that 
there was still ambiguity around the taxonomy of large apes.  
114 Rotten Borough’s were electoral districts that had very few voters (as suggested by the name 
Onevote), and were used to guarantee favoured individuals getting into parliament. For example, Edmund 
Burke spent the latter part of his career representing a rotten borough. To be elected to a rotten borough 
was a statement of social standing.  
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Early descriptions of the Orang-utan were always fixated with their human 
characteristics. Harlan’s and Burrough’s orang-outang (Gibbon) is likened to a human 
through its walking techniques, which they state that the Gibbon would “walk erect” 
and that when running they “still keep… the body … nearly erect”. They also indicate 
that this is extremely difficult for the creature to do, stating: “they … balance 
themselves very prettily, by raising their hands over their head and slightly bending the 
arm at the wrist and elbow, and then run tolerably fast, rocking from side to side” 
(Harlan and Burrough 1834: 57). The emphasis is on accentuating the Gibbon’s ability 
to walk bipedal, despite the fact that in its natural habitat it would rarely descend to the 
ground and walk in such a manner. In this first scientific paper outlying the Hoolock’s 
existence, the focus is not the Hoolock but rather the Hoolock’s closeness to humans. 
Even in death, the Hoolock was attributed of dying from a human disease: “It had been 
attacked with scurvy on board ship, and on arriving at the cape was so feeble as to die at 
the end of twenty-four hours” (Harlan and Burrough 1834: 53). 
 
Like Harlan and Burrough, McLeod also focuses on how human the orang-utan was. 
For these writers, the orang-outang was a potential human. Both of these writers were 
writing at a time when the ideas of Lord Monboddo were still current; with these ideas 
being further popularized in literature by Peacock and Shelly. In addition, the 
evolutionary and philosophical arguments still focused on the Orang-outang, although 
by this time the evolutionary arguments were becoming more complex, and the 
ethnologists and biologists were distancing themselves from claiming the orang-outang 
was a human.115 Science was moving beyond simplistic connections between the orang-
utan and humans. The accounts from the mid 1830s onwards present a different 
perspective of the orang-outang: one that become, more focused on the orang-utan and 
made connections without speculating whether orang-utans were humans.   
 
On seeing a baby orang-utan, George Winsor Earl (Earl [1837] 1971: 230) observed that 
“from a distance of a few yards, it was really difficult to distinguish him from a negro 
                                                          
115  As seen in Chapter Four, the close of the nineteenth century saw a raft of scientific and philosophical 
discussion around the orang-outang and evolutionary theory with writers such as Rousseau (1761) 
Monboddo (1773) Kames (1774) and White (1799) advocating an orang-outang connection,. In 
comparison, Lawrence ([1819] 1848) and Blumenbach ([1865] 1969) were very critical of this approach. 
This debate had an afterlife. Once that it was accepted that Orang-utans were not human, the orang-utan 
became used as a point of comparison to between Negros and  Europeans (Tiedemann 1836), thereby 
being a tool of science to denigrate non-Europeans (Boon 1990).  
Chapter 7 – Ethnography, Race and Evolution 
 219
child, particularly when his nurse had tied a napkin before him, and was feeding him 
with a spoon” and that it was “nearly as helpless as an infant of the same age”. 
Although acknowledging the possibility of a connection, as we will see, Earl was 
generally very ambivalent to theories of a missing link. Earl’s observations are casual, 
but in this casual demeanour Earl was appealing to preconceived beliefs. Although 
critical of ‘missing link’ theories, Earl, through his casual comments, was appealing to 
the same basic desires.  
 
Like Earl, the naturalist Alfred Russel Wallace ([1869] 1962: 35) also commented on 
how infant orang-utans looked like babies:  
 
The Mias (orang-utan) [was] like a very young baby, lying on its back quite helpless, rolling 
lazily from side to side, stretching out all four hands into the air, wishing to grasp something, but 
hardly able to guide its fingers to any definite object; and when dissatisfied, opening wide its 
almost toothless mouth, and expressing its wants by a most infantine scream.  
 
Wallace commented that compared to monkeys “the baby Mias looked more baby-like 
by the comparison” (Wallace [1869] 1962: 35). Not only did Wallace perceive a 
similarity in action to a human baby, but he also started to treat the infant Mias (orang-
utan) as he would a baby, building it a cradle “with a soft mat for it to lie upon which 
was changed and washed everyday”. This also led to the daily washing of the baby 
Mias. Wallace comments that it “enjoyed the wiping and rubbing dry amazingly, and 
when I brushed its hair seemed to be perfectly happy, lying quite still with its arms and 
legs stretched out while I thoroughly brushed the long hair of its back and arms” 
(Wallace [1869] 1962: 33). Arguably, Wallace’s actions are no different to those of 
doting owner towards their pet, however, the regular references to its human 
characteristics makes a different connection: that of a father and adopted child 
connection. Wallace was not just caring for his pet, but was actively looking for its 
humanity.  
 
McLeod saw humanity even in the orang-utan’s psychology: 
 
When teased … he would display in a very strong manner the human passions, following the 
person whining and crying, throwing himself on his back, and rolling about apparently in a great 
rage, attempting to bite those near him, and frequently lowering himself by a rope over the ship’s 
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side, as if pretending to drown himself; but, when he came near the water’s edge, he always re-
considered the matter, and came on board again (McLeod 1819: 318). 
 
This physical and psychological similarity between humans and orang-utans created 
moral dilemmas. The common method of studying the orang-utan was to shoot it, 
observe its physical similarity to humans and then sell its skeleton to a European 
museum; thereby the naturalist was able to recoup the cost of the expedition. The 
morality of this became hard for some naturalists, Horace St. John stated: 
 
I never saw but one full-grown orang-utan in the jungle, and he kept himself well sheltered by a 
large branch as he peered at us. He might have shown himself with perfect safety, as I never 
could bring myself to shoot at a monkey (St. John 1862: 23). 
 
St. John, had no problems with shooting animals, but it was monkeys and the orang-
utan in particular that he felt uneasy about shooting. A similar dilemma was expressed 
by the American traveller Walter Murray Gibson: “The sailor had raised the carbine, 
and was about to fire, when I bid him stop; it seemed like murder to shoot at that human 
face, for I had heard something of wild and hairy races, roaming in the forests not far 
from the waters of Palembang” (Gibson 1855: 117). The implied premise was that they 
were too close to humans to treat as animals. 
 
Although Thomas Peacock’s Sir Oran Haut-ton was a satirical tale, the integration of 
orang-utans with European colonial society did occur as McLeod demonstrates. More 
broadly, it was common-place for orang-utans to be maintained as pets, with the human 
owners dressing them in clothes. St. John observed such an occurrence:  
 
When I lived in Brunei, a very young male was given me. Not knowing what to do with it, I 
handed it over to a family where there were many children. They were delighted with it, and 
made it a suit of clothes. To the trousers it never took kindly; but I have often seen him put on 
his own jacket in damp weather, though he was not particular about having it upside down or 
not. It was quite gentle and use to be fondled by the very smallest children. (St. John 1862: 23)  
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In a similar vein to St. John’s clothed orang-utan, McLeod commented that his orang-
utan friend “made no difficulty … when cold, or inclined to sleep, in supplying himself 
with any jacket he found hanging about, or in stealing a pillow from a hammock, in 
order to lie more soft and comfortably” (McLeod 1819: 317). McLeod regularly refers 
to the orang-utans requisitioning of objects as ‘theft’. McLeod indicates that the Orang-
utan naturally adopted a human lifestyle. Burrough makes similar inclinations: After 
observing that “she voluntarily covered herself with pieces of sail-clothe” Burrough 
tried to get the Hoolock to wear clothes: but it was a humanization that she refused to 
endure (Harlan and Burrough 1834: 53). Intriguingly, the Hoolock also learnt how to 
defecate on ship: “when answering to the calls of nature on board of ship, she would 
hold on to a rope and evacuate into the sea” (Harlan and Burrough 1834: 54). In another 
instance the Hoolock became so “tame and manageable … that he would take hold of” 
Burrough’s “hand and walk with” Burrough “helping himself along at the same time 
with the other hand applied to the ground as described above”. Burrough even taught, 
or, as Burrough implies, the Hoolock automatically adopted table manners:  
 
He would come at my call and seat himself in a chair by my side at the breakfast table, and help 
himself to an egg, or the wing of a chicken from my plate, without endangering any of my table 
furniture — he would partake of coffee, chocolate, milk, tea, &c., and although his usual mode 
of taking liquids was by dipping his knuckles into the cup and licking his fingers, still, when 
apparently more thirsty, he would take up the vessel from which I fed him with both hands, and 
drink like a man from a spring (Harlan and Burrough 1834: 57-58) 
 
Burrough never states that he taught the Hoolock these mannerisms. The inference is 
that the Hoolock adopted them automatically. The insinuations are indicative of the 
humanising of the orang-outang. This humanising of the orang-utan had implications to 
the local population. Burrough saw a connection to the local population in the 
Hoolock’s dietary habits. After it refused meat, rather than concluding that the Hoolock 
was a herbivore, Burrough maintained that it was “an antipathy to an indiscriminate use 
of animal food” and that this corresponded to “the different religious casts of this 
country” (Harlan and Burrough 1834: 58). Burrough’s attempt to connect the Hoolock’s 
dietary habits to the local population’s religious practices was a bold variant of the 
general social trend to humanize the large apes. Even observers that were sceptical of 
the human link, still made dietary connections between humans and orang-utans. St. 
John believed that “orang-utans die in captivity from eating too much raw fruit”. His 
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conclusion from this was that they needed to be “fed principally on cooked rice” (St. 
John 1862: 23). How he came to the conclusion that cooked rice was available in the 
Borneo canopy is not clear. However, this connects with the beliefs of the time that 
domesticity transformed biology and that the orang-utan was subjected to civilization. 
This had been the eighteenth-century argument of Monboddo and the Satirist Peacock, 
but was also the civilising mission attitude of colonialists such as Raffles, Brooke and 
Crawfurd. The second, reasoning was that St. John was locked into the humanising 
discourse.  
 
This humanising discourse came at a cost. As Burrough’s observations of the Hoolock’s 
diet demonstrates, the Hoolock was humanized at the expense of the local population. 
The religious practices of the locals became a biological condition of primitivism linked 
to the local apes. As Orang-utans were humanized, connections through implication 
were made with the indigenous populations that lived in the same territory as the great 
apes. These connections presented the indigenous community as being little more than 
evolved apes. Discussions on the similarities between the orang-utan and humans 
continued the hierarchical ‘chain of being’. However in making these connections, these 
writers were tackling the issue of how primordial was the tribe.  
 
Absorbing the Indigenous Traditions  
 
The use of orang-utans in dehumanising the local populations of Southeast Asia, 
interlinked with the primordialising stream of naturalization that occurred in the 
nineteenth-century. This hierarchical vision of colonial society has been criticized for its 
blatant racism many times before (Ashcroft, et al. 1989, Bhabha 2004, Boon 1990, Said 
1995, Spivak 1988). It is fair to say that racial hierarchy (as a modern version of the 
‘chain of being’) was both a deliberate policy of the British and other European 
empires, whilst also being a naturalized ideology of the period. These hierarchical 
mechanisms, served to legitimize and maintain power in the colonial world through the 
‘chain of being’ (Abraham 2004, Alatas 1977, Boon 1990, Fanon 1970, Hirschman 
1986, Ooi 2003, Said 1995). These mechanisms were not solely external, but were 
rooted in pre-existing endogenous prejudices that were transformed by the process of 
colonization (Cannadine 2002). The symbolism surrounding the orang-utan was also 
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part of this process. The image of the orang-utan developed by travel writers, naturalists 
and philosophers was largely based on local stories. The accounts of the orang-utan left 
by Wallace, St. John, Brooke and others would have been limited to boring anatomical 
details of the orang-utan’s physical structure if it wasn’t for the zest of local stories. 
This local knowledge portrayed the orang-utan as being deeply intertwined with local 
society as an interconnection between the human and the natural world. Like the 
ethnologist’s ‘chain of being’, the orang-utan was also a hierarchal symbol for the 
indigenous peoples of Borneo and Malaya.  
 
Three basic stories constituted the travel-writers’ repertoire on the orang-utan’s role in 
indigenous society; each of which accompanied the ubiquitous acknowledgement that 
this was a “Dayak story”, and therefore unreliable.116 This acknowledgement creates an 
important dynamic that will be discussed later. The first and most detailed of the stories, 
were tails of orang-utans attempting to form sexual relations with humans. The second 
was derogatory stories that spoke of wild tribes, with tails, that lived in the distant hills. 
The final narrative was one of alliance, wherein the orang-utans aided humans in 
different ways. These three narratives will all have had meaning to the Dayak and other 
indigenous tribes of Borneo. This meaning would have reflected the deep roots that a 
hunter-gather society has with the landscape, and these stories and legends would have 
been a reflection of the hunter-gatherer’s closeness to the natural world. This was 
diametrically different to that expressed in post-enlightenment modes of thought (Brody 
2002, Stewart-Harawira 2005). By comparison, the regurgitated travellers’ account’s 
transform these stories. Rather than reflecting the continuation of nature (under 
European ideas of the separation between humans and the environment) these stories 
reflect hierarchy and ‘difference’.  
 
This connection between the natural world and human society is exampled by stories 
that link tribal origins to the orang-utan. These stories came in a variety of different 
forms. Usually they indicate some form of alliance that protected the tribe in the mythic 
past. St. John noted that in some Dayak communities it was “forbidden to kill …an 
orang-utan”. In one community he visited, the people maintained it was related to the 
                                                          
116 Although the ‘Dayak stories’ were questioned for their reliability, the European accounts are equally 
unreliable, for travel writer/explorer/ethnologist reiterate each others gossip and accounts to boost their 
Chapter 7 – Ethnography, Race and Evolution 
 224
time when the community was “first settled at the hill on Banting, the orang-utan 
abounded there. Their enemies once came to attack the place, but were repulsed by the 
assistance of the orang-utans, who crowded to the edge of the fruit groves to glare on 
the strangers, and were probably mistaken for men.” (St. John 1862: 73) Similar beliefs 
can be found on the Malayan peninsular in relation to the orang-asli, which were 
sometimes referred to as orang-utan by the Malays (Bourien 1865: 73, Favre 1865: 14, 
Thomson 1875). One tradition that the orang-asli held of their origins was that: 
 
They were all descended from two white apes — from two “ounka puteh.” The two ounka puteh, 
having reared their young ones, sent them into the plains, and there they perfected so well, that 
they and their descendents became men; but others, on the contrary, who returned to the 
mountains, still remained apes (Bourien 1865: 73).117  
 
This observation was made by a French ethnologist in a paper to the London 
Ethnological Society, and he didn’t fail to make the obvious connection to evolutionary 
theory:  
 
M. Bemailet, consul for France and Egypt, says that men have descended from fishes; it is 
astonishing, then, that my savages should say they are descended from two white apes—two 
ounka putedh, the most beautiful species known, and that which approaches most close to the 
human race? I have however seen other savages contradict the former, and say that the ape is 
nothing else than a degenerate man. The author of the Philosophy of Nature and of the Changes 
of Natural History makes fish the descendants of man. Let us admit it, then, that our philosophic 
savages are, in the particular, quite as wise and logical as our pretended philosophers (Bourien 
1865: 73). 
 
In the Dayak or Orang-asli world-view, these stories were symbols of human society’s 
closeness to the natural world. However, when recounted by Europeans they were 
transformed and interpreted by dominant ideas of evolution and the ‘chain of being’. 
This meant their meaning was transformed from humans’ interrelationship to the natural 
world, to a notion of biological hierarchy wherein the orang-utans primal condition 
reflected on the various indigenous communities.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
own small observations. Therefore, accounts of the Orang-utan from the nineteenth century reflect 
European fantasies on savagery, nature and its relationship to humans. 
117 The tradition was recorded by another French traveller-ethnologist Pierre E´tienne Lazare Favre (1865: 
84-85) (also known as Paul Abbe´ Favre) who went under the pseudonym of R. Favre, and as such the 
library records vary somewhat. 
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Inherent to the discourse on race is an undercurrent of sex.118 Sex was used to define the 
limits of what it meant to be human. The ability to procreate was the core issue around 
the debates on race and hybridity (as discussed in Chapter Four). It was this argument 
on hybridity that gave the scientific tick to the biological unity of the human races. This 
same question pervaded the literature on the orang-utan. St. John informs us that “The 
Dayaks tell many stories of the male orang-utans in old times carrying off their young 
girls, and of the latter becoming pregnant by them” (St. John 1862: 22).119 He qualifies 
this by stating “but they are, perhaps, merely traditions”, therefore the Dayaks are 
merely reiterating a good yarn. However, he also notes the case of a huge male orang-
utan “carrying off a Dutch girl, who was, however, immediately rescued by her father 
and a party of Javanese soldiers, before any injury beyond fright had occurred to her” 
(St. John 1862: 22).120  
 
Dayak traditions in travel writers’ narratives occupy a mythic reality, being fanciful 
tails: this is the rational St. John speaking. Although rejecting these stories, St. John 
supports them with a grain of European knowledge represented by the Dutch girl. St. 
John wants it both ways, but in doing so he was reaffirming a racial hierarchy. By 
pronouncing the native stories as illogical, the Dayaks are condemned to being natives 
devoid of higher reasoning capacity; but at the same time, by giving some legitimacy to 
                                                          
118 This point can be taken further. Franz Fanon (1970) writes about desire, and use of sex to distinguish 
primordial difference between white and black. This argument holds that desire for sex was used to 
project animalistic qualities on to Negro people.  
119 The stories of offspring my not be as ridiculous as they sound. Recent research into the DNA 
relationship between humans and chimpanzees have found that for 1.2 million years early humans and 
chimpanzees interbred, a point that is shown in the fossil remains that show both human and chimpanzee 
characteristics (Patterson, et al. 2006). Likewise there is fossil evidence that for a considerable period of 
time Humans and Neanderthals interbred (Trinkaus and Shipman 1993: 415). In a newspaper article 
commenting on the find, Colin Groves from ANU was quoted as stating “that even today it could be 
possible for humans and chimps to have sex and produce offspring, although there would be ethical 
problems” (Cauchi 2006). Although this relates to chimpanzees, Schawartz (2005), argues that the bone 
structure of orang-utans is closer to humans than the chimpanzees and that therefore, it is arguable 
whether or not, orang-utans are closer to humans than chimpanzees. It is not the focus of this thesis to 
discuss the scientific merits of these points; however, what they do indicate is the possibility that humans 
did carry orang-utan offspring. Interestingly this debate is essentially the same as the one over race and 
hybridity in the nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century the question was whether or not a racial 
hybrid was fertile as the means of deciding the unity of the human race. This debate raises similar 
questions: are these other branches of the humanoid family entitled to be considered human? (Goodin, et 
al. 1997, Leakey and Lewin 2003, Marks 2002). 
120 This story may come from a story that Walter Murray Gibson heard whilst he was imprisoned in Java 
(Gibson 1855: 423-426). St.John makes no reference to this. However, his brother Horace S.John 
Reviewed Gibson’s Prison of Weltevreden (St. John 1856). Much of Horace’s writings on Southeast Asia 
were sourced on materials that his brother Spencer provided (Spilsbury 2004).  
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the stories, St. John was also enshrining their primitiveness. St. John was holding out 
the prospect that the Dayaks were the hybrid offspring of orang-utans and humans, 
although he would never formally subscribe to this belief.  
 
Stories of abduction and sex focus on primal desires and present divisions between 
civilization and primitivism.121 It is important to note who is the active sexual partner in 
these stories. It is neither the Dayak nor the Europeans, but rather the orang-utan. Most 
of these accounts refer to women being abducted, with the implication being that 
primordial desire of the beast was being transferred to human civilization. As St. John 
observed, “it is seldom that we hear of the female orang-utan running off with a man” 
(St. John 1862: 156). The dynamic of such a narrative is very different. The raw 
primitiveness of male sexual desire has a long cultural history, in comparison women 
have rarely been presented in this light. St. John gave a detailed recollection of the only 
account he heard of a female orang-utan abducting a male human, in which she used her 
raw strength to subdue the Murut human. “There he remained some months jealously 
watched by his strange companion, fed by her on fruits and the cabbage of the palm, and 
rarely permitted to touch the earth with his feet, but compelled to move from tree to 
tree” (St. John 1862: 157). St. John believed that this was most likely a true story, 
having been told the location of village in which this individual now lived. The 
narrative of primordalism is still compelling throughout this account. In the end, it was 
                                                          
121 There are many interesting connections between gender, tribalism, savagery/barbarism and the orang-
utan. Ulla Wagner (1972: 132) gives the following account of an old Sakaran legend: 
Which says that the daughter of their great ancestor, who resides in heaven, near the Evening 
Star, refused to marry until her betrothed brought her a present worth her acceptance. The man 
went into the jungle and killed a deer, which he presented to her; but the fair lady turned away in 
disdain. He went again, and returned with a mias, the great monkey (sic) who haunts the forest; 
but this present was not more to her taste. Then, in a fit of despair, the lover went abroad, and 
killed the first man that he met, and throwing his victim's head at the maidens feet, he exclaimed 
at the cruelty she had made him guilty of; but to his surprise, she smiled, and said, that now he 
had discovered the only gift worthy of herself. 
Wagner argues that head-hunting was emerging on a sliding scale of men proving their manhood, with 
women demanding the practice of head-hunting before consenting to marry. Wagner (1972: 133) 
rationally attributes this to women wanting protection, commenting:  
An Iban woman would no doubt be well aware that a very beneficial side-effect of the warlike 
exploits of her kinsmen and co-villagers would be increased safety and greater chances of 
survival. 
For our purposes the rationality behind head-hunting is not an issue, however, the Iban Dayaks and the 
colonials were connecting it on a sliding scale of barbarism from hunting to murder, via the orang-utan. 
This practice was interlinking with the procreation of the tribe, with head-hunting becoming a marker of 
ethnicity. Therefore there are many interesting connections between gender, barbarism and the orang-
utan, with the orang-utan representing the limits of the human and the tribe. 
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the human’s whit that led to his escape and the orang-utan being killed by his 
technological weaponry.  
 
St. John depicts a very close relationship between orang-utans and humans in these 
stories. The previous stories show that humans could live within the orang-utan world, 
and his accounts of orang-utan ‘pets’ showed this interaction can go both ways. 
Although depicted as being able to live in the same community, there is always a 
difference. The Murat did not want to live with the orang-utan and conversely the 
orang-utans refuse to become human. These stories show an ambiguity between 
civilization and primordialism. The implication for the barbarian was that civilization 
became biologically absolute. Education could no longer remove barbarism. Barbarism 
became an inherent animal trait 
 
Associating humans with Orang-utans was not just a European phenomenon. This same 
association was a derogatory symbol throughout Southeast Asia and became a 
mechanism to define extreme ethnic differences.122 Settled farming and maritime 
communities related stories of wild tribes, in the interior of their respective countries, 
that lived like the orang-utan and still had tails.123 Thomas Newbold’s (1839ii: 416) 
summary of some of these accounts show that these stories were common throughout 
the archipelago: 
 
There are many idle tales current among Malays of the existence in the woods and mountains of 
malignant races, half men, half monkeys, endowed with supernatural powers; such for instance 
are the Pikats of Java, who are said to dwell on the summits of hills, and to intermarry with the 
Siamangs; the Pangans and the cannibal Bennangs, who, like beasts, cohabit with their nearest 
                                                          
122 James Boon (1990: 29-48) insinuates that this is a European concern being forced into native accounts. 
The implicit claim is that the Europeans are the racists and the peoples of Southeast Asia are not. A 
century and a half later, it is very hard to account for this; however, it is a common theme throughout 
nineteenth-century accounts, therefore there must be some reality to these claims.   
123  St.John recounted the following account:  
It is singular how the story of the men with tails has spread. I have heard of it in every part I 
have visited, but their country is always a few days’ journey farther off. The most circumstantial 
account I ever had was from a man who had traded much on the north-east coast of Borneo. He 
said he had seen and felt the tails, they were four inches long, and were very stiff, so that all the 
people sat on seats in which there was a hole made for this remarkable appendage to fit in. 
(St.John 1862: 40) 
John Thomson recounted a similar tradition from Malaya:  
As to these hill tribes-' Orang Bukit,''Orang Outan,''Orang Anto,' mountain men, men of the 
wilds, spirit men-such people, the Malays solemnly assure us, carry tails, whose tufted ends they 
Chapter 7 – Ethnography, Race and Evolution 
 228
relatives; the malignant Mawa that mocks the laugh of a human being, with its iron arm and 
body covered with shaggy hair; and the treacherous Biliong that watches over the tigers, and 
which is supposed on rainy nights to visit the abodes of men, and under the pretext of asking for 
fire, to seize and tear them into pieces with its enormous claws.  
 
These stories were so common that they were rarely taken seriously. George Windsor 
Earl commented on this:  
 
In the year 1834 … I was informed by several of the more intelligent among the natives, that a 
wild, woolly-haired, people existed in the interior; but information was mixed up with so many 
incredible details respecting their habits, that I was led to consider the whole as fabulous; and the 
subject is treated in this light in the narrative of my voyages (Earl 1853: 144-145).  
 
By the 1830s, most of the travel writers rarely believed the accounts of wild tribes 
living in the interior and possessing tails.124 These reflected the reality that the interior 
                                                                                                                                                                          
dip in damar oil and ignite, and thereupon rushing all ablaze into the Malayan campongs, spread 
fire and destruction around. (Thomson 1875: 35) 
124 An exception to this was Walter Murray Gibson (1855) who became obsessed with these stories and 
said that he had actually seen one:  
I spoke to the Panyorang about them. He stepped out of the room, making sign to me to 
follow…I heard some one cry lakass, quick and harsh, as though urging a beast; yuh! a grunt 
from a gruff voice in reply. An orang kubu, said the Panyorang; and I saw a dark brown form, 
tall as a middle-sized man, covered with hair, that looked soft and flowing; the arms, hands, legs 
and feet, seemed well formed like the Malays; the body was straight; and easily bore, on the 
right shoulder, the yoke of two heavy panniers, filled with material for the building that was 
going on. The Panyorang gave me some of the same particulars about the orang kubu, that were 
told to me by the Dutch officer on the Soonsang, to which he added some of the fable, that 
surrounds every eastern, and especially Malay account of any thing. These were tai orang, the 
refuse of men: they were the descendants of some slaves of Alexander, who had fled from their 
master. They could tell nothing of their forefathers; they could only speak some short grunting 
words; and one syllable only of Malay words they could repeat: nassee, rice, being nass with 
them; and yan for orang. They were brutes, they had no worship, no marriage, no law, no 
clothing, no idea of its use; they were the accursed of Allah, companions of djins on earth; fit 
only to be beasts of burden; and the Malays hunted them and caught them in pits and tree tops; 
and made slaves of them, as of right, said the Panyorang, all beings ought to be, who are inferior 
to men. The eyes of this Kubu were clearer, the nose fuller, and the lips were thinner than those 
of the common Malay, but the mouth was wide, lips protruding, and chin formed no part of the 
hairy face; yet it was pleasantly human in its expression; more so than the dirty, mottle-skinned 
lascars and coolies I had seen at Minto and Palembang. Was this then some lower grade of 
human being, some connecting link, between man and beast, more human than orang utan, or 
chimpanze; and less so than Papuan or Hottentot? I could not say so from what I saw, nor from 
all the strange stories I heard. But that beings of well made human form, covered with hair, 
almost without speech, and living on raw food, dwell in the caves and tree tops of the forests of 
Sumatra, are facts that are well established. The Panyorang said that the Sultan of Jambee had a 
great many Kubu slaves. (Gibson 1855: 181-182)  
Gibson’s accounts are extremely interesting. There has been a long tradition of sighting what has become 
know as the orang-pendek, which is Sumatra’s version of the Yeti (Cribb 2005). The problem with taking 
Gibson’s account seriously was that his accounts of his time in Southeast Asia is political manifesto of 
how he believed colonialism should occur. These arguments are made using symbolism; therefore, 
references to these mythical beings could be more symbolic than anything else.  Horace St.John put it this 
Chapter 7 – Ethnography, Race and Evolution 
 229
of Borneo and Sumatra were wild places, in which the tribes were savage barbarians, 
and like Africa were dangerous places for European explorers. These claims by the 
travel writers reflected the indigenous social divisions that existed: for the coastal 
communities had very little to do with those of the interior. With a hint of pathos, one 
travel writer commented on this trend: “In answer to my inquiry, the person in question 
said that the people on the other side of Kinibalu were very bad men, and killed 
everyone who approached them. I said I had heard the same account of his fellow-
countryman, and he shook his head in deprecation of such a wicked report” (Crespigny 
1858: 347). In total these stories reflected pre-existing practices of power and 
persecution. Earl noted: 
 
On approaching the boat, a Papua or New Guinea-negro, one of my boat’s – crew, was perceived 
cutting wood for thole pins; and the Javanese soldiers, by way of alarming him, and amusing 
themselves, rushed towards the spot shouting “Orant-outan!” on which the poor man, who had 
no notion of being shot for a monkey, jumped behind a tree and roared out, that he was not an 
orang-outan but an orang Papua (Earl [1837] 1971: 228).  
 
Earl’s story demonstrates that distinctions relating to civilization were being made prior 
to the European involvement in Southeast Asia; therefore, British travel writers were 
building on pre-existing prejudices. In reiterating these stories and prejudices, the travel 
writers were reforming them into a new discourse of civilization and power, one based 
on biology, race and nation. This discourse transforms the early colonial society from its 
mercantile multiculturalism into a racial hierarchy, bound by a vertical ‘chain of being’. 
 
Reconciling the Limits of the Primordial Tribal-Nation 
 
The ‘chain of being’ that linked nations and tribes to a primordial core is an implicit 
idea that was woven through nineteenth-century narratives of Southeast Asia. The 
orang-utan emerged at the limits of the ‘chain of being’. The naturalising of the nation 
meant that the nation was primordialized into the natural landscape, this process 
                                                                                                                                                                          
way: “During this same visit he also saw one of the Orang Kubu, a hairy man, of Sumatra, of whose 
existence, we believe, the ethnologists doubt; but Mr. Gibson cannot, without disputing his own eyesight” 
(St. John 1856). By the 1870s comical stories were being published in popular pamphlets such as: 
Account of a race of human beings with tails : discovered by Mr. Jones, the traveller, in the interior of 
New Guinea (c1873), indicating the extent to which it had become popular trope. The irony behind these 
stories is that none of the great apes have a tail, therefore why would the missing link have a tail? 
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generated the orang-utan as the ultimate primordial being linking the barbarian tribe-
nation back to the savage condition of nature. This chapter has examined how the tribe 
was embedded in nature through the orang-utan. However, the civilized nation was not 
disconnected from the tribe and nature. The journalist, ethnologist and founder of the 
Journal of the Indian Archipelago, James Logan (1847: 180) commented on this 
phenomenon: 
 
When we look upon some half or wholly naked people as dark in the minds as in their persons, 
to judge from the absence of all arts, we are ready to conclude that they are in every respect at an 
infinite distance from ourselves, and in fact are as near the orang-utan as they are remote from 
us. But these people have a possession … they have a language, which is an image of our own, 
and is the same great record of sensation, though and feeling.  
 
Living in Singapore in 1847, Logan could see the popular tendency to place tribal 
society as the ‘other’ that is “dark in mind” and in “person” lives in the jungle and is 
devoid of the “arts”. Logan’s criticism of the popular tendency is reminiscent of James 
Cowles Prichard’s 1847 claim that “our relations to these tribes will appear to be not 
very different from those which might be imagined to subsist between us and a race of 
orangs” (quoted in chapter four). For both Logan and Prichard the primordial ‘chain of 
being’ was the legitimization of barbarism by the civilized towards the savage, Logan 
(1847: 181) continues:  
 
The contradiction, however, lies in our own ignorance and prejudice, and the fact, when 
considered with all that it implies, literally speaks volumes against the habit, in which we too 
often indulge, of viewing such races, not from the basis of a common humanity, but from the 
pinnacle of our own advantages. 
 
Both Logan and Prichard present their ethnology within a Christian cosmology, with 
Logan (1847: 173) commenting “It is because Man is essentially, even in his lowest or 
normal state, a shadow of the Divinity, and a mirror of all nature, capable of an infinite 
perception and reflection of the sensible, that he creates a language as spontaneously, 
variously and luxuriantly as the earth arrays itself of vegetation”. Rather than linking 
humans and nature within the ‘chain of being’ Logan saw two chains existing as a 
duality. Humans were shadows of God and therefore mirrors of nature not part of 
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nature. Therefore culture (language and art) were the products of humans, these were 
distinctly different from nature but existed as a mirror to the diversity of nature.  
 
Logan saw problems in linking humans to nature; therefore he clearly demarked two 
separate entities: culture and nature. Although Logan separated culture from nature, he 
was still primordially naturalising the nation; however, by separating the two, Logan 
was trying to place limits on the extent of primordialism, limiting human primordialism 
to culture.  
 
It is in this field, where necessity and reason have released man from their inflexible bonds, and 
given him over to the capricious and protean power of accident, fancy, and taste, that we must 
find the evidence which tradition has lost. All that lies without it belongs to the common history 
of man. It is here that we shall find the particular history of races (Logan 1847: 172-173). 
 
The tribes and nations were united by a common history of man, but this history was the 
history of the races. Logan saw that “necessity and reason” had created the need for 
language, with language being a common “possession” of all humans. Language was 
the common connection linking the tribe and the nation, with Logan explaining that “the 
person of the savage, and the mind of the civilized man must first wander far into new 
realms of action or thought, before he can loosen the ties of a language once produced” 
(Logan 1847: 174). Language therefore was the key to the nation’s past. Logan (1847: 
174) saw that “every language contains within itself the evidence of its own immediate 
origin and progress”. Therefore the nation could be traced back to the tribal barbarian. 
This meant that all savages and barbarians were linked back to an original tribe. Yet for 
Logan, language was merely a traceable symptom of the nation, not the key aspect of 
the nation itself. He argued:   
 
A nation portrays its existing condition better in its manners, habits and customs than in its 
language. The expression which were once a literal reflex of the former may remain, but, with 
reference to the present, they may have become entirely figurative. It is true that habits also lose 
much of their primitive significance, but it cannot be so generally and entirely forgotten as that 
of words so often is (Logan 1847: 175).  
 
Logan was linking culture in the shape of manners, habits, customs and language to 
primordialism. Therefore the nation descends to the tribe and, for Logan, this marks the 
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limits of primordialism. Yet in limiting primordialism to culture, Logan was still 
naturalising the nation. He saw that “in communities there is a general social prototype 
on which every person is formed” (Logan 1847: 175). However, at the same time, 
Logan could not totally expunge all aspects of the ‘chain of being’ having traces of 
primordialism beyond culture, commenting that “this great fixed life-mould, imprints its 
shape on every fresh member born into the community, and gives a sameness of 
direction to the wild and luxuriant growth in which nature indulges when free from such 
restraint” (Logan 1847: 175). Culture, in both the tribe and the nation civilized raw 
nature. Even though Logan is aware of the problems with primordializing the tribal-
nation into nature, with it leading to dehumanization, Logan was finding it hard to 
overcome the naturalising tendency to link the nation and the tribe to nature.  
 
This chapter has examined how the naturalising of the nation led to the primordializing 
of the nation. As the nation was naturalized as common sense, a second process of 
naturalization occurred in which the nation became primordialized. In presenting the 
nation as primordial, the nation was connected to the tribe, but this raised questions on 
the limits of primordialism. In naturalising the nation as common sense, with the tribe 
acting as a primordial pathway, the nation became part of nature. Therefore the orang-
utan and the missing link emerged as a conjunctional point; potentially explaining the 
birth of the tribe. These arguments can be seen as a projection of degeneracy of tribal 
society, but as this chapter has argued, this is problematic. By primordializing the 
nation, the nation made the barbarian and tribal savage the cultural source of identity in 
the civilized empire. Therefore it was not a simple process of degeneracy. Despite this, 
liberal-minded Christian intellectuals who were committed to humanity’s unity, were 
conscious that missing link theories did project tribal society in a negative light. 
However, even figures such as James Logan and James Cowles Prichard (discussed in 
Chapter Four), who recognized the problems in connecting the nation to nature, still 
assumed a link between the nation and nature in assuming the nation as common sense.  
 
Chapter 8 - Distinguishing the 
Nation from Empire and the 
Barbarian 
 
 
As this thesis has argued, rather than being an empire of state, the British Empire was a 
tangled geographical structure — with overlapping spaces for governance and order; 
civil society and commerce — whilst all were sustained by theories that were founded 
on barbarian renewal. As an origin of national culture, the barbarian was carried 
forward. The barbarian became both a founder of nations and an object of opposition to 
empire. The British Empire was founded by barbarians, yet it had the objective of 
ending barbarism and creating order. The barbarian was both a positive and a negative 
factor, making the British Empire a contradictory cultural phenomenon. This all 
occurred within a system of territorially defined colonial jurisdictions. These were 
ambiguous spaces within the modern structure of empire, and it is in these ambiguous 
spaces that the naturalization of the nation occurred as the empire dealt with the 
barbarian legacy.  
 
This naturalization of the nation occurred in many forms. Chapter Six examined the 
naturalization of nation through the process of governance, wherein the empire was 
justified on grounds of developing the barbarians and reinvigorating nations. It became 
the role of British imperialism to introduce societies to modern capitalism, and thereby 
liberate people from the tyranny of traditional ways of life. This transformed the 
barbarian lover-of-freedom into the risk-taking capitalist. A key component in this was 
the introduction of the nation. The nation and capitalism become allied structures on the 
road to liberation.  
 
This chapter explores the emergence of the nation as a central aspect of the critique of 
empire from within the metropole. This critique emerges out of liberal discourse on 
civilization; however, this focus on civilization became a vexatious issue as liberals 
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became divided over the role of empire and civilization. Many anti-slavery campaigners 
such as Joseph Hume and Richard Cobden went on to challenge colonialism in Asia; 
whilst others such as James Brooke, used aboriginal protection as a means to justify 
further imperialism. This chapter explores the awkward way in which liberalism adopts 
nation-formation globally. This adoption of the nation as a central aspect of social and 
political organization became a divisive fissure within liberal politics. This chapter 
explores the split between the liberal radicals in Southeast Asia and the liberal radicals 
within the imperial metropole. This split was over competing ideas of the role of the 
nation and the empire.  
 
The empire’s structure of geographical disjuncture and system of social hierarchy all 
created space for the nation. But the nation, as a system of improvement, ultimately 
meant self-determination, and therefore independence. This contradiction between 
extraction and liberation was not a problem during the early-nineteenth century, with 
colonists and officials maintaining the blinkered belief that they were doing good deeds. 
Although there was initial resistance to imperialism, once it became absorbed, local 
rulers were then pensioned off and the British were able to freely pursue their 
governance schemes of transformation. This contradiction between self-determination 
and exploitative servitude marked the first half of the nineteenth-century. A series of 
mid-century events and confrontations showed these contradictions in relief. In doing 
so, new movements emerged that naturalized the nation in different ways. These 
confrontations did not deliberately reinterpret the nation from is ambiguous eighteenth-
century terminology, but instead were part of a wider mid-century reconfiguring of the 
nation. The nation lost its connection to the barbarian. Liberal internationalists saw the 
nation as distinct from empire and the barbarian. Ideas of the nation were ‘in the air’, 
and the nation became a universalized term of analysis. Without engaging in a reflective 
process, conservatives, liberal imperialists and radical liberal internationalists were 
seeing the world as a construct of nations. To the liberal internationalists these nations 
all had rights as nations.  
 
The 1850s marked a major transition, with the nation becoming a common form of 
political expression and analysis. The intellectual climate was changing and events on 
the periphery and in the centre of the empire challenged the exploitive nature of 
imperialism. In the centre a new wave of radical liberal politicians emerged. Some of 
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these radicals, such as John Buxton, had emerged from the anti-slavery debates of the 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Others such as Richard Cobden and John 
Bright cut their political teeth fighting the Corn Laws, and some, such as Joseph Hume, 
participated in both debates. Practical challenges to slavery and imperial expansion were 
being launched in parliament and the popular press; but many of these activists were 
also buoyed by philosophical transformations.  
 
The Humanitarian Movement and Anti-colonialism 
 
The idea of self-determination (for the nation) had emerged during the French 
Revolution, partly under the banner of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, with fraternity 
meaning brotherhood and the expansion of the revolution. However the French deputies 
were reluctant to spread the revolution beyond of Europe. This lead Jeremy Bentham 
(1830: 8) to proclaim in a 1793 speech to the French National Convention that: 
“Martinique and Guadalupe have already pronounced their separation. Has that 
Satisfied you? I am afraid rather it has irritated you. They have shaken off the yoke; and 
you have decreed an armament to fasten it on again”. Although Bentham’s speech was 
in 1793, it was not published as a pamphlet until 1830. A strong anti-colonial trend 
emerged within the utilitarianism movement during the 1820s and lasted through to the 
1840s. This movement had two broad directions: the anti-colonial imperialists that 
emerged on the periphery; and the anti-imperialists, who emerged in the metropole.  
 
This trend in criticising the expansion of empire has been called the period of Little-
England, as opposed the period of Big-England that emerged in the late-nineteenth 
century when imperial expansion became a nationalist drive.125  
 
Anti-colonialism was influential with the parliamentary liberal radicals (Turner 2004: 
176). This anti-colonialism was not in any way comparable to the comprehensive belief 
in self-determination that emerged in the twentieth century.126 Nevertheless, the idea of 
                                                          
125 This term was originally coined by John Steerly (1890) 
126 Writing in the mid-twentieth century, John S. Galbraith (1961) argued that the anti-colonial movement 
or ‘little Englanders’ were more myth than reality during the mid-nineteenth century. Although the ‘little-
Englanders’ were un-developed proselytizers of self-determination the naturalization of self-
determination (as applied to the nation) had its genesis during this period.  
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the nation and the rights of non-European peoples was present,127 but primarily the 
focus was on the corruption of the political system. Anti-colonial essays focused on 
dependency as a political system and argued that dependency was a corruption of good 
governance. John Stuart Mill’s critique of empire (which was examined in Chapter 
Two) falls into this category. One of the most aggressive attacks on empire during this 
period was George Cornwall Lewis’s (1841) Essay on the Government of 
Dependencies. One of the key arguments of the utilitarians was that decolonization was 
a means of preventing war between the European states (Turner 2004: 176). The 
utilitarian movement was generally in favour of empire, as a means of pursuing their 
rationalistic ends of forced human improvement (Mehta 2004). Liberalism reflected the 
contradictions between the nation and the empire, yet this contradiction meant that both 
ideas were undergoing change.  
 
These debates produced critiques of the British Empire. These critiques all presumed 
the nation to be a natural structure in different ways. The anti-slavery debates initiated 
these critiques. They constituted a humanitarian critique of empire for some; whilst, for 
others, abolition represented a purpose for empire (Hochschild 2005). These anti-
slavery debates ended in the late 1830s. Although they introduced a critique of empire, 
these debates were framed within the parameters of civilization. Slavery was a moral 
issue that questioned notions of civility. In this arena, the use of the nation was limited 
to claims such as ‘we the nation stand ashamed’.  
 
The first challenge to imperialism was the Abolition Movement. The British Empire of 
the eighteenth century was based around America. This was very different to the 
nineteenth-century empire in Asia. It was an empire of colonial migration that totally 
displaced (to the point of destroying) native populations. In comparison the empire in 
Southeast Asia was based on the maintenance of native populations for the purposes of 
economic extraction. Despite this difference, the role of slavery in Britain’s American 
empire had some structural similarities to the later Asian empire. Slavery was about the 
management of non-European peoples for economic gain. Rather than extracting rents, 
as was the case in India, American slavery was about moving people for the purposes of 
                                                          
127 These ideas can be explored in James Macqueen’s (1825) Colonial Controversy. Macqueen is actually 
a conservative writing against the “anti-colonialists’, however his critiques portray the ideas of the time 
for both sides of the debate.  
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labour-intensive production. From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, abolitionists 
focused on the economics of slavery as well as the moral issues of servitude. An early 
example of the political economic critique of slavery was Thomas Clarkson’s Essay on 
Slavery (1786). The essay originated as the winner of the Latin Prize at Cambridge 
University in 1785. In its first edition Clarkson’s essay presented a moralistic case, 
however in later editions Clarkson focused more on the practical economy of slavery 
(Hochschild 2005: 127). Increasingly the abolitionists focused on fighting the economic 
interests of slavery.  
 
Slavery was extremely profitable. The abolitionists had to challenge the profitability of 
slavery through political economy. To expose the abysmal practices of slavery and 
create a moral argument to end the process, the abolitionists needed to establish that 
slavery was inefficient. In An essay on the Impolicy of the African Slave Trade, 
Clarkson (1788) outlined the total economic cost of the slave trade. Arguing that in toto 
the slave trade was inefficient and denied Britain access to a grater source of real trade 
in other commodities from Africa.128 The abolitionists argued the liberal notions of 
liberty to pursue commerce, therefore, although slavery was profitable to some, the 
abolitionists made the argument that slavery was a net economic drain on society.129 
The focus on protection of the rights of non-European peoples was framed within the 
concept of social rationality. In effect, the argument held that slavery was in the worst 
interests of British and African society. This logic meant that the abolitionist movement 
had a paternalistic premise, wherein the interests of the indigenous people were best 
understood by British liberals (Blackburn 1988: 295). This paternalist logic would limit 
                                                          
128 In conception, Clarkson’s argument was very similar to modern-day environmentalists who argue the 
total cost of consumerism, expressed as environmental degradation, is not recognized by conventional 
economics.  
129 Economic rationality has long been a focus of critique. Marxist historiography has argued that slavery 
was not abolished until it had lost its competitive edge (Genovese 1969). There are two main points to 
this argument: one, that under capitalism, morality can only occur when immorality provides a lesser 
economic gain; and two, all moral decisions are based a material reality. The problem with this argument 
is that slavery was still very profitable, with demand for products increasing (Schama 2002: 108). It is 
also notable that, after the abolition of slavery, slave-like working conditions continued in the American 
South and was introduced into parts of the British Empire; particularly in Queensland, wherein Torres 
Strait Islanders and the Aboriginal population were forced to work without pay. The claim that slavery 
ended only when it became economically inefficient is testament to the success of the abolitionists’ 
arguments. Their argument was that free labour was ultimately more profitable than forced labour. 
Therefore this argument was based on eventual gains of a complex division of labour and not immediate 
gains of extraction. The abolitionists did not prove that slavery was inefficient, but rather presented 
abolition as having economic benefits (Porter 1999: 204).  
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the first wave of anti-imperial critique. Rather than challenging empire, liberalism 
channelled empire.  
 
With the ending of slavery throughout the British Empire, many of the abolitionists 
moved to critiquing the system of colonialism itself. Thomas Fowell Buxton had led the 
parliamentary charge for abolition from the 1820s onwards. Buxton attempted to 
redirect the humanitarian energies of the abolitionist movement. He argued that the 
focus should be on reparations for past wrong-doings. These wrong-doings Buxton 
(1837: 5) summarized as: 
 
Too often, their territory has been usurped; their property seized; their numbers diminished; their 
character debased; the spread of religion impeded. European vices and diseases have been 
introduced amongst them, and they have been familiarized with the use of our most potent 
instruments for the subtle or the violent destruction of human life viz. Brandy and gunpowder.  
 
Despite the crimes of Europeans, Buxton argued in The African Slave Trade and its 
Remedy (1840) that a key aspect of slavery was the nature of trade in non-European 
societies. Non-European societies were intrinsically built around slavery as a mode of 
production. Buxton argued that a key aspect of slavery was the nature of the trade in 
non-European societies. Non-European societies were intrinsically built around slavery 
as a mode of production. Buxton’s argument was that Europeans had fallen into the trap 
of slavery. Therefore Buxton effectively blamed the victims for seducing the 
perpetrators. This argument was quite common. Officials in Prince of Wales Island 
(Penang) bemoaned the fact that slavery existed in Penang, and, like Buxton, blamed it 
on the natives. The Judge and magistrate of Penang commented:  
 
I was not ignorant, that slavery, limited and unlimited, has been here tolerated. I know that 
emigrants, both from the Malays, Peninsula, and from the Eastern Islands, who had become 
inhabitants of Prince of Wales Island, have been permitted to retain in slavery those whom they 
had brought as slaves to this place. But all this passed sub silento; for after careful search, I have 
not found any regulation of the local government, or any order from the Governor General in 
council, authorizing the establishment of slavery (Dickens 1828[1/1/1802]: 429).  
 
Therefore, it was the natives that were corrupting civilization, bringing slaves to new 
colony for slavery was “universally prevalent in all the adjacent countries over which 
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the British government … [had] no control” (Counter, et al. 1828[29/9/1809]: 441). 
These sentiments of corruption were resolutely expressed in 1807 by the acting 
Governor for Prince of Wales Island, W. E Philips (1828[25/12/1807]: 436), who 
commented: “slavery in its mildest forms is degrading to the minds of Britons and only 
tolerated as a means of drawing population to an infant colony, which from the now 
flourishing state of this island is no longer necessary, therefore derogatory to our 
national character”. Clearly, Governor Philips saw it as a central issue and believed it 
his duty to end the practice on Prince of Wales Island. What is interesting for our 
purposes was that Philips linked abolition to the nation and the national character, 
bearing in mind that by 1807, abolition had only just been achieved throughout the 
British Empire after a bitter twenty-year struggle. Yet at the same time, Governor 
Philips (1828[25/12/1807]: 439) said he didn’t want to “too suddenly interfere with 
ancient and authorized usages”, by this Philips meant caution should be shown in 
“interfering in the domestic arrangements and customs of the various native inhabitants” 
(1828[4/2/1809]: 439). Therefore within these debates over implementing abolition, 
officials in the farthest reaches of the empire were viewing a policy that was based on 
property rights and individuality through the prism of national culture and the 
independent rights of Southeast Asian culture.  
 
Faced with these problems, rather that disengagement, Buxton urged the introduction of 
“legitimate commerce”, which “might be the precursor, or the attendant, of civilization, 
peace and Christianity, the unenlightened, warlike, and heathen tribes who now so 
fearfully prey on each other, to supply the slave markets of the New World” (Buxton 
1840: 306). Buxton appears to suggest that the barbarity of Africa created slavery. This 
barbarity needed to be civilized if slavery was to end. Buxton saw this transformation 
emanating from commerce. The barbarian needed to be transformed from barbarism to 
capitalism. In this transformation Buxton argued, “the merchant, the philanthropist, the 
patriot, and the Christian, may unite” (Buxton 1840: 306). Although critically scathing 
of imperial practices, Buxton ultimately blamed indigenous societies for imperialism. It 
was their barbarity that entrapped and forced Europeans to commit the sin of slavery. 
This exonerated Britain from its own crimes, but at the same time gave Britain an 
imperial burden to fulfil its Christian duty and reform these corrupt practices. In this 
plea for reform, the contradiction at the heart of nineteenth-century British imperialism 
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was not revealed and contested, but rather Buxton and his followers provided new 
layers of complexity to the contradiction.  
 
The onus of barbarism was moved from an internal condition to an external condition. 
The British were no longer barbarians. The empire became defined against the 
barbarians. This reaffirmed the basic structure of empire, removing the barbarians from 
within the empire. Yet the contradiction of the nation was still there. The barbarians 
were now outside the gates, but the gates existed in the name of the nation. The empire 
was still the tool of the nation. 
 
Barbarism, Civilization and Tribal Rights 
 
The transition is also seen in James Cowles Prichard’s ethnological publications. As 
noted in Chapter Four of this thesis, Prichard had built a political argument about racial 
equality into his research. The publication of the Natural History of Man ([1843] 1855) 
was the truncated and accessible version of Prichard’s work. Its publication coincided 
with the success of the abolition movement. In his introduction, Prichard outlined a 
humanitarian critique of colonialism (discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis). He 
argued that colonialism had meant that non-Europeans had become the “domestic slaves 
of the lordly caste, under whose protection they are susceptible of some small 
improvement” (Prichard [1843] 1855: 6). In portraying the moral shame of colonialism, 
Prichard argued that his critique was “near to an apology” for past practices (Prichard 
[1843] 1855: 7). Like Buxton, Prichard was redirecting the abolition movement into an 
anti-imperial movement.  
 
Prichard demonstrates some of the problems with this critique. Prichard’s arguments 
were based on the scientific arguments for equality or basic rights. By framing this 
debate through science, the focus was on rights within empire. Although critiquing 
empire (similar to Raffles) Prichard and Buxton were arguing for a change of practice in 
expressing the empire. The debate was on equality of humanity and became framed in 
the context of race. The focus was on changing key practices of power within the 
empire, rather than the system of power in itself. The system of power was never 
questioned. The humanitarians spoke from within the system that created slavery, and 
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believed the system itself could be maintained and transformed. Therefore, the 
humanitarians pursued civil society within the imperial framework as a means of 
improving the lot of aboriginal peoples.  
 
Buxton’s and Prichard’s calls for the protection of indigenous societies became manifest 
in a series of Protection Societies, all formed in the late 1830s. Most of these protection 
societies were focused on transforming the social condition of Africa, such as Buxton’s 
‘African Civilization Society’ (formed in July 1839), or in the case of Joseph Sturge’s 
‘British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society’ (formed in April 1839) aimed at eradicating 
slavery internationally. These were dedicated protection societies that followed in the 
footsteps of the anti-slavery campaign.  
 
A broader campaign emerged from the politicized quarter of the ethnologists. Following 
Prichard’s example, Thomas Hodgkin formed two societies that had mutually 
supporting interests. The first was the Aborigines’ Protection Society (APS) formed in 
1837. The APS was a response to the finding of the 1837 Select Committee on 
Aborigines (Buxton 1837). The committee recommended that ‘whatever may be the 
legislative system of any Colony, we … advise that, as far as possible, the Aborigines 
be withdrawn from its control’, and placed in the ‘more impartial hands’ of Imperial 
executive officials (Porter 1999: 208). They also maintained that indigenous labour 
should be regulated to protect their freedom, and that land sales should be controlled to 
guarantee just returns and provide opportunities for ‘religious instruction and education’ 
to the native inhabitants (Porter 1999: 208). The APS was the pressure-group that 
sought to implement these recommendations and, in contrast to the other protection 
societies, its focus was empire-wide. It was supported by Hodgkin’s other project the 
Ethnological society, who’s aim was to “distinguishing the characteristics … of the 
varieties of Mankind” ("Regulations" 1848: 3), in doing so, the Ethnological society 
provided the means of understanding the Aboriginal populations of the world.130 
Science, which had been skilfully used in the anti-slavery campaign (see Chapter Four), 
was now part of the humanist campaign for benign imperialism. 
                                                          
130 The political direction of the Ethnological society was made clear with the Blackballing of Robert 
Knox. Knox’s London Anthropological society certainly interpreted the Ethnological Society as being a 
Quaker project, with Anthological Review stating in 1868 “Prior to Mr. Crawfurd’s occupying the 
presidential chair, his views on certain scientific subjects had been far from popular with a faction of 
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The humanitarian projects of the 1840s were failures. Buxton had campaigned for an 
expedition up the African Niger River. It resulted in forty of the 145 Europeans on the 
expedition dieing of fever, and the expedition being aborted. The APS had pushed for 
Aboriginal Protectors to be appointed in the Australian colonies in 1838, but ten years 
later these measures showed little effect in mitigating the effects of white settlement on 
the Aboriginal population in the Australian colonies. In this climate of imperial 
protection, James Brooke championed the idea of Aboriginal protection in Asia. Brooke 
was very critical of the methods pursued by all the protection associations.  
 
Whilst we admire the torrent of devotional and philosophical exertions, we cannot help 
deploring, that the zeal and attention of the leaders of these charitable crusades have never been 
directed to the countries under consideration. These unhappy countries have failed to rouse 
attention or excite commiseration, and as they sink lower and lower, they afford a striking proof 
how civilization my be crushed, and how the fairest and richest lands under the sun may become 
degraded by continuous course of oppression and misrule (Brooke 1853i: 20).  
 
For Brooke, Aboriginal protection was little more than a talk-fest and that the focus of 
the protection societies and anti-slavery societies was misguided, stating:  
 
The Indian Archipelago has fully shared this neglect, for even the tender philanthropy of the 
present day, which originates such multifarious schemes for the amelioration of doubtful evils, 
and which shudders at the prolongation of apprenticeship in the West for a single year,131 is blind 
to the existence of slavery in its worst and most exaggerated form, in the East (Brooke 1853i: 
19). 
 
These critiques were part of Brooke’s 1839 statement of purpose for a geographical 
expedition to Borneo. This was a scientific expedition, but it was made in a well-armed 
yacht, and Brooke’s tone betrays his political ambitions. One constant that Brooke 
maintained was his belief in protecting the indigenous inhabitants (Tarling 1992). 
Brooke’s departure for Borneo in 1839 is historically important. It placed Brooke’s 
expedition at the crescendo of the anti-slavery movement; at the point in which the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Quakers, who headed by Dr. Hodgkin, were then dominant in the Society; and neither friendly nor 
respectful were the terms in which Mr. Crawfurd and his opinions were spoken of” (Hunt 1868: 432). 
131 This is in reference to the fact that slave owners had a short term reprieve, with slavery being 
commuted to an apprenticeship, meaning that the slave owners had three extra years of free labour before 
the total abolition of slavery. 
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movement was looking for new directions. Like Buxton, Brooke saw more imperialism 
as the only means of protecting the indigenous population. Aboriginal inhabitants 
needed to be improved to be saved and this was to be done through good governance 
and the freeing of commerce. To achieve this, Brook (1853i: 11) argued: 
 
It would seem, that territorial possession is the best, if not the only means, by which to acquire a 
direct and powerful influence in the Archipelago, but any government instituted for the purpose 
must be directed to the advancement of the native interests and the development of native 
resources, rather than by a flood of European colonization, to aim at possession only, without 
reference to the indefeasible rights of the Aborigines (my emphasis).  
 
Brooke naturalized the continuing contradictions of British imperialism. He believed in 
the rights of the indigenous population. Yet these indigenous rights only existed in 
subservience to empire. They were seen through a paternalistic lens of what was in their 
best interest; with Brooke deeming that economic development was the native’s future. 
Fulfilling indigenous interests was Brooke’s constant defence of his private campaign to 
colonize Sarawak. In liberating the indigenous population from the tyrannies of slavery 
and piracy, Brooke forcefully imposed his will throughout Sarawak, suppressing 
indigenous and native objections. Barbarism had to submit to order. Brook and his 
followers regularly outlined the barbaric practices of the Dyaks. The barbaric practices 
of head hunting and violent inhuman warfare went to the core of their character. Hugh 
Low (1848: 188) was on Brooke’s staff, he argued that “the passion for head-hunting, 
which now characterizes these people, was … probably as ancient as their existence as a 
nation”. Barbarism was the core of their national character, however Low (1848: 188) 
believed that the practice had been radically transformed in what was then living 
memory “it was not formerly so deeply rooted in their characters as it is at present, and 
many of the inhabitants of Sarawak have assured me that they well recollect the tribes 
first visiting the sea with that ostensible and avowed object”. Low (1848: 189) argued it 
was a response to encroachment with the Malays being “instrumental in encouraging 
this barbarous practice”. Their barbarism had become “a corruption of its first 
institution” (Low 1848: 188). “The practice of preserving the heads of their enemies, 
anciently instituted that they might be kept as memorials of triumph, has degenerated, 
from its originally sufficiently barbarous intention, into a passion for the possession of 
these horrid trophies, no matter how obtained” (Low 1848: 165-166). Low (1848: 188) 
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speculated that it had been transformed as a defence mechanism that “preserve[d] their 
country from invasion” through “inspire[ing] terror wherever they carried their arms”.  
 
The Dyak was a barbarian and their barbarism was their core national character, but 
rather than civilising the Dyak, the nation had become more barbarous. This barbarism 
was degeneracy; that could be, and needed to be, tamed. Their barbarism had degraded 
from its original condition as a result of colonising Malays. Low argued the key to 
taming the barbarian was empire. Empire provided security, order and commerce:  
   
It can easily be imagined after this account of their sufferings, which might easily be swelled by 
an enumeration of horrors common to civilised, and may peculiar to barbarian warfare, with 
what pleaure they hailed the return of peace, which Mr. Brooke’s arrival promised them; and the 
gratitude they now feel, and the affection with which they regard the man who saved their 
residue from starvation, slavery, and death, is equal to the sufferings from which his humanity 
delivered them; and the only fear which has hitherto, since the establishment of his government, 
alloyed their happiness is, that any accident should interrupt the protection they have hitherto 
received. (Low 1848: 190) 
 
Responding to the issues of slavery and barbarism the humanitarians blamed the victim. 
This action sanctioned empire as the logical solution to the barbarian. This meant that 
the humanitarian critique led to colonialism and imperialism. This critique was 
constrained by the contradictions inherent in British imperialism. The critique never 
addressed the problem of the nation to British imperialism which was emerging under 
the radar. These inconsistencies would lead to a real humanitarian critique of empire 
that was based on the nation.  
 
In aiding the nation, an anti-colonialist critique that was also anti-imperial emerged. 
This critique imagined a new global world of independent nations. The earlier anti-
slavery/anti-colonialist critique was too bound to the logic of empire as the protector of 
civilization from barbarism. As a nation, Britain was an expansionist identity. As Nairn 
(1977) and Kumar (2006, 2003) argue, Britain was always an empire. This expansionist 
idea of Britain papered over the contradictions within British political discourse. This 
made Brooke’s vision of the protective empire in Sarawak consistent with the idea of 
Britain.  
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This discourse of control insinuates a process of naturalization wherein the inhabitants 
of Sarawak are absorbed for their own progressive benefit into the greater identity of 
Britain. Brooke’s own discourse on nation and governance does not allow for 
naturalization. He presents himself as being distinct and separate from the inhabitants of 
Borneo, stating: “the Chinese are a check upon the Malay, and both parties eager to 
have somebody who can stand between them” (Brooke 1853i: 65), thereby placing 
himself as the external disinterested governor. In this external capacity, Brooke saw 
himself as a voice for the Dyak’s, but in doing so he engaged in the systems of 
oppression against those he saw as enemies of the Dyaks and anybody that resisted his 
liberal visions of ending slavery, piracy and introducing capitalist development. Even 
the Dyaks who practised piracy were subject to Brooke’s wrath, with Brooke deeming 
them degenerate Dyaks.  
 
British Liberalism and Nationalist Movements 
 
From the mid-1820s, national liberation became a popular theme amongst the British 
middle class and elite. For a variety of different reasons, in a variety of different 
circumstances, the liberals, the radicals and the conservatives all gave their moral 
weight to struggles for national liberation. By mid-century the nation was a symbol of 
liberation and reform. It was a focal point for neo-classical imagery, a point of historical 
belonging in the yearning for the ancient regime, whilst also being a focal point for 
great power rivalry. National liberation became a blank canvas on which political 
visions could be drawn, and internal British political foes found unity in nebulous calls 
for the liberation of ethnic-national groups.  
 
The case example of the liberals and conservatives finding common ground was the 
cause for Greek liberation. Support amongst the elite occurred for a variety of reasons, a 
core issue was classical education which bred romantic ideals on Greek independence 
(Taylor 1969: 40). In the mind of liberal Benthamite followers, an independent Greece 
would be like India: a model society. The British Parliament’s Greek Committee 
originally held great utilitarian hopes for Greece, with wide sweeping visions of social 
reform. But as the practical problems of state-creation emerged, many of these ideals 
were left by the wayside (Turner 2004: 96). The neo-classical and romantic beliefs of 
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Lord Byron were another arm of the liberation cause. Many of the liberal radicals who 
had preached social reform in India were also heavily involved in the cause of Greek 
independence: Joseph Hume examples this phenomenon. Hume served in India as a 
surgeon and returned to Britain, becoming a parliamentary radical (J.A.H 1917, Turner 
2004). Hume, like many of his radical contemporaries, was intrinsically concerned with 
the plight of India and the inherent sovereignty of Asian societies. Many of the radicals 
expressed a belief in national liberation for European ethnic groups. The idea of the 
nation as a cultural political group was becoming widely accepted as a natural reality. 
This acceptance was not limited to Europe. The national liberation cause was extended 
to Asian societies. It represented an emerging belief in the natural sanctity of the nation.  
 
In the 1830s, the East India Company extended its territorial control over India. One 
such acquisition was the principality of Sattara.132 Sattara had been an independent ally 
of the East India Company, and had signed a formal treaty of alliance in 1819. But in 
1832 a jurisdictional dispute occurred over who controlled some lucrative jagheers133. 
The British Empire in India had been substantially built on controlling the land taxes. 
Robert Clive had set the trajectory in motion by stripping the principality of 
Murshidabad of an army, in doing so the Company took the rights to collect revenue for 
the Murshidabad principality: thereby effectively eliminating Murshidabad sovereignty. 
The story was continued in Sattara, wherein the Bombay government took jurisdiction 
over six Jagheers. Purtaub Singh, the raja of Sattara launched a staunch campaign of 
objection which resulted in his forceful removal as raja of Sattara, he was replaced by 
his brother Appa Saib (Hume 1848a, Hume 1848b).  
 
Joseph Hume saw this as an illegal attack on Sattaran sovereignty. In response he 
launched a publicity campaign in parliament and in The Times newspaper demanding 
that Britain honour its treaties. The changes in Hume’s arguments throughout this 
campaign, was a symptomatic representation of the naturalization of nation. Hume’s 
early arguments are solely based on the transfer of sovereignty. The issue was whether 
or not Sattara was a sovereign state or subject to British suzerainty. Hume presented 
                                                          
132 The modern spelling of Sattara is Sātāra. I have chosen to use the nineteenth century spelling as a 
means of maintaining the originality of quotations as much as possible.  
133 The modern spelling of jagheer is jagir. A Jagir was an administrative region where public taxation is 
collected privately. 
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sovereignty as a property issue, focussing on the illegal use of power in deposing the 
raja and the raja’s rights of ownership. But by the end of 1848, he admits that:  
 
I am not ignorant, however, that rights of sovereigns are little regarded either by Christians or 
heathens when they have might sufficient to disregard them; and consequently, when the 
fainéant Rajah fell into our hands, and his territories into our power, and the dread of a general 
Mahratta war had passed over, I am well aware that the Rajah became de facto something 
different from what he was de jure (Hume 1848b). 
 
For Hume imperialism by treaty created a de facto transfer of sovereignty, although not 
legal it became the practical reality. The states in India, although formally equal to 
Britain, were in practice in a relationship of suzerainty to the British Empire. Hume was 
scathing of this practice, but he recognized its realpolitik logic. This Realpolitik 
approach had its own problems. Hume saw the extinction of the Raja’s sovereignty over 
Sattara as a direct affront to a Mahrattan desire for national liberation. Although the 
legality of the sovereign transfer was a principle issue, Hume maintained that 
sovereignty was just the expression of national liberation. The subjugation of the 
Mahratta nation (and by inference Asian nations more generally) was the real problem 
for the British Empire. To illuminate this point, Hume places the realpolitik of British 
imperialism in historic context by stating:  
 
The avowed objects for which the Sattara principality was originally constituted in 1819 … are 
described by Grant Duff 134 to have been the comfort and dignity of the imprisoned Rajah of 
Sattara, the raising up of a counterpoise to the remaining influence of the Brahmins, the 
conciliation of the Mahratta nation, and the opening for the employment of many persons, whom 
it would have been expensive to suit, and who could not obtain a livelihood under the English 
administration” (Hume 1848b).  
 
Hume appealed to the 1819 policy of realpolitik of Grant Duff. The British 
administration saw that a stable independent Sattara bordering on British India was 
more practical than direct control. On the surface, this had nothing to do with nationalist 
imagery. This was a rational decision of realpolitik. Yet the nation is emerging. 
Statements such as ‘influence of the Brahmins’ or ‘conciliation of the Mahratta nation’ 
raise the threat of nationalist populism. However, the nation was subservient in Duff’s 
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explanation to the needs of the Raja and the administrative elite. Duff focuses on 
appeasing the Mahratta elite. Hume criticized a core admission of Duff’s, stating: 
 
Now, among this list of avowed objects there is a remarkable omission. Viz., that of the 
nationality of the Mahrattas, and the necessity for our then purposes and welfare of enlisting 
their national feelings on our aide in the person of their political suzerain (Hume 1848b). 
 
Hume attributes the nation and the desire for national liberation as being an underlying 
political force. Hume argued that Britain had previously used this force in strengthening 
British power. For Hume, national considerations were of prime importance in 
developing British policy. In listing national considerations as an omission, Hume’s 
argument is an example of the naturalization of the nation and its acceptance, by mid-
century, as a basic political force in all societies. Hume’s criticism of Duff’s omission is 
testament to the quick pace in which the nation gained political importance. To 
substantiate his argument, Hume frames the relations between the Raja and the British 
within a nationalist narrative of Mahratta history. The historical location of this 
nationalist narrative was the Mahratta war of 1817-18, in which Hume accredited the 
Raja as being a key element in preventing a war of national liberation, stating:  
  
When it is remembered that Bajee Rao, isolated from all other Mahratta chiefs, and proclaimed a 
rebel by the head of his nation then in our camp, nevertheless for several months defied the 
whole power of the British Government … if the influence of the Rajah’s name could have been 
brought to bear against us, and if Bajee Rao, instead of being discountenanced and denounneced 
as a rebel by the Rajah, had by him been encouraged, or only suffered, to gather to his standard 
the powerful Mahratta tribes then already in arms; indeed, I feel confident that there is no such 
officer who will take upon him to say, if such a general rising of the Mahrattas had openly been 
countenanced by the Rajah, that we should at this time have been holders of one single square 
mile of the whole Mahratta country (Hume 1848b).  
 
Insightfully, Hume saw that nationalistic sentiments were a powerful source of 
resistance. On this note his sentiments are mixed. Hume saw Mahratta nationalism as a 
threat to British interests, but he also maintained that British power needed to work in 
conjunction with nationalistic forces. For Hume, Asian nations were a natural reality 
and, as such, Britain ignored Asian national aspirations at their peril.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
134 Grant Duff was the Resident to Sattara immediately after the treaty of 1819, and on retiring from the 
Indian civil service he wrote History of the Mahrattas (1912), (The Banffshire Journal 1858: 10) 
Chapter 8 – Distinguishing the Nation from Empire and Barbarian 
 249
 
As evidence of British consideration of national interest in India, Hume quoted the 
official correspondence of Mr. Elphinstone135 to the Governor-General of India from 
18th of June, 1818:  
 
I will simply refer to the original letter from Mr. Elphinstone to the Governor-General …“The 
name of the Mahratta country shows us that we have more to apprehend from it. The whole 
population are Mahrattas, and all have some attachment to their nation, and feel some interest in 
its greatness;” to which he afterwards adds “at the time when I had to decide, the Mahrattas 
showed not disposition whatever to quit the Pelshwa’s standard; and it appeared not improbable 
that the dread of the complete extinction of their national independence, and still more that of the 
entire loss of their means of subsistence, from the want of Government likely to employ them, 
would induce them to adhere to Bajee Rao with an obstinacy that could never have been 
produced by affection for his person or interest in his cause. It, therefore, seemed expedient to 
remove their grounds of alarm by establishment of a separate Government” (Hume 1848b). 
 
Elphinstone claimed to have used the imagery of the nation of as a means of dividing a 
rebellion. In so doing Elphinstone saw its potential as a force against imperialism whilst 
the British Empire was still being formed. Hume placed great importance on this letter. 
For him, Elphinstone’s letter represented the real reason why Sattaran sovereignty 
needed to be upheld. Primarily it represented a nation and was a symbol of 
independence in an environment of de facto British sovereignty. But beyond the nation 
was also an issue of property rights. He argued that Sattaran sovereignty was sanctified 
in a treaty:   
 
It is of the essence of all treaties to establish conditions and obligations; and if the fact of the 
stronger imposing conditions on the weaker abrogated the title of the latter to independent 
sovereignty, not only should we be obliged to deny … every … native Prince; but also we 
should be obliged to maintain that France in 1814 and 1815 become the vassal of the allies of the 
time, or, in language analogous to your correspondent’s, “a fief as it were of the allied Empire in 
Europe” — a position too preposterous to require further comment (Hume 1848b).  
 
According to Hume an Asian treaty should be of equal status to a European treaty. 
Hume considered Sattaran sovereignty as being based on the nation. This nation-based 
sovereignty meant that it should be considered equal to any European sovereignty. 
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Hume had taken the emerging idea of the nation from European politics and 
transplanted it as a social political belief into an Asian context. In doing so, he saw 
colonial wars as struggles of national liberation, in the same vein as the 1848 struggles 
within Europe. Hume’s campaign lasted for most of 1848, but the tone of his arguments 
gained increased nationalistic tones after the revolutions of 1848. Hume may have been 
making links of association between the revolutions in continental Europe and the 
colonial wars in Asia. At the very least, Hume’s focus on national liberation was 
indicative of the extent to which the nation had been naturalized within British political 
thinking as a concept in its own right.  
 
The nation was being accepted as a natural cultural fact. In Joseph Hume’s political 
arguments, the nation was no longer dependent on pre-modern imagery of the barbarian. 
The nation stood as a cultural-political entity in its own right. It was distinctly different 
to ideas of order and civilization. Those earlier cultural ideas of civilization and 
barbarism are missing in Hume’s arguments. Hume saw nations and sovereignty as the 
dominant theme. However, the image of savagery and barbarism had not totally 
disappeared from Hume’s campaigns. Hume reintroduced the themes of civilization and 
barbarism as a critique of Empire and James Brooks campaigns in Sarawak.  
 
Independent Tribal Nations in the Thoughts of the Anti-Colonial, Liberal 
Imperialists 
 
Hume assumed the naturalness of the nation and excluded barbarism from the nation. In 
doing so, Hume was also assumed that nations had rights; and that these rights were 
universally applied to Europe and Asia. In defending the rights of Sattara against 
European aggression and colonization, Hume was linking into a general reflective 
criticism on the course of British colonialism. Hume’s arguments were not dissimilar to 
those made by John Crawfurd or by James Brooke.  
 
Brooke was scathing of the methods and effects of European colonialism, asking the 
provocative question: “have any people ever been so civilized, especially where the 
difference of colour stamps a mark of inextinguishable distinction between the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
135 Mountstuart Elphinstone was the Resident of Poonah at the beginning of the Mahratta wars (The 
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governing and the governed?” (Brooke 1848i: 66) Brooke firmly rooted rights to self-
government within the nation, claiming that “National independence is essential to the 
first dawn of political institutions” (Brooke 1848i: 67). National independence was tried 
to political institutions, but Brooke was particular in his discussion of political 
institutions, limiting them to institutions that show the “glimmer of elective 
government, the acknowledged rights of citizenship, and the liberal spirit” (Brooke 
1848i: 66). In tying political institutions to “elective government” and “rights” Brooke 
was linking into the themes of British historiography on the nation, independence and 
the empire that were outlined in Chapter Two of this thesis. The trope that marked 
Enlightenment history saw the “nations of the East” as barbaric and despotic, and 
distinctly different from the nations of Europe that were formed by individuals. Both 
groups were the decedents of barbarians, but Asia produced despotism, in comparison 
Europe produced individuality and self-government. The uneasy logic of this trope was 
that all nations were products of barbarians, but only European exceptionalism had 
produced modern liberal-democratic nations. By comparison, Asia was engulfed in the 
unchanging, ahistorical and circular pattern of ancient despotic nations. Brooke spoke to 
this belief and based his theory of the nation and self-determination on it.  
 
Brooke made the distinction between a nation and state, commenting that “Is it not as 
necessary for states, as for individuals, to form a distinctive character?” For “The 
vassalage of the mass, like the dependence of a single mind, may form a yielding, 
pliant, and even able character; but, like wax, it retains one impression only, to be 
succeeded by the next which shall be given” (Brooke 1848i: 67). This was the circular 
argument that encompassed liberal ideas of the nation (that were explored in Chapter 
Two and Three). A national character defined the existence of a nation, however a 
despotic state could not be considered a nation for the population was suppressed, and 
not independent of the Government, “depriving them of all that stimulus which leads to 
the independence of communities” (Brooke 1848i: 67). Brooke spoke to a liberal belief 
that connected the nation to civil society and liberalism, which (as explored in Chapter 
Three), was a dominant theme in British political thought.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Banffshire Journal 1858: 10).  
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Like Edward Gibbon and John Stuart Mill, Brooke looked to ancient Rome to explain 
this idea of the nation: “Has any European nation ever been civilized by this process? I 
know of none. The downfall of Rome was the first dawn of liberty to her conquered 
provinces; and what struggles, what bloodshed, what civil wars, what alternate 
advancement and retrogression, have marked the strife of liberty in our own country!” 
(Brooke 1848i: 67) The nation is being defined in opposition to empire; with empire 
being despotism, which nations need to resist in constant struggle of bloodshed. The 
logic of the barbarian freedom weaves through Brooke’s reasoning; and the downfall of 
Rome, bloodshed and civil war all speak of resistance to authority. This barbarian 
resistance was “absolutely necessary to the development of freedom” and therefore the 
nation (Brooke 1848i: 67). Brooke continued his dialogue maintaining that “any other 
mode, any patent means, is but reducing a people from a bad state to a worse, and, 
whilst offering protection and food, depriving them of all that stimulus which leads to 
the independence of communities” (Brooke 1848i: 67). Brooke was adamant, the nation 
could not be forged through the state; it had to develop in resistance to the state and as 
an expression of collective individuality.  
 
Brooke argued that empire and European colonialism were the twin evils of the world. 
The history of European engagement with the world was “but a record of horrors from 
which the human mind revolts”. Brooke (1848i: 67-68) continues: 
 
We have the picture of innocent, and of comparatively happy, nations — nations prosperous and 
hospitable, confiding in the honour and integrity of Europeans. We seek them and they are no 
more. These nations have been extirpated; their arts, their very language, lost in the march of this 
monster colonisation which is to confer every benefit.  
 
Brooke saw the pattern as being the same in every continent, with engagement in 
Southeast Asia being no exception: 
 
The first voyagers from the West found the natives rich and powerful, with strong established 
governments, and a thriving trade with all parts of the world. The rapacious European has 
reduced them to their present condition. Their governments have been broken up; the old states 
decomposed by treachery, by bribery, and intrigue; their possessions wrested from them under 
flimsy pretences; their trade restricted, their vices encouraged, their virtues repressed, and their 
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energies paralysed or rendered desperate, till there is every reason to fear the gradual extinction 
of the Malay races (Brooke 1848i: 69). 
 
Based on outlining these crimes of colonization, Brooke peppered his journals (1848) 
and his latter published letters (1853) with calls for native independence and a general 
resistance to empire. He argued that “national independence … can only be effected in 
two ways: first, by the amalgamation of two races, the governing and the governed; or, 
secondly, by the expulsion of the former”. Brooke was grounding the logic of the nation 
to race, but he was also naturalising the modern themes of one race one government. 
Although Brooke allowed for the prospect of hierarchically multicultural society with 
the “amalgamation of two races, the governing and the governed”, Brooke concluded 
this was not possible with modern European colonization, commenting: “In the case of 
the dark races, the latter is the only alternative; and anybody who may not like this 
philosophy, must go to the Penny Cyclopedia, and look for one suited to his taste” 
(Brooke 1848i: 67-68). 
 
Brooke (1848i: 71) concluded his attack on European colonialism by stating:  
 
I think that, however strong the present prepossessions they will shake the belief in the 
advantages to be gained by European ascendancy as it has heretofore been conducted, and will 
convince the most sceptical of the miseries immediately and prospectively flowing from 
European rule, as generally Constituted 
 
Brooke talked the talk of an anti-imperialist. Throughout his works he expunges his 
liberal credentials, outlining policies to end slavery, end piracy and headhunting, limit 
the effects of European colonialism and introduce liberal institutions. In this regard, 
Brooke was following in the long line of liberal radicals who wrote on Southeast Asia; 
these includ William Marsden, Stamford Raffles, John Crawfurd, and John Anderson. 
Each of these radicals had proclaimed the evils of European colonialism in Southeast 
Asia, yet each of them was a colonial official and all actively propagated the empire.  
 
Critically reflecting on this tradition of scholarship and anti-colonial rhetoric by the 
‘Great Men’ of colonial Southeast Asia, John Turnbull Thomson (1865: xiii) 
commented:  
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It is dangerous to oppose the judgment of such a man; yet, on a very material point I am constrained 
to differ from him. Crawfurd, like most covenanted servants of the late East India Company, dilated 
much on the “intemperance”, “avarice”, “rapacity”, “violence”, and “injustice” of Europeans in 
India, — these Europeans in India being no other than his own countrymen. Forty years ago it was 
considered to be true policy on the part of the monopolizing East India Company to vilify their 
country-men, and exclude them. This subject is so closely connected with my present theme, that, in 
mentioning Crawfurd, I could not avoid noticing it. During my longs residence in the East, I 
observed many and long-continued examples of the above artificial prejudices, practically carried 
out.  
 
Thomson was writing after the East India Company had been disbanded and its territory 
and assets transferred to the crown. Thomson ([1864] 1984, 1865) was overwhelmingly 
in favour of this, he wanted a real cosmopolitan empire devoted to improving the lives 
of everybody involved. His critique of the ‘Great Men’ was that they were part of “a 
‘closed civil service’” that represented a “pampered aristocracy of employés”. 
According to Thomson, the fact that each of these writers favoured limited engagement 
between the Asian peoples and Europeans was merely a mechanism to defend their 
pecuniary interests.  
 
Thomson was arguing that company protectionism was defended by structuring the 
empire around nations and as a defence of nations. Each of these ‘Great Men’ 
commented on the disastrous effect of integrated hierarchical colonization for the 
subjected. Each of these writers was also engaged with ethnology and readily mused 
about the possibility of strengthening Asian nations. Therefore (as argued in Chapter 
Five), the geography and structure of the East India Company necessitated a focus on 
the nation, however Thomson’s critique can be taken further. John Stuart Mill (as 
explored in Chapter Two) was also an East India Company official. Mill, like the ‘Great 
Men’ of Southeast Asia was also critical of the practices of colonialism and favoured a 
disengaged empire. If this empire existed at all, Mill ([1861] 1998: 461) argued that it 
needed to be “govern[ed] through a delegated body, of a comparatively permanent 
character; allowing only a right of inspection, and a negative voice, to the changeable 
Administration of the State”. Mill ([1861] 1998: 461) argued that the East India 
Company was “such a body” and that “England and India will pay a severe penalty” for 
disbanding the company. Mill believed in a body of orientalist experts that understood 
the society they were governing. Rather than propagating philosopher kings, Mill 
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believed in propagating philosopher civil servants that were removed from democratic 
scrutiny and could structure their governance of Asia around the notion of native 
independence. Raffles, Crawfurd and Brooke all express similar sentiments. Therefore, 
although the were proselytizing the language of self-determination, their meaning was a 
very limited self-determination within a technocratic laissez-fair empire.  
 
Mill, Raffles, Crawfurd and Brooke appear to subscribe to the same political values as 
Hume and the Cobdenite radicals, and were expressing similar sentiments. On his return 
from Asia and pursing a platform of liberal radicalism, Crawfurd ran for the House of 
Common twice; he failed both times. Despite this similarity in views there were major 
differences between the British radicals from Southeast Asia and the parliamentary 
radicals in Britain. This distinction would emerge around the accountability of empire, 
and was manifest as opposition to Brooke’s private anti-colonial imperial campaign in 
Sarawak.  
 
Empire as the Source of Barbarism and the Naturalness of Nations 
 
James Brooke’s zeal in suppressing resistance in the name of the British Empire was 
subject to a mixed response back in the imperial centre. Popular opinion was 
overwhelmingly behind Brooke. Brooke and his officers published a steady stream of 
volumes accounting for their escapades in bringing order to Borneo. This was a 
publicity blitz, and initially it served Brooke well. He gained a knighthood and access to 
state support for his private campaigns. These accounts also revealed a dark side to 
empire-building in Borneo. Captain Rodney Mundy’s edited version of Brooke’s 
journals gave accounts of battles between James Brooke’s forces and the Pirates and 
Dyak head-hunters. To Joseph Hume and other liberal radicals these campaigns were 
more like massacres.  
 
The incident that sparked the challenge to Brooke’s civilizational crusade was when 
“500 Dyaks of Sarabes and Sakarrans” were “put to death on the night of the 31st of 
July, 1849, by the ships of war under the command of Captain Farquhar, R.N., and by 
the natives of Sarawak, under command of Sir J. Brooke”. Hume argued that these 
Dyaks were “not sea pirates” as Brooke maintained and therefore “ought not to have 
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been massacred under the vague allegation that they were so” (Hume 1852: 6). Hume 
raised questions about what civilization and order represented under an empire. 
Reminiscent of Edmund Burke’s campaign to bring Warren Hastings to account in 
India, Joseph Hume used parliament to question the validity of Brooke’s claims to bring 
civilization to Borneo. Brooke’s allies responded in the popular Press, attacking Hume’s 
humanity for questioning the civilising role of empire and also questioned his 
patriotism. Hume (1852: 8) responded in kind with blunt questioning of Brooke’s 
humanity: 
 
The charges against Sir James Brooke are, that he instigated a powerful naval force to destroy 
with grape shot, rockets, and paddle wheels, many hundred pitiful and helpless Dyaks, described 
by himself as destitute of fire-arms, and running off and disappearing at the sound of a single 
musket-shot, he himself being the first person that ever charged the Dyaks with or suspected 
them of piracy in the source of more than three centuries; that he pursued the Dyaks in question 
into their rivers for many miles—the very rivers in which he had himself been by his own 
showing most kindly and hospitably received not very long before, and that subsequently the 
force under his directions burnt and destroyed their villages, their fishing boats, their provisions, 
fruit trees, and their cultivation; and, finally, that he has perseveringly attempted to confound 
these unhappy Dyaks with Llanuns, Soolos, and other notorious pirates of the Eastern seas, 
consisting of tribes differing from the Dyaks in language, manners, and state of civilization. 
 
Brooke had unleashed a “mournful catastrophe” in “Borneo” for “political advantage”. 
Brooke’s arguments on civilization were “a system of mystification” that muddied the 
reality of “affairs in Borneo” (Hume 1852: 8). Hume argued that these were not 
barbarian pirates, but “weak savages” that had been “slaughtered under the allegation 
that they were pirates” (Hume 1852: 8). Hume charged Brooke with giving 
contradictory descriptions of the “Borneans”; always in terms convenient to his wider 
political needs. Those against him were “pirates” whilst those in favour of Brooke were 
a “free people” who chose Brooke as their “own form of Government” (Hume 1852: 3). 
Hume questioned this “free people” argument on multiple grounds: “it may be worth 
while to remark, that the free people who are thus represented as choosing their own 
form of Government, and Sir James Brooke, an alien in colour, language, manners, and 
religion, for their ruler, are thus depicted in his printed diary as: … ‘children of a larger 
growth… [whose] rulers are perfectly unacquainted with Europeans, being educated, or 
rather brought up, in a way which renders it a matter of astonishment that they should 
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be some of them so good as they are”. Hume showed the poverty of imperial language 
which moved easily from the ‘free barbarian’ to the ‘savage’ and finally to the 
‘irrational child’. Hume showed the political convenience, meaninglessness and 
ultimatel inhumanity of such arguments. 
 
Rather than the Dyaks being the pirates, Hume argued that charges of criminality could 
be levelled at Brooke. For Brooke “obtained possession of … Sarawak by an 
unmistakeable threat of violence” (Hume 1852: 4). And Brooke “guided Her Majesty’s 
squadron to attack the capital of the chief native Prince in Borneo, at whose Court he 
was Her Majesty’s Representative, and drove the Prince in question into the jungle”. In 
doing so, Hume argued, Brooke broke British and “International law”, for as an 
ambassador he was coordinating in hostile actions. “Sir James Brooke seized the 
opportunity of the Sultan’s distress, to wrest from him a new grant of the territory of 
Sarawak, absolving himself from the payment of a previously stipulated annual tribute 
of 2000 dollars” (Hume 1852: 22). Hume was challenging the imperial conception of 
civilization and humanity. Hume argued that Brooke, as a “public official”, could be 
held to account on the grounds of irresponsible governance. Throughout his attack on 
Brooke, Hume has a subtle dependence on the principle of nationality and the 
sovereignty of the nation. To Hume, the Dyak ‘pirates’ needed to be seen as patriots: 
 
I believe the Dyaks are men who boldly defended their native soil against the lawless ambition 
of Sir James Brooke, until they were overpowered and destroyed by the superior force of Her 
Majesty’s and the East India Company’s naval forces (Hume 1852: 50).  
 
By 1853, Hume was in ill-health and died of heart failure on 20 February 1855. But his 
defence of non-European nations did not die with him. Richard Cobden and John Bright 
also championed the rights of nations as part of their free market liberal 
internationalism. In a letter to John Bright, Richard Cobden gave a scathing 
commentary on Brooke’s escapades in Borneo, stating:  
 
You must get Captain Mundy’s edition of ‘Brooke’s Diary’ … There are details of bloodshed 
and executions which, if they had appeared in the first volume, would have checked the 
sentimental mania which gave Brooke all his powers of evil … It shocks me to think what 
fiendish atrocities may be committed by English arms without rousing any conscientious 
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resistance at home, provided they be only far enough off, and the victims too feeble to trouble us 
with their remonstrances or groans (Cobden 1881ii: 55-56).  
 
Cobden saw empire as the corruptor, but he was also well aware of the emergence of 
imperial nationalism. As a result, Cobden argued that “we as a nation have an awful 
retribution in store for us if Heaven strikes a just reckoning, as I believe it does, for 
wicked deeds even in this world” (Cobden 1881ii: 56). Like Hume, Cobden was critical 
of what he saw as fake humanitarianism. Brooke’s arguments of empire, as protection, 
which justified overwhelming retribution against indigenous resistance was hypocrisy. 
Cobden stated: “There must be a public and solemn protest against the wholesale 
massacre. The Peace Society and the Aborigines Society are shams if such deeds go 
unrebuked” (Cobden 1881ii: 56). Both Cobden and Brooke claimed the anti-colonial 
moral-high-ground, but both saw it from a very different perspective. Cobden’s 
accusation that the ‘Peace Society and the Aborigines Society are shams’ was testament 
to a new form of anti-colonial critique. In this critique (unlike the civilizational critique 
that legitimized people like Brooke) Hume, Cobden and Bright recognized the indelible 
need for independent nations. In doing so they stripped away the contradictions of the 
British Empire, unveiling it as an inefficient mechanism of power, patronage and 
exploitation. More than this, they revealed the future of liberal internationalism. From 
Cobden onwards the nation became a key plank in British liberalism and British 
internationalism. This liberal internationalist approach had no place for the barbarian. 
The nation would stand as a cultural entity in its own right.  
 
 
Naturalising the Nation within British Internationalism 
 
A key aspect of the Cobdenite critique of empire was the fiscal irresponsibility of 
empire. Cobden’s above-criticisms of Brooke’s massacres in Borneo were private 
remarks. His private correspondence often focused on morality issues. In comparison, 
Cobden’s public arguments were rarely devoted to moralistic claims. His public 
arguments cocooned morality issues within charges of overriding fiscal ineptitude and 
complacency. Therefore, unlike Hume, Cobden would rarely make arguments based 
solely on nationhood, sovereignty or international law. Instead nationhood, sovereignty 
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and international law became necessary structures disseminating from Cobden’s (1881: 
501) arguments to fiscally constrain empire. His reasoning for this was clear: 
 
It is … my firm belief, that nothing will awaken the people of this country to a proper sense of 
their responsibility and peril in the East, but a due appreciation of the state and prospects of the 
revenue of that country. 
 
Statements such as these portray Cobden’s pessimistic view of human sympathy; 
believing that the cost of imperialism would need to materially affect the British public 
before they would do anything about it. However, Cobden (1881: 500) placed great 
faith in the power of British public opinion, arguing: 
 
With an enlightened public opinion brought to bear more directly on the affairs of India, there 
will be a better chance of avoiding that source of all fiscal embarrassment, constant wars, and 
constant annexation of territory. 
 
The debate over foreign policy was dependent on the convergence of two visions: 
public opinion and fiscal self-interest. Cobden’s use of ‘we the nation’ centred on the 
fiscal common dominator of the British public. Cobden bluntly summarized the logic of 
empire as: was it in the taxpayer’s interest to take over Asia. For Cobden, fixed borders 
that separated nations were a means of limiting the cost of expansion. In comparison to 
his belief in the fiscal logic of borders, Cobden stated “there can be no doubt that in 
India the extension of our territories is popular among the servants of the company”. 
These company servants reflected a wider “insatiable love of territorial 
aggrandisement”, the cost of which Cobden (1867ii: 102) argued “we shall probably be 
wilfully blind, until awakened from a great national illusion by some rude shock to the 
fabric of our Indian finance”. Cobden had continually argued that the fundamental 
nature of the English/British nation was that of the ‘shop keeper’ (Cobden 1867i: 125). 
This placed Cobden’s cost-benefit approach as the natural logic of English/British 
character. Although the nation disseminates as a logical consequence of Cobden’s 
thought, it is indicative of the extent of the nation’s naturalization that Cobden felt a 
need to justify his economic logic as a nationalist approach. In attempting to capture the 
nationalist high-ground, Cobden (1881: 502) presented his opponents as being 
emotional, jingoistic and fiscally irresponsible:  
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In one of the most influential organs of the Indian Government it is stated,— ‘Every one out of 
England is now ready to acknowledge that the whole of Asia, from the Indus to the Sea of 
Ochotzk, is destined to become the patrimony of that race which the Normans thought, six 
centuries ago, they had finally crushed, but which now stands at the head of European 
civilisation. We are placed, it is said, but the mysterious but unmistakable designs of Providence, 
in command of Asia; and the people of England must not lay the flattering unction to their 
should, that they can escape from the responsibility of this lofty and important position, by 
simply denouncing the means by which England has attained it.’ 
 
It is an interesting point that Cobden chose this ethnocentric statement as a testament to 
the fiscal irresponsibility of East India Company officials. This quote could have been 
at home in Robert Knox’s polemic prose. Instead, Cobden took it from the East India 
Company’s journal. The blatant overtones of racial superiority and the theme of 
conquest in English history are not what Cobden infers when he questions the 
responsibility of the Company. In the same speech on India, Cobden (1881: 507) 
himself makes racial claims stating: “the English race can never become indigenous in 
India”. Cobden’s wider writings also assumed racial connections with the landscape. 
His own travel writings on America and Europe demonstrate a connection between the 
race-nation and the landscape (Hinde 1987). In choosing an ethnocentric passage to 
represent the attitudes of the Company, Cobden showed the dangers of arguments 
dependent on national destiny. Cobden’s problem with claims about destiny can be seen 
in his quoting of Lord Dalhousie (1867ii: 103), who stated: “ ‘let us fulfil our destiny, 
which there, as elsewhere, will have compelled us forward in spite of our wishes’: or, in 
plain English, let us take the whole of Burmah, even if it should prove ruinous to our 
finances, because it is our destiny”. The irrationality lay in connecting the nation to a 
destiny of conquest: an objective that Cobden believed was fraught with long-term 
dangers and problems.  
 
Cobden’s critique of empire in India existed on two levels: responsible governance and 
a belief in indigenous rule. Cobden’s criticisms of Company officials’ desires to expand 
the borders of empire was the fulcrum of these twin critiques. For Cobden (1881: 502), 
the continued expansion of empire in India and Asia had the flow-on effect of 
underdevelopment and misuse of funds intended for India’s economic development: 
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The Court of Directors are often attacked for not making railways and works of irrigation; and I 
think they deserve the charges brought against them.… How can they be expected to make 
railways and other public works, when they cannot prevent the President of the Board of 
Control, or the Governor-General, at any time wasting the substance in war which should be 
applied to these improvements? (Cobden 1881: 502) 
 
War became the excuse for administrative incompetence. The funds that had been 
allocated for the technological transformation of India, had been used in extending the 
Company’s control of Burma as well as occupying additional principalities within India. 
The occupation of Burma itself became a focus of Cobden’s criticism. In his pamphlet 
How Wars are Got up in India (1867), Cobden reviled the integral problems of double 
government in India. India was essentially governed by two forces: the British 
Government, who controlled by the overarching Board of Control, which was secret and 
hidden behind the Court of Directors; whilst the agents of control were the company, 
who governed through the allocation of patronage. These multiple levels of government 
were used as a feeble excuse by officers to selectively disobey orders (Cobden 1867: 
99-102). In the case of Burma, it resulted in war: “Commodore Lambert, whilst owning 
no allegiance to the Government of India, made war upon the Burmese with the 
Queen’s ships without having had any orders from the British Admiralty to enter upon 
hostilities” (Cobden 1867: 100). 
  
This created a culture of expansion in Asia that was in direct contravention of a 
“resolution … that forbad the extension of … territories in tropical countries” (Cobden 
1881: 500). For Cobden, this was a total misappropriation of British funds, but more 
particularly Indian funds, for the cost of the war was born “not to us, but to the unhappy 
ryots of Hindostan” (Cobden 1867: 101). These funds should have been spent on 
“irrigation, or the facilities of communication in India”, but instead “All this money has 
been wasted, and is gone, and the people have no compensation for it” (Cobden 1881: 
506). This was an attack on the extraction of taxes from India, without serving Indian 
interests.  
 
The patronage of India … is another evil arising from the system of … government. Now, it is 
one of the evils of this system, that the patronage is in a great many instances given to 
Europeans, where it ought to be given to natives. … I want to see a large number of natives 
brought into the employment of the Government.(Cobden 1881: 503) 
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This attack on patronage (taxation) was a classic liberal claim to accountable 
government. Patronage in Cobden’s mind is not a wrong in itself, but his claim is that 
the practice of patronage verged on extraction. Cobden maintained that the East India 
Company’s patronage was public money, and should be spent in the public good. He 
saw the core problems of liberal imperialism. As an agent of empire, the East India 
Company was fulfilling its mandate of extraction. This was against the liberal principle 
of government: that government served a public purpose. A liberal empire meant that 
the empire served the interests of those who were conquered. By attacking the 
Company’s patronage, Cobden was asked the question ‘if India’s taxation was not spent 
on India, how was it serving India’s interests?’. This question attacks the fundamental 
being of empire, for Cobden was maintaining the government of India should be 
accountable to India’s interests and not to British perceptions of India’s interests (which 
was the position of Mill, Raffles, Crawfurd and Brooke).  
 
Cobden’s argument meant that the East India Company — by virtue of spending the 
money on its own aggrandizement and not spending money on public works — was 
forming a logical space for an Indian nation with self-governance. Governments became 
tied to patrons/constituents, a liberal attitude to governance dictated the government 
needed to represent these patrons/constituents. Therefore, even through banal issues 
such as employment in public office, Cobden was projecting nation as a necessary 
consequence of accountable administration.  
 
In projecting the view of accountable administration, Cobden (1881: 507) was 
presenting India as a burden on the English/British nation stating: “I am under the 
impression that, so far as the future is concerned, we cannot leave a more perilous 
possession to our children than that which we shall leave them in the constantly 
increasing territory of India.” By presenting the empire as an irresponsible burden on 
future English/British generations, Cobden presents an independent Indian nation as a 
direct consequence.  
 
The English race can never become indigenous in India; we must govern it, if we govern it at all, 
by means of a succession of transient visits; and I do not think it is for the interest of the English 
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people, any more than of the people of India, that we should govern permanently 100,000,000 
people, 12,000 miles off (Cobden 1881: 507). 
 
This vision of an independent India becomes framed within an overarching vision of 
global trade. Empire, he argued, was not a real pathway to wealth: 
  
I see no benefit which can arise to the mass of the English people from their connection with 
India, except that which may arise from honest trade; I do not see how the millions of this 
country are to share in the patronage of India, or to derive any advantage from it, except through 
the medium of trade; and therefore, I say emphatically, that if you can show me that the East 
India Company is the reality which many persons suppose it to be, I shall not be the party to 
wish to withdraw their responsible trust and place it again in the hands of a Minister of the 
British Crown (Cobden 1881: 507-508). 
 
Richard Cobden’s critique of colonialism systematically developed over the course of 
the 1850s. It had developed in response to the acts of imperial aggrandizement within 
India and Southeast Asia. In the case of Borneo and Burma the advocates of colonialism 
had used free trade and the nation as an excuse for occupation. Throughout these 
debates, Cobden, who was seen as the premier advocate of free trade, challenged the 
connection between imperialism and free trade. In doing so he was revealing the 
contradiction between liberalism and empire. Rather than bring an end to nations, 
Cobden saw independent nations as the only mechanism to pursue real ‘free trade’. 
Cobden argued that the territorial conquest of nations makes everybody worse off. It 
destroys the wealth of the conquered nation, thereby rendering it useless as a trading 
partner: 
 
Nowhere can you find such vast quantities of produce in the hands of native capitalists ready to 
meet the most sudden and extraordinary demands. Last year the silk crop failed in Europe, and 
you sent for 30,000 or 40,000 bales extra from China, and got it. How long would the native 
opulence last if we had possession of China? Look at poverty-stricken India! Compare Delhi 
with Nankin (Cobden 1857). 
 
Cobden was limiting free trade as an expansive entity, free trade could only exist 
through the independence of nations. Capital and individuality were not universal 
expansive forces, but rather forces that were locally developed and tied to local 
identities and conditions. For Cobden, free trade and empire were oxymorons to each 
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other. Their unification was purely for venal reasons, such as domestic political 
convenience or for the advancement of the careers of those on the periphery, as was 
expressed in his writings on Burma. In short it was unified for nationalist purposes, but 
it resulted in the total distortion of free trade. As Cobden was imagining a global 
economy based on civil society, he was doing so through the framework of national 
communities. These communities were an expression of local culture and local 
capitalism. Cobden’s identity was the future of liberal internationalism. He saw the 
nation as a natural cultural entity that supported capitalism, yet at the same time he saw 
nationalism as a dangerous aberration of the nation.  
 
This chapter has examined how, with the end of the slave trade and the rise of liberal 
radicalism, many radicals developed their critiques to question the economic and moral 
logic of empire. Empire became seen as a waste of money and an aberration of 
humanism, with Richard Cobden being the foremost advocate of this school of thought. 
This transition created divisions between the radical liberals on the edges of the empire 
(who could be termed anti-colonial imperialists) and the radical liberals within the 
metropole. For the radical liberals on the edges of empire, such as John Crawfurd and 
James Brooke, empire was the mechanism by which barbarians could be developed into 
nations, indigenous societies protected and liberalism could be achieved. By 
comparison, the anti-imperialism radicals from the metropole, saw the previous 
argument as an evil contradiction. For Joseph Hume, Richard Cobden and many other 
radicals, empire was the destroyer of liberalism.  
 
Richard Cobden maintained a stanch opposition to romantic nationalist causes, arguing 
that they just lead to war and conflict. Cobden’s and Hume’s opposition to Brooke’s 
romantic desires to build a modern tribal-nation in Borneo is consistent with their 
overall hostility to imperial nationalism. Cobden mounted a consistent attack on 
colonialism on the grounds that it abused the rights on non-European nations and was a 
waste of money. Joseph Hume, Richard Cobden, John Bright and a number of other 
radicals spoke-up for the rights of Asian nations against empire.  
 
These debates were indicative of the naturalization of nation that had occurred by mid-
century and how nation was challenging the course of imperialism. On both sides there 
was a recognition of the nation within political discourse. Both sides appealed to the 
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ideal of the nation. The liberals from the Asian periphery saw a need for an anti-colonial 
empire run by civil servants schooled in ethnology. For these liberal radicals the empire 
needed to manage nations. By comparison, the radical liberals from the metrople saw 
this as an imperial adventure that would not protect nations, it would destroy them. 
These debates both portray how the nation became a central aspect of social thought in 
both the metrople and periphery of the empire by the mid-nineteenth century.  

Chapter 9 – Conclusion: From the 
Barbarian to the Nation in the 
Civilising Empire 
 
 
Nations are both natural and created. They are natural because they are seen to be 
natural. It is currently impossible to imagine a nationless world without conceiving it 
through the prism of the nation. That was the problem that cosmopolitanism began to 
face in the early part of the nineteenth-century. The nation emerged within every 
sentence describing a cosmopolitan world of empires. Despite this subtle pervasiveness, 
the nation emerged during a period in which few people could conceive the totality of 
the nation. The nation emerged in a world of empires. The cosmopolitanism of empire 
would have appeared as the logical future of identity. The British identity was a creation 
of empire. As Tom Nairn (1977), Linda Colley (1992) and Krishan Kumar (2006, 2003) 
have all maintained, the national identity crisis within Britain only emerged when the 
formal colonial empire had lost its dominance. Empires are expansionary entities that 
assimilate peoples within the expanding cosmopolitanism of empire. Logically the 
cosmopolitanism of empire was suited to the expansions of modernity. Yet the reality 
was different. As the British Empire expanded, the idea of nation followed in its wake. 
This thesis has asked the question: ‘How did this occur?’ 
 
This question has been asked many times before. There is an exhaustive theoretical 
literature explaining how the nation was a result of the modern world. However, in each 
case the theoretical literature focuses on the creation of a social-political identity. The 
literature tends to skim over the question of ‘why this social-political identity was seen 
as a nation?’ In doing so, the theoretical literature focuses on the internal creation of 
identity in relation to external stimulus. Therefore, the British nation emerged out of 
struggles against external identities, namely the French and Spanish; but also internal 
identities such as the English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish. These struggles of community 
occur in the context of changing material conditions and the emergence of capitalism. 
These material forces form identities against the other. This theoretical view of the 
nation presents the nation as an emergence of internal identity. What this view doesn’t 
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answer is: ‘why was this identity considered a nation in the first place?’ In Chapter 
Two, I examined the arguments of Ernest Gellner (1964, 1983), Tom Nairn (1977, 
1997) and Benedict Anderson ([1983] 1991). Each of these theorists examined how the 
nation emerged as a cultural response to the pressures of the modern world. The work of 
each of these theorists implies an unstated question: ‘why were these cultural responses 
to modernity nations?’ Gellner, Nairn and Anderson focused on how nations were 
created, but in not asking the above question, they also assumed that the nation was 
‘natural’ — or rather, that the social-political identities hammered out on the anvil of 
modernity were naturally nations.  
 
This unexplored assumption that nations are ‘natural’ is not limited to Gellner, Nairn 
and Anderson. It is present across the theoretical and historical literature on nations and 
nationalism studies. This creates problems. How can the nation be ‘natural’ when the 
literature maintains that nations are modern constructs? The argument in this thesis was 
that the nation underwent a process of naturalization. It is this process of naturalization 
that has given the nation its contradictory character: being a primordial identity that was 
a modern construction. It is this naturalization that allows the nation to encompass 
ancient traditions that were reconceived as modern inventions. Naturalization allows for 
the time and space contradictions within the nation.  
 
For the nation to be assumed to be natural, it had to be global. By this I mean that the 
nation was, and is, seen as a global phenomenon and that the world was/is divided into 
nations. Or to put it another way: for one nation to exist, many nations have to exist. For 
the nation to be naturalized as an internal sense of identity, it also had to be seen as a 
global sense of identity.  
 
I have argued that this naturalization can be seen as an ideological process, with 
ideology being the mechanism by which we assume an idea to be natural common 
sense; and therefore unquestioned. The natural reality that nations exist emerged largely 
without being questioned. Theorists and historians of ideas have often been perplexed 
by the fact that nineteenth-century theorists didn’t fathom the constructedness of the 
nation. A classic example is Karl Marx, who could develop a theory that, at least in one 
rendition, reduced everything to the means and mode of production, yet who 
unquestionably used the nation as a basic social structure. Although Marx is a graphic 
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example, liberal and conservative writers all showed signs of both transcending and 
collapsing into the nation.  
 
The failure of early social theorists to understand the constructedness of the nation is a 
testament to the processes by which the nation became naturalized. The nation emerged 
in every aspect of social thought. This is not to say that the emergence of nations was 
not reflected upon. Chapters Two, Three, and Four expand on how in the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth centuries’ social theorists often reflected upon the construction of 
nations. These writers were actively engaged in responding to, whilst also developing, 
the modern nation. This occurred in multiple areas of social thought. Liah Greenfeld 
(1993, 2003) had argued that it was a key component of early modern political thought. 
Her argument is that the nation emanated out of struggle for popular sovereignty in 
seventeenth-century Britain. This is a strong and provocative argument, but it blurs the 
distinction between liberalism and nationalism. Certainly the issue of Protestant Britain 
verses Catholic Europe was instrumental in defining the British as a separate identity to 
Europe. In addition, the struggles between king and parliament established an idea of 
popular sovereignty. However, although these issues feed into the nation, it is hard to 
argue that the nation is the key aspect of these struggles. And we are still left with the 
question ‘why was this a nation?’ These struggles show that key themes in the nation 
were emerging, but these were not distinct from other political and ideological 
movements.  
 
Within these transformations was an overlaying discourse between civilization and 
barbarism. One of the earliest forms of political theory was that of order and chaos 
(expanded in Chapter Two). The ancient and medieval ideas of society and politics were 
based in this binary logic. Order emerged with empire, and empire was expansionary. 
Chaos existed outside of empire; and in terms of identity politics, this distinction 
between order and chaos was often manifested in the barbarian. The empire 
encompassed civilization and stability. The barbarian existed on the periphery and 
lacked civilization. Although different nuances existed, this was a core distinction in 
most empires. There, the ‘other’ was a very simplistic term that related to whether or 
not an individual accepted and was included in the civilization of the expanding empire. 
Empires were relatively inclusive. People became Roman if they adopted Roman attire 
and a Roman way of life. By comparison, the barbarian remained on the outside, 
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speaking an incomprehensible language and worshiping strange gods. Above all, the 
barbarian did not have order. In the nineteenth-century understanding of Roman terms, 
the barbarian had freedom without civilization.  
 
It was this distinction between the barbarian and civilization that fed into early 
conceptions of the nation. As J. G. A. Pocock (1999) maintains, the birth of 
historiography in Europe faced problems. How can the past fit within the narrative of, 
the then, contemporary politics? Europe was expanding and meeting the savage. Ronald 
Meek has maintained that the idea of the savage was crucial in the development of 
modern social thought. In basic terms, Europe emerged with the destruction of the 
Roman Empire. Their own medieval histories pointed to the social origins of European 
states emerging from the barbarian hoards that overran the Roman Empire. European 
historiography became quite distinct from its Ancient counterparts. In most instances, 
ancient empires linked their past to a mythical law-giver. Therefore in historiographical 
terms, ancient empires were born out of order. By comparison, Europe was born out of 
the chaos of the barbarian.  
 
Chapters Two and Three examined how early modern historians began writing the 
histories of Europe back to the barbarian tribes. European history had an affinity with 
the savage that Europeans were encountering in other parts of the world. In Britain the 
affinity was even closer. Eighteenth-century Scottish philosophers knew that tribal 
(clan) society had ended in the highlands of Scotland only a few generations earlier, and 
remnants could still be found in the late-eighteenth century.  
 
However, as Chapter Three demonstrated, the savage was distinctly different from the 
barbarian. The savage was a creation of modern social thought (Pocock 2005:  2-3). In 
comparison to the savage, the barbarian descended back in the tomes of the ancient 
authors, and therefore, the barbarian was a link from the ancient world to the modern 
world. The barbarian was a cultural link back to a mythical time. Although British 
history had mythical law-givers, such as King Arthur (who fought the barbarian 
invaders); in practice, British historical narrative went back to the barbarian invasions 
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that ‘wiped out’ the Romano-Celts — and therefore Arthur’s legacy.136 The political 
revolutions of the time began to base political claims on the ‘Ancient’ or ‘Gothic 
Constitution’ of the barbarians. Lacking order, the barbarian had freedom. The 
barbarian origins of British intuitions inferred traditional rights. Early liberalism began 
harking back to the primordial tradition.  
 
The idea, that the barbarian founded institutions meant that the barbarian did not die. 
Instead the barbarian moved through history. Rather than being defined against 
barbarians, eighteenth and nineteenth-century Britain became the product of the 
barbarian. This created a unique trajectory to the past, in which tribalism was brought 
forward into modern political discourse. In historical narrative these barbarian 
institutions were the foundations of European nations. The barbarian provided a means 
of conceiving ethnicity within social theory.  
 
A key aspect of this social theory was the market (expanded in Chapter Three). Markets 
transformed the barbarian from the unordered lover of freedom to the risk-taking 
capitalist. The key aspect of this was civil society. Barbarian freedom created civil 
society; and in doing so, society became distinctly different to the state. As a founding 
force in civil society, the barbarian brought forward ancient traditions into the modern 
commercial world. The barbarian became drawn into a theory of renewal. Nineteenth-
century ideas on liberty saw the barbarian as bringing renewal to tired systems of 
empire. Nations, being products of barbarians, maintained an internal system of 
renewal.  
 
This early economic writing was not limited to the inherent barbarian who had been 
culturally brought forward. Chapter Three examined arguments on the role of markets 
in shaping a national character. Character became a response to material conditions. 
Material conditions were a product of the landscape; therefore the landscape shaped the 
national character. This type of reasoning within political economy grounded the nation 
within particular territories. But it also created another sense of renewal. For capitalist 
political economy could act as a new mechanism of renewal, avoiding the long-
                                                          
136 This narrative has dominated British historiography since the end of the Dark Ages. Ironically 
archaeologists are now disputing the concept of the barbarian invasion, arguing there is no archaeological 
evidence for it (Pryor 2005).  
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extended process of barbarian destruction and renewal. Free markets allowed the 
internal barbarian to flourish. At face value, free markets held the promise of global 
cosmopolitanism and would wipe away the idea of the nation. Individualism could reign 
supreme. Logically mercantilism was the propagator of the nation, by connecting the 
state to economy and therefore society; mercantilism did feed into economic 
nationalism, yet free-market liberalism also strengthened the role of nations. 
Structurally there was no necessity for the nation within free-market liberalism. Yet the 
language of free-market liberalism reaffirmed the nation. It is a demonstration of the 
extent to which laissez-fare liberalism naturalized the nation. Therefore, liberal political 
economists preached the expansiveness of markets and argued that these open markets 
supported nations.  
 
Whilst advocates of laissez-faire were imagining the barbarian nation within the 
marketplace, the biological idea of race was also emerging from the logic of liberalism 
and the barbarian, as explained in Chapter Four. Racial theory was heavily dependent 
on liberal ideas of education and political economy. Early ideas of biological change 
depended on material characteristics of the landscape. Lifestyle and mechanisms of 
survival in a landscape shaped a person’s biology. Changes in landscape and work 
practices were woven, over time, into peoples’ biology. These ideas were streamlined 
into early evolutionary theory. These initial evolutionary ideas followed the Lockean 
idea of education, wherein the body and mind responded to external stimulus. These 
early ideas of biological change conceived of new ways in understanding time and 
history. Biology was fed into the historical narrative. In feeding biology into history, 
heritage became inherently collective and primordial. This had major political 
ramifications. If communities were biologically connected, ideas of a social contract 
appeared misplaced. Blood and biology defined a society and not laws.  
 
From the 1870s, racial science was closely connected to the politics of slavery. Racial 
science legitimized and emphasized human differences. These differences were either 
ordained by God or descended into the mist of time. The connections between race and 
nation were obvious. Beyond the focus of white and black, race was used to describe 
national differences. During the late-eighteenth, and for most of the nineteenth-century, 
the words ‘race’ and ‘nation’ were used interchangeably. Yet race grounded identity 
firmly in biology in a way that the nation could never do. By the 1840s, advocates of 
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racial science began moving beyond the politics of slavery, and focused on biological 
explanations of social issues. By 1850, Robert Knox proclaimed that “race in human 
affairs is everything”. Most social theorists employed race, in varying degrees, as a 
means of understanding politics: John Stuart Mill is a classic example, using race to 
explain the European revolutions of 1848 (Varouxakis 1998). In this capacity he was 
only marginally different to Robert Knox who also explained these nationalist 
revolutions as racial wars of liberation.  
 
For Knox and other racial theorists (examined in Chapter Four), inter-racial war was a 
primal instinct. His account of the European races was based on historical beliefs about 
the barbarian hordes from Northern Europe. Knox made suppositions about their 
barbarian characteristics and superimposed them on to the cultural nation. Therefore the 
cultural nation became the racial barbarian. For Knox, democracy and political 
ideologies were pre-ordained by race. Therefore, Anglo-Saxons had a democracy 
because their barbarian psyche demanded freedom. In comparison the Celts required the 
despotic brutal authority of a tribal warlord. Extreme racial theory saw the racial 
barbarian as being at the heart of the nation. The racial-barbarian was the source of 
national unity. In fulfilling innate racial desires, Knox and other racial theorists brushed 
aside arguments about civilization and ethics. This legitimized all actions of 
imperialism as the fulfilment of the barbarian character.  
 
Although influential, Robert Knox was an outsider and on the extreme end of racial 
science. But his ideas reflected the changing beliefs of the time. Charles Darwin ([1879] 
2004, [1859] 2003) represents the other side of the racial science spectrum. Unlike 
many of his followers, such as Herbert Spencer ([1874] 1884), Darwin did not attribute 
everything to biology. The ‘survival of the fittest’ mantra didn’t sit easily with Darwin. 
In the Decent of Man ([1879] 2004), he saw that nations were more cultural (he referred 
to culture as art) than biological. Knox made no attempt to understand the difference 
between culture and biology. He effectively made culture biological, and, therefore, 
innate. Darwin on the other hand understood there were clear differences. He saw 
nations as being historical constructions, yet he also argued they were still subject to the 
laws of natural selection. He argued that humans had evolved culture as a survival 
mechanism. Therefore, culture was subject to the pressures of materialism. Darwin also 
argued that the barbarian was brought forward through time. He saw patriotism as the 
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core of group cohesion. Successful patriotism moved from the savage barbarian to the 
civilized nation. Patriotism was moulded by the processes of art in natural selection. 
Darwin continually goes back to the nation, and struggles to develop a biological 
understanding of change outside of the nation.  
 
Race gave the barbarian a new lease of life. It reintroduced beliefs about a primordial 
core at the heart of the nation. However, by the mid-ninetieth century the nation had 
become a natural reality in people’s lives. It had become integrated into multiple aspects 
of social thought. It became impossible to conceive of society without responding to the 
nation. Between the late-eighteenth century and mid-nineteenth century the nation 
became the accepted means of understanding European societies. Through political 
economy and racial science, the nation had gained a greater meaning. The nation had 
absorbed the barbarian pre-history of Europe. Through the barbarian, the nation gained 
a primordial past. Although the barbarian nation was a link to the past, it also became a 
focus of modern exceptionalism. Modern nations were imagined as dramatically 
different to the ancient empires and civilizations of the past. The barbarian tribalism of 
the modern nation created a greater sense of an ethnic core and exclusivity. This meant 
that the nation had a primordial past, whilst also being a conjunctional brake with the 
past. The nation was modern, yet it had a history.  
 
Part Two of this thesis examined how the modern primordial and racial nation emerged 
in a global context. The nation was not just a matter of self-realization; it was expressed 
globally within the expansion of empire. This global expansion of nations allowed for 
the internal expression of the nation. Southeast Asia is a case example of how the nation 
became naturalized within the grammar of empire. The nation was imagined on multiple 
levels. Chapter Five examined how national identity emerged structurally as the 
legitimization of British rule. The British transplanted their nationality into indigenous 
hierarchies of order. British officials were distinguished by their nationality not their 
social status. This expansion of empire initially occurred as a mercantilist enterprise. A 
key aspect of this expansion was the idea of sovereignty and ownership of territory and 
trading rights. This was a brutal system of imperialism that directly attacked Southeast 
Asian societies and systems of power. Chapters Five and Six examined how a British 
free-trade critique of mercantilism emerged in the early-nineteenth century. These 
arguments drew on Adam Smith’s ([1776] 1981) criticism of mercantilism in the 
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Wealth of Nations. In critiquing mercantilism, a new form of empire was proposed. One 
based on civilization rather than criminal extraction. These arguments were advanced by 
colonial officials such as Stamford Raffles (1835, [1817] 1965), William Marsden 
([1811] 1966), John Crawfurd (1828, 1820, 1829) and James Brooke (Brooke 1853, 
Mundy 1848). These arguments were also promoted in popular travel-writing on 
Southeast Asia from the early to mid-nineteenth century. They advocated that a real 
empire, based on civilization, be established. But this claim to civilization occurred in 
the name of the nation.  
 
There were three aspects to this proposed British Empire in Southeast Asia: native 
rights, commerce and a form of imperial cosmopolitanism that recognized ethnological 
differences. These three issues were based around the question of legitimacy. Raffles 
and Crawfurd both imagined an empire that was legitimized on the grounds of liberal 
ideology. Implicit within their arguments was a belief that empire needed to improve 
peoples’ lives. Both Raffles and Crawfurd wrote about Southeast Asian nations; 
however they both discounted the legitimacy of these nations. According to these 
colonial intellectuals, these nations had been corrupted by their own native elites. 
Chapter Six examined how these nations were seen as having become barbaric and had 
fallen from their previous status of civilization. This fall from grace was analysed 
through political economy. The mode of production in Southeast Asia had corrupted the 
elite, and had recreated a sense of barbarism, with piracy and slave-like labour 
conditions replacing real commerce. This barbarism destroyed freedom. It was not the 
destructively invigorating barbarism, similar to that at end of the Roman Empire; rather, 
it was merely a destructive form of barbarism.  
 
The barbarian was increasingly seen as a European. Southeast Asia had savages that 
lived in a state of barbarism, or degenerate nations that had reverted to barbarism; but 
rarely were these people directly called barbarians. Barbarism was the universal 
condition. Therefore the Malays, in practicing piracy and running amok, were exercising 
the barbaric love of freedom but were excluded from the privileges of being barbarians. 
Running amok was the ultimate act of individuality against the collective, that last 
throw of the dice before inevitable destruction. Although the Malay was barbarian-like, 
his barbarism was portrayed as somehow different. By the 1860s, Crawfurd’s (1863, 
1861) racial writing emphasized the Teutonic aspect of the barbarian. This was a subtle 
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distinction that marked the European as different to other peoples of the world. Yet, at 
the same time, the same meanings about the barbarian were carried forward. The 
barbaric character of the Malays and the Dayak savages of Borneo were discussed as 
core characteristics of these nations. This distinction emphasized European difference, 
but at the same time transplanted the idea of ethnicity. Equally, Chapter Severn 
explained how barbarism was a deep-rooted primordial sense of cultural conditioning; 
that, in trying to reform it, empire faced an uphill battle.  
 
Raffles, Marsden, Crawfurd and Brooke all argued that empire should be the means of 
reforming these divergent characteristics. Although this argument legitimized empire, 
by transcending the nation, it did so by justifying the transcendence in the name of 
correcting the divergent barbarian nations of Southeast Asia. Therefore in developing an 
empire (based on civilization versus barbarism) the nation was naturalized within 
civilization and barbarism.  
 
Early advocates of an empire, based on civilization in Southeast Asia, projected entrepôt 
cosmopolitanism. The proposed mechanism of reform in Southeast Asian was an open 
commercial system based on a series of entrepôts. These entrepôts would allow an 
empire of trade to emerge, whilst also preventing the mercantilist slide to territorial 
control that would harm nations. These entrepôts would become focal points of 
commercial success. Their open free status would mean that native traders would flock 
to these ports. In flocking to these ports, the natives would experience a higher culture, 
and civilization would permeate throughout the archipelago. Singapore became the 
centre-point of this cosmopolitan project of reform. Once established, practical 
problems emerged. The barbarian actions of Malay pirates, recalcitrant Malay 
aristocrats, and perceived native laziness, as well as inter-European rivalry, and ancient 
imperial nationalism, all curtailed the success of the entrepôt vision. To fulfil this vision 
of liberal civilization, advocates such as James Brooke focused on direct territorial 
control and (repressive measures against any resistance), this is explained in Chapter 
Eight. Brooke represented the practical imperium to the early vision of Raffles and 
Crawfurd.  
 
Brooke’s actions showed the limits of cosmopolitanism. Barbarism was named and 
identified at the limits of inclusiveness. But in doing so, the nation was being projected 
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on to the outsiders. This distinction was noted by the emerging liberal internationalists. 
Joseph Hume and Richard Cobden argued that what Brooke described as ‘pirates’ could 
also be seen as legitimate patriots defending their homelands. Hume, Cobden and other 
liberal radicals revealed the problems with a liberal empire. Proponents of empire had 
established the primacy of liberal civilization. The liberal parliamentary radicals were 
revealing the hypocrisy of this position. If liberal empire was established on the grounds 
of developing nations through individualism, the nation and individual patriotism 
became core values. When people expressed these values by resisting the liberal empire, 
a crisis in legitimacy emerged that reduced the empire to nothing more than a venal 
institution for extraction. Although the liberal radicals were in no position to end the 
empire, and many of them were far from realising that conclusion themselves, they were 
expressing the nation as a global natural reality. They were moving from 
cosmopolitanism to internationalism.  
 
Richard Cobden certainly made this transition. For him free trade could not be 
supported by military strength. Cobden’s criticism of the Burma campaign aimed at the 
cost of such escapades versus the returns. Although he publicly focused on the cost-
benefits of imperialism, his private letters reveal a humanitarian impost. Cobden was 
recognising nations in Asia as being culturally significant in their own right, and that 
empire was a destructive force against the nation. By the 1860s the nation stood as a 
cultural entity in its own right. John Stuart Mill published his chapter on nationality as 
the basis of self-government in 1861. His chapter was future-oriented. Many of the 
examples he cited, like the Italian nationality, were a work in progress. Nationality was 
the future condition of representative government. Mill ([1861] 1998: 432) argued that 
representative free institutions needed to based on nationality. Yet at the same time, as 
he preached the rise of nationality, Mill lamented the fall of the barbarian. Although his 
work on the nation was future-orientated, Mill’s writings on barbarian freedoms were in 
the past tense. He saw public opinion and the expression of nationality as being a threat 
to the freedom derived from the barbarian.  
 
The 1860s saw the nation emerge in its full ideological strength in the British 
imagination. This occurred through a long process of naturalization. This naturalization 
occurred through the nation being used across multiple aspects of social thought. In 
doing so, the nation gained a meaning beyond its early ambiguous use. The nation 
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became the means of understanding popular sovereignty that transcended time, and 
carried the barbarian into a changing world. But above all, the nation was global. All 
societies were divided into nations. The way in which the nation was used in early 
social theory placed the nation as a basic social structure in all societies. The nation was 
thus imagined as a natural primordially-modern reality.  
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